2.7. Guideline 7: When an Industry Undergoes a Trend Toward Consolidation, the Agencies Consider Whether It Increases the Risk a Merger May Substantially Lessen Competition or Tend to Create a Monopoly

The recent history and likely trajectory of an industry can be an important consideration when assessing whether a merger presents a threat to competition. The Supreme Court has explained that “a trend toward concentration in an industry, whatever its causes, is a highly relevant factor in deciding how substantial the anticompetitive effect of a merger may be.” [Endnote 40] It has also underscored that “Congress intended Section 7 to arrest anticompetitive tendencies in their incipiency. [Endnote 41] The Agencies therefore examine whether a trend toward consolidation in an industry would heighten the competition concerns identified in Guidelines 1-6.

The Agencies therefore closely examine industry consolidation trends in applying the frameworks above. For example:

Trend Toward Concentration

If an industry has gone from having many competitors to becoming concentrated, it may suggest greater risk of harm, for example, because new entry may be less likely to replace or offset the lessening of competition the merger may cause. Among other implications, in the context of a trend toward concentration, the Agencies identify a stronger presumption of harm from undue concentration (see Guideline 1), and a greater risk of substantially lessening competition when a merger eliminates competition between the merging parties (see Guideline 2) or increases the risk of coordination (see Guideline 3).

Trend Toward Vertical Integration

The Agencies will generally consider evidence about the degree of integration between firms in the relevant and related markets and whether there is a trend toward further vertical integration. If a merger occurs amidst or furthers a trend toward vertical integration, the Agencies consider the implications for the competitive dynamics of the industry moving forward. For example, a trend toward vertical integration could magnify the concerns discussed in Guideline 5 by making entry at a single level more difficult and thereby preventing the emergence of new competitive threats over time.

Arms Race for Bargaining Leverage

The Agencies sometimes encounter mergers through which the merging parties would, by consolidating, gain bargaining leverage over other firms that they transact with. This can encourage those other firms to consolidate to obtain countervailing leverage, encouraging a cascade of further consolidation. This can ultimately lead to an industry where a few powerful firms have leverage against one another and market power over would-be entrants or over trading partners in various parts of the value chain. For example, distributors might merge to gain leverage against suppliers, who then merge to gain leverage against distributors, spurring a wave of mergers that lessen competition by increasing the market power of both. This can exacerbate the problems discussed in Guidelines 1-6, including by increasing barriers to single-level entry, encouraging coordination, and discouraging disruptive innovation.

Multiple Mergers

The Agencies sometimes see multiple mergers at once or in succession by different players in the same industry. In such cases, the Agencies may examine multiple deals in light of the combined trend toward concentration.

[Endnote 40] United States v. Pabst Brewing, 384 U.S. 546, 552-53 (1966).

[Endnote 41] Phila. Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 362 (quoting Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 317).