2.2. Guideline 2: Mergers Can Violate the Law When They Eliminate Substantial Competition Between Firms
A merger eliminates competition between the merging firms by bringing them under joint control. [Endnote 17] If evidence demonstrates substantial competition between the merging parties prior to the merger, that ordinarily suggests that the merger may substantially lessen competition. [Endnote 18] Although a change in market structure can also indicate risk of competitive harm (see Guideline 1), an analysis of the existing competition between the merging firms can demonstrate that a merger threatens competitive harm independent from an analysis of market shares.
Competition often involves firms trying to win business by offering lower prices, new or better products and services, more attractive features, higher wages, improved benefits, or better terms relating to various additional dimensions of competition. This can include competition to research and develop products or services, and the elimination of such competition may result in harm even if such products or services are not yet commercially available. The more the merging parties have shaped one another’s behavior, or have affected one another’s sales, profits, valuation, or other drivers of behavior, the more significant the competition between them.
The Agencies examine a variety of indicators to identify substantial competition. For example:
Strategic Deliberations or Decisions
The Agencies may analyze the extent of competition between the merging firms by examining evidence relating to strategic deliberations or decisions in the regular course of business. For example, in some markets, the firms may monitor each other’s pricing, marketing campaigns, facility locations, improvements, products, capacity, output, input costs, and/or innovation plans. This can provide evidence of competition between the merging firms, especially when they react by taking steps to preserve or enhance the competitiveness or profitability of their own products or services.
Prior Merger, Entry, and Exit Events
The Agencies may look to historical events to assess the presence and substantiality of direct competition between the merging firms. For example, the Agencies may examine the competitive impact of recent relevant mergers, entry, expansion, or exit events.
Customer Substitution
Customers’ willingness to switch between different firms’ products is an important part of the competitive process. Firms are closer competitors the more that customers are willing to switch between their products. The Agencies use a variety of tools, detailed in Section 4.2, to assess customer substitution.
Impact of Competitive Actions on Rivals
When one firm takes competitive actions to attract customers, this can benefit the firm at the expense of its rivals. The Agencies may gauge the extent of competition between the merging firms by considering the impact that competitive actions by one of the merging firms has on the other merging firm. The impact of a firm’s competitive actions on a rival is generally greater when customers consider the firm’s products and the rival’s products to be closer substitutes, so that a firm’s competitive action results in greater lost sales for the rival, and when the profitability of the rival’s lost sales is greater.
Impact of Eliminating Competition Between the Firms
In some instances, evidence may be available to assess the impact of competition from one firm on the other’s actions, such as firm choices about price, quality, wages, or another dimension of competition. Section 4.2 describes a variety of approaches to measuring such impacts.
Additional Evidence, Tools, and Metrics
The Agencies may use additional evidence, tools, and metrics to assess the loss of competition between the firms. Depending on the realities of the market, different evidence, tools, or metrics may be appropriate.
Section 4.2 provides additional detail about the approaches that the Agencies use to assess competition between or among firms.
[Endnote 17] The competitive harm from the elimination of competition between the merging firms, without considering the risk of coordination, is sometimes referred to as unilateral effects. The elimination of competition between the merging firms can also lessen competition with and among other competitors. When the elimination of competition between the merging firms leads them to compete less aggressively with one another, other firms in the market can in turn compete less aggressively, decreasing the overall intensity of competition.
[Endnote 18] See also United States v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665, 669-70 (1964) (per curiam) (“[I]t [is] clear that the elimination of significant competition between [merging parties] constitutes an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. . . . It [can be] enough that the two . . . compete[], that their competition [is] not insubstantial and that the combination [would] put an end to it.”); ProMedica Health Sys., Inc. v. FTC, 749 F.3d 559, 568-70 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 575 U.S. 996 (2015).