2.5. Guideline 5: Mergers Can Violate the Law When They Create a Firm That May Limit Access to Products or Services That Its Rivals Use to Compete
The Agencies evaluate whether a merger may substantially lessen competition when the merged firm can limit access to a product, service, or route to market [Endnote 27] that its rivals may use to compete.
Mergers involving products or services rivals may use to compete can threaten competition in several ways, for example: (A) the merged firm could limit rivals’ access to the products or services, thereby weakening or excluding them, lessening competition; (B) the merged firm may gain or increase access to rivals’ competitively sensitive information, thereby facilitating coordination or undermining their incentives to compete; or (C) the threat of limited access can deter rivals and potential rivals from investing.
These problems can arise from mergers involving access to any products, services, or routes to market that rivals use to compete, and that are competitively significant to those rivals, whether or not they involve a traditional vertical relationship such as a supplier and distributor relationship. Many types of related products can implicate these concerns, including products rivals currently or may in the future use as inputs, products that provide distribution services for rivals or otherwise influence customers’ purchase decisions, products that provide or increase the merged firm’s access to competitively sensitive information about its rivals, or complements that increase the value of rivals’ products. Even if the related product is not currently being used by rivals, it might be competitively significant because, for example, its availability enables rivals to obtain better terms from other providers in negotiations. The Agencies refer to any product, service, or route to market that rivals use to compete in that market as a “related product.”
The Agencies analyze competitive effects in the relevant market in which the merged firm competes with rivals that use the related product. The Agencies do not always define a market around the related product, although they may do so (see Section 2.5.A.2).
2.5.A. The Risk That the Merged Firm May Limit Access
A merger involving products, services, or routes to market that rivals use to compete may substantially lessen competition when the merged firm has both the ability and incentive to limit access to the related product so as to weaken or exclude some of its rivals (the “dependent” rivals) in the relevant market.
The merged firm could limit access to the related product in different ways. It could deny rivals access altogether, deny access to some features, degrade its quality, worsen the terms on which rivals can access the related product, limit interoperability, degrade the quality of complements, provide less reliable access, tie up or obstruct routes to market, or delay access to product features, improvements, or information relevant to making efficient use of the product. All these ways of limiting access are sometimes referred to as “foreclosure.” [Endnote 28]
Dependent rivals can be weakened if limiting their access to the related product would make it harder or more costly for them to compete; for example, if it would lead them to charge higher prices or offer worse terms in the relevant market, reduce the quality of their products so that they were less attractive to trading partners, or interfere with distribution so that those products were less readily available. Competition can also be weakened if the merger facilitates coordination among the merged firm and its rivals, for example by giving the merged firm the ability to threaten to limit access to uncooperative rivals.
Rivals or potential rivals may be excluded from the relevant market if limiting their access to the related product could lead them to exit the market or could deter them from entering. For example, potential rivals may not enter if the merged firm ties up or obstructs so many routes to market that the remaining addressable market is too small. Exclusion can arise when a new entrant would need to invest not only in entering the relevant market, but also in supplying its own substitute for the related product, sometimes referred to as two-stage entry or multi-level entry.
Because the merged firm could use its ability to limit access to the related product in a range of ways, the Agencies focus on the overall risk that the merged firm will do so, and do not necessarily identify which precise actions the merged firm would take to lessen competition.
2.5.A.1. Ability and Incentive to Foreclose Rivals
The Agencies assess the merged firm’s ability and incentive to substantially lessen competition by limiting access to the related product for a group of dependent rivals in the relevant market by examining four factors.
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Availability of Substitutes
The Agencies assess the availability of substitutes for the related product. The merged firm is more able to limit access when there are few alternative options to the merged firm’s related product, if these alternatives are differentiated in quality, price, or other characteristics, or if competition to supply them is limited. -
Competitive Significance of the Related Product
The Agencies consider how important the related product is for the dependent firms and the extent to which they would be weakened or excluded from the relevant market if their access was limited. -
Effect on Competition in the Relevant Market
The Agencies assess the importance of the dependent firms for competition in the relevant market. Competition can be particularly affected when the dependent firms would be excluded from the market altogether. -
Competition Between the Merged Firm and the Dependent Firms
The merged firm’s incentive to limit the dependent firms’ access depends on how strongly it competes with them. If the dependent firms are close competitors, the merged firm may benefit from higher sales or prices in the relevant market when it limits their access. The Agencies may also assess the potential for the merged firm to benefit from facilitating coordination by threatening to limit dependent rivals’ access to the related product. These benefits can make it profitable to limit access to the related product and thereby substantially lessen competition, even though it would not have been profitable for the firm that controlled the related product prior to the merger.
The Agencies assess the extent of competition with rivals and the risk of coordination using analogous methods to the ones described in Guidelines 2 and 3, and Section 4.2.
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In addition to the evidentiary, analytical, and economic tools in Section 4, the following additional considerations and evidence may be important to this assessment:
Barriers to Entry and Exclusion of Rivals. The merged firm may benefit more from limiting access to dependent rivals or potential rivals when doing so excludes them from the market, for example by creating a need for the firm to enter at multiple levels and to do so with sufficient scale and scope (multi-level entry).
Prior Transactions or Prior Actions. If firms used prior acquisitions or engaged in prior actions to limit rivals’ access to the related product, or other products its rivals use to compete, that suggests that the merged firm has the ability and incentive to do so. However, lack of past action does not necessarily indicate a lack of incentive in the present transaction because the merger can increase the incentive to foreclose.
Internal Documents. Information from business planning and merger analysis documents prepared by the merging firms might identify instances where the firms believe they have the ability and incentive to limit rivals’ access. Such documents, where available, are highly probative. The lack of such documents, however, is less informative.
Market Structure. Evidence of market structure can be informative about the availability of substitutes for the related product and the competition in the market for the related product or the relevant market. (See Section 2.5.A.2)
2.5.A.2. Analysis of Industry Factors and Market Structure
The Agencies also sometimes determine, based on an analysis of factors related to market structure, that a merger may substantially lessen competition by allowing the merged firm to limit access to a related product. [Endnote 29] The Agencies’ assessment can include evidence about the structure, history, and probable future of the market.
Structure of the Related Market
In some cases, the market structure of the related product market can give an indication of the merged firm’s ability to limit access to the related product. In these cases, the Agencies define a market (termed the “related market”) around the related product (see Section 4.3). The Agencies then define the “foreclosure share” as the share of the related market to which the merged firm could limit access. If the share or other evidence show that the merged firm is approaching or has monopoly power over the related product, and the related product is competitively significant, those factors alone are a sufficient basis to demonstrate that the dependent firms do not have adequate substitutes and the merged firm has the ability to weaken or exclude them by limiting their access to the related product. (See Considerations 1 and 2 in Section 2.5.A.1). [Endnote 30]
Structure of the Relevant Market
Limiting rivals’ access to the related product will generally have a greater effect on competition in the relevant market if the merged firm and the dependent rivals face less competition from other firms. In addition, the merged firm has a greater incentive to limit access to the dependent firms when it competes more closely with them. Market share and concentration measures for the merged firm, the dependent rivals, and the other firms, can sometimes provide evidence about both issues.
Nature and Purpose of the Merger
When the nature and purpose of the merger is to foreclose rivals, including by raising their costs, that suggests the merged firm is likely to foreclose rivals.
Trend Toward Vertical Integration
The Agencies will generally consider evidence about the degree of integration between firms in the relevant and related markets, as well as whether there is a trend toward further vertical integration and how that trend or the factors driving it may affect competition. A trend toward vertical integration may be shown through, for example: a pattern of vertical integration following mergers by one or both of the merging companies; or evidence that a merger was motivated by a desire to avoid having its access limited due to similar transactions among other companies that occurred or may occur in the future.
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If the parties offer rebuttal evidence, the Agencies will assess it under the approach laid out in Section 3. [Endnote 31] When assessing rebuttal evidence focused on the reduced profits of the merged firm from limiting access from rivals, the Agencies examine whether the reduction in profits would prevent the full range of reasonably probable strategies to limit access. When evaluating whether this rebuttal evidence is sufficient to conclude that no substantial lessening of competition is threatened by the merger, the Agencies will give little weight to claims that are not supported by an objective analysis, including, for example, speculative claims about reputational harms. Moreover, the Agencies are unlikely to credit claims or commitments to protect or otherwise avoid weakening the merged firm’s rivals that do not align with the firm’s incentives. The Agencies’ assessment will be consistent with the principle that firms act to maximize their overall profits and valuation rather than the profits of any particular business unit. A merger may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly regardless of the claimed intent of the merging companies or their executives. (See Section 4.1)
If the merged firm has the ability and incentive to limit access to the related product and lessen competition in the relevant market, there are many ways it could act on those incentives. The merging parties may put forward evidence that there are no reasonably probable ways in which they could profitably limit access to the related product and thereby make it harder for rivals to compete, or that the merged firm will be more competitive because of the merger.
2.5.B. Mergers Involving Visibility into Rivals’ Competitively Sensitive Information
If rivals would continue to access or purchase a related product controlled by the merged firm post-merger, the merger can substantially lessen competition if the merged firm would gain or increase visibility into rivals’ competitively sensitive information. This situation could arise in many settings, including, for example, if the merged firm learns about rivals’ sales volumes or projections from supplying an input or a complementary product; if it learns about promotion plans and anticipated product improvements or innovations from its role as a distributor; or if it learns about entry plans from discussions with potential rivals about compatibility or interoperability with a complementary product it controls. A merger that gives the merged firm increased visibility into competitively sensitive information could undermine rivals’ ability or incentive to compete aggressively or could facilitate coordination.
Undermining Competition
The merged firm might use visibility into a rival’s competitively sensitive information to undermine competition from the rival. For example, the merged firm’s ability to preempt, appropriate, or otherwise undermine the rival’s procompetitive actions can discourage the rival from fully pursuing competitive opportunities. Relatedly, rivals might refrain from doing business with the merged firm rather than risk that the merged firm would use their competitively sensitive business information to undercut them. Those rivals might become less-effective competitors if they must rely on less-preferred trading partners or accept less favorable trading terms because their outside options have worsened or are more limited.
Facilitating Coordination
A merger that provides access to rivals’ competitively sensitive information might facilitate coordinated interaction among firms in the relevant market by allowing the merged firm to observe its rivals’ competitive strategies faster and more confidently. (See Guideline 3.)
2.5.C. Mergers That Threaten to Limit Rivals’ Access and Thereby Create Barriers to Entry and Competition
When a merger gives a firm the ability and incentive to limit rivals’ access, or where it gives the merged firm increased visibility into its rivals’ competitively sensitive information, the merger may create entry barriers as described above. In addition, the merged firm’s rivals might change their behavior because of the risk that the merged firm could limit their access. That is, the risk that the merger will give a firm the ability and incentive to limit rivals’ access or will give the merged firm increased visibility into sensitive information can dissuade rivals from entering the market or expanding their operations.
Rivals or potential rivals that face the threat of foreclosure, or the risk of sharing sensitive information with rivals, may reduce investment or adjust their business strategies in ways that lessen competition. Firms may be reluctant to invest in a market if their success is dependent on continued supply from a rival, particularly because the merged firm may become more likely to foreclose its competitor as that competitor becomes more successful. Firms may use expensive strategies to try to reduce their dependence on the merged firm, weakening the competitiveness of their products and services. Even if the merged firm does not deliberately seek to weaken rivals, rivals or potential rivals may fear that their access will be limited if the merged firm decides to use its own products exclusively. These effects may occur irrespective of the merged firm’s incentive to limit access and are greater as the merged firm gains greater control over more important inputs that those rivals use to compete.
[Endnote 27] A “route to market” refers to any way a firm accesses its trading partners, such as distribution channels, marketplaces, or customers.
[Endnote 28] See Illumina, Inc. v. FTC, No. 23-60167, slip op. at 17 (5th Cir. Dec. 15, 2023) (“[T]here are myriad ways in which [the merged firm] could engage in foreclosing behavior . . . such as by making late deliveries or subtly reducing the level of support services.”).
[Endnote 29] See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 328-34; Illumina, slip op. at 20-22 (“There is no precise formula when it comes to applying these factors. Indeed, the Supreme Court has found a vertical merger unlawful by examining only three of the Brown Shoe factors.” (cleaned up)); Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345, 353 (2d Cir. 1979); U.S. Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 599 (6th Cir. 1970).
[Endnote 30] See Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 328 (“If the share of the market foreclosed is so large that it approaches monopoly proportions, the Clayton Act will, of course, have been violated............................... ”). The Agencies will generally infer, in the absence of countervailing evidence, that the merging firm has or is approaching monopoly power in the related product if it has a share greater than 50% of the related product market. A merger involving a related product with share of less than 50% may still substantially lessen competition, particularly when that related product is important to its trading partners.
[Endnote 31] A common rebuttal argument is that the merger would lead to vertical integration of complementary products and as a result, “eliminate double marginalization,” since in specific circumstances such a merger can confer on the merged firm an incentive to decrease prices to purchasers. The Agencies examine whether elimination of double marginalization satisfies the approach to evaluating procompetitive efficiencies in Section 3.3, including examining: (a) whether the merged firm will be more vertically integrated as a result of the merger, for example because it increases the extent to which it uses internal production of an input when producing output for the relevant market; (b) whether contracts short of a merger have eliminated or could eliminate double marginalization such that it would not be merger-specific, and (c) whether the merged firm has the incentive to reduce price in the relevant market given that such a reduction would reduce sales by the merged firm’s rivals in the relevant market, which would in turn lead to reduced revenue and margin on sales of the related product to the dependent rivals.