Fiscal Year 2001 Accountability Report
APPENDIX H
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December 31, 2001
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL |
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THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL |
SUBJECT: |
Top Management
Challenges in the |
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Department
of Justice - 2001 List |
Attached to this memorandum is the
Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) December 2001 list of the Top
Management Challenges facing the Department of Justice (Department). We
have created this list annually, beginning in 1997 in response to a congressional
request. It is our hope that the list will aid Department managers in
developing strategies to address what we consider to be the top ten management
challenges facing the Department.
As in past years, the challenges
are not listed in order of seriousness. However, it is clear that the
top challenge facing the Department is its response to terrorism, a challenge
that we first placed on the list last year. In addition to updating management
challenges that appeared on our list in previous years, this year we have
added three new challenges ("Sharing of Intelligence and Law Enforcement
Information," "Performance Based Management," and "Department of Justice
Organizational Structure"). We combined two challenges from our 2000 submission
("INS Border Strategy" and "Removal of Illegal Aliens" have become "The
INS's Enforcement of Immigration Laws") and removed two challenges ("Prison
Overcrowding" and "Human Capital"). While the challenges we have removed
remain important issues for the Department, we try to keep our list of
challenges to ten.
We look forward to working
with the Department to address these important management challenges,
both by drawing upon findings and recommendations from past OIG reviews
and by continuing to conduct reviews in these areas.
Please contact me at 514-3435
if you have any questions or if we can assist in any way.
Management
Challenges in the Department Of Justice
December
2001
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Counterterrorism: As the events of September 11, 2001,
have illustrated, the United States faces grave threats of terrorist
attacks. The use of chemical, radiological, and nuclear weapons
remains a danger, while the use of biological agents has become
a reality. Terrorists could attempt to attack water supplies, communications,
national infrastructure, or government institutions. Advances in
computer technology and the Internet have increased the risks of
cyber-terrorism. In recognition of these threats, last year we
included for the first time the “Departmental Response to Terrorism”
as a top management challenge facing the Department of Justice (Department).
This year, as
the Department has recognized and as the Attorney General has clearly
articulated in response to the attacks of September 11, terrorism
is the most important challenge facing the Department. On November
8, 2001, when releasing the Department’s Strategic Plan for fiscal
years (FY) 2001-2006, the Attorney General stated that the fight
against terrorism was now the first and overriding priority of the
Department
Accordingly, the first objective in the Department’s Strategic
Plan for 2001-2006 is to “Protect America Against the Threat of
Terrorism.” The three strategic objectives under this goal emphasize
prevention and disruption of terrorist operations before an incident
occurs, investigation of terrorist incidents to bring perpetrators
to justice, and prosecution of individuals who have committed or
intend to commit terrorist acts against the United States. The
Strategic Plan notes the significant management challenge facing
the Department as it seeks to effectively manage its counterterrorism
program and avoid potential gaps in coverage or duplicate services
provided by state and local governments. In addition, the infusion
of billions of dollars into the Department’s efforts to combat terrorism
presents its own set of challenges.
In FY 2002, the OIG will devote significant resources to reviewing
Department programs and operations that affect its ability to respond
to the threat of terrorism. For example, we will examine the Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) use of its counterterrorism funds.
In separate audits, we will examine the mix of cases investigated
by the FBI, as well as the FBI’s management of its information technology
(IT) projects.
The OIG is currently conducting an audit that relates to the government’s
ability to respond to terrorism. Our audit reviews domestic preparedness
grants that the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) awards to state
and local entities for training and equipment to respond to acts
of terrorism. We also examine the amount of funding awarded and
whether grants are being used for their intended purpose.
The OIG has also undertaken additional program reviews and audits
in the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), whose work
is critical to deterring terrorists from entering or remaining in
the United States. For example, we have conducted follow-up reviews
on INS programs such as the Visa Waiver Program and the INS’s effort
to control the Northern Border. We also have begun reviews of how
the INS determines whether to send non-immigrants attempting to
enter the United States to secondary inspection at air ports of
entry, how the INS is handling its responsibilities to implement
an automated system to monitor foreign students in the United States,
and how the INS uses Advance Passenger Information System data to
help deter the entry of terrorists or other criminals into the United
States.
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2. |
Sharing of Intelligence
and Law Enforcement Information: One of the lessons arising
from the September 11 terrorist attacks is the critical importance
of sharing intelligence and other law enforcement information among
federal, state, and local agencies. Since September 11, the Attorney
General and the Director of the FBI repeatedly have spoken about the
importance of this issue, both to the investigation of the terrorist
attacks and in ongoing efforts to prevent future attacks.
The Department must ensure that law enforcement agencies on the
federal, state, and local levels have access to information that
could be important in helping detect and deter terrorist attacks.
The Department must also overcome any inclination by law enforcement
and intelligence agencies to keep information solely within their
agencies rather than sharing it with other law enforcement agencies.
By memorandum dated September 21, 2001, the Attorney General directed
that information exposing a credible threat to the national security
interests of the United States should be shared with appropriate
federal, state, and local officials so that any threatened act may
be disrupted or prevented. In late October, the President signed
the USA Patriot Act of 2001, which permits greater sharing
of intelligence and law enforcement information, such as information
derived from Title III intercepts, information provided to grand
juries, and information contained in criminal history databases.
However, the Department faces significant challenges in both ensuring
that these new authorities are used appropriately and in ensuring
that other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies have
access to information important to their work. An example of these
issues is the failure of the INS and the FBI to link the information
in their automated fingerprint identification systems and the consequences
of that failure. A 1998 OIG inspection in the INS entitled
“Review of the INS’s Automated Biometric Identification System”
(OIG report #I-1998-10) and a March 2000 OIG Special Report
examined how the INS handled its encounters with a Mexican national
accused of a series of murders in the United States (“The Rafael
Resendez-Ramirez Case: A Review of the INS’s Actions and the Operation
of its IDENT Automated Fingerprint Identification System”).
Nothing in the INS’s automated fingerprint identification system
(IDENT) alerted INS employees that the FBI and state and local law
enforcement were looking for Resendez in connection with a brutal
murder. The INS’s IDENT system was not linked to FBI data, and
when Border Patrol agents apprehended Resendez as he attempted to
illegally cross the border into New Mexico, the Border Patrol followed
its standard policy and voluntarily returned Resendez to Mexico.
He returned to the United States within days of his release and
murdered several more people before surrendering. This case highlighted
the failure of the INS and the FBI to develop a way to share important
criminal information about individuals. We noted the importance
of expeditiously integrating IDENT with the FBI’s Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) to enable the two systems
to share fingerprint information.
A fully integrated IDENT/IAFIS system would provide INS employees
with immediate information on whether a person they apprehend or
detain is wanted by the FBI or has a record in the FBI’s Criminal
Master File. Similarly, linking IDENT and IAFIS could provide state
and local law enforcement agencies with valuable immigration information
as part of a response from a single FBI criminal history search
request. The OIG recently issued a follow-up report (OIG Report
#I-2002-003) on the status of INS and FBI efforts to integrate the
two systems, concluding that integration has proceeded slowly and
is still years away.
The OIG also has begun an audit that will address another aspect
of information sharing. This audit assesses the procedures used
by immigration inspectors at air ports of entry to prevent inadmissible
persons from entering the United States. The OIG will analyze whether
primary and secondary inspectors have access to needed intelligence
information to prevent the entry of inadmissible persons into the
United States.
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Information Systems Planning and Implementation: OIG audits,
inspections, evaluations, and special reports continue to identify
mission-critical computer systems in the Department that were poorly
planned, experienced long delays in implementation, or did not provide
timely, useful, and reliable data. Given the critical role these
systems play in the Department’s operational and administration
programs – not to mention the vast sums of money spent on developing
and deploying these systems – information systems planning and implementation
remains a top management challenge in the Department.
For example, OIG audits have found that the INS has made huge
investments in automation technology and information systems that
have yielded questionable results. Our March 1998 audit titled
“INS Management of Automation Programs” (OIG report #98-09) disclosed
significant weaknesses in the management of the INS’s automation
initiatives. Among other things, we found that several major INS
systems were behind schedule and that the INS lacked definitive
performance measures for tracking critical project milestones.
In July 1999, we issued a follow-up review of the INS’s management
of its automation programs (OIG report #99-19), which found that
the INS continued to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on automation
initiatives without being able to explain how the money was spent
or what was accomplished.
The General Accounting Office (GAO) has raised similar concerns
in its reviews of INS IT practices. One GAO report concluded that
the INS did not have an institutional system blueprint that lays
out the organization’s current and target IT operating environment
(GAO report #AIMD-00-212). In another review, GAO determined that
the INS had not implemented practices associated with effective
IT investment and enterprise architecture management. Further,
the INS’s investments were not aligned with an agency-wide blueprint
that defines the agency’s future plans, and the INS did not know
whether its ongoing investments were meeting their cost, schedule,
and performance commitments (GAO report #02-147T). In another report,
the GAO found that the INS was managing its IT investments as individual
projects rather than as a complete portfolio and, consequently,
will not be able to determine which investments contribute most
to the agency’s mission. The GAO also found that the Department
was not guiding and overseeing the INS’s investment management approach
(GAO report #01-146).
The OIG has also reviewed individual INS technology systems and
found problems. In March 2000, the OIG issued a follow-up review
of the INS’s Passenger Accelerated Service System (INSPASS) (OIG
report #00-07), an automated system designed to facilitate the inspection
of low-risk travelers at airports. The report noted that as of
1998 the INS had spent more than $18 million to develop INSPASS
and had, since the OIG’s previous INSPASS audit in March 1995 (OIG
report #95-08), increased INSPASS reliability, usage, and performance.
However, we found that the benefits provided by INSPASS in FY 1998
were insignificant because only 1 percent of the travelers in the
six participating airports used the automated system. While INSPASS
is a small program, we concluded that the problems found there illustrated
some of the INS’s overall problems with managing its automation
initiatives.
Both the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 and the INS Data Management and Improvement Act of 2000
required the INS to develop an automated entry/exit system for use
at land, sea, and air ports of entry. The INS’s automated I-94
system was developed to meet the requirements of both laws. The
efficient use of a fully automated I-94 system could aid the INS
in identifying and tracking individuals when they enter and exit
the country. Yet, a 2001 OIG audit (OIG report #01-18) assessed
the design and implementation of the automated I-94 System and determined
that the INS has not properly managed the project. As a result,
despite having spent $31.2 million on the system from FY 1996 to
FY 2000, the INS: (1) does not have clear evidence that the system
meets its intended goals, (2) has gained the cooperation of only
two airlines and is operating the system at only four airports,
and (3) is in the process of modifying the system. Recent INS projections
estimate that an additional $57 million for this system will be
needed through FY 2005.
The OIG is currently examining the process by which the INS tracks
and monitors foreign students and exchange visitors once they enter
this country. As part of the review, OIG inspectors are examining
the INS’s implementation of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information
System, an automated information system designed to track the immigration
status of such students.
The OIG’s concerns about Department information systems are not
limited to the INS. An OIG Special Report issued in July 1999 examined
how the Department handled FBI intelligence information related
to its campaign finance investigation (“The Handling of FBI Intelligence
Information Related to the Justice Department’s Campaign Finance
Investigation”). This report raised questions about how the FBI
uses its automated databases. The Department’s Campaign Finance
Task Force used the FBI’s Automated Case Support (ACS) system and
other FBI databases to obtain information on individuals and organizations
they had under investigation. However, we found that FBI practices
and policies have handicapped the usefulness of the FBI’s databases.
For example, problems in the way information was entered or searched
in the databases, together with the way that search results were
handled within the FBI, resulted in incomplete data being provided
to the Task Force. Further, we found that many of the FBI personnel
we interviewed were not well versed in the use of the FBI’s database
systems.
In addition, the OIG’s ongoing review of the belated production
of documents in the Timothy McVeigh case will assess similar issues
related to the FBI’s automated information systems.
Due to the importance of information technology in the FBI and
the large amounts of money involved, the OIG has begun an audit
of the FBI’s management of its information technology projects.
This audit will assess: (1) how the FBI selects its IT projects,
(2) how the FBI ensures that projects under development deliver
benefits, and (3) how the FBI ensures that completed projects deliver
the expected results.
We have raised issues with other Department information technology
systems. For example, the OIG’s FY 2000 audit of the U.S. Marshal
Service’s (USMS) financial statement (OIG report #01-30), found
that implementation of the USMS Standardized Tracking, Accounting,
and Reporting System (STARS) continues to be problematic. During
FY 2000, USMS field offices were continuing to use the agency’s
Financial Management System, which was originally scheduled to be
replaced by STARS, because of delays in implementing the new system.
In FY 2001, the OIG issued an audit of the implementation of the
Collection Litigation Automated Support System (CLASS) by the Department’s
Office of Debt Collection Management (DCM). This audit (OIG report
#01-15) determined that the DCM was at least 18 months behind schedule
in implementing CLASS and had incurred more than $4.6 million in
additional costs. Moreover, DCM management could not project a
completion date and estimated additional completion costs of $400,000
per month. Delays resulted from management indecision, changes
in telecommunication requirements, and disagreements between the
DCM and the Executive Office for United States Attorneys about CLASS’s
capabilities.
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Computer Systems Security: In response to the threat to
Department computers, databases, and networks, and in recognition
of the importance of information technology, the Department has
classified computer security as a material weakness since 1991.
Recently, the House Government Reform Subcommittee on Government
Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations
gave the Department an “F” for its computer security efforts in
FY 2001, the same grade the Department received in FY 2000.
OIG audits have disclosed serious problems in computer security
that could lead to the compromise of sensitive systems and data.
The OIG conducts security assessments and penetration testing using
state-of-the-art security system software. These reviews have found
that select computer controls were inadequate to protect the systems
and their sensitive data from unauthorized use, loss, or modification.
The OIG is also conducting regular computer security audits mandated
by the Government Information Security Reform Act (GISRA), which
requires that Inspectors General audit the security of critical
information systems in their agencies. Our audits assess
the Department’s compliance with GISRA and related information security
policies, procedures, standards, and guidelines. In FY 2001, we
tested the effectiveness of information security control techniques
for nine systems (five sensitive but unclassified (SBU) and four
classified systems) at the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys,
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA), Justice Management Division (JMD), and FBI.
With respect to the five SBU systems audited, we found weaknesses
in management, operational, and technical controls, including password
management, logon management, user and account rights assignment,
file system and system configuration, and system auditing management.
With respect to the four classified systems, we found that select
computer security controls were not implemented to protect the systems
from unauthorized use, loss, or modification. We also noted weaknesses
in password and logon management, account integrity, system auditing
management, physical and personnel controls, contingency planning,
and policies and procedures. Penetration testing on three classified
systems also resulted in auditors obtaining access to the systems.
For example, on one system the auditors obtained root access allowing
them to identify user account identifications and passwords and
giving them the capability to erase, modify, or upload files.
The weaknesses found on the SBU systems are considered low to moderate
risk. Weaknesses found on the classified systems, when considered
collectively, are a moderate to high risk. Weaknesses were more
voluminous and material for the Department’s classified systems
because they had not been subject to the frequency of external reviews
as had the SBU systems. For FY 2002, the OIG intends to perform
14 GISRA audits and will conduct application reviews of the DEA’s
MERLIN and BOP’s SENTRY automated information systems.
In FY 2001, the OIG also issued a report assessing the Department’s
critical infrastructure protection planning for its computer-based
infrastructure (OIG report #01-01). This report, part of a President’s
Council on Integrity and Efficiency government-wide review of the
nation’s critical infrastructure assurance program, found that while
the Department submitted the required critical infrastructure protection
plan, it had not yet: (1) adequately identified all its mission-critical
assets, (2) assessed the vulnerabilities of each of its ADP systems,
(3) developed remedial action plans for identifying vulnerabilities,
or (4) developed a multi-year funding plan for reducing vulnerabilities.
As a result, the Department’s ability to perform certain vital missions
could be at risk from terrorist attacks or similar threats.
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5. |
The INS’s Enforcement of Immigration Laws: The INS’s enforcement
of immigration laws, particularly its ability to deter illegal immigration
and remove aliens who are here illegally, is a critical and longstanding
management challenge.
Within the INS, the Border Patrol faces significant enforcement
challenges along the southwest and northern borders to stem the
tide of illegal aliens, drugs, and potential terrorists. For example,
in last year’s list of top management challenges (December 1, 2000),
we reported on the OIG’s review of “The Border Patrol’s Efforts
Along the Northern Border” (OIG report #I-2000-004). The report
identified significant gaps in the INS’s northern border operations,
the increasing illegal activity along the northern border, and the
limited resources available to address this growing concern. In
response to a recommendation contained in the OIG report, the INS
reassessed its approach in managing risks at the northern border.
Its new approach focuses on enhancing national security and on controlling
cross-border crime activity and illegal migration while facilitating
legitimate travel and commerce. While Attorney General Reno approved
the northern border strategy in the final days of her term, one
year later the INS has not developed any implementation plan. Given
the Department’s emphasis on securing the nation’s borders post
September 11, the need for implementation of a coordinated northern
border strategy is greater than ever.
Alien smuggling remains a serious problem confronting the INS,
and the INS needs to have an effective anti-smuggling program.
However, the OIG report “Survey of INS’s Anti-Smuggling Units” (OIG
report #I-2001-03) concluded that the INS’s anti-smuggling program
operates with limited effectiveness. The review found: (1) the
program lacked coordination and direction, (2) the structure of
the anti-smuggling program is problematic, and (3) the program has
insufficient financial and personnel resources.
A May 2000 GAO report titled “Alien Smuggling Management and Operational
Improvements Needed to Address Growing Problems,” (GAO report #GGD-00-103)
reached a similar conclusion. This GAO report found that the INS’s
alien smuggling efforts have been fragmented and uncoordinated,
that the INS does not know if it is using its anti-smuggling resources
most effectively, and that it lacks an agency-wide automated tracking
system that would help prevent duplicative investigations and promote
intelligence sharing.
An OIG audit found serious problems in how the INS handles its
deferred inspection process. When additional immigration examinations
are required of individuals seeking entry into the United States,
they are sent to secondary inspection. If an immediate decision
regarding admissibility cannot be made there, INS inspectors have
the discretion to defer the inspection until a later date so that
documentary evidence – such as an existing INS file – can be reviewed.
In these cases, the individual is admitted (or “paroled”) into the
country and must report to an INS district office at a later date
to complete the inspection. A 2001 OIG audit of the INS Deferred
Inspection Program (OIG report #01-29) revealed that in our sample
nearly 11 percent (79 of 725) of the individuals paroled into
the country under the deferred inspections process failed to appear
at an INS office to complete their inspection.
This audit also found that the INS did not have adequate procedures
in place to ensure that individuals who fail to appear are either
brought in to complete their inspections or are appropriately penalized
for failing to appear. In many cases, we found that the INS did
not initiate follow-up activity of any kind. Our analysis revealed
that among those who failed to appear, INS inspectors identified
over 50 percent as either having criminal records or immigration
violations at the time of entry. Subsequent OIG inquiries of criminal
history databases revealed that nine individuals in our sample were
charged or convicted of crimes considered to be aggravated felonies
after their deferral.
Additionally, we found that the INS’s controls were inadequate
to determine the effectiveness of the deferred inspection process
or the number of individuals deferred and the outcome of those inspections.
Records maintained at airports and district offices were incomplete.
Inspectors at all nine airports we visited destroyed deferral documentation
after limited and varied retention periods. The INS’s paper-based
tracking of deferred inspections failed to provide an adequate agency-wide
system of tracking deferrals. As a result, inspectors were unable
to detect parole violators and other repeat offenders upon their
reentry into the United States.
The INS lacks an effective enforcement policy that specifically
targets the overstay population. While the INS estimates that overstays
comprise 41 percent of the illegal alien population in the
United States, INS data shows that only a small percentage of the
deportable aliens apprehended by INS investigators are overstays.
A 1996 OIG inspection found that the INS’s program to deport illegal
aliens has been largely ineffective, finding that the INS was successful
in deporting only about 11 percent of non-detained aliens after
final orders had been issued. Anecdotal information continues to
support this low percentage. In a more recent inspection (OIG report
#I-99-09), we noted that ineligible aliens, including convicted
felons, were inappropriately granted voluntary departure because
the INS and the Executive Office for Immigration Review had not
ensured that all eligibility requirements are met. We found that
the INS lacks an effective departure verification system and therefore
has no way of knowing whether illegal aliens granted voluntary departure
have left the country.
The monitoring of alien overstays and removal of criminal aliens
has been a Department material weakness since 1997. Among other
issues, the INS failed to identify many deportable criminal aliens,
including aggravated felons, or initiate Institutional Removal Program
(IRP) proceedings before they were released from prison. The Department’s
Management Controls Report for FY 2000 stated that the INS issued
new policy guidance to clarify the roles of agents working in the
IRP, developed better inmate tracking systems to identify and deport
criminal aliens, and developed new staffing models to allow the
INS to concentrate resources where they are most needed. The OIG
is currently performing an audit of the IRP to determine if past
OIG recommendations were implemented and assess whether program
enhancements can streamline the IRP process.
The OIG issued an inspection report in 2001 titled “INS’s
Escort of Criminal Aliens” (OIG report #I-2001-005). This
report found that the INS’s practice of escorting criminal aliens
on commercial airlines when the aliens are removed from the United
States to non-border countries placed the traveling public at potential
risk because the INS does not consistently follow its established
escort policy. In three of the four districts visited by the OIG,
INS managers disregarded established INS policies, resulting in
the placement of violent aliens, without escorts, on commercial
airlines.
As discussed above, the OIG is conducting several follow-up reviews
that identified issues to assess the progress made to correct deficiencies
identified by previous OIG inspections of the INS’s enforcement
efforts. The follow-up reviews concern OIG inspections on “Border
Patrol Efforts Along the Northern Border” (OIG report # I-2000-04),
“The Potential for Fraud and INS Efforts to Reduce the Risks of
the Visa Waiver Pilot Program” (OIG report #I-1999-10), “Transit
Without Visa Program Inspection” (OIG report #I-1992-07), and “INS’s
Monitoring of Nonimmigrant Overstays” (OIG report #I-1997-08).
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6. |
Financial Statements and Systems: While the
Department has made some progress in improving its financial statements
and systems, this issue remains a top management challenge. In FY
2000, the Department received an unqualified opinion on its consolidated
balance sheet and statement of custodial activity (OIG report #01-07).
However, the Department received a qualified opinion on the remaining
financial statements due to the INS’s inability to substantiate the
earned revenues offset portion of Immigration Program Costs because
of inadequate records to support the pending applications at the beginning
of the fiscal year.
Audits of the Department’s financial statements reported three
material weaknesses and one reportable condition at the consolidated
level and 15 material weaknesses and 23 reportable conditions at
the component level for FY 2000. Thus, much work still needs to
be done to eliminate the internal control weaknesses found during
the financial statement audits. Congress recognized this when the
House Government Reform Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial
Management and Intergovernmental Relations gave the Department a
“D-” for its FY 2000 financial management, the same grade it received
for its FY 1999 efforts.
Most Department components still tend to view the preparation
of financial statements as an end-of-the-year exercise they often
meet by hiring a significant number of contractors and performing
labor-intensive procedures. Because the Department lacks automated
systems to readily support financial statement preparation and ongoing
accounting operations, many tasks have to be performed manually.
One such task, the year-end count of INS applications needed to
determine deferred revenue, caused delays in processing applications.
Other problems resulted from the lack of integration between the
Department’s automated accounting systems and subsystems. Because
systems are not designed to readily produce or support information
needed to produce the financial statements, the Department’s finance
staffs had to perform additional manual reconciliation of data.
The Department’s ability to maintain or improve its audit results
will require continuation of the substantial efforts expended this
past year. Any decrease in this effort could adversely affect the
Department’s audit results.
In addition, Department components including the INS and Federal
Prison Industries, Inc., continue to encounter significant difficulties
in implementing their financial management systems. With new financial
systems needed at several components, it is imperative that the
Department overcomes these implementation difficulties in order
to continue on a path toward improving its financial management
and eventually removing this issue as a management challenge.
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7. |
Detention Space and
Infrastructure – the USMS and the INS: Obtaining and efficiently
managing detention space for the USMS and the INS – a material weakness
in the Department since 1989 – remains a top management challenge.
Both agencies continue to experience rapid growth in their use of
detention space, from an average of 43,408 beds in 1998 to a projected
64,962 beds in 2002. The INS, in particular, may need additional
detention space in light of the Department’s response to the September
11 attacks. Expanding the use of detention space also places increasing
demands on INS and USMS transportation, communications, and staff.
To obtain additional
detention space, the Department has relied on outside contractors
(including state and local governments and for-profit entities)
to house federal detainees. OIG audits of contractors for detention
space have resulted in significant dollar findings. For example,
in FY 2001 we issued an audit of an intergovernmental agreement
(IGA) for detention space with York County, Pennsylvania (OIG report
#GR-70-01-005). The audit revealed that in FY 2000, York overcharged
the Department a total of $6.1 million due to York’s understatement
of its average daily population, a key figure used to determine
reimbursement from the INS. If York uses the jail day rate determined
by our audit and the INS, the USMS, and the BOP continue to use
the same amount of jail days, the Department could realize savings
of approximately $6.4 million annually.
An OIG audit
of the IGA with the Government of Guam (OIG Report #GR-90-01-006)
found that for the period of October 1, 1998, through September
30, 2000, the Department overpaid Guam more than $3.6 million
based on the actual allowable costs and the average daily population.
In addition, the OIG found that the Department could realize annual
savings of $3.3 million by using the audited rate for future payments
Our discussions
with the Department, the INS, and the USMS disclosed considerable
disagreement regarding the nature of the agreements used to obtain
jail space from state and local governments. In our view, the Department
has not yet settled on a procurement process to obtain detention
space in a manner that meets prudent business practices and existing
procurement regulations.
Another OIG
audit (OIG report #01-16) determined that as many as 18,000 federal
detainees are held in private facilities on any given day, and the
use of these private facilities is expected to increase. We concluded
that the Department’s reliance on only a few private providers raises
concerns about the impact should one of those providers cease operations.
The OIG report noted that the BOP, the USMS, and the INS had not
developed a coordinated contingency plan to address the loss of
bed space if a private provider is unable to continue operations
on a large scale. Without coordinated contingency planning, the
disruption of contract detention services could lead to a host of
legal, health, financial, logistical, safety, and security issues.
OIG reviews
have highlighted the need for additional bed space for juveniles
detained by the INS. During an inspection of the Border Patrol’s
efforts to control illegal entries along the United States-Canada
border (OIG report #I-2000-004), the OIG was told by the Border
Patrol that most aliens apprehended by Border Patrol Agents (BPAs)
are released pending a court date because of shortages in detention
space. Aliens interviewed by BPAs along the northern border reported
that smugglers had assured them that even if they were apprehended
while being smuggled into the United States they would later be
released.
In an OIG review
titled “Unaccompanied Juveniles in INS Custody” (OIG report #I-2001-009),
the OIG examined the treatment of unaccompanied and undocumented
juveniles who are held in INS custody for more than 72 hours and
placed into formal immigration proceedings. We found deficiencies
at INS districts, Border Patrol sectors, and INS headquarters that
could have potentially serious consequences for the well being of
the juveniles. These deficiencies included lack of segregation
for non-delinquent and delinquent juveniles and lack of required
weekly visits by INS juvenile coordinators with all juveniles in
INS custody.
In FY 2002,
the OIG plans to audit the Department’s detention activities. Among
the issues of concern is the extent to which Department components
share information about detention needs in specific geographic areas
and coordinate with each other in acquiring detention space at consistent
and economical rates. In addition, we will also continue to audit
USMS and INS agreements for detention space with government and
for-profit providers, as OIG resources permit.
Finally, the
Department recently established a Detention Trustee with broad responsibilities
related to many of the problems discussed above. We are concerned
that the Detention Trustee may not have the authority or resources
to resolve the many long-standing detention issues that he is expected
to address.
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8. |
Grant Management: In recent years, the Department
has become a grant-making agency that has disbursed billions of dollars
to grantees. Among other initiatives, the grants support community
policing, encourage drug treatment programs, reimburse states for
incarcerating illegal aliens, and fund counterterrorism initiatives.
For a Department that historically had limited experience in awarding,
monitoring, and reporting on grant progress, the infusion of such
significant amounts of grant money over the past several years has
resulted in a continuing management challenge for the Department.
Overall, OIG reviews have found that many grantees did not submit
required program monitoring and financial reports and that program
officials’ on-site monitoring reviews did not consistently address
all grant conditions.For example, an OIG inspection found that some
grantees who received formula grant funds from the OJP for prison
substance abuse services needed to improve their reporting of program
implementation and their accounting for matching funds and federal
grant funds sub-awarded to state and local agencies (OIG report
#I-2000-022). We found that OJP’s administration of this grant
program could be strengthened through better monitoring and by obtaining
more timely and definitive information from grantees.
OJP provides State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP) grants
to state and local governments to help defray the cost of incarcerating
undocumented criminal aliens convicted of felonies. Our audit of
this program (OIG report #00-13) found that the five states reviewed
by the audit received overpayments for unallowable inmate costs
and ineligible inmates. The aggregate cost of these overpayments
totaled approximately $19.3 million. We also found that OJP’s methodology
for compensating applicants was over-inclusive and should be improved,
and we estimated that OJP overpaid applicants in our sample for
at least 1,760 inmates whose immigration status was “unknown.”
Several years ago, the OIG audited the management and administration
of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Grants
Program (OIG Report #99-14) to evaluate COPS’ ability to meet its
goal of adding 100,000 police officers, COPS’ and OJP’s monitoring
of grantees, and the quality of guidance provided to grantees to
assist them in implementing essential grant requirements. At the
time of the audit, we reported numerous deficiencies in the grant
monitoring of COPS grants, some of which have continued through
FY 2001. Based on our concerns, the OIG will continue to audit
individual COPS grantees to ensure the monies provided are used
for the purposes specified in the grant award (42 individual COPS
grant audits were issued in FY 2001).
In FY 2002,
the OIG is planning to perform an audit of administrative grant
activities in OJP, and between OJP and COPS, to identify functions
that can be streamlined.
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9. |
Performance Based Management:
On November 8, 2001, the Attorney General challenged the Department
to hold itself accountable through performance measures, stating
that “Performance should be measured by outcomes and results, not
inputs.” Similarly, the President’s “Management Agenda for Fiscal
Year 2002” prepared by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
demands integration of budget and performance, stating “[o]ver the
past few years the Department has seen a significant expansion in
its mission and a rapid growth in resources. Meaningful measures
supported by performance data, particularly measures of program
outcome, are essential to evaluate this investment and determine
future resource requirements.”
A pressing management challenge for
the Department is ensuring, through performance based management,
that its programs are achieving their intended purposes. The Department
received a congressional grade of “F” for its 1999 performance report
that assesses agency progress towards meeting the mandates of the
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA).
The GAO reviewed the Department’s FY 2000 performance report and
the FY 2002 performance plan to assess Department progress in achieving
selected key outcomes that were identified as important Department
mission areas. The GAO reported that the Department’s overall progress
towards achieving each of the four key outcome measures was difficult
to ascertain because the performance report generally lacked measurable
targets and lacked clear linkage between performance measures and
outcomes.
The OMB has recognized that the Department’s establishment of a
Strategic Management Council (SMC) should aid in focusing the Department’s
resources on programs that result in positive outcomes, not simply
output. The SMC is designed to provide direction and leadership
on Department strategic planning, resource management, and performance
accountability.
In a Department that has grown so rapidly over the past decade,
linking credible performance measures to budget development and
allocation of resources is a significant challenge. As a regular
part of OIG program audits, we examine performance measures for
the component or program under review. We highlight the existence
or absence of such measures and offer recommendations as to whether
the reported results are supported by reliable measurement methods
or systems. We will continue to do so with our audits.
In addition,
in FY 2002 we plan to audit the DEA’s implementation of the GPRA.
The audit will assess whether the DEA has developed quantifiable
goals that support its mission and whether the performance data
gathered to date are valid and accurate.
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10. |
Department
of Justice Organizational Structure: The Department is developing
or implementing reorganization plans in several of its components.
While some of this reorganization is related to the events of September
11, some is designed to correct long-standing organizational problems.
The challenge for Department managers is not only to ensure that the
reorganizations accomplish their intended purposes, but also to see
that the Department’s interconnected programs and functions are not
adversely impacted by the changes.
The INS has proposed
reorganizing itself into two separate but connected bureaus, one
to handle enforcement of immigration laws and one to provide services
and benefits to immigrants. Members of Congress are advocating
competing reorganization proposals, including one that would break
the INS into separate agencies to focus on enforcement and benefits
and another that would create separate bureaus but retain a single
agency structure. Among the INS’s many challenges in any such reorganization
will be to ensure that quality service is provided to eligible applicants
while reconciling competing priorities, addressing insufficient
accountability between field offices and headquarters staff, repairing
outdated IT systems, and harmonizing inconsistent operations and
policies.
OJP is reorganizing to
reduce duplication in grant programs and improve efficiency. As
mentioned previously, the OIG plans to audit OJP to assess the level
of duplication in its grant management and oversight process in
an effort to identify efficiencies.
Finally, the FBI is
reorganizing its operations and reevaluating its mission in light
of the September 11 attacks and its new priority to prevent acts
of terrorism. In December 2001, the FBI Director announced a restructuring
plan for FBI Headquarters that the FBI described as the first step
in a "phased process of reorganizing assets, modernizing and
integrating new technology, and consolidating functions."
To assist in this restructuring
effort, the OIG will review the FBI’s allocation of resources to
conduct the varied investigations under its jurisdiction. The audit
will: (1) evaluate the types and number of cases the FBI investigates,
(2) assess performance measures for FBI casework, and (3) determine
if opportunities exist for certain investigations to be handled
by other federal, state, and/or local law enforcement agencies.
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