UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PETITIONER V. FLORENCE BLACKETTER MOTTAZ,
ETC.

   No. 85-546

   In the Supreme Court of the United States

   October Term, 1985

   On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit

   Brief for the United States

                       PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

   The only parties to the proceeding are those listed in the caption.
 Respondent sought to represent a class of all similarly situated
Indians residing in the United States (J.A. 9-10).  However, the
district court dismissed the suit on statute of limitations grounds,
and it therefore did not certify a class.

            TABLE OF CONTENTS
   Parties to the Proceeding
   Opinions below
   Jurisdiction
   Statutes involved
   Questions Presented
   Statement
   Summary of argument
   Argument:
      Respondent's suit against the United States based
      on an allegedly illegal sale of her undivided
      fractional interests in the allotments 27 years before
      this suit was filed is barred by the statute of
      limitations
      I. Established principles of sovereign immunity
         strongly disfavor implied exceptions to statutes of
         limitations that Congress has imposed as conditions
         on its consent to suit against the United States
     II. The court of appeals clearly erred in holding
         that this Court's decision in Ewert v. Bluejacket
         supports the conclusion that respondent's cause of
         of action has not "accrued" for purposes of the
         federal statute of limitations because the underlying
         transaction allegedly was void
    III. This suit is in any event barred by the
         applicable statute of limitations, irrespective
         of respondent's theory of recovery
         A. Because respondent disputes the United
            States' title to the former allotments, this
            suit is subject to the Quiet Title Act and
            is barred by its 12-year statute of
            limitations
         B. Respondent's suit is barred by the six-year
            statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a)
            insofar as she seeks damages for allegedly
            unlawful conveyances of the allotments in
            1954
         C. Respondent is foreclosed from bringing
            an action under 25 U.S.C. 345 and 28 U.S.C.
            1353, which permit the district courts to
            entertain suits involving a right to an
            allotment
            1. The district court did not have jurisdiction
               under 25 U.S.C. 345 or 28 U.S.C. 1353
            2. This suit is barred by the six-year statute
               of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) even
               if jurisdiction does lie under 25 U.S.C. 345
               or 28 U.S.C. 1353
   Conclusion
   Appendix

                            OPINIONS BELOW

   The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-8a) is reported
at 753 F.2d 71, and the memorandum order of the district court (Pet.
App. 9a-11a) is unreported.

                             JURISDICTION

   The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 12a) was entered on
January 18, 1985, and a petition for rehearing was denied on April 29,
1985 (Pet. App. 13a).  On July 22, 1985, Justice Blackmun extended the
time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and
including September 26, 1985.  The petition was filed on that date,
and was granted on November 18, 1985.  The jurisdiction of this Court
is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

                           STATUTES INVOLVED

   25 U.S.C. 345 and 483, and 28 U.S.C. 1353, 2401, 2501 and 2409a,
are reproduced in relevant part at App., infra, 1a-4a.

                          QUESTION PRESENTED

   Whether either the twelve-year statute of limitations under the
Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. 2409a(f), or the six-year statute of
limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) applicable to suits against the
United States generally, bars this suit brought by an heir of an
Indian allottee against the United States to recover land to which the
United States acquired title in an allegedly unlawful transaction 27
years earlier, or to recover money damages in the amount of the
current fair market value of the land.

                               STATEMENT

   1. On December 5, 1905, three Chippewa Indian ancestors of
respondent Mottaz received allotments of land on the Leech Lake
Reservation in Cass County, Minnesota, pursuant to the General
Allotment Act of February 8, 1887, 25 U.S.C. 331 et seq., and the
Nelson Act of January 14, 1889, ch. 24, 25 Stat. 642 et seq.  The
allotments were held in trust by the United States for periods that
eventually were extended indefinitely by Section 2 of the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. 462.  Respondent inherited a
one-fifth interest in one of the allotments and a one-thirtieth
interest in each of the other two (Pet. App. 2a).

   Under 25 U.S.C. 483, the Secretary of the Interior "is authorized
in his discretion, and upon application of the Indian owners, to issue
patents in fee, to remove restrictions against alienation, and to
approve conveyances, with respect to lands or interests in lands held
by individual Indians." In the early 1950s, some of the individuals
who also owned fractional interests in the three allotments at issue
in this case requested the Department of the Interior to sell the
allotments.  Pet. App. 2a.  In May 1953, the Department's Office of
Indian Affairs sent letters to respondent pertaining to each of these
allotments, which read in part (ibid. (emphasis added)):

      Some of the owners have requested the sale of this land.  We
      have appraised both land and timber, if any, and as soon as we
      get the consent to sell, an effort will be made to obtain a
      buyer by advertising for sale bids.  This land will not be sold
      unless the high bid is equal to, or more than, the appraisal
      value.  If no reply is received from you within ten (10) days,
      it will be assumed that you have no objection to the sale.

   Respondent did not object to the sale of the allotments (Pet. App.
9a), although she also did not sign and return to the Office of Indian
Affairs a form stating that she expressly consented to the sales (id.
at 3a).  /1/ The Interior Department accepted bids for the allotments,
and in 1954, each allotment was sold to the United States Forest
Service.  /2/ The tracts now are included in the Chippewa National
Forest (ibid.).

   In 1967, respondent visited the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and
expressed a desire to sell all of her inherited land.  In its written
response to that visit, BIA identified the interests in allotments
that respondent then held.  BIA's response did not mention any
interest in the three allotments at issue here.  DX A8 (J.A. 17).  In
response to another inquiry in 1981, BIA again provided respondent
with a list of all her current interests in allotments.  BIA also
stated that respondent once had held interests in the three allotments
that were sold to the Forest Service in 1954.  However, it informed
her that those interests had been identified by BIA as so-called
"Secretarial Transfer" cases, which referred to transactions in which
not all of the heirs had consented to the conveyance of their
interests in a particular allotment.  PX 5 (J.A. 44-45).  Respondent's
interests apparently were so designated pursuant to a project the BIA
had instituted in the late 1970s in order to identify potential claims
that might be affected by the statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C.
2415, a provision applicable, inter alia, to trespass damage actions
brought by the United States on behalf of Indians.  Pet. App. 3a.  See
generally County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida II), No.
83-1065 (Mar. 4, 1985), slip op. 14-16.  /3/

   2. On December 30, 1981, respondent filed this action in the United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota (J.A. 1, 7-11).
She alleged, inter alia, that the sales of the three allotments were
made without her consent or permission and were, for that reason,
"illegal and void" (J.A. 8);  that the United States and its agents
breached their fiduciary duties and were negligent in selling the land
without obtaining her consent (J.A. 10);  and that her property was
taken for a public use without just compensation, in violation of the
Fifth Amendment (J.A. 10).  As relief, respondent sought damages in
the amount of the current fair market value of each parcel or, in the
alternative, rescission of the sales, with title to the allotments to
revest in respondent and other descendents, heirs, and assigns of the
original allottees (ibid.; Pet. App. 3a-4a).  /4/ Following a pretrial
hearing on June 6, 1982, respondent dismissed without prejudice her
demand for rescission of the sales and revesting of title in
respondent and others (J.A. 12), leaving only her demand for damages
(Pet. App. 4a).

   On October 7, 1983, the district court granted the United States'
motion for summary judgment, holding that this suit is barred by the
statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) (Pet. App. 9a-11a).
Section 2401(a) provides that "every civil action commenced against
the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is filed within
six years after the right of action first accrues." In this case, the
court held that respondent's cause of action first accrued when she
learned of the sales of the allotments.  The court found that "(t)he
deposition of the (respondent) clearly reveals that she had knowledge
of the sale in 1954," and it concluded on this basis that the suit is
time-barred under 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) (Pet. App. 10a).

   The district court also rejected respondent's argument that the
statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2415 for trespass damage actions
relating to Indian lands (see pages 3-4 & note 3, supra) overrides the
six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a).  The court
reasoned that "28 U.S.C. Section 2415 applies to actions brought on
behalf of a recognized tribe or individual Indian," not "claims
against the United States," which are governed by 28 U.S.C. 2401(a).
Pet. App. 10a-11a (emphasis in original).

   3. The court of appeals reversed and remanded (Pet. App. 1a-8a).
The court of appeals acknowledged that respondent had voluntarily
dismissed her complaint insofar as it sought rescission of the sales
and the revesting of title in respondent and others (id. at 4a), and
that she now only "seeks to obtain damages for the government's
alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary duty" (id. at 6a).  But the
court did not read this partial dismissal to constitute an abandonment
of what it took to be the "gist" of respondent's complaint:  that "the
sale of her land was illegal and void and did not transfer title" (id.
at 4a).  Instead, the court believed that "(respondent's) claim for
damages in the amount of the fair market value of the land must be
construed as equivalent to a claim for return of the land itself" (id.
at 6a).  The court believed "as a matter of policy" that because the
parcels are incorporated in an inaccessible national forest where they
have little value to respondent, she "may force the government to pay
her the fair market value of the land rather than to simply return the
land itself" (id. at 6a-7a, 8a).

   In its brief discussion of the statute of limitations issue (Pet.
App. 4a-6a), the court of appeals relied primarily on this Court's
decision in Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129, 137 (1922).  Ewert held
that the state statute of limitations did not bar a suit by an Indian
to recover land that was acquired by a non-Indian in violation of a
federal statutory prohibition.  The court of appeals acknowledged that
the parties had not identified any case that considered whether Ewert
also prevents the application to Indian land claims of federal statute
of limitations, such as the general statute of limitations in 28
U.S.C. 2401 for claims against the United States (Pet. App. 5a-6a).
However, without discussion or citation to supporting authority, the
court concluded that "Congress has not repudiated its policy of
protecting Indian land by providing that claims against the United
States for title to wrongfully alienated allotments are barred by a
statute of limitations" (id. at 6a).  Instead, the court read Ewert to
stand for the proposition that if the underlying sale of land is void,
"the concept that a cause of action 'accrues' at some point (for
purposes of the statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401 (a)) is
inapplicable because the allottee simply retains title all along"
(Pet. App. 6a).

   In remanding the case for further proceedings (Pet. App. 7a-8a),
the court held that respondent's failure to interpose an objection to
the sale of the allotments in 1953 would not in itself constitute
consent to the sale for purposes of 25 U.S.C. 483, but that if
respondent in fact received payment for her interests in the land in
1954, it "may be assumed that she consented to the sale and thus that
she does not have a cause of action" (Pet. App. 7a).  On the other
hand, the court held that "(i)f the government did not pay
(respondent), then it does not hold title to her allotments until she
receives payment equal to the fair market value of the land" (id. at
7a-8a).  The court acknowledged the government's argument that "the
payment records may be difficult if not impossible to recover and that
this is a good reason why a statute of limitations should bar
(respondent's) claim" (id. at 7a n.8).  Nevertheless, the court held
that "(t)he government must bear the burden of proving that it paid
(respondent) and therefore that it holds valid title to the (three)
allotments" (ibid. (footnote omitted)).  /5/

                          SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

                                  I.

   The fundamental rule of sovereign immunity is that the United
States cannot be sued without the consent of Congress.  This rule
applies to suits brought by Indians in the same manner as it applies
to all others.  When the legislation in which Congress consents to
suit contains a statute of limitations, the limitations provision
constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity that must
be strictly observed by the courts.  Exceptions thereto are not to be
implied.  The court of appeals failed to respect these principles in
this case.

                                 II.

   Although the court of appeals believed that respondent still is
asserting a claim of title to the three parcels of land in question,
it failed to consider the application of the Quiet Title Act (QTA) and
the 12-year statute of limitations for QTA suits.  See 28 U.S.C.
2409a(f).  The court of appeals did acknowledge that under 28 U.S.C.
2401(a), other civil actions brought against the United States in
district court are barred unless the complaint is filed within six
years of the date on which the right of action first "accrues." But
the court nevertheless held that this suit, filed 27 years after the
sale of the parcels, is not barred by 28 U.S.C. 2401(a).

   The court of appeals held that where a suit is brought by an Indian
claiming that a prior sale of his land was void, the concept that the
cause of action "accrues" at some point is inapplicable because the
allottee retains title all along.  The only authority the court of
appeals cited for this novel proposition, Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259
U.S. 129, 137 (1922), lends it no support.  The Court's holding in
Ewert that the state statute of limitations did not bar the suit was
based on the principle that under the Supremacy Clause, state-law time
bars do not apply of their own force to Indian land title claims based
on federal law.  Moreover, the court of appeals' view that a cause of
action based on a void transaction never "accrues" and therefore can
never be time-barred is inconsistent with the function of a statute of
limitations, which is to preclude a suit after passage of the
specified period of time irrespective of the merits of the claim, and
with the purpose of ensuring respose and protecting the courts and
defendants from the difficulties associated with the litigation of
stale claims.

                                 III.

   Quite aside from the error in the court of appeals' rationale for
avoiding the statute of limitations, this suit is barred irrespective
of the manner in which it is characterized.

   A. Although respondent voluntarily dismissed her demand for
rescission of the 1954 sales and revesting of title in her, the court
of appeals held that the gist of respondent's suit is that those sales
were void and that she therefore retains title to her interests in the
three parcels.  For this reason, the court believed that her demand
for a money judgment must be regarded as the equivalent of a demand
for the return of the land itself.  If the court of appeals is correct
that respondent is disputing the United States' title to the three
parcels, then this suit is governed by the QTA, because that Act is
the exclusive means for adjudicating a disputed title to real property
in which the United States claims an interest.  Block v. North Dakota,
461 U.S. 273, 286 (1983).  That the QTA is exclusive as regards suits
brought by Indians is evident from the fact that although Congress
fashioned an exception from the QTA for suits involving trust or
restricted Indian lands -- i.e., for situations in which Indian
interests are aligned with those of the United States as the defendant
-- Congress did not include any comparable exception for cases
involving an Indian plaintiff.  Moreover, although Congress granted
the United States the option of retaining the property if it pays
compensation to a prevailing QTA plaintiff, Congress did not grant the
plaintiff a similar option to demand a money judgment in lieu of the
return of the property, as the court of appeals permitted in this
case.

   Because jurisdiction over this suit lies exclusively under the QTA
insofar as respondent disputes the United States' title, it is
time-barred by 28 U.S.C. 2409a(f), which requires that a QTA suit be
brought within 12 years of the date on which it accrued.  This
limitation applies to "(a)ny civil action" brought under the QTA and
contains no exception for suits brought by Indians.  Section 2409a(f)
provides that a cause of action "shall be deemed to have accrued on
the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should
have known of the claim of the United States." In this case,
respondent knew of the sale of the property in 1954, far more than 12
years before this suit was filed, and her suit therefore is barred.

   B. Respondent also has characterized her suit as one for money
damages, based on an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the United
States in connection with the sale of her interests in 1954.
Jurisdiction over such a suit would lie under the Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. 1346(a)(2), but the district court now is barred from
exercising that jurisdiction by the six-year statute of limitations in
28 U.S.C. 2401(a).  With one exception not relevant here, Section
2401(a) applies to "every civil action" commenced against the United
States in district court.  The legislative history of the provision in
28 U.S.C. 1505 for Indian tribes to sue the United States, discussed
by this Court in United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535,
539 (1980), demonstrates that Congress intended Tucker Act suits
brought by Indians to be subject to the same conditions to which such
suits brought by other plaintiffs are subject, and the courts of
appeals have not recognized any exception from the statute of
limitations for Tucker Act suits brought by Indians.

   C. Finally, respondent has characterized her suit as one for an
allotment under 25 U.S.C. 345 and the corresponding jurisdictional
provision, 28 U.S.C. 1353.  However, those provisions by their terms
are limited to suits involving "the right of any person * * * to any
allotment of land under any law or treaty" -- i.e., to suits for an
"original allotment." F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 380
n.184 (1942).  They do not authorize a suit to recover a parcel of
land that previously was patented to an Indian in satisfaction of his
right to an allotment and then later conveyed out of trust status.

   This interpretation of the provisions now codified at 25 U.S.C. 345
and 28 U.S.C. 1353 is confirmed by the circumstances of the enactment
of the former provision in 1894 and by the legislative history of each
of four amending statutes enacted over the ensuing 17 years.  This
Court's decisions also make clear that these provisions "ha(ve)
reference to original allotments claimed under some law or treaty, and
not to disputes concerning the heirs of one who held a valid and
unquestioned allotment" (First Moon v. White Tail, 270 U.S. 243, 245
(1926)), and that "Section 345 authorizes, and provides governmental
consent for, only actions for allotment" (Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128, 142 (1972)).  Moreover, the QTA has now
displaced any right of action that might once have been available
under 25 U.S.C. 345 and 28 U.S.C. 1353 to contest the United States'
title to formerly allotted land, and the Tucker Act is the exclusive
jurisdictional basis for a damage action against the United States in
connection with such land.

   In any event, even if 25 U.S.C. 345 and 28 U.S.C. 1353 do confer
jurisdiction on the district courts to entertain a suit such as this,
respondent's suit nevertheless is barred by the six-year statute of
limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), which applies to "every civil
action" commenced against the United States in district court.

                               ARGUMENT

 RESPONDENT'S SUIT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES BASED ON AN ALLEGEDLY
ILLEGAL SALE OF HER UNDIVIDED FRACTIONAL INTERESTS IN THE ALLOTMENTS
27 YEARS BEFORE THIS SUIT WAS FILED IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS

 I. ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY STRONGLY DISFAVOR
IMPLIED EXCEPTIONS TO STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS THAT CONGRESS HAS
IMPOSED AS CONDITIONS ON ITS CONSENT TO SUIT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

   Respondent knew in 1954 of the sale by the Secretary of her
fractional interests in the three allotments, and the BIA's listing of
her holdings in 1967 confirmed that the United States no longer held
those interests in trust for her.  The court of appeals nevertheless
refused to find that this suit -- which was filed in 1981, 27 years
after the sale -- is barred by the statute of limitations.  This was
error.

   The principles that govern the statute of limitations issue in this
case are firmly established.  As the Court recently observed in
another case involving a dispute over title to land, "(t)he basic rule
of federal sovereign immunity is that the United States cannot be sued
at all without the consent of Congress." Block v. North Dakota, 461
U.S. 273, 287 (1983).  The Court there reiterated the rule that even
"(t)he States of the Union, like all other entities, are barred by
federal sovereign immunity from suing the United States in the absence
of an express waiver of this immunity by Congress." Id. at 280.  This
principle applies equally to suits by Indians.  See, e.g., United
States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980).

   "A necessary corollary of this rule is that when Congress attaches
conditions to legislation waiving the sovereign immunity of the United
States, those conditions must be strictly observed, and exceptions
thereto are not to be lightly implied." Block v. North Dakota, 461
U.S. at 287.  "When waiver legislation contains a statute of
limitations, the limitations provision constitutes a condition on the
waiver of sovereign immunity" (ibid.) and "'defines th(e) court's
jurisdiction to entertain the suit.'" Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S.
156, 160 (1981), quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399
(1976), and United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941).  See
Munro v. United States, 303 U.S. 36, 41 (1938);  Finn v. United
States, 123 U.S. 227, 233 (1887).  See also United States v. Mitchell,
463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983).  These principles weigh heavily against
recognition of implied exceptions to the statute of limitations that
Congress has imposed as a condition on its consent to suit against the
United States.  Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. at 287-288;  United
States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-118 (1979);  Soriano v. United
States, 352 U.S. 270, 275-276 (1957);  Kendall v. United States, 107
U.S. 123, 125-126 (1882).

   In this case, respondent alleges that the sale of her interests in
the former allotments to the Forest Service was void and that she
therefore retains title to those interests, and she seeks a money
judgment in the amount of the current fair market value of her
interests in lieu of the return of the land itself.  This suit
therefore is barred either by the statute of limitations under the
Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U.S.C. 2409a(f), insofar as respondent seeks
to establish her title to the allotments, or by the statute of
limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), which is applicable to other suits
brought against the United States in district court.  The former
provision states that "(a)ny civil action" brought under the QTA to
adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United
States claims an interest shall be barred unless it is commenced
within twelve years of the date upon which it "accrued." 28 U.S.C.
2409a(f).  The latter provision states that "every civil action"
commenced against the United States in district court shall be barred
unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of
action first "accrues." 28 U.S.C. 2401(a).  /6/

   The conclusion that this suit is barred by one or both of these
federal statutes of limitations is compelled, we submit, by Block v.
North Dakota, 461 U.S. at 287-290.  There it was held that the broad
language in the QTA imposing a statute of limitations on "(a)ny civil
action," and the policies of repose reflected in that provision,
require the application of the statutory bar to a suit brought by a
State in the same manner as it is applied to suits brought against the
United States by other persons.  The same reasoning requires the
application of the statutes of limitations in the QTA and 28 U.S.C.
2401(a) to those civil actions against the United States that are
brought by Indians.

   The court of appeals failed to respect these principles that govern
conditions on the waiver of sovereign immunity, including statutes of
limitations.  In fact, it did not even discuss those principles.
Instead, relying solely on Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129, 137
(1922), which held that a state statute of limitations did not bar a
suit by an Indian against a private party, the court of appeals held
that the federal statutes of limitations applicable to all civil
actions against the United States imposes no bar to this suit.  As we
demonstrate in Point II, infra, the court of appeals' reliance on
Ewert for this unprecedented holding is completely without merit.

   The court of appeals compounded its error by its failure even to
identify the particular statute that it believed gave Congress's
consent to suit in this case, by its evident confusion regarding the
relief respondent seeks, and by its misunderstanding of the effect the
nature of that relief has on the determination of which statute of
limitations applies.  But as we demonstrate in Point III, infra, this
suit is barred by the statute of limitations irrespective of how it is
characterized -- whether as (a) an action to quiet title to
respondent's interests in the former allotments that were sold to the
United States Forest Service in 1954, (b) an action to recover damages
for the allegedly illegal sales, or (c) a suit for an allotment.

 II. THE COURT OF APPEALS CLEARLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THIS COURT'S
DECISION IN EWERT V. BLUEJACKET SUPPORTS THE CONCLUSION THAT
RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAS NOT ACCRUED" FOR PURPOSES OF THE
FEDERAL STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BECAUSE THE UNDERLYING TRANSACTION
ALLEGEDLY WAS VOID

   Although the court of appeals characterized respondent's claim as
one to establish her title to the former allotments, it did not even
address the application of the QTA or the 12-year limitation on
bringing an action under the QTA.  See pages 21-27, infra.  The court
did acknowledge that, under 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), other civil actions
brought against the United States in district court are barred unless
the complaint is filed within six years of the date on which the right
of action first "accrues." /7/ But it nevertheless held that 28 U.S.C.
2401(a) imposes no bar to this suit.  In the court of appeals' view,
in a suit brought by an Indian based on a land transaction that
allegedly was void, "the concept that a cause of action 'accrues' at
some point is inapplicable because the allottee simply retains title
all along" (Pet. App. 6a).  Respondent endorses that interpretation of
28 U.S.C. 2401(a), and she argues that the same interpretation should
be given to the term "accrued" in 28 U.S.C. 2409a(f) if the Court
holds that this suit must be brought under the QTA.  See Br. in Opp.
15-16, 18.  /8/

   This novel rule, under which the application of the threshold bar
to suit would turn on the merits of the plaintiff's claim, cannot be
squared with the very premise of a statute of limitations, which is to
preclude a suit after passage of the specified period of time
irrespective of the merits of the underlying action.  Block v. North
Dakota, 461 U.S. at 291-292.  The court of appeals' rule also is
completely inconsistent with the purposes underlying such statutes of
repose:  "although affording plaintiffs what the legislature deems a
reasonable time to present their claims, they protect defendants and
the courts from having to deal with cases in which the search for
truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by
death or disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of
documents, or otherwise." United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117
(1979).  /9/ These purposes apply with full force where the
plaintiff's claim is that the prior transaction by which the defendant
purportedly acquired title is void.  Cf. Joines v. Patterson, 274 U.S.
544, 553 (1927).

   The court of appeals made no effort to reconcile its holding
regarding when a cause of action brought by an Indian "accrues" with
the purposes of statutes of limitations generally.  Nor did it point
to any support for that holding in the text, legislative history, or
judicial construction of the statutes of limitations that are
applicable to this case, 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) and 28 U.S.C. 2409a(f).
The only authority the court of appeals cited was this Court's
decision in Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129, 137 (1922).  Pet. App.
4a-6a;  see also Br. in Opp. 15-18.  But as the court of appeals
conceded (Pet. App. 4a-5a), this Court held in Ewert only that a state
statute of limitations did not bar a suit brought by an Indian to
recover land that had been sold in violation of a federal statutory
prohibition.  The Court made clear in Oneida II (slip op. 13 n.13)
that this holding in Ewert rested on the principle that under the
Supremacy Clause, state-law time bars do not apply of their own force
to Indian land title claims.  See also United States v. Ahtanum
Irrigation District, 236 F.2d 321, 334 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 988 (1957).

   The Court did not suggest in Ewert that, by virtue of the void
nature of the underlying transaction, the cause of action to recover
the land in question had not yet even accrued for purposes of the
running of the state statute of limitations if that statute did apply.
 Cf. Joines v. Patterson, 274 U.S. at 553.  Accordingly, Ewert in no
way suggests that an otherwise applicable federal statute of
limitations is without force and effect simply because the suit in
question is brought by an Indian and is based on an allegedly void
sale of land.  A fortiori Ewert furnishes no support for the court of
appeals' and respondent's efforts to avoid the explicit limitations
Congress has imposed in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) and 28 U.S.C. 2409a(f) on
the bringing of suits against the United States.  As we have explained
(see pages 13-14, supra), such a limitation on Congress's waiver of
sovereign immunity must be strictly enforced, and a court is "not free
to construe it so as to defeat its obvious purpose, which is to
encourage the prompt presentation of claims." United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117.  Yet the court of appeals' interpretation of
the term "accrues" renders the statute of limitations wholly
inapplicable, and thus powerless to encourage the prompt presentation
of claims, whenever the claim is based on an allegedly void
transaction.

   In any event, 28 U.S.C. 2409a(f) on its face forecloses the
argument advanced by respondent and the court of appeals.  That
provision specifically provides that an action under the QTA "shall be
deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in
interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States."
This provision makes clear that it is sufficient to trigger the
running of the limitations period that, as in this case, the plaintiff
knew or should have known of the United States' claim of title,
irrespective of whether that claim is valid or instead is based on a
transaction that proves to have been void.  /10/

   There is no basis for giving a substantially different construction
to 28 U.S.C. 2401(a).  That Section requires that an action be brought
within six years of when the "right of action first accrues" (emphasis
added).  The quoted language makes clear that the six-year period
begins to run from the date on which the plaintiff first has a right
to sue (Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. at 275) -- assuming that he
knew or should have known of the factual basis for his suit (cf.
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 120, 122).  The fact that the
transaction giving rise to the cause of action under Section 2401(a)
might have been void has no bearing on the plaintiff's right to sue
when he first has that knowledge.  Accordingly, the allegedly void
nature of the transaction does not prevent the "accrual" of the right
of action and the commencement of the running of the six-year
limitations period under 28 U.S.C. 2401(a).  In fact, if respondent's
right of action truly has not yet even "accrued," she presumably has
no legal right to recover and her suit is premature.  Cf. Kendall v.
United States, 107 U.S. at 125.  That obviously is not her position,
or that of the court of appeals.

   In sum, the only authority cited by the court of appeals -- Ewert
v. Bluejacket, supra -- offers no support whatever for its holding
that respondent's right of action has not accrued and that this suit
is not barred by the statute of limitations.  Nor is there any other
support for this novel theory, on which the court of appeals' decision
is entirely based.

 III. THIS SUIT IS IN ANY EVENT BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS, IRRESPECTIVE OF RESPONDENT'S THEORY OF RECOVERY

   For the reasons stated in Point II, supra, the court of appeals'
unprecedented rationale for holding that this suit is not barred by
the statute of limitations is wholly without merit.  In her brief in
opposition, respondent has advanced several other arguments in defense
of the judgment below.  As we shall explain, however, this suit is
barred irrespective of the manner in which respondent characterizes
it.

 A. Because Respondent Disputes The United States' Title To The Former
Allotments, This Suit Is Subject To The Quiet Title Act And Is Barred
By Its 12-Year Statute of Limitations

   Respondent voluntarily dismissed the complaint in this suit insofar
as it sought rescission of the 1954 sales of the three allotments and
the revesting of title in respondent and the other heirs of the
original allottees.  This left only her claim for money damages.
Respondent's remaining suit for damages would appear to be one arising
under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2).  See pages 28-32, infra.

   The court of appeals, however, elected not to read respondent's
partial dismissal as an abandonment of her basic contention that sale
of the parcels without her consent was void and that she therefore
retains title to the land (Pet. App. 4a, 6a).  Instead, it believed
that the claim for damages should be construed as the equivalent of a
claim for return of the land itself (id at 6a-7a).  The court believed
that "(i)n light of the land's inclusion within the Chippewa National
Forest and the thirty years which have passed since the sale," if
respondent's claims have merit, "she may force the government to pay
her the fair market value of the land rather than to simply return the
land itself" (id. at 8a).  If the court of appeals is correct that
respondent's complaint still should be construed to assert a claim of
title to the three former allotments, then this suit necessarily
arises under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. 2409a, and it is barred by
the 12-year statute of limitations in that Act.  /11/

   1. In the Quiet Title Act (QTA), Congress consented, with certain
exceptions to the naming of the United States as a party defendant in
a civil action "to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in
which the United States claims an interest, other than a security
interest or water rights." 28 U.S.C. 2409a(a).  This Court held in
Block v. North Dakota that "Congress intended the QTA to provide the
exclusive means by which adverse claimants could challenge the United
States' title to real property." 461 U.S. at 286 (footnote omitted).
The Court applied this rule in Block to hold that a State may bring an
action only under the QTA to establish its title to real property in
which the United States claims an interest, and that the conditions on
bringing an action under the QTA -- including its 12-year statute of
limitations -- cannot be avoided by resorting to another form of
action.  461 U.S. at 280-286.  So, too, the QTA is the exclusive means
by which an Indian may bring an action, such as the instant suit, that
challenges the United States' title to real property.

   Indeed, Congress specifically focused on Indians when it enacted
the QTA, yet did not fashion an exception for suits brought by
Indians.  The QTA expressly "does not apply to trust or restricted
Indian lands" (28 U.S.C. 2409a(a) ).  /12/ That language was intended
to prevent "(a) unilateral waiver of the defense of sovereign
immunity" as to land that the United States holds in trust for
Indians;  it thereby serves to protect the United States and the
Indian beneficiaries from litigation and adverse claims by others and
to preserve the committments the United States has made to the Indian
people.  Dispute of Titles on Public Lands:  Hearing on S.216, S.579
and S.721 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the Senate Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1971)
(hereinafter cited as QTA Hearing).  See Block v. North Dakota, 461
U.S. at 283, 285, S. Rep. 92-575, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971);  H.R.
Rep. 92-1559, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 2d Sess. 10-11 (1972).  In
other words, this language excludes from Congress's waiver of
sovereign immunity those cases in which the Indians' interests are
aligned with those of the United States as a defendant.  The exception
does not encompass suits brought by an Indian as a plaintiff to
challenge the United States' title to real property that the
government does not ostensibly hold in trust for the Indians, but
instead holds for other purposes (such as the National Forest in this
case).  See, e.g., Grosz v. Andrus, 556 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1977).  Cf.
Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, No. 82-629 (May 29,
1984), slip op. 8-12.  The absence of any such exception for suits
brought by Indians reinforces the conclusion that such suits are
within the scope of the QTA.  As a result, an Indian plaintiff is
treated the same as any other person who has a claim adverse to that
of the United States, and the QTA accordingly is the Indian's
exclusive avenue of relief.  /13/

   For the foregoing reasons, the court of appeals erred in failing to
conclude that this suit is subject to the QTA.  The court of appeals
also erred in holding that where the plaintiff disputes the United
States' title to land and seeks to establish his own title, he may
force the United States to pay him compensation in the amount of the
full market value of the land, rather than to return the land.  Under
the QTA, if the final determination of title is adverse to the United
States, the United States is expressly given the right to retain
possession, upon payment to the plaintiff of the amount the district
court finds to be just compensation, rather than to be disturbed in
its possession.  28 U.S.C. 2409a(b).  Affording this "discretionary
option" to the government was intended "to insure that the waiver (of
sovereign immunity) would not 'serve to disrupt costly ongoing Federal
programs that involve the disputed lands'" (Block v. North Dakota, 461
U.S. at 283, quoting QTA Hearing 2, 19).  Congress did not, however,
confer on the QTA plaintiff who prevails on his claim of title a
parallel right to insist upon the payment of compensation rather than
the return of the land.  This omission from the "precisely drawn" and
"detailed" provisions of the QTA (Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. at
285) indicates that Congress deliberately withheld that option from
the plaintiff.  See United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 208
(1982).  /14/

   2. If, as we submit, jurisdiction over this case lies exclusively
under the QTA insofar as respondent seeks to establish her title to
and recover her interests in the former allotments (or to obtain a
money judgment in lieu of recovering the property interests), then the
suit is barred by the 12-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C.
2409a(f) for actions brought under the QTA.

   The Court held in Block v. North Dakota that a State, like any
other party who wishes to take advantage of the waiver of sovereign
immunity in the QTA, must comply with the statute of limitations in 28
U.S.C. 2409a(f), which requires that a suit under the QTA shall be
barred unless it is brough within 12 years of the date on which it
accrued.  In concluding that suits brought by States are covered by
this statutory condition, the Court relied on the all-inclusive
statutory language that imposes a limitation on the bringing of "(a)ny
civil action" under the QTA;  the absence of any indication in the
legislative history that suits brought by States were meant to be
excluded;  and the necessarily uniform policy of repose embodied in
the limitations period to protect the national public interest.  461
U.S. at 287-290.  These same considerations require the conclusion
that the generally applicable federal statute of limitations in 28
U.S.C. 2409a(f) also applies to a suit brought by an Indian against
the United States to adjudicate a disputed title to real property.
See Grosz v. Andrus, 556 F.2d 972, 974-975 (1977).  Cf. FPC v.
Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 115-124 (1960).

   Section 2409a(f) provides that an action under the QTA "shall be
deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in
interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States."
In this case, the district court found that respondent knew of the
sales in 1954 (Pet. App. 10a).  This suit, which was commenced in
1981, more than a quarter of a century later, therefore is clearly
barred by the 12-year statute of limitations under the QTA.

 B. Respondent's Suit Is Barred By The Six-Year Statute Of Limitations
In 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) Insofar As She Seeks Damages For Allegedly
Unlawful Conveyances Of The Allotments In 1954

   Respondent also has characterized her suit as one seeking money
damages for a breach of fiduciary duty by the United States based on
allegedly unlawful sales of the allotments in 1954 without her
consent.  See J.A. 8, 10;  Br. in Opp. 9-12;  Pet. App. 6a.  She
argues that the district court has jurisdiction over such a damages
claim under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2), by virtue of this
Court's decisions in United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 445 U.S.
535 (1980) and United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206
(1983).  See Br. in Opp. 7-12;  J.A. 7.  /15/

   We agree that the Tucker Act would furnish a basis of jurisdiction
over a damage action such as this.  /16/ However, the district court
now is barred from exercising that jurisdiction by the six-year
statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), which respondent concedes
(Br. in Opp. 17) is applicable to a Tucker Act suit brought in
district court.  Section 2401(a) provides that, except as provided
under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, "every civil action commenced
against the United States shall be barred unless the complaint is
filed within six years after the right of action first accrues." Just
as the broad reference in the QTA's statute of limitations to "(a)ny
civil action" includes actions filed by Indians, so too the broad
reference in Section 2401(a) to "every civil action" includes a suit
filed by an Indian -- here, a suit under the Tucker Act for money
damages.

   There is no indication that Congress contemplated an implied
exception from the plain language of Section 2401(a) for a Tucker Act
suit brought by an Indian.  To the contrary, in Mitchell I, this Court
recognized the intent of Congress to treat Indians and non-Indians
alike under the Tucker Act.  There, the Court considered 28 U.S.C.
1505, which granted the Court of Claims (now the Claims Court)
jurisdiction over any claim for money damages against the United
States by an Indian tribe.  The Court quoted the legislative history
of the provision, which stated that the tribal claimants "'are to be
entitled to recover in the same manner, to the same extent, and
subject to the same conditions and limitations, and the United States
shall be entitled to the same defenses, both at law and in equity, * *
* as in cases brought in the Court of Claims by non-Indians under (28
U.S.C. 1491).'" 445 U.S. at 539 (emphasis added), quoting H.R. Rep.
1466, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1945).  In particular, it was intended
that such Indian tribal claims would be governed by the six-year
statute of limitations in what is now 28 U.S.C. 2501, which is
applicable to all Tucker Act suits in the Claims Court under 28 U.S.C.
1491.  Creation of Indian Claims Commission:  Hearings on H.R. 1198
and H.R. 1341 Before the House Comm. on Indian Affairs, 79th Cong.,
1st Sess. 149 (1945) (section-by-section analysis submitted by Felix
Cohen).  See Lindahl v. OPM, No. 83-5954 (Mar. 3, 1985), slip op. 18.
/17/ It follows a fortiori that Tucker Act claims brought in the
Claims Court by individual Indians, which arise directly under 28
U.S.C. 1491, are likewise governed by the six-year statute of
limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2501.

   Correspondingly, the Court of Claims and Federal Circuit uniformly
have held that suits for money damages brought by Indian tribes or
individual Indians against the United States are subject to the
six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2501.  In so holding,
those courts have rejected the proposition that the existence of a
fiduciary or trust relationship between the United States and the
Indians with respect to the property in question rendered the statute
of limitations inapplicable.  See, e.g., Menominee Tribe v. United
States, 726 F.2d 718, 721-722 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, No.
83-1922 (Oct. 1, 1984);  Hydaburg Co-Op Ass'n v. United States, 667
F.2d 64, 69-70 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 905 (1982);
Fort Mojave Tribe v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. 727, 728 (1976);
Andrade v. United States, 485 F.2d 660, 664 (Ct. Cl. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 831 (1974);  Capoeman v. United States, 440 F.2d 1002
(Ct. Cl. 1971).  /18/ In light of this consistent interpretation,
there is no reason why an implied exception to the parallel six-year
statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) should be recognized for
suits brought by Indians.  And in fact no such exception has been
recognized.  See Loring v. United States, 610 F.2d 649, 650 (9th Cir.
1979);  Christensen v. United States, 755 F.2d 705, 706-707 (9th Cir.
1985), petition for cert. pending, No. 85-372;  Big Spring v. United
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 767 F.2d 614, 616-617 (9th Cir.
1985).

 C. Respondent Is Foreclosed From Bringing An Action Under 25 U.S.C.
345 And 28 U.S.C. 1353, Which Permit The District Courts To Entertain
Suits Involving A Right To An Allotment

   In addition to relying on 28 U.S.C. 1346, which confers
jurisdiction on the district courts over Tucker Act and QTA suits (28
U.S.C. 1346(a)(2) and (f)), respondent also alleged that the district
court had jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. 345 and 28 U.S.C. 1353 (J.A.
7).  As we explain below, these provisions do not furnish a basis for
jurisdiction in this case.  But even if they did, respondent's suit
would be barred by the six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C.
2401(a) that is applicable to "every civil action commenced against
the United States" in district court.

 1. The District Court Did Not Have Jurisdiction Under 25 U.S.C. 345
Or 28 U.S.C. 1353

   The two statutory provisions pertaining to allotments upon which
respondent relies were intended to confer jurisdiction on the district
courts only with respect to suits for an "original allotment." F.
Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 380 n.184 (1942).  This case,
however, presents no question of a right to receive an original
allotment of reservation land under the General Allotment Act or the
Nelson Act;  the parcels in which repsondent now claims an interest
were allotted to the original allottees, respondent's ancestors, in
1905 (Pet. App. 5a).  The parcels then were sold by the Secretary
almost 50 years later.  Respondent contends that those sales were
unlawful, and she seeks to establish her title to the allotments and
obtain a money judgment in lieu of their return.  A district court has
no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 345 and 28 U.S.C. 1353 over such a
suit, because those statutory provisions do not extend to a challenge
to the administration or disposition of a parcel of land after it has
been allotted.  And at least since the passage of the QTA, those
provisions also do not confer jurisdiction over a suit to adjudicate a
disputed title to a previously allotted parcel in which the United
States claims an interest in a capacity other than that of trustee for
the Indians concerned.

   1. The statute upon which respondent principally relies, 25 U.S.C.
345, provides in relevant part:

         All persons who are in whole or in part of Indian blood or
      descent who are entitled to an allotment of land under any law
      of Congress, or who claim to be so entitled to land under any
      allotment Act or under any grant made by Congress, or who claim
      to have been unlawfully denied or excluded from any allotment or
      any parcel of land to which they claim to be lawfully entitled
      by virtue of any Act of Congress, may commence and prosecute or
      defend any action, suit, or proceeding in relation to their
      right thereto in the proper district court of the United States;
       and said district courts are given jurisdiction to try and
      determine any action, suit, or proceeding * * * involving the
      right of any person * * * to any allotment of land under any law
      or treaty * * *;  and the judgment or decree of any such court
      in favor of any claimant to an allotment of land shall have the
      same effect, when properly certified to the Secretary of the
      Interior, as if such allotment had been allowed and approved by
      him(.)

   In a number of respects this provision on its face is limited to a
suit by an Indian to establish his right to receive an allotment from
the Secretary.  First, it refers to an Indian who is "entitled to an
allotment," who claims to be so entitled, or claims to have been
"unlawfully denied or excluded from any allotment or any parcel of
land" to which he is entitled under an Act of Congress.  All of these
phrases would appear to refer to a person who is claiming a right
under an Act of Congress to participate, along with other members of
the tribe concerned, in the Secretary's initial dividing up of the
reservation is severalty.  Moreover, the jurisdictional grant is
specifically limited to those suits "involving the right of any person
* * * to any allotment." This language does not encompass a plaintiff,
such as respondent in this case, who is seeking to recover a parcel of
land that previously was patented to an Indian in satisfaction of his
right to an allotment and then conveyed out of trust status.

   The interpretation of 25 U.S.C. 345 just suggested is reinforced by
two features of its concluding clause.  First, that clause refers to a
"claimant to an allotment," which likewise connotes a person claiming
an entitlement to receive an allotment from the Secretary in the first
instance.  Second, it provides that the court's judgment in a suit
under 25 U.S.C. 345, when certified to the Secretary, shall have the
same effect "as if such allotment had been allowed and approved by
him." As the General Allotment Act makes clear, an allotment is
"allowed and approved" by the Secretary as part of the initial
division and assignment of reservation land to individual Indians.
See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 142
(1972).  /19/ The judgment the plaintiff seeks in a suit under 25
U.S.C. 345 therefore is the equivalent of an order directing the
Secretary to take the steps necessary for the issuance of a patent.
By contrast, in a suit brought by an Indian to recover a previously
alloted parcel of land that was sold by the United States, the
recovery of possession of the land and the confirmation of equitable
title in the Indian is not the equivalent of an original allotment of
the parcel.

   2. The interpretation of 25 U.S.C. 345 suggested by its plain
language (which does not encompass this suit) is confirmed by its
origins and by the legislative history of several amendatory acts.
Section 345 is derived from the Act of August 15, 1894, ch. 290, 28
Stat. 305, an Act appropriating money for the conduct of Indian
affairs.  The paragraph immediately preceding the predecessor to 25
U.S.C. 345 appropriated money to allow the President to survey Indian
lands "and to complete the allotment of the same" pursuant to the
General Allotment Act of 1887.  See 28 Stat. 304-305.  The quoted
phrase indicates that the term "allotment" was understood to refer to
the process of assigning parcels to individuals, which would be
"complete(d)" within a discrete period of time.  The most reasonable
construction of the succeeding paragraph, the present 25 U.S.C. 345,
is that it was intended only to resolve disputes concerning the
entitlement of individual Indians that might arise during that
transitional process of division and assignment.  In other words, as
one court construing the Act soon after enactment explained, it was
intended "to settle the rights of parties seeking allotments in
severalty" and "was adopted for the purpose of affording to claimants
who were refused recognition by the land department the opportunity to
litigate their rights before a judicial tribunal." Sloan v. United
States, 95 F. 193, 195 (C.C.D. Neb. 1899), appeal dismissed, 193 U.S.
614 (1904).

   At every step, the subsequent history of 25 U.S.C. 345 confirms
this limited scope:

   a. The committee reports on the Act of February 6, 1901, ch. 217,
31 Stat. 760 et seq., which amended the 1894 Act to provide for a
manner of securing service in suits arising under it, stated that the
1894 Act "authorize(d) the institution of suits or proceedings in the
circuit court (now the district court) of the United States by
claimants for allotments of Indian land." H.R. Rep. 1714, 56th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1901) (emphasis added);  S. Rep. 2040, 56th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1901).  There was no suggestion that Congress intended to
consent to suits by Indians against the United States with respect to
other matters that might arise after the original claimants had
obtained their allotments, as in this case.

   b. In 1906, Congress excepted the Osage Indians from the coverage
of the 1894 Act in a manner that is directly relevant to the
interpretation of the present 25 U.S.C. 345.  See Act of June 28,
1906, ch. 3572, Section 1, 34 Stat. 540;  United States ex rel. Jump
v. Ickes, 117 F.2d 769 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 575
(1941).  Section 1 of the 1906 Act provided that the roll of the Osage
Tribe that was then shown on the records of the United States was to
be regarded as the final roll, although Section 1 permitted the
Secretary to revise that roll in certain respects.  Section 2 of the
1906 Act provided for the selection of allotments by members of the
Osage Tribe, with all controversies to be settled by a Commission
consisting of three members of the Tribe.  34 Stat. 541.  Section 1 of
the 1906 Act further stated that the provisions of the 1894 Act
"granting persons of Indian blood who have been denied allotments the
right to appeal to the courts, are hereby repealed as far as the same
relate to the Osage Indians" (34 Stat. 540;  25 U.S.C. 345 note
(emphasis added)).  Congress thus placed in statutory form an
interpretation of the 1894 Act that limits its reach to suits by
Indians who were "denied allotments" by the Secretary.  This
interpretation also is evident from the fact that Congress believed
the 1894 Act would be unnecessary for the Osage Indians because all
matters pertaining to the allotment process were to be resolved by the
special Osage Commission.  Congress therefore obviously did not
contemplate that an Indian would have occasion to invoke that statute
after he received his allotment.

   c. This same understanding is reflected in the text and legislative
history of the 1911 revision of the judicial code, which, inter alia,
vested jurisdiction to entertain suits under 25 U.S.C. 345 in the
district courts, rather than the circuit courts, as under the 1894
Act.  See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, Section 291, 36 Stat. 1167.
Consistent with this action, Congress included in the section of the
judicial code that contained the various jurisdictional grants to the
district courts a grant of jurisdiction "(o)f all actions, suits, or
proceedings involving the right of any person, in whole or in part of
Indian blood or descent, to any allotment of land under any law or
treaty." Section 24(24), 36 Stat. 1094 (emphasis added).  As we have
explained (see page 35, supra), the emphasized language, which was
drawn directly from the jurisdictional grant in the 1894 Act, connotes
a suit to obtain an allotment in the first instance.

   Moreover, the cases that had arisen under the 1894 Act by the time
of the 1911 revision of the judicial code involved questions of an
Indian's entitlement to receive an allotment or disputes between
several Indians claiming a right to an allotment of the same parcel of
land.  /20/ One such case was cited in the legislative history.  See
S. Rep. 388, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 1, at 62 (1910), citing Smith v.
He-Yu-Tse-Mil-Kin, 110 F. 60 (C.C.D. Or. 1901), aff'd, 194 U.S. 401
(1904).  Because the jurisdictional grant enacted in 1911 (the present
28 U.S.C. 1353) was "but a codification" of the then-existing
jurisdictional grant in the 1894 Act (First Moon v. White Tail, 270
U.S. 243, 245 (1926)), the background of its enactment indicates that
both 25 U.S.C. 345 and 28 U.S.C. 1353 are to be understood to be
confined to such suits.

   d. Finally, an amendment to the new judicial code enacted shortly
thereafter reflects the same view of the jurisdictional provision.  As
originally enacted in March 1911, that provision did not contain the
exception in the 1894 Act for lands held by the Five Civilized Tribes
or the Quapaw Indian Agency.  Compare 28 Stat. 305 with 36 Stat. 1094.
 Congress quickly corrected that omission in the Act of December 21,
1911, ch. 5, 37 Stat. 46 et seq.  "The original act did not apply to
the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians nor the Quapaw Agency, for the
reason that the determination of allotments was contemplated to be
exercised by the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes" (48 Cong.
Rec. 576 (1911)).  /21/ Congress feared that the omission of a
parallel exception from the jurisdictional provision enacted in March
1911 might "lead to extended litigation and delay the settlement of
the affairs of the Five Civilized Tribes for some years to come." S.
Rep. 147, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1911).  As in the case of the Osage
Tribe (see page 38, supra), Congress's conclusion that the
jurisdictional grants in 25 U.S.C. 345 and 28 U.S.C. 1353 were
unnecessary after the allotment process for the Five Civilized Tribes
was completed by the Dawes Commission further demonstrates that
Congress did not intend a role for those provisions with respect to
Indians who already had received an allotment.

   Moreover, the House Report on the Act of December 21, 1911 stated
that "(t)he plain intention of (the 1894 Act) was to authorize any
person claiming to be entitled to receive an allotment to prosecute
his claim" (48 Cong. Rec. 576 (1911) (emphasis added)).  The report
further observed that the obvious purpose of the revision of the
judicial code in March 1911 was to give the district courts the same
jurisdiction theretofore exercised by the circuit courts.  However,
the report noted that the language used was "ambiguous," and it
explained that the amended version of the jurisdictional grant
conformed to the 1894 Act by providing "a remedy to any claimants for
an allotment alleged to be unlawfully denied" (ibid. (emphasis
added)).  Thus, whatever ambiguity might previously have existed,
Congress made clear when it enacted the Act of December 21, 1911 (as
it had before) that the provisions now contained in 25 U.S.C. 345 and
28 U.S.C. 1353 were intended to confer jurisdiction only over suits to
obtain an original allotment that the Secretary had improperly
withheld.

   3. This Court's decisions reflect the same view of 25 U.S.C. 345
and 28 U.S.C. 1353.  In First Moon v. White Tail, supra, the Court
held that the present 28 U.S.C. 1353 did not confer jurisdiction on
the district court to entertain an action brought against the United
States and an heir of the original allottee by another Indian who also
claimed to be an heir of the allottee but who had been determined by
the Secretary not to be entitled to an interest in the allotment.  The
Court explained that the statutory provision "has reference to
original allotments claimed under some law or treaty, and not to
disputes concerning the heirs of one who held a valid and unquestioned
allotment." 270 U.S. at 245.  Similarly, in Arenas v. United States,
322 U.S. 419, 430 (1944), the Court observed that under 25 U.S.C. 345,
"the courts have decided disputes between Indians and the Government
as to the relative qualifications of two claimants to receive, as a
member of a band, a patent, Hy-Yu-Tse-Mil-Kin v. Smith, 194 U.S. 401,
and whether particular lands were appropriate for allotment, United
States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446 ((1924))." See also Halbert v. United
States, 283 U.S. 753, 755 (1931).

   Most recently, in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. at 142, the Court said of 25 U.S.C. 345:

      This, however, is an allotment statute.  Allotment is a term of
      art in Indian law.  U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Federal Indian
      Law 774 (1958).  It means a selection of specific land awarded
      to an individual allottee from a common holding.  Reynolds v.
      United States, 174 F. 212 (CA8 1909).  See the Act of February
      8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388, as amended, 25 U.S.C. Sections 331-334.
      Section 345 authorizes, and provides governmental consent for,
      only actions for allotment.

   The Court cited for this proposition not only First Moon and
Arenas, but also two court of appeals decisions holding that 25 U.S.C.
345 is limited to suits to determine the right of an Indian to an
allotment and "gives no general consent of the United States to be
sued even in connection with its administration of allotments" (United
States v. Preston, 352 F.2d 352, 355-356 (9th Cir. 1965);  Harkins v.
United States, 375 F.2d 239, 241 (10th Cir. 1967)).

   Against this background, it is clear that 25 U.S.C. 345 and 28
U.S.C. 1353 permit suits only "for an original allotment." F. Cohen,
Handbook of Federal Indian Law 380 n.184 (1942).  Respondent does not
advance a claim in this case for an "original allotment." Rather, she
seeks to establish her title to three parcels that were conveyed out
of trust status after their allotment and to recover a money judgment
from the United States in lieu of recovering her interests in those
parcels.  Her claims therefore arise "in connection with (the
government's) administration of (the) allotments" (United States v.
Preston, 352 F.2d at 356) -- namely, the Secretary's sale of those
parcels, allegedly without her consent and in violation of 25 U.S.C.
483 and other statutory provisions.  This suit therefore is not within
the jurisdictional grant in 25 U.S.C. 345 or 28 U.S.C. 1353.  /22/

   4. Although the narrow scope of 25 U.S.C. 345 and 28 U.S.C. 1353
appears evident, it is not necessary in this case conclusively to
resolve the precise nature of the cause of action and jurisdictional
grant in those statutory provisions, particularly as against private
parties.  This is so because respondent does not in any event have a
right of action against the United States under these provisions in
the circumstances of this case.

   Insofar as respondent disputes the title to the three parcels
acquired by the United States in 1954, it now is irrelevant whether
respondent might have brought such an action under 25 U.S. 345 and 28
U.S.C. 1353 prior to the enactment of the QTA in 1972.  As this Court
held in Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. at 284-286, the QTA is now the
exclusive means by which any person, including an Indian, may obtain
an adjudication of a disputed title to land in which the United States
claims an interest.  See Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. at 284-286.
If the result were otherwise, all of the "carefully crafted provisions
of the QTA deemed necessary for the protection of the national public
interest" -- including the QTA's 12-year statute of limitations --
"could be averted." 461 U.S. at 284-285.  /23/ Moreover, under the
court of appeals' view that respondent's demand for a money judgment
in the amount of the current fair market value of her interests in the
three parcels is to be viewed as the equivalent of a demand for the
return of the property, that aspect of respondent's suit also is
subject to the QTA and, for that reason alone, cannot be brought under
25 U.S.C. 345 and 28 U.S.C. 1353.  /24/

   Nor, in our view, do 25 U.S.C. 345 and 28 U.S.C. 1353 furnish a
basis of jurisdiction or a substantive right to money damages against
the United States for breach of a fiduciary duty in connection with
the administration of allotted lands -- such as the alleged sale in
1954 of the three previously allotted parcels involved in this case.
See Vicenti v. United States, 470 F.2d 845, 847-848 (10th Cir. 1972);
Harkins v. United States, 375 F.2d 239, 241 (10th Cir. 1967).  A
waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity to a suit for money
damages must be express.  Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 212.  Nothing in
the language of 25 U.S.C. 345 suggests the availability of money
damages.  To the contrary, that section prescribes a specific remedy
of a wholly different sort:  the judgment in favor of the claimant has
the same effect, when certified to the Secretary, as if the allotment
had been allowed and approved by the Secretary.  The prescription of
this remedy, in the nature of declaratory judgment, substantially
undermines any argument that 25 U.S.C. 345 mandates the payment of
compensation.  Compare Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 217.  /25/ Nor is
there any indication in the legislative history of the predecessor
statutes or 28 U.S.C. 1353 of an intent to expose the government to
monetary liability.  For these reasons, if any statute creates a
substantive right to money damages in this case, it is not 25 U.S.C.
345, but 25 U.S.C. 483 or other statutory provisions that bar the sale
of an allotment if not authorized by Congress.  See, e.g., 25 U.S.C.
348, 464.  A suit to recover damages from the United States under
those provisions, like such a damage action arising under any other
Act of Congress, can be brought in district court only under the
Tucker Act.

   That the Tucker Act is the exclusive basis for respondent's damages
action is evident from the text of the Tucker Act itself, which grants
the district courts jurisdiction over civil actions against the United
States, not exceeding $10,000 in amount, that are "founded * * * upon
* * * any Act of Congress" (28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2) (emphasis added)).
The Tucker Act thus was intended to be a "'comprehensive measure by
which claims against the United States may be heard and determined."
Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 213, quoting H.R. Rep. 1077, 49th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1886).  Moreover, in Mitchell I and Mitchell II, the
plaintiffs sought to recover money damages based on violations of
fiduciary duties imposed by various statutes governing the
administration of allotments, and that suit was brought under the
Tucker Act.  Respondent similarly asserts (Br. in Opp. 10-12) that the
Secretary's actions in this case violated fiduciary duties imposed by
25 U.S.C. 483 and other statutes.  Respondent's efforts to recover
money damages for these alleged violations therefore must also be
brought under the Tucker Act, subject to the six-year statute of
limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a).

 2. This Suit Is Barred By The Six-Year Statute Of Limitations In 28
U.S.C. 2401(a) Even If Jurisdiction Does Lie Under 25 U.S.C. 345 or 28
U.S.C. 1353

   There is no need to consider further, however, whether 25 U.S.C.
345 and 28 U.S.C. 1353 furnish a basis for this suit against the
United States.  Even if they do, this suit remains barred by the
six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a).  Section 2401(a)
applies to "every civil action commenced against the United States" in
district court.  /26/ This all-embracing language necessarily includes
civil actions against the United States under 25 U.S.C. 345 and 28
U.S.C. 1353.

   Respondent argues (Br. in Opp. 16-19), however, that the statute of
limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) applies only to actions under the
Tucker Act.  This argument has been rejected by every court of appeals
that has considered the question.  Geyen v. Marsh, No. 84-4607 (5th
Cir. Nov. 5, 1985), slip op. 472-473;  Walters v. Secretary of
Defense, 725 F.2d 107, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1983), quoting Werner v. United
States, 188 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1951).  See also Christensen v.
United States, 755 F.2d at 706;  Impro Products, Inc. v. Block, 722
F.2d 845, 850 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, No. 84-170 (Oct. 29,
1984);  Boruski v. United States, 493 F.2d 301, 304 n.5 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 808 (1974);  Screven v. United States, 207 F.2d
740, 741 (5th Cir. 1953).

   Respondent relies on the fact that prior to 1948, the paragraph
that conferred Tucker Act jurisdiction on the federal district courts
contained a six-year statute of limitations (see 28 U.S.C. (1946 ed.)
41(24)), but the paragraph that conferred jurisdiction over actions
involving a right to allotments did not (see 28 U.S.C. (1946 ed.)
41(24)).  She argues that 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) therefore should also be
limited to suits under the Tucker Act.  Respondent completely ignores
the significance of the amendments Congress made in 1948.

   The former Section 41(20) of Title 28 provided that "(n)o suit
against the Government of the United States shall be allowed under
this paragraph (i.e., under the Tucker Act) unless the same shall have
been brought within six years after the right accrued for which the
claim is made" (emphasis added).  By contrast, as a result of the 1948
revision, the relevant statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2401(a), is
not tied to any particular jurisdictional grant.  It instead appears
in Chapter 161 of Title 28, entitled "United States as Party
Generally," and it applies to "every civil action commenced against
the United States" (emphasis added).  Thus, Congress clearly made the
statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) applicable not only to
suits arising under the Tucker Act (to which the limitations period in
28 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) 41(20) was expressly confined), but also to other
actions against the United States, including those under 25 U.S.C. 345
and 28 U.S.C 1353.

   In sum, no matter what the theory of respondent's 27-year-old claim
-- whether it is viewed as an action to adjudicate a disputed title
under the Quiet Title Act, a suit for money damages under the Tucker
Act, or a proceeding involving a right to an allotment under 25 U.S.C.
345 and 28 U.S.C. 1353 -- it is barred by the applicable statute of
limitations.

                              CONCLUSION

   The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.

   Respectfully submitted.

   CHARLES FRIED

      Solicitor General

   F. HENRY HABICHT II

      Assistant Attorney General

   LAWRENCE G. WALLACE

      Deputy Solicitor General

   EDWIN S. KNEEDLER

      Assistant to the Solicitor General

   DAVID C. SHILTON

   J. CAROL WILLIAMS

      Attorneys

   JANUARY 1986

   /1/ Some of the other owners of fractional interests in the
allotments did give their express consent to the sales (Pet. App. 3a;
see J.A. 13).

   /2/ Apparently the normal procedure was to distribute the proceeds
of such a sale to the heirs who owned interests in the allotment (Pett
App. 9a) -- unless, perhaps, there were claims against the allottee or
previous beneficial owners to be settled out of the proceeds (J.A.
35).  There is no allegation in the complaint in this case that such a
distribution did not occur with respect to the three allotments at
issue.

   /3/ 28 U.S.C. 2415, which was originally enacted in 1966 (Act of
July 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-505, 80 Stat. 304 et seq.), imposes a
statute of limitations on various actions brought by the United States
generally, including those brought on behalf of Indians.  Section 2415
originally imposed a six-year limitation on the United States'
bringing of contract claims a three-year limitation on tort claims,
and a six-year limitation on trespass actions and certain other
claims.  Prior to 1982, the statute had been amended on a number of
occasions to extend the limitations period for damage actions based on
pre-1966 transactions affecting Indian lands.  Act of July 18, 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-353, 86 Stat. 499 et seq.; Act of Aug. 15, 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-103, 91 Stat. 842 et seq.; Act of Mar. 27, 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-217, 94 Stat. 126 et seq.

   In connection with the 1982 amendments to 28 U.S.C. 2415, the
Secretary was required to prepare a list of Indian claims accruing
prior to July 18, 1966, that were subject to the statute of
limitations.  Those claims that were listed are not barred by 28
U.S.C. 2415;  those that were not listed became time-barred upon the
passage of 60 days after the publication of the final list.  Indian
Claims Limitations Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-394, 96 Stat. 1976 et
seq., 28 U.S.C. 2415 note.  See Oneida II, slip op. 15.  The
legislative history of the 1982 amendments describes "Secretarial
transfer" cases as trespass claims that resulted from the Secretary's
sale of trust land in heirship status without the consent of all of
the heirs.  See H.R. Rep. 97-954, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1982).

   The three allotments on the Leech Lake Reservation in which
respondent formerly owned an interest (Nos. 855, 856 and 857 (J.A.
7-8, 13)) are included on this list of claims prepared pursuant to the
1982 Act.  48 Fed. Reg. 13846 (1983).  Although respondent's claims
therefore are not barred by 28 U.S.C. 2415 and the Indian Claims
Limitations Act of 1982 insofar as they might lie against anyone other
than the United States as a result of the allegedly unlawful sale of
her interests, her claims against the United States are not covered by
those provisions.  The latter claims instead are subject to the
statutes of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) and 2409a(f) that are
applicable to suits against the United States.  See Pet. App. 10a-11a.

   /4/ Respondent also sought to represent a class of Indian allottees
(and their descendents, heirs and assigns) of land previously held in
trust anywhere in the United States that was transferred by the United
States without their consent (J.A. 9).

   /5/ The court left open for decision on remand the question whether
25 U.S.C. 483 prevented the Secretary from selling the allotments
without respondent's consent (Pet. App. 7a).  Although the court
seemed to believe that this issue (and the question whether payment
was made to respondent) bore on the application of the statute of
limitations, they would appear to go to the merits of whether an
unauthorized sale occurred in 1954 and whether the United States
thereafter wrongfully withheld from respondent the proceeds of that
sale.

   /6/ Section 2401(a) contains an exception for suits covered by the
Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. 601 et seq.  See 41 U.S.C.
607(g)(1)(A), 609(a)(3).  That exception has no application here.

   /7/ The court did not indicate whether it regarded respondent's
suit as one for money damages under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C.
1346(a)(2), or as a suit for an allotment under 25 U.S.C. 345 and 28
U.S.C. 1353.  As we explain below (see pages 33-47, infra), the
district court had no jurisdiction over this suit under the latter two
provisions.  But even if it did, this suit would be barred by the
six-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a).  See pages
47-49, infra.

   /8/ There is no reason to believe that the court of appeals would
have reached a different conclusion with respect to the meaning of the
term "accrued" in 28 U.S.C. 2409a(f) if it had addressed the question
of the applicability of the QTA.

   /9/ The policy of repose underlying statutes of limitations has
particular force where, as here, the dispute concerns title to real
property.  Lewis v. Marshall, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 470, 477-478 (1831);
cf. Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 620 (1983).

   /10/ The notion that the validity of the United States' claim of
title affects the application of the QTA's limitations provision has
been rejected in suits involving non-Indians.  See Stubbs v. United
States, 620 F.2d 775, 781 (10th Cir. 1980);  Knapp v. United States,
336 F.2d 279, 282-283 (10th Cir. 1980).  It is the existence of a
claim of title by the United States that gives rise to the right of
action under the QTA.  See 28 U.S.C. 2409a(d) (the jurisdiction of the
district court shall cease if the United States, prior to trial,
disclaims all interest in the property adverse to the plaintiff).  It
is consistent with this statutory premise to begin the running of the
limitations period upon notice of that claim.

   /11/ In her complaint as originally filed, respondent sought, as an
alternative to money damages, the recission of the original sales and
the revesting of title in her (J.A. 10).  It therefore seems clear
that the complaint stated a claim under the QTA insofar as it disputed
the United States' title to the former allotments.  Moreover,
respondent included 28 U.S.C. 1346 among the alleged bases of
jurisdiction (J.A. 7), and subsection (f) of Section 1346 grants the
district courts jurisdiction of QTA actions under 28 U.S.C. 2409a(f).

   Because respondent, on June 16, 1982, voluntarily dismissed her
claim for revesting of title (J.A. 12), the United States' subsequent
motion for summary judgment relied only on 28 U.S.C. 2401 in asserting
that the suit is barred by the statute of limitations (C.A. App. 11).
The district court, noting that respondent sought only damages (Pet.
App. 9a), held that the suit is barred by 28 U.S.C. 2401(a).  For this
reason, the application of 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) was the principal issue
discussed in the government's brief on appeal.  However, the
government's brief also stated that "while not pled below, any action
to quiet title to this land is barred as well by virtue of the
twelve-year statute of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2409a(f)." Gov't C.A.
Br. 8 n.6.  See also id. at 9 n.8.  After the panel chose to construe
respondent's complaint, despite the partial dismissal, to continue to
assert a claim of title, the government addressed the application of
the QTA at length in its petition for rehearing with suggestion for
rehearing en banc.  That petition was denied without comment (Pet.
App. 13a).

   /12/ The second sentence of 28 U.S.C. 2409a(a) provides that the
QTA does not apply to trust or restricted Indian lands and does not
apply to or affect actions that can be brought under several
specifically enumerated statutory provisions, including the Tucker Act
(28 U.S.C. 1346, 1491) and the McCarran Amendment (43 U.S.C. 666),
which consents to the naming of the United States in certain water
rights adjudications.  See, e.g., Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe,
463 U.S. 545 (1983).

   /13/ Respondent errs in relying (Br. in Opp. 16) on Spaeth v.
Secretary of the Interior, 757 F.2d 937 (8th Cir. 1985), for the
proposition that this suit is not covered by the QTA.  In Spaeth, the
United States claimed that the parcels of land in question were "trust
or restricted Indian lands" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 2409a.
See 757 F.2d at 942-943.

   /14/ Where the United States has lawfully acquired property without
paying just compensation at the time of the acquisition, the property
owner may bring an action under the Tucker Act to recover that
compensation -- at least where Congress has not made the Tucker Act
unavailable.  See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., No. 83-196 (June 26,
1984), slip op. 27-28;  Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419
U.S. 102, 125-136, 148 (1974).  In this case, however, respondent
alleges that the Secretary's sale of her interests in the three
allotments without her consent was unlawful under 25 U.S.C. 483 and
other statutory provisions.  See Br. in Opp. 2-3, 8, 10;  J.A. 8.  It
is well settled that unauthorized conduct by an agent of the
government is not the act of the government and therefore is not a
taking of property for which the Fifth Amendment requires the payment
of compensation.  See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., slip op. 27;
Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 127 n.16, quoting
Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 336 (1910);  United States v.
North American Co., 253 U.S. 330, 334 (1920).  Respondent's claim for
a money judgment on the theory that her property was taken for public
use without just compensation therefore must fail.  If respondent were
to regard the sales in 1954 as lawful and to premise her claim to just
compensation on an allegation that she did not receive payment for her
interests in the allotments at that time, the instant action would in
any event be barred by the six-year statute of limitation in 28 U.S.C.
2401(a).  See pages 28-32, infra.

   /15/ The district courts and Claims Court have concurrent
jurisdiction over suits for money damages under the Tucker Act where
the amount in controversy is $10,000 or less.  28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2),
1491.  Where the amount in controversy exceeds that amount, the Claims
Court's jurisdiction is exclusive.

   /16/ Of course, the Tucker Act itself creates no substantive right
to money damages.  For this reason, as respondent acknowledges (Br. in
Opp. 9, 10-12), in order to recover in a suit under the Tucker Act,
respondent would be required to establish that whatever statutory
provision she maintains was violated by the sales in 1954 "'"can
fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal
Government for the damage sustained."'" Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 217,
quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976), and
Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002, 1009 (Ct. Cl.
1967).

   Respondent also alleged that the Secretary was "negligent" in
selling the allotments without the consent of everyone who had an
interest in them (J.A. 10).  Perhaps respondent thereby intended to
state a cause of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28
U.S.C. 1346(b), 2671 et seq.  However, any claim under the FTCA is
barred unless it is presented to the appropriate federal agency within
two years after it accrues or unless the action is begun within 6
months of the notice of final denial of the claim.  28 U.S.C. 2401(b).
 See 28 U.S.C. 2675.  This provision applies equally to a tort claim
by an Indian.  Mann v. United States, 399 F.2d 672, 673 (9th Cir.
1968).  There has been no suggestion that respondent submitted a claim
to the Department of the Interior within two years of the sales by the
Secretary in 1954, and any action under the FTCA would have long since
been barred by the time this suit was filed in 1981.

   /17/ The permanent provision vesting the Court of Claims with
jurisdiction over tribal claims was intended to eliminate the need for
special jurisdictional acts to enable the Court of Claims to consider
tribal claims.  See United States v. Dann, No. 83-1476 (Feb. 20,
1985), slip op. 6-7.  These Acts often imposed time limitations for
the consideration of Indian claims.  See, e.g., Act of June 3, 1920,
ch. 222, 41 Stat. 738-739.  In addition, in 1946, when Congress
enacted 28 U.S.C. 1505 and created the Indian Claims Commission to
adjudicate claims arising prior to 1946 (25 U.S.C. (1970 ed.) 70 et
seq.), it imposed a five-year limitation on the period within which
claims could be brought before the Commission.  25 U.S.C. (1976 ed.)
70.  Congress's pattern of imposing such time limits in statutes that
specifically address claims by Indians against the United States
substantially undermines any argument for an implied exception from
generally applicable statutes of limitation for such suits.

   /18/ In Capoeman, the Court of Claims also rejected the contention
that Indians are excluded from the running of the limitations period
by virtue of the provision in 28 U.S.C. 2501 (which likewise appears
in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a)) that the claim of a person "under legal
disability or beyond the seas" at the time the claim accrues may be
filed within three years after the disability ceases.  See 440 F.2d at
1003-1005.  The court construed this language to refer to a legal
disability that impaired the claimant's access to the court.  Id. at
1004;  see also Goewey v. United States, 612 F.2d 539, 544 (Ct. Cl.
1979).  There has been no suggestion in this case that respondent was
under a legal disability that tolled the running of the limitations
period under 28 U.S.C. 2401(a).  She presumably was as capable of
suing in 1954 as she was in 1981.  See, e.g., Poafpybitty v. Skelly
Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 368-369 (1968).  Cf. Oneida II, slip op. 7-8.
The existence of this express exception for certain claimants who
might be incapable of suing within the six-year period further
reinforces the conclusion that Indians who are not under such a
particularized disability are, like all other claimants, covered by
the statutes of limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2401(a) and 2501.  See
Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. at 272-274;  Kendall v. United
States, 107 U.S. at 125.

   The Court of Claims did suggest in Capoeman that the statute of
limitations in 28 U.S.C. 2501 might not bar a suit brought by an
Indian after the passage of six years from the date on which it first
could have been brought if:  the suit involved a liquidated claim for
money, the money had been appropriated by Congress, and the government
did not contest the validity of the claim.  440 F.2d at 1003.  See
also Christensen v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 1539, 1540-1541 (D.
Nev. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 705, 706-707 (9th Cir. 1985), petition for
cert. pending, No. 85-372.  In such a case, however, there is no real
"exception" to the statute of limitations.  The United States holds
the funds in question for the benefit of the plaintiff and is under a
continuing duty to make the funds available to the plaintiff upon
demand, whether or not six years have passed since the time at which
he first might have made such a demand.  See United States v. Taylor,
104 U.S. 216, 221-222 (1881).  This rationale has no application here.

   /19/ As stated in the General Allotment Act, 25 U.S.C. 331 (the
President is authorized "to cause allotment to each Indian located (on
the reservation) to be made * * * not to exceed eighty acres of
agricultural or one hundred and sixty acres of grazing land to any one
Indian");  25 U.S.C. 333 ("The allotments * * * shall be made by
special agents appointed by the President * * * under such rules and
regulations as the Secretary of the Interior may from time to time
prescribe, and shall be certified by such special alloting agents.");
25 U.S.C. 348 ("Upon approval of the allotments provided for in this
act by the Secretary of the Interior, he shall cause patents to issue
therefor in the name of the allottees * * *.").

   /20/ See, e.g., Sloan v. United States, supra;  Waldron v. United
States, 143 F. 413 (C.C.D.S.D. 1905);  Guyett v. McWhirk, 154 F. 784
(C.C.D. Or. 1907);  United States v. Fairbanks, 171 F. 337 (8th Cir.
1909), affd, 223 U.S. 215 (1912);  Reynolds v. United States, 174 F.
212 (8th Cir. 1909).

   /21/ See generally Woodward v. de Graffenried, 238 U.S. 284 (1915);
 F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 773-777 (1958).

   /22/ Although the Seventh Circuit has adhered to the view of the
scope of 25 U.S.C. 345 and 28 U.S.C. 1353 discussed in the text (see
Coleman v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 715 F.2d 1156, 1162
(7th Cir. 1983)), the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have construed
those provisions to extend to more than suits for an original
allotment.  See, e.g., Fontenelle v. Omaha Tribe, 430 F.2d 143 (8th
Cir. 1970);  Gerard v. United States, 167 F.2d 951, 953 (9th Cir.
1948);  Scholder v. United States, 428 F.2d 1123, 1125-1126 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970);  Loring v. United States,
610 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1979);  Christensen v. United States, supra;
Big Spring v. United States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 767 F.2d 614,
616 (9th Cir. 1985);  Begay v. Albers, 721 F.2d 1274 (10th Cir. 1983).
 However, these decisions did not consider the legislative history of
25 U.S.C. 345 and 28 U.S.C. 1353, discussed above, and the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits previously had taken a contrary view (see United States
v. Eastman, 118 F.2d 421, 423 (9th Cir. 1941);  Harkins v. United
States, 375 F.2d 239, 241 (10th Cir. 1967);  Vicenti v. United States,
470 F.2d 845, 846 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 1057
(1973).

   For the reasons stated in the text, we believe that the more recent
decisions of the Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, the earliest of
which was rendered more than 50 years after the statutory provision
was enacted in 1894 (compare Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co.
v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, No. 84-262 (June 10, 1985), slip op. 16), are
incorrect and should not be followed, especially since they are
contrary to this Court's consistent interpretation.  In Begay v.
Albers, supra, the Tenth Circuit found an alternative basis of
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1331 insofar as that case was brought
against the private defendants.  See 721 F.2d at 1279.  This case of
course does not involve the question whether an allottee claimant may
bring such an action under 28 U.S.C. 1331.

   /23/ In the sort of case for which 25 U.S.C. 345 and 28 U.S.C. 1353
were intended -- a suit to obtain an original allotment from the
United States -- the plaintiff would not dispute the United States'
title to the land.  The plaintiff would acknowledge that title, held
in trust for the Indians concerned, and simply seek to have the nature
of the Indians' beneficial interest converted from common to
individual ownership.  Cf. McKay v. Kalyton, 204 U.S. 458, 468-469
(1907).  Such a suit therefore would not be subject to QTA.

   /24/ To the extent Congress intended to preserve remedies against
the United States under other statory provisions when it enacted the
QTA, it expressly so provided.  See note 12, supra.  But Congress did
not include suits under 25 U.S.C. 345 and 28 U.S.C. 1353 among those
exceptions.  Any right of action that previously might have existed
under those provisions to challenge the United States' title to real
property accordingly did not survive enactment of the QTA.  In light
of this Court's then-recent decision in Affiliated Ute, which was
rendered on April 24, 1972, and gave Section 345 a narrow reading that
does not extend to quiet title actions against the United States (see
page 41, supra), it is understandable that Congress did not include an
exception for such suits when it enacted the QTA six months later, on
October 25, 1972.  Pub. L. No. 92-562, 86 Stat. 1176 et seq.  Compare
Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. at 282.

   /25/ The court in Antoine v. United States, 637 F.2d 1177, 1182
(1981), opinion after remand, 710 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1983), believed
that 25 U.S.C. 346 supported recognition of a right of action for
money damages under 25 U.S.C. 345.  Section 346 provides, inter alia,
for the United States Attorney to answer a complaint filed under
Section 345 by filing "a notice of any counterclaim, set-off claim for
damages, or other demand or defense whatsoever of the Government in
the premises." The court in Antoine believed that the reference to a
"set off" meant that Congress contemplated that damages claims could
be brought under 25 U.S.C. 345.  The court read far too much into this
single term.  Section 346 was enacted as Section 2 of the Act of
February 6, 1901, 31 Stat. 760, discussed at page 37, supra.  The
purpose of that Act was to provide a "uniform manner for securing
service" in cases covered by the 1894 Act.  H.R. Rep. 1714, supra, at
1;  S. Rep. 2040, supra, at 1.  To accomplish that goal of uniformity,
Congress simply incorporated verbatim into the present 25 U.S.C. 346
the terms of Section 6 of the Tucker Act (Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch.
359, 24 Stat. 506), which prescribes the method of service under that
Act.  H.R. Rep. 1714, supra, at 1;  S. Rep. 2040, supra, at 1.
Because the provision was derived from the Tucker Act, it is natural
that it would make reference to a possible "set-off." But that
incorporation scarcely suggests that Congress intended to provide a
cause of action for money damages when it enacted the predecessor to
25 U.S.C. 345 seven years earlier.

   /26/ Section 2401(a) contains a single exception for suits under
the Contract Disputes Act of 1978.  See note 6, supra.  In addition,
if another, more specific statute of limitations applies to a
particular suit, such as that under the FTCA or QTA (28 U.S.C. 2401(b)
or 2409a(f)), the more specific provision applies.

   APPENDIX