STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA, ROBERT E. HANSON, STATE TREASURER OF NORTH DAKOTA, APPELLANTS V. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA No. 88-926 In The Supreme Court Of The United States October Term, 1988 On Appeal From The United States Court Of Appeals For The Eighth Circuit Motion To Affirm under the Twenty-first Amendment. TABLE OF CONTENTS Question Presented Opinions below Jurisdiction Constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions involved Statement Argument Conclusion OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the court of appeals (J.S. App. A1-A22) is reported at 856 F.2d 1107. The opinion of the district court (J.S. App. A23-A32) is reported at 675 F. Supp. 555. JURISDICTION The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on September 9, 1988. The notice of appeal was filed on November 16, 1988 (J.S. App. A35). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(2). /1/ CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED 1. Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "The Congress shall have Power * * * To raise and support Armies * * * (and) To make Rules for the * * * Regulation of the land and naval Forces * * *." Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution further provides in pertinent part: "The Congress shall have Power * * * to exercise * * * Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings * * *." Article IV, Section 3 of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States * * *." Article VI, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof * * * shall be the supreme Law of the Land * * *." Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." 2. Title 10, United States Code, Section 2488 (Supp. IV 1986), provides in pertinent part: (a) The Secretary of Defense shall provide that -- (1) covered alcoholic beverage purchases made for resale on a military installation located in the United States shall be made from the most competitive source, price and other factors considered * * *. Department of Defense Armed Services Military Club and Package Store Regulation 1015.3-R, ch. 4, Section C (codified at 32 C.F.R. 261.4) /2/ provides in pertinent part: The Department of Defense shall cooperate with local, state, and federal officials to the degree that their duties relate to the provisions of this chapter. However, the purchase of all alcoholic beverages for resale at any camp, post, station, base, or other DoD installation within the United States shall be in a manner and under such conditions as shall obtain for the government the most advantageous contract, price and other factors considered. These other factors shall not be construed as meaning any submission to state control, nor shall cooperation be construed or represented as an admission of any legal obligation to submit to state control, pay state or local taxes, or purchase alcoholic beverages within geographical boundaries or at prices or from suppliers prescribed by any state. 3. Section 84-02-01-05(7), N.D. Admin. Code (1986), provides: All liquor destined for delivery to a federal enclave in North Dakota for domestic consumption and not transported through a licensed North Dakota wholesaler for delivery to such bona fide federal enclave in North Dakota shall have clearly identified on each individual item that such shall be for consumption within the federal enclave exclusively. Such identification must be in a form and manner prescribed by the state treasurer. Section 84-02-01-05(1), N.D. Admin. Code (1986), provides: All persons sending or bringing liquor into North Dakota shall file a North Dakota Schedule A Report of all shipments and returns for each calendar month with the state treasurer. The report must be postmarked on or before the fifteenth day of the following month. QUESTION PRESENTED Whether regulations of the State of North Dakota, requiring out-of-state liquor suppliers to affix to each bottle of liquor sold to federal enclaves located in North Dakota a label stating that the liquor must be consumed on those premises and requiring those suppliers to file monthly reports, impermissibly interfere with the federal procurement scheme and otherwise fall outside the State's authority STATEMENT 1. The State of North Dakota contains two federal enclaves, Grand Forks Air Force Base and Minot Air Force Base, over which the State and the federal governments exercise concurrent jurisdiction. Each military installation contains clubs and package goods stores that sell alcoholic beverages exclusively to military personnel and their families. These clubs and stores are "non-appropriated fund instrumentalities" (NFIs) of the federal government. Although operated by the military, they do not receive congressionally appropriated funds. Instead, the facilities support themselves; any profits generated from liquor sales are used to fund recreational and other support services for each base's military personnel and their families. J.S. App. A3, A23. Under Department of Defense Armed Services Military Club and Package Store Regulation 1015.3-R, ch. 4, Section C, the military must obtain liquor for the NFIs "under such conditions as shall obtain for the government the most advantageous contract, price and other factors considered" (32 C.F.R. 261.4). /3/ In order to minimize cost, the military operates a "joint-military service consolidated purchasing program for distilled spirits" (D.R. 30). /4/ Under this program, all military facilities in a thirteen state area, including the two North Dakota installations, purchase alcoholic beverages in bulk directly from distillers/suppliers, as opposed to purchasing from local wholesalers. This program enables the military to negotiate the best possible price, since it can avoid buying from distributors at the local wholesale level whose prices include additional markups. Prices for liquor purchased by the military from out-of-state suppliers are significantly lower than those for liquor bought from licensed wholesalers within North Dakota. /5/ See D.R. 3, 30. 2. Effective January 1, 1986, the State of North Dakota issued specific regulations aimed at the federal government's purchase of liquor at the two military bases located in the State. /6/ The principal regulation, the labeling provision, requires all out-of-state liquor suppliers to affix to each bottle of liquor sold to those federal installations a label stating that the liquor must be consumed on those premises. N.D. Admin. Code. Section 84-02-01-05(7) (1986). The regulation imposes no such labeling requirement on local suppliers and distributors. A companion provision calls for all suppliers to file a monthly report showing the quantity of liquor shipped into the State during the preceding month. N.D. Admin. Code. Section 84-02-01-05(1) (1986). In early November 1986, the State held a meeting for representatives of out-of-state distillers/suppliers in order to explain the labeling and reporting requirements for direct sales of liquor to the two federal military bases in North Dakota. /7/ As a result of the added administrative burdens and costs imposed by compliance with those new requirements, five out-of-state suppliers informed the military that they would no longer ship liquor to the bases in North Dakota. Another out-of-state distiller agreed to continue supplying liquor to the NFIs North Dakota, but told the military that its prices would increase from $.85 to $20.50 per case in order to cover the additional costs of complying with the State's regulations. In light of these developments, the official responsible for the military's procurement of liquor stated: "If the installations in North Dakota are forced to purchase their distilled spirits requirements from in-State sources in the future, it will cost the installations involved between $200,000 and $250,000 per year more than if the purchases are made from out-of-State distillers/importers" (D.R. 32). J.S. App. A4, A25-A26; D.R. 30. /8/ 3. On November 26, 1986, the United States filed this action against appellants in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota. The complaint, reciting the factual background set out above, alleged that the labeling and reporting requirements of the State's regulations interfere with the federal military's procurement of liquor, conflict with governing federal procurement law, and therefore violate the Supremacy Clause. The complaint sought a judgment declaring those regulations invalid and an injunction barring the State's enforcement of them as applied to military bases in North Dakota. J.S. App. A2; D.R. 1-7. Appellants initially answered the complaint by contending that their regulations did not conflict with federal law. In any event, appellants argued that the Twenty-first Amendment authorized regulations as necessary "to prevent the unlawful diversion of alcohol from military enclaves into the internal commerce of North Dakota" (D.R. 10). The parties thereafter entered into a stipulation of facts and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. /9/ 4. The district court granted appellants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that the State's regulations do not conflict with the federal law requiring the military to purchase liquor at the "(l)owest cost" (J.S. App. A28). The court reasoned that the "state's regulations may have indirectly caused the price of out-of-state supplies of alcoholic beverages to increase, but they do not prevent the federal government from obtaining those beverages at the 'lowest cost.' The 'lowest cost' has merely increased" (ibid. (footnote omitted)). Even if there were a conflict, the court stated, it would need to balance the State's authority to regulate liquor under the Twenty-first Amendment against the federal government's interests (J.S. App. A28-A29). It ruled that a State has authority to impose regulations designed to prevent the unlawful diversion of liquor. The court accepted that proffered reason for the State's regulations, finding that it was not "pretextual," /10/ and therefore concluded that the regulations are "a valid exercise of (the State's) core power under the Twenty-first Amendment" (id. at A31). Turning to the competing interests, the court concluded that the State's "significant interest in preventing unlawful diversion of alcoholic beverages" clearly outweighed the federal government's interest "in keeping its costs down" (ibid.). Accordingly, the court alternatively held that the regulations at issue fall within the State's powers under the Twenty-first Amendment and are not barred by the Supremacy Clause (ibid.). 5. The court of appeals reversed (J.S. App. A1-A22). It first noted that Congress, in 10 U.S.C. 2488(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986), implemented "a longstanding policy of purchasing alcoholic beverages at the lowest available price and using the proceeds for the benefit of the welfare and morale of military personnel and their families" (id. at A12). The court recognized the State's power under the Twenty-first Amendment, but observed that such power "reaches its limits when the state attempts to exercise that power over an instrumentality of the federal government itself" (id. at A10). Accordingly, the court concluded that the Twenty-first Amendment "provides no basis for regulating the means by which Congress has sought to order military liquor procurement and to provide for the welfare and morale activities of military personnel" (id. at A13). The court of appeals also weighed the competing interests at stake in concluding that federal law preempted the State's regulations (J.S. App. A13-A18). It recognized the State's "traditional power to regulate unlawful diversion of liquor in transit to the (military) bases" (id. at A17), but found that the State's efforts here impermissibly conflicted with federal law. "Congress had mandated that the military procure liquor on a competitive basis in order to maximize profits for the support of welfare and morale activities" (id. at A15). The court observed that the State's regulations will increase the military's annual liquor bill by more than $200,000, and that "the effect (of the regulations) in large part is to require the military to make purchases within the State -- purchases that would not otherwise be competitive with out-of-state sources" (id. at A15-A16). The court held that "this result conflicts with Congress' desire for open competition designed to maximize revenue for welfare and morale activities" (id. at A16 (footnote omitted)). /11/ ARGUMENT The decision of the court of appeals, holding that the State's liquor labeling and reporting regulations impermissibly interfere with the federal government's procurement of liquor for military bases located in North Dakota, is correct. The decision does not conflict with any decision of this Court or any other court of appeals. Plenary review is therefore unwarranted and the decision should be summarily affirmed. 1. Appellants (J.S. 11-13), joined by the National Beer Wholesalers' Association, Inc., as amicus curiae (Br. 6-8), contend that the State's regulations, designed to prevent unlawful diversion of liquor, do not substantially conflict with the federal procurement scheme of obtaining liquor for military bases at the most competitive price. The record plainly belies that assertion. Under governing federal law, /12/ the military must purchase liquor from the "most competitive source." As applied to the two bases in North Dakota, that federal scheme requires military procurement officials to purchase the liquor in bulk quantities directly from out-of-state distillers/suppliers because those suppliers were offering lower prices than licensed wholesalers within the State. See D.R. 3, 30; see also note 5, supra. As a result of the added administrative burdens and costs imposed by compliance with the State's new labeling and reporting requirements, however, five out-of-state suppliers would no longer ship liquor to military bases in North Dakota, and another such supplier would do so only at additional costs of up to $20.50 per case. In sum, the State's regulations directly interfere with the federal government's efforts to obtain liquor from the "most competitive source," by forcing the military to use different suppliers and to spend over $200,000 more for liquor. J.S. App. A4, A25-A26; D.R. 30-32. The Court has long held that, under the Supremacy Clause, federal law preempts state regulation where the latter "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); e.g., Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. 86-986 (Mar. 22, 1988), slip. op. 6; Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699 (1984). Under 10 U.S.C. 2488(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986), as the court of appeals correctly observed, "Congress has mandated that the military procure liquor on a competitive basis in order to maximize profits for the support of welfare and morale activities" (J.S. App. A15). Here, the record established that the State's regulations will increase the military's annual liquor bill by more than $200,000 and will "require the military to make purchases within the State -- purchases that would not otherwise be competitive with out-of-state sources" (id. at A15-A16). Under these circumstances, the State's regulations plainly conflict with the federal procurement scheme mandating "open competition" (id. at A16), and thus the court of appeals properly held that the State's regulatory efforts fail under the Supremacy Clause. /13/ 2. Appellants (J.S. 8-11), again joined by the National Beer Wholesalers' Association, Inc., as amicus curiae (Br. 8-12), further contend that the Twenty-first Amendment authorizes the State to issue regulations designed solely to prevent the unlawful diversion of liquor within its borders. To be sure, as the court of appeals recognized, "the state has always had the right pursuant to its police power to take reasonable measures to prevent the unlawful diversion of liquor into its stream of commerce" (J.S. App. A16 (citations omitted)). /14/ Contrary to appellants' assertion, however, the Twenty-first Amendment does not authorize the States to pursue that objective by regulating federal procurement of liquor to be supplied to federal military enclaves. See United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 421 U.S. 599, 613-614 (1975) (Mississippi Tax Comm'n II); cf. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518, 536-538 (1938). The Amendment "primarily created an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause," Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976); in other words, Section 2 of the Amendment permits the States to regulate and tax private commerce in alcoholic beverages in a manner which might otherwise violate the Commerce Clause. See State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Market Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62-63 (1936). But "(o)nce passing beyond consideration of the Commerce Clause, the relevance of the Twenty-first Amendment to other constitutional provisions becomes increasingly doubtful." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. at 206. Here, as mentioned previously, the State's regulations conflict with federal procurement law and with federal regulation of military enclaves and thus do not survive scrutiny under the Supremacy Clause. Accordingly, those regulations may not be resurrected under the Twenty-first Amendment. "The State's Twenty-First Amendment powers, though broad, are circumscribed by other provisions of the Constitution." 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 346 (1987). And this Court has made clear that the Amendment does not confer authority on the States to regulate the affairs of the federal government. See Mississippi Tax Comm'n II, 421 U.S. at 613-614 (Amendment does not "abolish() federal immunity with respect to taxes on sales of liquor to the military on bases where the United States and Mississippi exercise concurrent jurisdiction"); Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. 341, 345-346 (1964) (Amendment does not authorize state tax on foreign importer of liquor where tax violated Export-Import Clause of Constitution); see also Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976) (recognizing Congress's broad power under the Property Clause (U.S. Const. Art. IV, Section 3, Cl. 2)). Accordingly, the court of appeals properly concluded that the State's regulations fall outside any authority conferred by the Twenty-first Amendment. Appellants (J.S. 8-10), without mentioning this Court's later decision in Mississippi Tax Comm'n II, rely heavily on the Court's statement in United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 412 U.S. 363, 377 (1973) (Mississippi Tax Comm'n I), that a State may, "in the absence of conflicting federal regulation," regulate liquor shipments destined for military bases located within the State. Appellants seriously misconstrue that statement. First, the Court plainly stated that, as a necessary but not sufficient condition, any state effort must not conflict with federal law. Here, as we have shown above and as the court of appeals expressly held, the State's regulations contravene applicable federal procurement law. In any event, in Mississippi Tax Comm'n II, the Court expressly held that "the Twenty-first Amendment confers no power on a State to regulate -- whether by licensing, taxation, or otherwise -- the importation of distilled spirits into territory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction * * * (or) concurrent jurisdiction * * * (421 U.S. at 613 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). /15/ CONCLUSION The judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted. WILLIAM C. BRYSON Acting Solicitor General JAMES I.K. KNAPP Acting Assistant Attorney General RICHARD FARBER Attorney MARCH 1989 /1/ The Court's appellate jurisdiction conferred in Section 1254(2) was repealed by the Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, Section 2(a), 102 Stat. 662, but the repeal did not take effect until September 25, 1988 (Section 7, 102 Stat. 664). The repeal does not apply to this case, because it does "not * * * affect the right to review or the manner of reviewing the judgment or decree of a court which was entered before such effective date" (ibid.). In this case, the court of appeals held unconstitutional regulations promulgated by the State Treasurer of North Dakota under his statutory authority to regulate the State's liquor distribution system. See N.D. Cent. Code Section 5-03-05 (1975). Those regulations, which are enforceable as state laws, appear to be "State statute(s)" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1254(2). See King Mfg. Co. v. Augusta, 277 U.S. 100, 104-105 (1928); Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 183 (1877); cf. Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 43 (1983). /2/ In 1983, the Department of Defense amended the regulation by substituting the phrase "price and other factors considered" for the phrase "price and other considered factors." Department of Defense Change No. 1 for Armed Services Military Club and Package Store Regulation 1015.3-R, ch. 4, Section C. The Code of Federal Regulations inaccurately contains the original phrasing. We have inserted the corrected phrasing in our citation to the codified version of the regulation in the Code of Federal Regulations and will refer to that corrected version. /3/ Title 10, United States Code, Section 2488(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986), directs the Secretary of Defense to provide that "covered alcoholic beverage purchases made for resale on a military installation located in the United States shall be made from the most competitive source, price and other factors considered." The Secretary promulgated the Department of Defense Armed Services Military Club and Package Store Regulations under his rulemaking authority conferred by 50 U.S.C. App. 473 (1982 Supp. IV 1986), which empowers him "to make such regulations as he may deem to be appropriate governing the sale, consumption, possession of or traffic in beer, wine, or any other intoxicating liquors to or by members of the Armed Forces." /4/ "D.R." refers to the Designation of Record prepared by the Clerk of the District Court and filed with appellants' brief in the court of appeals. /5/ Under the State's regulatory scheme, there are three levels of liquor suppliers: out-of-state distillers/suppliers, state-licensed wholesalers, and state retailers. The State imposes a tax at the wholesale and retail levels. See N.D. Cent. Code Sections 5-03-04 and 5-03-07 (1975). /6/ Appellant Robert E. Hanson, as the State Treasurer of North Dakota, actually promulgated the regulations under his statutory authority to regulate the State's liquor distribution system. See N.D. Cent. Code Section 5-03-05 (1975). The regulations "have the force of law thirty days after the date of mailing to the persons affected by such regulations" (ibid.). /7/ From December 1985 through October 1986, federal law required the military to procure liquor from the State in which the base was located. See Act of Dec. 19, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-190, Section 101, 99 Stat. 1185. As of November 1, 1986, however, Congress authorized the military once again to purchase liquor from the most competitve source regardless of location. See Act of Oct. 30, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-591, Section 101, 100 Stat. 3341; Act of Nov. 14, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-661, Section 313, 100 Stat. 3816. Hence, the labeling and reporting requirements imposed by appellants' regulations had no practical effect until November 1986. /8/ That official also estimated that the State's regulations would impose an additional cost of $50,000 for the military's immediate liquor procurement needs in November and December 1986 (D.R. 32). /9/ Appellants did not dispute the declaration submitted by the United States detailing the expected additional costs imposed by the regulations. Nor did appellants dispute that the five identified out-of-state suppliers would no longer service the bases in North Dakota and that another supplier would substantially raise its prices. See Declaration of Kim Keltz, Chief of the Special Contracts Branch, Air Force Nonappropriated Fund Purchasing Office, San Antonio, Texas (D.R. 30-32). In support of their position, however, appellants submitted an affidavit of appellant Robert E. Hanson. That affidavit stated that "(v)arious distillers/suppliers have notified (him) that they intend to comply with (the regulations)" (D.R. 48). The affidavit did not identify those out-of-state suppliers. Moreover, the affidavit declared that Hanson, in his capacity as State Treasurer, is "aware of the diversion of alcoholic beverages from North Dakota federal enclaves into the state's domestic commerce in contravention of the state's established liquor distribution system" (id. at 49). The affidavit did not identify any such diversions, although it mentioned two incidents in Hawaii and Washington (id. at 50). In a second affidavit, Hanson ultimately did mention two instances of apparent diversion of liquor from the North Dakota military bases. Hanson could neither confirm that those diversions actually occurred nor relate the amount of liquor involved. Id. at 60-63. /10/ The court stated that "(w)hether or not there have been actual cases of unlawful diversion is not particularly relevant" (J.S. App. A31); see note 9, supra. /11/ Chief Judge Lay dissented (J.S. App. A18-A22). He concluded that the State's regulations, designed solely "to prevent diversion of out-of-state liquor destined for military bases," fall within the State's power under the Twenty-First Amendment (id. at A22). Under those circumstances, "the federal government must accept the resulting increase in the cost of out-of-state liquor when it considers sources from which to purchase its liquor" (ibid.). /12/ See 10 U.S.C. 2488(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986); Department of Defense Armed Services Military Club and Package Store Regulation 1015.3-R, ch. 4, Section C (codified at 32 C.F.R. 261.4). /13/ Moreover, the State's regulations, although nominally aimed at out-of-state liquor suppliers, are designed to regulate the federal enclaves themselves. Appellants have contended throughout the litigation that they imposed the labeling and reporting requirements "in order to prevent the unlawful diversion of liquor, either en route to the military enclaves or off the enclaves after delivery, into the state's domestic commerce" (J.S. 9). To the extent the State seeks to regulate the federal enclaves, its effort cannot be squared with the principle that, under the Supremacy Clause, "the activities of the Federal Government are free from regulation by any state." Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441, 445 (1943) (footnote omitted). That constitutional immunity, as this Court has held, obtains with particular force where a State seeks to regulate the federal government's exclusive authority over military procurement derived from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. E.G., Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 250-263 (1963); Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187, 189-190 (1956); see United States v. Texas, 695 F.2d 136, 139-141 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 933 (1983). Appellants (J.S. 11-12) mistakenly rely on Penn Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 261, 269-275 (1943). In that case, the Court upheld a State's refusal to renew the license of a milk dealer who had sold milk to a military installation at prices below those prescribed by state law. In holding that state law did not impermissibly interfere with federal procurement law, the Court made clear that the applicable federal regulation, which otherwise called for competitive procurement, suspended that requirement "when the price is fixed by federal, state, municipal or other competent legal authority" (318 U.S. at 277 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). In other words, the State's regulatory efforts had not been preempted because Congress had effectively implemented a "hands off policy" concerning state minimum price laws (id. at 278). By contrast, here, as in Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. at 254-255, applicable federal law requires, without exception, that the military's procurement proceed on a competitive basis. Accordingly, the court of appeals' decision is entirely consistent with Penn Dairies. /14/ Appellants have not asserted that the regulations were an exercise of the State's traditional police power. And to the extent appellants' claim under the Twenty-first Amendment can be construed as raising an issue surrounding the extent to which a State may prevent unlawful diversion of imported liquor within its borders (see J.S. 10-11, 13-14), that claim does not warrant plenary review where, as here, the State's efforts plainly interfere with lawful activities of the federal government mandated by Congress. The United States, however, does support the State's underlying policy against diverting untaxed liquor from federal enclaves to intrastate commerce. See Department of Defense Armed Services Military Club and Package Store Regulation 1015.3-R, ch. 4, Section F3 (1982) ("Members of the Uniformed Services and other authorized purchasers shall not sell, exchange, or otherwise divert packaged alcoholic beverages to unauthorized personnel, or for purposes which violate federal, state, or local laws, or Status of Forces agreements."). /15/ The National Beer Wholesaler's Association, Inc., as amicus curiae (Br. 9-10 n. 16), seeks to blunt the force of Mississippi Tax Comm'n II by suggesting that the decision held only that a State may not "impose() the legal burden of taxation on the military as the ultimate purchaser." That contention cannot be squared with the Court's explicit conclusion (421 U.S. at 613) that the Twenty-first Amendment does not empower the States to regulate the federal government's direct importation of liquor into federal enclaves, like military bases, where the government exercises exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.