UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, . CR No. 18-0218 (TSC)

v.

MARIIA BUTINA, a/k/a . Washington, D.C.

MARIA BUTINA, . Friday, April 26, 2019
. 10:07 a.m.

Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING BEFORE THE HONORABLE TANYA S. CHUTKAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

For the Government: ERIK M. KENERSON, AUSA

THOMAS N. SAUNDERS, AUSA U.S. Attorney's Office National Security Section 555 Fourth Street, NW Washington, DC 20530

WILLIAM MACKIE, ESQ.

U.S. Department of Justice National Security Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW RFK Building, Suite 7700 Washington, DC 20530

For the Defendant: ROBERT N. DRISCOLL, ESQ.

> ALFRED D. CARRY, ESQ. McGlinchey Stafford, PLLC 1275 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Suite 420

Washington, DC 20004

Court Reporter: BRYAN A. WAYNE, RPR, CRR

> U.S. Courthouse, Room 4704-A 333 Constitution Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20001

PROCEEDINGS

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Your Honor, we have Criminal Action 18-218, United States of America versus Mariia Butina. We have Mr. Erik Kenerson, Mr. Thomas Saunders, and Mr. William Mackie representing the government. We have Mr. Alfred Carry and Mr. Robert Driscoll representing Ms. Butina, who is present, and we also have Ms. Crystal Lustig representing Probation.

THE COURT: Good morning, everyone.

Good morning, Ms. Butina.

We're here for the sentencing of Ms. Butina, who has pleaded guilty to conspiracy to act as an agent of a foreign government in violation of Title 18, Sections 371 and 951 of the United States Code.

I know that there's some materials here that have been filed under seal, and there may be representations that you want to make to me under seal. If you do, we're going to try and approach the bench. I really don't want to have to clear the courtroom. I don't plan on discussing any sealed matters, but if you need to, we can take it at the bench and seal the transcript.

So let me tell you what I've received and reviewed in advance of this hearing. I have received and reviewed the presentence report and the sentencing recommendation from the Probation Department, and also the following documents that have been submitted by counsel in advance of the hearing: a copy of

the plea agreement signed by Ms. Butina, along with the Statement of Offense.

And I'll say at this point that the government noted in its sentencing memorandum a factual mistake in the Statement of Offense. I'll say that that factual mistake does not affect my consideration of the sentencing factors or my sentence, but is there any objection to that correction, Mr. Driscoll?

MR. DRISCOLL: There's not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

So, Government, I'd like you to file a revised Statement of Offense after the hearing. Thank you.

I've also received and reviewed a sentencing memorandum from the government, with exhibits that are redacted on the public docket. Included in these exhibits is a declaration from Robert Anderson, Jr., a former FBI agent. I have reviewed the unredacted exhibits which were filed under seal.

Now, there was a missing exhibit, Exhibit 8, that was referenced in the Government's sentencing memorandum that I didn't receive. I requested a copy and received a copy last night. Mr. Driscoll, have you had a chance to look at that?

MR. DRISCOLL: We have, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Do you have any objection to the exhibit and to having the government file it after this hearing?

MR. DRISCOLL: We do not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's going to be under seal. Correct?

MR. KENERSON: I believe it was filed under seal last night, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes. I'm going to grant the motion for leave to file under seal.

MR. KENERSON: Thank you.

1.3

THE COURT: And just file a redacted version for the public docket after this hearing.

Okay. I've received a supplemental memorandum in aid of sentencing and a motion for downward departure, which is under seal. I've received a sentencing memorandum from Defendant with exhibits, and these exhibits include 24 character letters and three certificates.

These include a certificate of completion, Women Empowering Women; a certificate, Community Service Participation in Knitting Projects; and Certificate of Participation in a Life Skills Class. All but four of the letters that I've received include affidavits of accuracy of translation and the original Russian letter. Obviously, I haven't reviewed the original Russian letters, but I've reviewed the translated versions.

I've also reviewed the pleadings related to the defense's motion to exclude and strike the declaration of Robert Anderson,

Jr. I consider those part of the sentencing hearing record.

I did deny the defense motion to strike the declaration.

Now, Counsel, have I missed anything that has been

submitted for my review?

MR. KENERSON: Not from the government, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Kenerson, are you going to be speaking for the government today?

MR. KENERSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Driscoll, have I missed anything?

MR. DRISCOLL: You have not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, good.

Now, Ms. Butina, you may recall that at your plea hearing, the plea hearing proceeded in three steps. The first was to make sure that you were competent to take the plea, the second was to make sure that you were knowingly taking the plea and aware of the rights that you were giving up, and the third step was to make sure that your plea was entered into voluntarily.

Today's sentencing is going to proceed in four steps.

The first step is for me to determine whether you've reviewed the presentence report and whether there are any outstanding objections to the presentence report, and, if so, I have to resolve those objections.

The second step is for me to determine what sentencing guidelines and sentencing range, if any, apply to your case.

The third step is to hear from the government, from your lawyer, and from you, if you wish to be heard, about sentencing in this case.

The last step requires me to fashion a just and fair 1 2 sentence in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), 3 a statute you'll hear a lot about. You've already heard about it some at your plea, and I'm sure your lawyer has explained to 4 5 you what that is. 6 At the end of the hearing, I'll also deal with the joint 7 motion for order of judicial removal that the parties have 8 submitted. 9 Okay. So with regard to the presentence report, the final presentence report and sentencing recommendation were filed in 10 11 this case on April 16, 2019. 12 Mr. Kenerson, does the government have any objection to 13 any of the factual determinations set forth in the presentence 14 report? 15 MR. KENERSON: No, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Now, are you expecting an evidentiary 17 hearing? Do you have any witnesses present in the courtroom? MR. KENERSON: Your Honor, we do have a witness present 18 THE COURT: Is that Mr. Anderson? 19 20 MR. KENERSON: Yes. It's Mr. Anderson. I was going 21 to say we intend to make him available to the Court if the 22 Court wants to inquire or if the defense wants to inquire.

THE COURT: Okay. Here's how I'm going to handle it. Obviously, we've all read the Anderson Declaration. If, Mr. Driscoll, you wish to present argument beyond any argument

23

24

25

you've put in your motion to strike regarding the Anderson Declaration, I'll hear you. If you wish to question Mr. Anderson, you may also do so. Obviously, you know, not open-ended, but you also may do that. That's up to you, and you can let me know at the appropriate time.

MR. DRISCOLL: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, Ms. Butina, I'd like to ask you some questions. Are you fully satisfied with your attorneys, Mr. Driscoll and Mr. Carry, in this case?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Do you feel that you've had enough time to talk to them about the Probation Department's presentence report and the papers that the government filed in connection with the sentencing?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.

THE COURT: Now, Mr. Driscoll, have you and Ms. Butina read and discussed the presentence report?

MR. DRISCOLL: We have.

THE COURT: Are there any disputed issues of fact?

That is, does Ms. Butina have any objection to any of the factual statements set forth in the presentence report? And this does not include paragraph 71, which is the determination of whether there's a sufficient analogous guideline. I'll address that later.

MR. DRISCOLL: We raised minor issues, but it's fine

the way it --

THE COURT: Okay. I'll just deal with the factual objections I'm aware of, and I can tell you that they don't really affect my conclusion on the appropriate sentence here.

Page 3 regarding aliases. Mr. Kenerson, do you have any objection to striking the aliases as requested by the defense?

MR. KENERSON: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Those aliases will be stricken. Paragraph 62, the defense objection is overruled.

Ms. Butina is represented by retained counsel. This will not affect the Court's decision about whether to impose or whether she's able to pay a fine in this case. All right.

Paragraph 73, the government's memorandum. Page 12 at footnote 6 makes reference to the defendant's objection to paragraph 73. However, this objection is not in the final presentence report, and the defendant does not raise this submission in her memorandum.

The Court's understanding is that Ms. Butina objects to paragraph 73 because it is incomplete, because the plea agreement also states that the parties agreed, for allocution purposes, that a sentence within the estimated guideline range of zero to six months' imprisonment would be reasonable in light of all the sentencing factors under § 3553(a).

To begin with, the presentence report does not, as a matter of course, regurgitate all the language in the plea agreement.

Nonetheless, paragraph 5 of the plea agreement contains the language, "if the Court finds that a guideline range applies." So this objection, even if it were preserved by the defense, is overruled.

Paragraph 87, this objection is overruled. There's nothing about the factual accuracy of the language that is contested, and the Court will make its own determination about the defendant's ability to pay a fine.

Okay. Are there any further objections that I haven't covered, Mr. Driscoll?

MR. DRISCOLL: Not from the defense, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Kenerson?

MR. KENERSON: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Having ruled on the objections, I will accept the factual recitations in the presentence report regarding the circumstances of the offense, and, therefore, the facts as stated in the presentence report will be my findings of fact for the purposes of this sentencing.

The next issue is the determination of the guidelines, which is far more complicated in this case than in any other that I usually have before me. The presentence report lays out the Probation Office's calculation of the advisory guidelines that apply in this case. The calculation was done using the 2018 guidelines manual and is as follows:

The Probation Office's position is that, since there is no

analogous guideline, an advisory guideline range could not be determined for Ms. Butina's offense. The parties agree that pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines §2X1.1, the guideline range for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 follows the underlying substantive offense, which in this case is 18 U.S.C. § 951.

The parties further agree that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines do not specify an applicable guideline for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 951.

Pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines §2X5.1, where the guidelines do not expressly specify an applicable guideline, the Court should, and I quote, "apply the most analogous guideline. If there is not a sufficient analogous guideline, the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 shall control except that any guidelines and policy statements that can be applied meaningfully in the absence of a Chapter 2 offense guideline shall remain applicable.

So the government argues that there is no sufficiently analogous guideline for the underlying substantive offense and that the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 should control.

Before I go any further, Ms. Butina, have you discussed this disagreement -- it's very complicated -- having to do with our sentencing guidelines --

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. We did discuss it.

THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand the dispute?

Do you understand your lawyer's position?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. The defense argues that §2B1.1 is the most analogous and can be applied meaningfully for sentencing in this case. The defense also points the Court to U.S. sentencing guidelines §2J1.4.

The Court finds that there is not a sufficiently analogous guideline, and therefore the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 shall control. Neither the government nor the defense counsel has presented this Court with any binding authority on this question; that is authority from the D.C. Circuit or the Supreme Court, and this Court has been unable to find any either.

The majority of the courts that have dealt with this issue have determined that § 951 does not have a sufficiently analogous guideline, and I will cite to the cases the government provided to the Court:

United States v. Soueid, No. 11-CR-494, Document 59, from the Eastern District of Virginia; United States v. Chun, No. 16-CR-618, from the Southern District of New York; United States v. Alvarez, No. 05-CR-20943, from the Southern District of Florida; United States v. Buryakov, No. 15-CR-73, from the Southern District of New York; and United States v. Duran, No. 07-CR-20999, from the Southern District of Florida.

The defense urges the Court to follow the decision in United States v. Dumeisi, 2006 Westlaw 2990436, from the Northern District of Illinois. The defense characterizes this decision as the leading case for the proposition that U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines §2B1.1 is the most analogous action for a violation of § 951.

However, the Court is unaware of any other cases that have held as such, and the Court finds that there is no reasoning provided in the *Dumeisi* decision that would cause this court to disregard the other cases that I've cited and that the government cited.

The Court also finds that an elements-based approach does not advance the defendant's position. The offenses that the defense argues are analogous do not require any additional act in addition to the deceptive statement or withholding of information. In contrast, § 951 has an action element. Moreover, apart from an elements-based approach, §2B1.1 is primarily for theft and embezzlement offenses.

While §2B1.1 is used for false statements in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, the Court agrees with the government that the gravamen of a 951 violation is the acting as an agent of a foreign government without first notifying the Attorney General. It is of no moment that the acts themselves may have been legal. And I use the word "may." I'm making no finding that they were or were not.

Now, having determined the applicable guidelines, the next step is for me to consider departures. The presentence report does not include any departure grounds. The government has filed, under seal, a §5K1.1 motion for a downward departure.

1 The Court will grant that motion. The defense does not request 2 any other departures in its sentencing memorandum, and Probation 3 does not recommend any, which the defense did not object to.

Now, § 3553 requires me to consider a variety of factors, including the applicable penal statutes. So let me take a moment to describe the applicable statutory penalties for this The statutory maximum here is five years of imprisonment. If a term of imprisonment is imposed, the statutes provide that Ms. Butina faces a supervised release range following imprisonment of not more than three years.

In a case of a deportable alien who will likely be deported after imprisonment, the Court should ordinarily not impose a term of supervised release unless required by statute. That's from §5D1.1. The Court is aware of no statute that would require it to impose a term of supervised release in this case.

The statute of conviction sets a maximum fine of up to \$250,000, and a special assessment of \$100 per count is mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3013. The statutory restitution provision is inapplicable here because there is no identified victim.

Counsel, have I stated accurately the statutory framework under which we're operating in this case? Mr. Kenerson?

MR. KENERSON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Driscoll?

MR. DRISCOLL: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, before I discuss the other

23

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

1.3

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

24

25

sentencing factors that will bear on my final decision, I will at this point notify the parties of the particular sentence the Probation Office has recommended.

The Probation Office has recommended 12 months and one day of incarceration. Probation does not recommend supervised release, probation, or a fine. The recommendation of the Probation Office is not based on any facts or circumstances that have not already been revealed to the parties in the presentence report.

Now, at this point I'd like to give the parties the opportunity to address the sentencing guideline range and any other factors that bear on my consideration of a fair and just sentence under § 3553(a).

Mr. Kenerson, does the government wish to speak about the application of the factors?

MR. KENERSON: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.

So reading through both of the parties' submissions in this case --

THE COURT: I'm going to ask you to get closer to the microphone.

MR. KENERSON: Understood. So reading through both of the parties' submissions in this case, Your Honor, there is a picture, I think, that emerges of a young woman who is simultaneously talented and caring, but who is also savvy and determined. And despite the differing tone in the parties'

1.3

pleadings, this is not a case of contested evidence; it's a case of contested interpretation of that evidence. The government is not contesting Ms. Butina's love for her family or her desire for education or that she bought American toothpaste for the Russian Official.

But the defense, similarly, is not contesting that

Ms. Butina was here trying to establish a back channel of
communication with Russia. It does not contest that before she
was a student, she was able to get meetings with the Russian
ambassador, and that at that meeting she promised to send him
contact information for a prominent American and the name of an
advisor to a presidential candidate who would come to Moscow -that's in Exhibit No. 5 -- or that she was drafting notes that
talked about how to exert influence over U.S. foreign policy, or
noting how downplaying the Kremlin hand will help the Russians
exert the speediest and most effective influence in the
decision-making apparatus of the U.S. establishment. That's in
Exhibits 6 and 7.

The defense is not contesting that the defendant wrote notes to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs explaining the Russian Official's ability to come to the United States to meet with presidential candidates, and that they actually planned and hoped to do so on more than one occasion when the Russian Official was here.

It's not contesting that she sought the Russian governmental

feedback on someone she thought would be a Secretary of State candidate, believing that the Russian opinion would be taken into account in the United States.

So while it is certainly true that the defendant was an American University student and was a devoted daughter and sister -- and is a devoted daughter and sister -- she was simultaneously, in her own words, as quoted in the government's memorandum, executing a plan to establish unofficial contact based on common views and a system of conservative values with key politically minded organizations within the United States including the executive level of Political Party 1. And as she admitted in her Statement of Offense, she did this for the benefit of the Russian Federation.

As the Court weighs the 3553(a) factors, it shouldn't lose sight of that last fact. The information that the defendant put back to Russia through the back channel that she was trying to establish was of extreme importance to the Russian Federation, as I think the Court saw in former Assistant Director Anderson's declaration, and Russia targets the United States for malign, intrusive intelligence operations.

That the defendant did not know the exact final use to which this information would be put and that it was not classified, did not involve dead drops or spy tradecraft, does not diminish the potential harm that the defendant caused to the United States.

The declaration of former Assistant Director Anderson, of course, we believe speaks for itself, but it's important to note how valuable the information is that she sent back, information that had we received similar information in reverse, the Assistant Director for Counterintelligence would want to know that information. Her back channel of communication had serious harms -- serious potential to harm the U.S. political process as well as foreign policy interests and national security.

Of course, the Court has to analyze not only the seriousness of the offense but the defendant's role within that offense, and we'd ask the Court to look not just at Assistant Director Anderson's declaration but also at the defendant's conduct as laid out in the Statement of Offense and the exhibits, based on her knowledge and intentions.

We submit that that conduct, with her knowledge and her intent, was undoubtedly serious. This is, I think, where we fundamentally but respectfully disagree with defense's position here. This is not a registration offense. This is a case where the defendant acted in the United States as the agent of a foreign government, and as she admitted in the Statement of Offense, that she did so for the benefit of Russia.

As her words make clear, she was not solely an international relations student. Prior to her enrollment at American, and prior to the fact when her student visa was even

granted, she was organizing political trips for the Gun Rights
Organization senior leadership, among other things on that trip,
but it certainly had a political component, and sending
information about the political importance of the Gun Rights
Organization members back to Moscow.

She was specifically worried about her initiative being seized by someone else in the Russian government after that, and that's just one example of operational-type discussions amongst a lot of others that she had with the Russian Official.

When the defendant wrote about presidential candidates, she did not solely copy Wikipedia. For example, in Exhibit 4, she highlighted having met the candidate's advisors in the matters of international affairs and also highlighted having another such meeting planned.

She used the U.S.-Russia Friendship Dinners to learn

American influencers' reactions to her pitch on U.S.-Russia

relations, and she was able to adjust her pitch accordingly.

She asked advice on the Russian government's readiness to meet

with people, and the Russian Official wanted to make sure that

her contacts did not forget her after the election.

She provided names of potential Secretary of State appointees, organized a large delegation to the National Prayer Breakfast with the express goal of starting this back channel of communication, and she was again worried about someone in the Russian government seizing the initiative afterwards when she

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

failed to meet with the President as she was promised. It's her words and her intent as stated throughout that matters here, and there's no doubt that she was not simply a grad student.

The Court, of course, has a copy of the Diplomacy Project. The defense spends a lot of time talking about that in their submission. But when read in the context of Exhibits 6 and 7, talking about how to best exert influence over U.S. policy, and in the context of her note to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on getting Russian Official to the meetings to meet presidential candidates, and going so far afterwards as to suggest gifts to give these candidates to suggest at the start of this back channel of diplomacy, in the context of statements regarding laying the groundwork for the past five years with the Political Party 1 leadership and asking whether the government was ready to meet advisors and attempting to meet the President in 2017, it's clear that while the defendant was a student and before she enrolled, she was actively spending a significant amount of time trying to build this back channel of communication between the United States and Russia.

So the Court should not lose sight of these actions which occurred both prior to and concurrently with her attendance at American and throughout multiple visa applications. She knew -- as we laid out in the Statement of Offense, and she agreed, she knew that some of the information was going to the Russian government writ large, and she knew that the Russian Official

was a conduit to the Russian government writ large. This is not simply a case about whether defendant could have legally done everything she had done had she registered.

As we note in the government's memo, we obviously do not know what would have happened had she notified the Attorney General at any particular step in the process, or prior to her application for her F-1 visa, or prior to her application to American or to any other university. Maybe those visas would have been granted, but maybe they wouldn't.

That's the whole point, is that the defendant's actions deprived the United States of the ability to make that choice. They deprived American University of the ability to decide whether to admit her at all or whether to keep her on as a student if she had filed something during her time there. And it deprived many individuals within the United States of the ability to decide for themselves whether and on what terms to meet with her.

And her conduct, I think, really shows how easily it can be for a foreign government to target Americans in the United States. Her failure to register also gave the Russian government plausible deniability that she was acting on their behalf, which I'm sure the Court has seen they've attempted to use numerous times since this case was brought.

So, for these reasons, we respectfully disagree with the defense position that this is simply a failure-to-notify case

analogous to not filing a tax return or failing to register for military service.

But the government also recognizes, I think as we laid out in our memorandum, that this case is not espionage, which of course prescribes a much higher guideline range than what the government has requested here. The defendant should get credit for her acceptance of responsibility, she should get credit for having done so and agreed to cooperate in a case as high-profile as this one, and the Court should give her credit for those things.

We also recognize, as I think we did in the written submission, the lack of need for specific deterrence, and we acknowledge her substantial assistance, which the Court has noted, granted the government's motion. So the Court should take, obviously, all that into account, and the government did as well in coming to its sentencing recommendation to the Court.

And we're happy to answer any questions the Court may have at the bench about that substantial assistance, but unless the Court has any other questions for the government -- sure.

THE COURT: Let me inquire of Mr. Driscoll first if he would like to question Mr. Anderson. If he does not, then -- if he does, then you may approach again and address any issues raised in that questioning. Mr. Driscoll?

MR. DRISCOLL: I'm happy to leave the record as it is.

THE COURT: All right. And again, as I said, I have

reviewed your objections and your responses to the declaration 1 2 in your motion to strike and have taken those into consideration. 3 All right. Thank you, Mr. Kenerson. 4 MR. KENERSON: Thank you. 5 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Driscoll or Mr. Carry, 6 would defense counsel like to speak on Ms. Butina's behalf? 7 MR. DRISCOLL: Your Honor, assuming that the guideline 8 calculation lack of -- you're not going to apply 2B1.1 is firm, 9 we won't argue that. We'll just note our objection for the 10 record, and we'll just move on to the allocution with Mr. Carry. 11 THE COURT: Yes. You may approach for the allocution, 12 and your objection is noted for the record. 13 MR. DRISCOLL: Thank you. 14 THE COURT: Mr. Carry. 15 MR. CARRY: Thank you, Judge. 16 I have a few prepared remarks. 17 THE COURT: That's fine. I'll just ask that you 18 speak -- when we read, we tend to speed up, and for the sake 19 of my court reporter, if you could slow down a bit. Thank you. 20 MR. CARRY: Sure. So, for the past nine months, I've 21 gotten to know Mariia well. It's been impossible to speak with 22 her without sensing some regret. She never wished to break any 23 She never wished to lie. She never lied, and she never 24 acted maliciously. Even so, she knows she violated an important 25 statute, and for this she's being sentenced.

Before I tell the story of the actions Mariia took that has led to this moment, I'd like to first begin by addressing what's on everyone's mind. The case against Mariia is certainly timely. America is looking for enemies wherever we can find them. We feel wronged, and we should feel wronged, about the attacks on our democracy perpetrated by those who wish to cause us harm. Our laws exist for a reason: so we can have a government free from undue influence.

But here's the fact I wish to stress to the Court.

Mariia is not a spy. She's not intelligence. She's never been employed by the Russian government. She knows of no secret codes, safe houses, illegals. She has never engaged in covert activity, and she has never lied to our government.

I mention all this because, while many of us may be skeptical and untrusting, and I understand that feeling, the point is that Mariia is not a proxy for the Russian government. She's not a proxy for the Russian 13 who were indicted and remain at large.

Even so, Mariia did commit a serious crime for which she has deep remorse. The reason she's here today is because she failed to notify our government before agreeing to act as an agent of a Russian official.

Agent of a Russian official. I appreciate how that sounds. It's easy to let your mind wander and draw conclusions. But, of course, there are many agents of foreign governments

acting lawfully in the United States. The difference between those agents and Mariia is that they notified our government in advance, while Mariia did not. So when our government calls Mariia an agent, they are not calling her an intelligence agent. They are not calling her a secret agent.

In truth, nothing about Mariia has been secret. She's answered every single question posed to her by our federal government, and she's been answering these questions before she was even arrested. As we put in our memo, Mariia voluntarily produced thousands of pages of documents and voluntarily appeared before this same body, a Senate intel committee, answering all of its questions for a voluntary deposition for an eight-hour time period.

When the FBI carried out a search warrant, she gave the agents all of her electronics and passwords. She had nothing to hide. And when the FBI seized her computer and phone devices again with her arrest, they requested her passwords once more, and she had not changed them.

So what happened? Well, a lot of things have been said, and Mariia has explained everything. But her crime really comes down to this, and it's very simple. During Mariia's time in the United States, and unbeknownst to her, she was committing a felony, conspiracy to violate § 951.

While in this country, she maintained close contact with her family and friends from Russia. One of them was Aleksandr

Torshin, an official who used to work at the Russian Central Bank. They discussed vacations and their daily lives, but Mariia also took advice from him and did things for him. I don't mean to trivialize or rehash all the details which you have available to you, but the context for these things is somewhat important.

So, for example, she bought clothes for his grandchildren. She was also invited to a presidential campaign announcement, and she described the event to him because he asked about it.

Mariia complied by translating a Wikipedia page she copy-pasted into a Twitter direct message. This is how they communicated back and forth, and it was all unsecured.

Before starting school, Mariia made these business cards that listed her as a special assistant to Torshin. The title was made up. While traveling on a trip with him to the U.S. for an NRA event, there was a point when the host asked: One hotel room or two? This made her uncomfortable. She wanted to be appreciated for her intellect, not her gender. So she asked Torshin for permission to make the card and phony title, to keep anyone from mistaking her relationship with him for a romantic one ever again, and he said okay.

Once in school, Mariia met her share of discrimination on the American University campus, especially after the 2016 election. This didn't deter her, though. She grew to love the United States. You know, she tells a story. One of the first

stories she told me was that when she got here, she went to a grocery store, and she felt like it looked like a museum.

THE COURT: Mr. Carry, you just said she met her share of discrimination on the American University campus. What are you referring to?

MR. CARRY: So there were moments when she was in classes and there were people who read an article that came out that portrayed her in a bad light, and they presumed that she was here for bad reasons. As you see in one of the character letters that was provided, she points out that if they knew her, had they got to meet her, they would see that she's kind and generous, and she's not shady or shadowy. And it was hard for her to make friends, and so the friends she did have there were few and far between.

But in any event, like a sponge, she wanted to learn as much as she could about this country, and she admired our work ethic and ideals. And she knew this country to be good and just. In fact, she wished to live here. But she also loved her home, her family. She wanted a foot in both worlds.

So she thought perhaps she could work for a think tank; perhaps she could start a foundation or be the go-to consultant for anything American or Russian. These are the kinds of things that she had in mind as a potential career. Graduation was inevitable, so she continued to share her political thoughts and ideas with her American contacts and Torshin, although not under

orders or for money.

When the government tells this story, they stress words and phrases like "agenda" and "Russian interests" and "unofficial transmitter of communications." They're in the Statement of Offense. And we don't walk them back, but I believe the government has highlighted these words to make her actions appear more nefarious than they were.

Her agenda was better relations between Russia and the United States. The Russian interests she was pursuing was all the same. And as an unofficial transmitter of communications, this means that she had conversations with like-minded people at Friendship Dinners and other civic society events about how to improve relations.

These Friendship Dinners weren't a bad thing. It's not like they were plotting behind the scenes about how to infect the American government with a Manchurian candidate. No. They were cultural exchanges, attended mostly by artists, movie directors, philanthropists, and political wonks. They talked about world history and U.S.-Russian affairs. They talked about peace. And Mariia shared her thoughts and ideas with them as they did with her.

The Friendship Dinners were publicized and out in the open, and they were organized with her help by an American philanthropist who she met and has long been interested in restoring the relations with the U.S. and Russia as a legacy to

his father, which was an equal interest of Mariia's.

THE COURT: You're referring to Mr. O'Neill.

MR. CARRY: I'm referring to U.S. Person No. 2.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. CARRY: Mariia never stole any documents, bribed any officials, funneled money to the NRA, or lied to any investigators. And she just can't see how anyone would think she's a spotter.

I'll also note that some have cast doubt on the seriousness of a gun rights group in a country that doesn't allow such rights. I don't normally like to inject myself into argument, but I'll remind those same people that there was a time in this country when women did not have the right to vote, and I didn't have the right to marry. Rights advocacy is a bedrock principle of being American. Her gun advocacy wasn't a pretext, it was sincere, and the written testimonials from the wrongly convicted people she helped as part of her work should show that.

I also take issue with how the government has characterized some of her time in the U.S., as though she was only interested in her diplomacy activities versus school. Mariia came to the United States for school, and she was a straight-A student at AU. And I mean a near 4.0. She held two internships, did workstudy for professors, studied at the library every day, participated in class, took her coursework seriously, did all of her exams, and graduated with high marks.

When Mariia was arrested, it had been stated that she was using her education as a cover for nefarious or clandestine ends. This is not true. Mariia's main interest in coming to the United States was to pursue graduate work, but as an admirer of both this country and her home, she hoped for a better relationship between the two nations. For this reason, and for this reason alone, Mariia pursued peace-building by organizing dinners between Americans and Russians who wanted better relations.

In the end, Mariia didn't notify our government in advance of her activities, although she would have committed no crime if she had. Regardless, Mariia has confessed to her crime. She recognizes that her good ends were sought using unlawful means. She admits that her activities triggered a duty to notify the Attorney General and that she failed to provide that notice. For this, she is remorseful.

This remorse, which I know many Americans will be suspicious of, is not merely because she is currently in jail where she has spent most -- some of her time in solitary confinement. No. Mariia is filled with regret because she has accidentally harmed a country that she loved and admired, a country where she saw a future for herself, a country where she was moving to South Dakota to begin an American life.

These hopes have obviously been undone by her own actions. But Mariia understands why this is so, and her contrition is

honest, like everything else about her.

Judge, like you, I used to be a public defender. I loved the work and continue to help when I can because I can appreciate, in the words of Bryan Stevenson, that each of us is more than the worst thing we've ever done. In my eight years practicing law, I have met no one, and I've never said this before, but no one more emblematic of that belief than Mariia.

She has learned a valuable lesson. Given the highprofile nature of this case, she has felt the depths of shame
and humiliation. She has felt the weight of being called a
felon -- which now she is -- a foreign agent, and to some in the
news, a spy. These are brands that she will bear for the rest
of her days, and she knows what they will mean for her future.

She has languished in solitary confinement. Other than brief trips for transport, Mariia has gone outside only once. She has served a sobering night in Central Cell Block, weeks in the D.C. jail, and months in the Alexandria Detention Center. She has been justly punished.

Finally, I appreciate the sometimes higher range sentences for § 951 that the government points out for offenders, but this case is distinguishable. Mariia stole no sensitive information. She did no covert activity. She never lied to our government. There are no multiple counts here. She cooperated immensely.

All of Mariia's many good qualities as well, which are reflected in the many character letters you have seen, should

not be overshadowed by her aberrant act. So I ask that you impose a sentence of time served.

Unless you have any other questions for me with respect to the factors, I believe that Mariia would like to now speak.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Carry.

Ms. Butina?

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you very much for this opportunity to speak in front of you.

Dear Judge, I came to the U.S. like many others, to better my life. For me, that meant getting an academic degree, and I had no doubt that the best way to do that was here. I wanted a future career in the international policy. At the same time, I wished to mend relations while improving my own resume. So I sought to build bridges between my motherland and the country I grew to love. It was for these actions and my own ignorance that I deeply sorry and hope to be shown mercy. Never did I wish to hurt anyone.

My parents discovered my arrest on the morning news they watch in their rural house in a Siberian village. I love them dearly, but it harmed them morally and financially. They are suffering from all of that. I destroyed my own life as well. I came to the U.S. not under any orders but with hope, and now nothing remains but penitence.

If I had known to register as a foreign agent, I would have done so without delay. I never lied or held any secrets.

I never injured someone or committed other crimes. I just didn't register because I didn't know to. Ignorance of law, however, is not an excuse, in the U.S. or in Russia. And so I humbly request forgiveness.

The United States has always been kind to me, and while it has never been my intent to harm the American people, I did just that by not notifying your government of my actions in advance. I deeply regret this crime not merely because it has scarred me, my beloved friends and my cherished family, but, ironically, it has harmed my attempts to improve the relationships between the two countries.

For all the international scandal my arrest has caused, I feel ashamed and embarrassed. My parents taught me the virtue of higher education, how to live life lawfully, and how to be good and kind to others. I have three degrees, but now I'm a convicted felon with no job, no money, and no freedom.

My reputation is ruined both here in the United States and abroad. And while I know that I'm not this evil person who has been depicted in the media, I am responsible for these consequences. My personal ambitions and thinking, my choices, put me in this situation, and I'm sorry for all the alarm my behavior has become the reason for.

Just an apology will never be enough for my mistakes, dear Judge, because instead of building peace, I created discord.

I cannot change the past, though I've surely tried. I have

helped the U.S. government in any way they have requested, even before my arrest, by aiding the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee last spring, by aiding FBI agents, and recently by aiding the U.S. Attorney's Office. I still hold the whisper in my heart to one day return to this country, but I know this wish is only a dream.

Dear Judge Chutkan, over the last nine months, I've learned humility. I've met and shared stories with some remarkable other women, each flawed and struggling in their own way, but still good in their own way. As a Christian, God has carried me through so much and gave me so much. My attorneys fighting for me were not getting paid.

My family and the few friends who generously talked to me during days or nights while on breaks on my solitary confinement, I've seen those who have never had visitors or any money, even for a 30-seconds phone call. I've seen others who have waited along with me in the visitation room, and their visitors has never come. I'm so grateful for what I have, dear judge.

I've also kept a quote on my windowsill from my cell that says, "When you go through deep waters, I'll be with you." God has carried me through this uneasy but deserved experience. It is my penance. Now I beg for mercy, for the chance to go home and restart my life. Please accept my apologies and allow me to begin again. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Butina.

Sentencing is the most difficult part of this job.

After considering the departures and hearing statements made

by counsel and Ms. Butina, statements which I believe were

sincerely made, on both sides, I must now consider the relevant

factors set out by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and ensure

that I impose a sentence sufficient but not greater than

necessary to comply with the purposes of sentencing.

These purposes include the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense. The sentence should also deter criminal conduct, protect the public from future crimes by the defendant, and promote rehabilitation.

I must consider in each case the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the types of sentences available, and the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. I've considered all of these factors in deciding what the appropriate sentence is in this case, and I will discuss some of them now.

With regard to the nature of the offense, as Mr. Anderson, who is the former Assistant Director of the FBI's Counterintelligence Division, noted in his declaration, the United States is Russia's primary target for malign and intrusive intelligence operations.

In targeting the United States, and I quote, "Russia works to obtain not only classified material or trade secrets, but also to collect any information that could, by itself or in conjunction with other efforts, assist the Russian government in increasing its geopolitical power or undermining and harming that of the United States."

Contrary to defense counsel assertions in its sentencing memorandum, this was no mere failure to provide the U.S. government with required information. While it is certainly true that Ms. Butina was not engaged in any espionage activity, and while I certainly agree that she was a legitimate and hard-working student at the same time as she was engaging efforts, she was not simply seeking to learn about the U.S. political system.

She was seeking to collect information about individuals and organizations that could be helpful to the Russian government, and she was doing this under the direction of a Russian official for the benefit of the Russian government at a time when the Russian government was acting to interfere and affect the United States' political and electoral process.

Her activities organizing Gun Rights Organization visits to Russia, U.S.-Russia Friendship Dinners, were all used to establish back-channel lines of communication to advance Russian interests. The conduct was sophisticated, and penetrated deep into political organizations. Ms. Butina was likely able to

establish the contacts she did precisely because she did not reveal herself to be an agent of a foreign government.

This case is not simply about failing to notify the

Attorney General. Yes, it may be true that had Ms. Butina

alerted the Attorney General, her conduct might have been legal.

But it is because she did not register that her conduct was so

dangerous and her crime a threat to our country's democratic

institutions.

One of the things that Ms. Butina should have learned during her studies in this country is that she was able to participate in our political system and make connections because this is a country where our constitution protects individuals' freedoms to associate, gather, and exchange ideas, free from governmental interference.

But this is also a country where the rule of law means something, and our laws require her to declare her true business in this country, which was to gather information and develop relationships that could be used to Russia's advantage. This was no simple misunderstanding by an overeager foreign student. There can be no doubt, as Mr. Anderson noted in his declaration, that the offense that Ms. Butina has pled to is serious and jeopardized this country's national security.

Turning to Ms. Butina's characteristics as an offender.

It is apparent to this court, from hearing from Ms. Butina,

from hearing from Mr. Carry, Mr. Driscoll, over the last nine

months, and from reading all of the letters submitted on your behalf, Ms. Butina, that you are an intelligent, personable, kind, and hard-working person who is a devoted daughter, sister, granddaughter, and who impressed people wherever she went.

It is also clear to this court that you were a legitimate and engaged student at American University and that you -- you know, in a language that is not your own, you managed to graduate with a 3.91 grade point average, and that is to your credit.

I also accept and understand that you have acknowledged your wrongdoing and have fully accepted responsibility for it. You have provided the government with substantial assistance and cooperation, resulting in their filing of a downward departure letter. You are well educated, you have no prior convictions, you don't have a prior history of criminal activity, and I will tell you that I have no doubt that you will not have any further criminal activity in your future.

I do also understand that on completion of your sentence, should I sign the order of removal, you may be immediately subject to removal. You have a strong support network, which is evidenced by the many letters that the Court has received from your family, your friends, your former professors, your support network, priests, your former colleagues -- one former colleague at American University, and others.

No doubt you have suffered greatly because of the national attention that this case has received, including some salacious

details that were proven to be incorrect. And in the era of Google, those will be difficult to overcome. So I take those factors into consideration, and I take your absolute -- what I take to be your absolute sincerity and remorse into consideration.

Ms. Butina faces a maximum sentence of five years of imprisonment. She has been held for a little over nine months. Her counsel asks for her to be sentenced to time served, and she and the government have agreed to an order of removal, which will hopefully prevent her from spending additional prison time beyond her sentence awaiting deportation proceedings.

The government, after moving for a downward departure, asks for a sentence of 18 months of incarceration, which will mean that, with the time she has already been held, she would serve an additional nine months less any potential institutional good-time credit.

In addition to the nature and circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of Ms. Butina, I also have to consider the purposes of sentencing, among other factors, and one of the specific factors in 3553(a) is the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparity.

However, because there is not a sufficiently analogous sentencing guideline in this case, the Court was unable to find reliable national or D.C. Circuit statistics for mean and median sentences, and neither the government nor the defense has

provided any. What is clear, however, is that sentences for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 951 and conspiracies to commit that offense vary greatly. The Court's sentence is in line with a number of cases that the Court has reviewed.

If you could stand.

(Defendant complies.)

Having considered all of these factors, this court believes that a penalty of 18 months is sufficient but not greater than necessary to reflect the seriousness of the instant offense, to promote deterrence, to protect the public from future crimes that may be committed, and to avoid unwarranted disparities among defendants convicted of similar crimes.

Therefore, based on my consideration of all the 3553(a) factors, I will now state the sentence to be imposed.

It is the judgment of this court that you, Mariia Butina, are hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons for a term of 18 months on Count 1. You are further ordered to pay a special assessment of \$100. The Court finds that you do not have the ability to pay a fine and therefore waives imposition of a fine in this case.

The special assessment is immediately payable to the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Within 30 days of any change of address, you shall notify the Clerk of the Court of the change until such time as the financial obligation is paid in full.

The Probation Office shall release the presentence investigation report to all appropriate agencies in order to execute the sentence of the Court. Treatment agencies shall return the presentence report to the Probation Office upon the defendant's completion or termination from treatment. The Probation Office shall release the presentence investigation report and/or judgment and commitment order to the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement to facilitate any deportation proceedings.

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742, Ms. Butina, you have a right to appeal the sentence imposed by the Court if the period of imprisonment is longer than the statutory maximum or the sentence departs upward from the applicable sentencing guideline range. If you choose to appeal, you must file any appeal within 14 days after the Court enters judgment.

As defined in 28 U.S.C. § 2255, you also have the right to challenge the conviction entered or sentence imposed if new and currently unavailable information becomes available to you, or on a claim that you received ineffective assistance of counsel in entering a plea of guilty to the offense of conviction or in connection with sentencing. If you are unable to afford the cost of an appeal, you may request permission from the court to file an appeal without cost to you.

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit opinion in *United States v.*Hunter, 809 F.3d 677, are there any objections to the sentence

1 imposed that are not already noted on the record? Mr. Kenerson? 2 MR. KENERSON: No, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Mr. Driscoll? 4 MR. DRISCOLL: Other than noted, no. 5 THE COURT: All right. As set forth in the plea 6 agreement, the government pledged to move to dismiss the 7 remaining count of the indictment against Ms. Butina. 8 Does the government wish to do so now? 9 MR. KENERSON: Yes, Your Honor. We move to dismiss 10 the remaining count. 11 The motion is granted. THE COURT: The Court will 12 grant the Joint Motion for Order of Judicial Removal, which is 13 ECF No. 92. As a point of clarification, the last sentence of 14 the proposed order that was submitted to me read: "Wherefore, 15 it is hereby ordered, pursuant to Section 238(c) of INA, 8 U.S.C. 16 § 1228(c), that the defendant is ordered removed from the United 17 States to the Russian Federation promptly upon her sentencing." 18 To be clear, "upon her sentencing" means upon the 19 completion of the sentence just imposed. The Court has changed 20 the language to read "promptly upon the completion of her 21 sentence." Is there any objection to this not already stated, 22 Mr. Kenerson? 23 MR. KENERSON: No, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Mr. Driscoll? 25 MR. DRISCOLL: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else we should address today? All right. Ms. Butina, your counsel was correct when he quoted Bryan Stevenson in that you are -- and I tell this to defendants frequently -- that you are not the worst thing you have ever done. You are a young woman; you are smart; you are hard-working; you have a future ahead of you. I wish you the best luck. (Proceedings adjourned at 11:09 a.m.)

* * * * * *

CERTIFICATE

I, BRYAN A. WAYNE, Official Court Reporter, certify that the foregoing pages are a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Bryan A. Wayne BRYAN A. WAYNE