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FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SA CR NO. 18-00124 JLS

<u>I N F O R M A T I O N</u>

[18 U.S.C. § 371: Conspiracy; 42 U.S.C. \S 1320a-7b(b)(1)(\overline{A}): Soliciting and Receiving Illegal Remunerations for Health Care Referrals; 18 U.S.C. §§ 982(a)(7), 981(a)(1)(C), and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c): Criminal Forfeiture]

The United States Attorney charges:

COUNT ONE

[18 U.S.C. § 371]

INTRODUCTORY ALLEGATIONS Α.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

DANIEL CAPEN,

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

At all times relevant to this Information:

Healthsmart Pacific Inc., doing business as Pacific Hospital of Long Beach ("Pacific Hospital" or "PHLB"), was a hospital located in Long Beach, California, specializing in surgeries, particularly spinal and orthopedic surgeries. From in or around 1997 to in or around June 2004, Pacific Hospital was owned by majority shareholder Michael D. Drobot ("Drobot") -- through his Michael D.

Drobot Revocable Trust (the "Revocable Trust") and HealthSmart

Management Services Organization, Inc. ("HealthSmart MSO"), an entity

affiliated with Drobot -- as well as a number of physicians. In or

around June 2004, Pacific Hospital repurchased shares of common stock

from the physicians, effectively leaving Drobot as the sole owner of

Pacific Hospital.

- 2. On or about September 27, 2005, unindicted co-conspirator A ("UCC-A") effectively became the sole shareholder of Pacific Hospital through his ownership and control of the "[UCC-A] Family Trust," which, in turn, owned Abrazos Healthcare, Inc. ("Abrazos"), a privately held corporation formed and incorporated in February 2005 for the purpose of purchasing shares of Pacific Hospital from Drobot, through the Revocable Trust and HealthSmart MSO. UCC-A, through Abrazos, also acquired other interests in affiliated entities previously owned and/or controlled by Drobot.
- 3. On or about June 26, 2006, UCC-A provided defendant DANIEL CAPEN ("defendant CAPEN"), an orthopedic surgeon, with 10% of the common stock of Abrazos, which effectively gave defendant CAPEN a 10% ownership interest in Pacific Hospital.
- 4. On or about October 12, 2010, Drobot, through an affiliated entity, purchased UCC-A's shares of Abrazos, which effectively provided Drobot a 90% ownership interest in Pacific Hospital, while defendant CAPEN continued to maintain his 10% ownership interest until Pacific Hospital was sold on or about October 8, 2013.
- 5. James Canedo ("Canedo") was Pacific Hospital's Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"). UCC-B was Pacific Hospital's controller and would issue checks to vendors and other payees at the direction of Drobot, Canedo, and others affiliated with Pacific Hospital.

- 6. Pacific Specialty Physician Management, Inc. ("PSPM") was a corporation headquartered in Newport Beach, California, that provided administrative and management services for physicians' offices. Until approximately August 31, 2005, Drobot was the majority shareholder of PSPM, with George William Hammer ("Hammer"), UCC-C (a PSPM executive), Linda Martin ("Martin"), UCC-D (a PSPM manager and executive) all holding minority shareholder interests. After approximately August 31, 2005, PSPM was 47% owned by UCC-A, through the [UCC-A] Family Trust, 36% owned by Drobot, and 17% owned by three individuals affiliated with PSPM. Effective January 1, 2008, Hammer was given close to a 50% ownership interest in PSPM and UCC-D obtained the remaining approximately 50% of PSPM. On or about August 1, 2010, Hammer and UCC-D divested their shares in PSPM to Drobot, through his Revocable Trust. UCC-E, who Hammer hired as a controller for PSPM and affiliated entities in approximately 2001, served as PSPM's CFO starting in approximately mid-2008.
 - 7. One of the medical practices PSPM managed was Southwestern Orthopedic Medical Corporation, doing business as Downey Orthopedic Medical Group ("Downey Ortho"). Defendant CAPEN, along with other physicians affiliated with Downey Ortho (collectively, the "Downey Ortho-Affiliated Physicians," or singularly, a "Downey Ortho-Affiliated Physicians," or singularly, a "Downey Ortho-Affiliated Physician"), maintained a medical practice at various Downey Ortho clinic locations, including Downey, Thousand Oaks, and Sherman Oaks. Martin was the office manager for Downey Ortho from the inception of the practice until approximately 2004, and worked closely with UCC-D, who was affiliated with Downey Ortho since approximately 1997. Through PSPM's management of Downey Ortho, Martin and UCC-D became affiliated with PSPM. UCC-C replaced Martin,

in her role managing Downey Ortho, when Martin left PSPM in approximately 2004. UCC-C left PSPM in approximately September 2009 and, at that time, UCC-D became the Chief Operating Officer of PSPM, until PSPM stopped managing Downey Ortho in 2013.

- 8. California Pharmacy Management LLC ("CPM") was a limited liability company, headquartered in Newport Beach, California, that operated and managed a pharmaceutical dispensing program in medical clinics for physicians. Drobot and Michael R. Drobot Jr. ("Drobot Jr.") owned and/or operated CPM. Hammer also had an ownership interest in CPM at various times prior to 2010.
- 9. Industrial Pharmacy Management LLC ("IPM") was a limited liability company, headquartered in Newport Beach, California. IPM operated and managed a pharmaceutical dispensing program in medical clinics for physicians through the use of pharmaceutical management agreements and claims purchase agreements. Drobot principally owned and controlled IPM until approximately 2010, when Drobot Jr. assumed ownership and control of IPM.
- 10. International Implants LLC ("I2") was a limited liability company, headquartered in Newport Beach, California, that purchased implantable medical hardware for use in spinal surgeries from original manufacturers and sold them to hospitals, particularly Pacific Hospital, starting around July 2008. At various times, I2 was effectively owned and/or controlled by Drobot, PSPM, and UCC-F, who was the General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer of Pacific Hospital until approximately mid-2012. UCC-E was the CFO of I2.
- 11. UCC-G was a paralegal and risk manager at Pacific Hospital, who worked closely with UCC-F.

- 12. Timothy James Hunt ("Hunt") was an orthopedic surgeon specializing in shoulder and knee arthroscopy, who, starting in approximately June 2008, owned and operated Allied Medical Group ("Allied Medical"), a medical practice with clinics in Lawndale and Long Beach, California, specializing in orthopedic medicine.
- 13. UCC-H was an orthopedic surgeon who owned and operated Intercommunity Medical Group ("Intercommunity Medical"), a medical practice with clinic locations in Long Beach, Torrance, Santa Ana, and Lawndale, California. Hunt practiced medicine at Intercommunity Medical from 1998 to 2008.
- 14. UCC-I was an office manager for both Intercommunity Medical and Allied Medical. UCC-J was also an office manager for Hunt at Allied Medical.
- 15. Precision Monitoring Resource, LLC ("PMR") generated toxicology referrals, specifically including urine drug testing ("UDT"), for laboratory testing at Pacific Hospital. Drobot owned and/or operated PMR, along with UCC-K and UCC-E, who were the President and CFO of PMR, respectively.
- 16. Long Beach Prescription Pharmacy, Inc. ("LBPP") was primarily a mail order pharmacy, with a retail pharmacy location onsite at Pacific Hospital. Drobot, through his Revocable Trust, owned LBPP at least until August 2010, when Drobot Jr. assumed ownership and/or control of LBPP. Starting in approximately February 2011, Drobot and Drobot Jr. used LBPP as a vehicle for Pacific Hospital to reimburse Drobot Jr. for kickback payments Drobot Jr. provided to certain physicians, through IPM, to induce these physicians to, among other things, refer or perform surgeries at Pacific Hospital.

- 17. From at least 1998, through approximately in or around 2010, Hammer performed various executive functions supporting Pacific Hospital, CPM, IPM, PSPM, and related entities. From in or around 2010, through at least September 2013, Hammer performed various tax and accounting functions for defendant CAPEN and Pacific Hospital, CPM, IPM, PSPM, I2, PMR, LBPP, and other Drobot-related entities (collectively, "Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities") to facilitate the conspiracy described in paragraphs 32 to 36 below.
- 18. Paul Randall ("Randall") was a "marketer" for various entities and individuals, who did business with Pacific Hospital and Hunt. Randall entered into a toxicology referral arrangement with Hunt, and later sold his toxicology "marketing" business to PMR. In or around late 2011, PMR obtained Hunt's toxicology referrals for laboratory testing at Pacific Hospital.
- 19. Philip Sobol ("Sobol") was an orthopedic surgeon who -based on a kickback arrangement with PSPM under a sham option
 contract, and later with IPM under a partially bogus pharmaceutical
 claims purchase agreement -- referred surgery patients to defendant
 CAPEN and others for surgeries to be performed at Pacific Hospital.

California Workers' Compensation System ("CWCS")

20. The California Workers' Compensation System ("CWCS") was a system created by California law to provide insurance covering treatment of injury or illness suffered by individuals in the course of their employment. Under the CWCS, employers were required to purchase workers' compensation insurance policies from insurance carriers to cover their employees. When an employee suffered a covered injury or illness and received medical services, the medical service provider submitted a claim for payment to the relevant

insurance carrier, which then paid the claim. Claims were submitted to and paid by insurance carriers either by mail or electronically.

The CWCS was governed by various California laws and regulations.

21. The California State Compensation Insurance Fund ("SCIF") was a non-profit insurance carrier, created by the California Legislature, that provided workers' compensation insurance to employees in California, including serving as the "insurer of last resort" under the CWCS system for employers without any other coverage.

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- 22. The Federal Employees' Compensation Act, Title 5, United States Code, Sections 8101, et seq. ("FECA"), through the FECA program, provided certain benefits to civilian employees of the United States, for wage-loss disability due to a traumatic injury or occupational disease sustained while working as a federal employee. Benefits available to injured employees included rehabilitation, medical, surgical, hospital, pharmaceutical, and supplies for treatment of an injury.
- 23. The Office of Workers' Compensation Programs ("OWCP"), a component of the Department of Labor ("DOL"), administered the FECA program, which was a federal workers' compensation program focused on return to work efforts.

Health Care Programs

- 24. The FECA program was a "Federal health care program," as defined by 42 U.S.C. \S 1320a-7b(f).
- 25. SCIF and other workers' compensation insurance carriers, the FECA program, personal injury insurers, and other public and

private plans and contracts, were "health care benefit programs" (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 24(b)), that affected commerce.

Relevant California Laws Pertaining to Bribery and Kickbacks

- 26. California law, including but not limited to the California Business and Professions Code and the California Insurance Code, prohibited the offering, delivering, soliciting, or receiving of anything of value in return for referring a patient for medical services.
- 27. California Business & Professions Code Section 650 prohibited the offer, delivery, receipt, or acceptance by certain licensees -- specifically including physicians -- of any commission or other consideration, whether in the form of money or otherwise, as compensation or inducement for referring patients, clients, or customers to any person.
- 28. California Insurance Code Section 750(a) prohibited anyone who engaged in the practice of processing, presenting, or negotiating claims, including claims under policies of insurance, from offering, delivering, receiving, or accepting any commission or other consideration, whether in the form of money or otherwise, as compensation or inducement to any person for the referral or procurement of clients, cases, patients, or customers.

Fiduciary Duties and the Physician-Patient Relationship

29. A "fiduciary" obligation generally existed whenever one person -- a client -- placed special trust and confidence in another -- the fiduciary -- in reliance that the fiduciary would exercise his or her discretion and expertise with the utmost honesty and forthrightness in the interests of the client, such that the client could relax the care and vigilance which she or he would ordinarily

exercise, and the fiduciary knowingly accepted that special trust and confidence and thereafter undertook to act on behalf of the client based on such reliance.

30. Physicians owed a fiduciary duty to their patients, requiring physicians to act in the best interest of their patients, and not for their own professional, pecuniary, or personal gain. Physicians owed a duty of honest services to their patients for decisions made relating to the medical care of those patients, including the informed choice of whether to undergo surgery and other medical procedures, as well as the selection of a provider and facility for such surgeries and procedures. Patients' right to honest services from physicians included the right not to have physician-fiduciaries solicit or accept bribes and kickbacks connected to the medical care of such patients.

B. OBJECTS OF THE CONSPIRACY

31. Beginning on an unknown date, but no later than 1998, and continuing through at least in or around October 2013, in Orange and Los Angeles Counties, within the Central District of California, and elsewhere, Drobot, defendant CAPEN from no later than 1998 to at least in or about March 2013, Canedo from no later than 1999 to at least October 2013, Drobot Jr. from no later than 2005 to at least in or about April 2013, Martin from 1998 to 2004 and 2010 to 2013, UCC-A from in or about August 2005 to at least in or about October 2010, UCC-D from no later than 1998 to at least in or about March 2013, UCC-C from no later than 1998 to at least 2009, UCC-E from no later than 1998 to at least 2009, UCC-E from no later than 2005 to at least in or about April 2013, and others known and unknown to the United States Attorney at various times between 1998

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and 2013, knowingly combined, conspired, and agreed to commit the following offenses against the United States:

- a. honest services mail and wire fraud, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1341, 1343 and 1346;
- b. use of an interstate facility in aid of bribery, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1952(a);
- c. monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957; and
- d. knowingly and willfully soliciting or receiving remuneration in return for referring an individual for the furnishing and arranging for the furnishing of any item or service, or purchasing or ordering and arranging for and recommending purchasing or ordering any good, service, or item, for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program, in violation of Title 42, United States Code, Section 1320a-7b(b)(1).

C. MANNER AND MEANS OF THE CONSPIRACY

- 32. The objects of the conspiracy were to be carried out, and were carried out, in the following ways, among others:
- a. Drobot, Hammer, Canedo, Drobot Jr., Martin, UCC-A, UCC-D, UCC-C, UCC-E, UCC-F, UCC-G, UCC-K, and other co-conspirators working with Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities would offer to pay and cause the payment of kickbacks to defendant CAPEN, Hunt, Sobol, and other surgeons (the "Kickback Induced Surgeons"), chiropractors, personal injury attorneys, marketers, and others (collectively, the "Pacific Kickback Recipients") in exchange for patient-related referrals to Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities for spinal surgeries, other types of surgeries, magnetic resonance

imaging ("MRI"), toxicology (or "UDT"), durable medical equipment, and other services (the "Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services") that would be billed to health care benefit programs, including the CWCS and the FECA program.

- b. Influenced by the promise of kickbacks, Pacific Kickback Recipients, including Hunt, Sobol, and defendant CAPEN, would cause patients insured by various health care benefit programs to have Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services at Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities.
- c. The Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services were performed in connection with patients referred to Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities. With respect to surgeries, Kickback Induced Surgeons, including Hunt, Sobol, and defendant CAPEN, would perform these surgeries and/or refer surgery patients to other Kickback Induced Surgeons, or other surgeons, who would be obligated to perform such surgeries at Pacific Hospital. For example, Hunt and Sobol would refer surgery patients to defendant CAPEN, who would bring those surgery referrals, among others, to Pacific Hospital.
- d. Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities and Kickback Induced Surgeons, including Hunt, Sobol, and defendant CAPEN, would submit claims, by mail and electronically, to health care benefit programs for payments related to the Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services.
- e. As defendant CAPEN, Drobot, Drobot Jr., Canedo, UCC-A, Hammer, and other co-conspirators knew and intended, and as was reasonably foreseeable to them, in using the mails, wire communications, and facilities in interstate commerce to:
- (i) communicate about patient referrals and underlying kickback

arrangements, (ii) submit claims to health care benefit programs for the Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services, and (iii) obtain payment from health care benefit programs for the Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services, Drobot, defendant CAPEN, UCC-A, Hammer, and other coconspirators would solicit, offer, receive, or pay, and/or cause the solicitation, offering, receipt, and payment of kickbacks that were material to patients and health care benefit programs.

- treating or otherwise rendering care to patients, including defendant CAPEN, owed a duty of honest services to those patients for decisions made relating to medical care and treatment, including the informed choice of whether to undergo surgery and other medical procedures, as well as the choice of a treatment provider and facility for such surgeries and procedures. That defendant CAPEN and other medical professionals responsible for the medical care of these patients would solicit and receive kickbacks to induce the referral of these patients and corresponding ancillary services to Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entitles for Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services would be material to these patients. As a result, the referral of patients to Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities influenced by concealed kickbacks deprived these patients of their right to honest services.
- g. Using the mails and other facilities in interstate commerce, Drobot, UCC-A, Hammer, Drobot Jr., Canedo, Martin, UCC-D, UCC-C, UCC-E, UCC-F, UCC-K, and others would communicate about and pay, and cause the payment of, kickbacks to Pacific Kickback Recipients, including defendant CAPEN, who referred and caused the referral of Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services to Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities.

h. Health care benefit programs would pay Pacific
Hospital and Affiliated Entities and Kickback Induced Surgeons,
including defendant CAPEN, for the Kickback Tainted Surgeries and
Services by mail and electronically.

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- i. To conceal and disguise the kickback payments from health care benefit programs, patients, and law enforcement, Drobot, UCC-A, Hammer, Drobot Jr., UCC-F, and other co-conspirators, through Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities, would enter into arrangements with Pacific Kickback Recipients, including defendant CAPEN. In many cases, these arrangements would be reduced to written contracts, including, among others, collection agreements, option agreements, research and development agreements, lease and rental agreements, consulting agreements, marketing agreements, management agreements, and pharmacy agreements.
- j. The written agreements would not specify that one purpose for the agreements would be to induce Pacific Kickback Recipients to refer Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services to Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities; indeed, some of the agreements would specifically state that referrals were not contemplated or a basis for the agreement. Additionally, the value or consideration discussed as part of these arrangements would, in fact, generally not be provided or desired; rather, the compensation would be paid, entirely or in part, depending on the arrangement, to cause Pacific Kickback Recipients to refer Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services to Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities. Relatedly, the written contracts would generally allow for remuneration to Pacific Kickback Recipients far in excess of any reasonable fair market value assessment of legitimate services or things of value

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purportedly contracted for -- to the extent calculated without regard to the value of the Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services.

- Defendant CAPEN would receive remuneration in exchange for performing Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services at Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities. These illegal kickbacks would be provided to defendant CAPEN under the guise of various arrangements, both written and oral, including a management agreement with PSPM; a medical directorship with Abrazos; payments from Pacific Hospital for UDT referrals obtained through PMR; and payments representing purported consulting fees, bonuses, and dividends.
- l. Under the PSPM management agreement, starting in or about 1998 and continuing until at least January 2013:
- i. PSPM would manage the Downey Ortho medical practice, including defendant CAPEN and other Downey Ortho-Affiliated Physicians, effectively providing for the management and administration of day-to-day business operations. PSPM's management and administrative services for Downey Ortho would include providing equipment and furnishings; billing and collection services; and payment of rent, administrative staff salaries, and other miscellaneous expenses. In exchange for these management and administrative services, PSPM would be entitled to a percentage of Downey Ortho's monthly collections from patient billings, and, in turn, an allocated share of the monthly collections for defendant CAPEN and other co-conspirators practicing at Downey Ortho.
- ii. According to the terms of the management agreement between PSPM and Downey Ortho, PSPM's management fee, which was calculated as a specified percentage of Downey Ortho's monthly collections, was purportedly: (1) "projected to be sufficient to

enable PSPM to recover all of the operating expenses of PSPM [and] generate a reasonable return on investment[;]" and (2) calculated "without taking into account . . . the volume or value of any referrals of business from . . . [Downey Ortho] to PSPM (or its affiliates)[.]" The PSPM management agreement further provided:

No amount paid hereunder is intended to be, nor shall it be construed to be, an inducement or payment for referral of, or recommending referral of, patients by [Downey Ortho] to PSPM (or its affiliates)[.] In addition, the management fee charged hereunder does not include any discount, rebate, kickback, or other reduction in charge, and the management fee charged hereunder is not intended to be, nor shall it be construed to be, an inducement or payment for referral, or recommendation of referral, of patients by [Downey Ortho] [to] PSPM (or its affiliates)[.]

iii. In reality, PSPM's management fee was understood to be "upside down," such that the percentage of monthly collections Downey Ortho paid to PSPM would cover only a fraction of PSPM's expenses associated with the management of Downey Ortho. Defendant CAPEN and other Downey Ortho-Affiliated Physicians understood that PSPM would not retain a sufficient percentage of monthly collections to pay the monthly operating expenses and other costs associated with managing Downey Ortho, and that this recurring PSPM deficit would allow defendant CAPEN and other Downey Ortho-Affiliated Physicians to retain a larger share of monthly Downey Ortho collections, based on the expectation and understanding that defendant CAPEN and other Downey Ortho-Affiliated Physicians would refer Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services to Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities.

iv. Drobot, UCC-A, defendant CAPEN, Hammer, Drobot Jr., Martin, UCC-E, UCC-D, UCC-C, and other co-conspirators understood that: (1) "PSPM [was] only in existence for [Pacific Hospital's]" benefit; (2) Pacific Hospital was closely affiliated with PSPM; and (3) based on the value of Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services that defendant CAPEN and other Downey Ortho-Affiliated Physicians referred to Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities, Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities would make regular payments to PSPM to subsidize the losses associated with PSPM's management of Downey Ortho.

Starting in mid-2008, I2 would be used to directly subsidize PSPM. Under California law, the cost of implantable medical devices, hardware, and instrumentation for spinal surgeries ("spinal hardware") was considered a "pass-through" cost that could be billed at no more than \$250 over what a hospital paid for the spinal hardware. To circumvent the pass-through restrictions, Drobot, UCC-A, defendant CAPEN, Hammer, and other coconspirators, would agree to form and use I2 to purchase spinal hardware for surgeries, inflate the price of such hardware, and then "sell" the hardware to Pacific Hospital at the inflated price. turn, Kickback Induced Surgeons, including defendant CAPEN and other Downey Ortho-Affiliated Physicians, would be instructed to use I2 spinal hardware for surgeries performed at Pacific Hospital. PSPM would effectively be made a shareholder of I2 to capture I2 sales proceeds, which would be used to pay kickbacks for the Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services, including subsidies to PSPM.

vi. Stated differently, defendant CAPEN and other

Downey Ortho-Affiliated Physicians understood and agreed to receive

indirect remuneration from Pacific Hospital, through PSPM, in exchange for referring Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services to Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities and using I2.

m. Drobot, UCC-A, Hammer, Drobot Jr., and other coconspirators would also cause Pacific Kickback Recipients to refer
Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services to Kickback Induced Surgeons,
who were obligated to bring such surgeries and services to Pacific
Hospital and Affiliated Entities. For example, based on various
interrelated kickback arrangements, Hunt and Sobol would refer spinal
surgeries to defendant CAPEN, among others, who would perform the
referred surgeries at Pacific Hospital.

Drobot, UCC-A, Hammer, Drobot Jr., Martin, UCC-E, UCC-D, UCC-C, UCC-G, UCC-F, and others would maintain, review and communicate about records of the number of Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services performed at Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities due to referrals from Pacific Kickback Recipients, as well as the amounts paid -- euphemistically referred to as "marketing costs" -to Pacific Kickback Recipients for those referrals. For example, Drobot, UCC-A, Hammer, Canedo, UCC-E, and other co-conspirators would calculate that the average kickback paid for a spinal surgery obtained through PSPM's management of Downey Ortho surgeons, including defendant CAPEN, would be approximately \$22,000, and that the cost of each spinal surgery obtained through an option contract with Hunt would be approximately \$10,000. These calculations would also account for circumstances where more than one kickback was paid for the same surgery; for example, when Hunt would refer a spinal surgery to defendant CAPEN, both would receive separate kickbacks.

- o. Periodically, Drobot, UCC-A, Hammer, Drobot Jr., UCC-F, and other co-conspirators would modify and propose modifying the written agreements used to disguise kickback payments to Pacific Kickback Recipients, or the payments made under the guise of such contracts, to roughly correspond with the volume of referrals to Pacific Hospital from the referral source.
- In an attempt to evade law enforcement and avoid p. criminal liability for the foregoing illegal kickback arrangements Drobot, UCC-A, defendant CAPEN, Hammer, and Hunt, Drobot Jr., Martin, UCC-F, and others would obtain, cause others to obtain, and provide and/or discuss with each other legal opinions and updates from outside health care attorneys and other sources concerning the legality of the kickback arrangements identified above. connection with soliciting legal advice from outside health care attorneys, Drobot, UCC-A, defendant CAPEN, Hammer, Drobot Jr., UCC-F, and other co-conspirators would intentionally not disclose, and affirmatively conceal the fact, that the intended purpose of the contractual arrangements, either entirely or in part, would be to induce Pacific Kickback Recipients to refer or perform Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services at Pacific Hospital and Affiliated Entities. Drobot, UCC-A, defendant CAPEN, Hammer, Martin, UCC-F, and other co-conspirators knew and understood that any such arrangements specifically intended to induce referrals would be unlawful, yet would continue to use these contractual agreements to disguise remuneration provided for Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services.

D. <u>EFFECTS</u> OF THE CONSPIRACY

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33. Had health care benefit programs and patients known the true facts regarding the payment of kickbacks for the referral of

Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services performed at Pacific
Hospital: (a) the health care benefit programs would have subjected
the claims to additional review, would not have paid the claims,
and/or would have paid a lesser amount on the claims; and
(b) patients would have more closely scrutinized a surgery or
hospital service recommendation, would have sought second opinions
from physicians who did not have a financial conflict of interest,
would not have had the surgery or service performed, and/or would
have insisted on a different hospital facility.

- 34. From 1998 to in or around April 2013, Pacific Hospital billed health care benefit programs at least approximately \$950 million in claims for the Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services. As a result of submitting these claims, Pacific Hospital was paid approximately \$350 million.
- 35. Between 1998 and April 2013, defendant CAPEN referred or performed Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services comprising approximately \$142 million of the total amount Pacific Hospital billed to health care benefit programs, and for which Pacific Hospital was paid approximately \$56 million.

E. OVERT ACTS

36. On or about the following dates, in furtherance of the conspiracy and to accomplish the objects of the conspiracy, Drobot, UCC-A, defendant CAPEN, Hammer, and Hunt, Canedo, Drobot Jr., Martin, UCC-D, UCC-E, UCC-E, UCC-F, UCC-G, UCC-K, and other co-conspirators known and unknown to the United States Attorney, committed, willfully caused others to commit, and aided and abetted the commission of the following overt acts, among others, within the Central District of California and elsewhere:

Overt Act No. 1: On or about May 19, 2006, UCC-A, acting as the sole Director of Abrazos, authorized Abrazos to issue additional shares of common stock.

Overt Act No. 2: On or about June 28, 2006, UCC-A sent or caused the sending of a letter via facsimile to East West Bank notifying the bank that UCC-A wished to transfer to defendant CAPEN 10% of the shares in Abrazos, which were then owned by the [UCC-A] Family Trust, along with a 10% interest in a promissory note owed to UCC-A personally from Abrazos. The letter stated that "[t]he consideration for these share would be [\$500,100] in cash, plus a promissory note in the amount of [\$875,274]." In the context of explaining the underlying purpose for the stock transfer, the letter stated:

Finally, [defendant CAPEN], through his professional reputation and contacts in the community, would drive increased business to [Pacific Hospital]. Overall; this would be a financially beneficial transaction for all parties involved.

Overt Act No. 3: On or about September 25, 2006, UCC-A and defendant CAPEN met for an Abrazos Board of Directors' Meeting at Pacific Hospital. During the meeting, UCC-A and defendant CAPEN elected the executive officers of Abrazos as follows:

President and Corporate Secretary: UCC-A

Vice President: defendant CAPEN

CFO: Hammer

Overt Act No. 4: On or about September 25, 2006, Abrazos held its annual meeting of shareholders, consisting of UCC-A and defendant CAPEN, at Pacific Hospital. During the meeting, according to the

meeting minutes, "it was agreed that [Abrazos] shall pay [defendant CAPEN] a \$4,000 per month stipend[.]"

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Overt Act No. 5: On or about December 23, 2006, defendant CAPEN emailed Drobot Jr., copying Drobot, UCC-A, Hammer, UCC-C, and others, stating, in part, that defendant CAPEN met with Hammer, UCC-C, and Drobot two weeks earlier, and discussed, among other PSPM-related topics listed in numerical order: "overhead", "reimbursement", how doctors "could cut overhead," and how "PSPM was going broke and the hospital was going broke[.]"

Overt Act No. 6: On or about March 24, 2007, in the context of reporting on a communication with defendant CAPEN, Hammer emailed UCC-C, UCC-D, and UCC-E, with a subject "Dr. [defendant CAPEN] et al," with instructions for UCC-D to prepare "from this point forward a monthly report on the total billings, collections and amount due from each [PSPM-managed] physician."

Overt Act No. 7: On or about April 28, 2007, Hammer emailed UCC-C and UCC-E, with a subject "PSPM Cash flow forecast," instructing them: "Do not show an[y] funds from either PHLB or CPM and just provide [Drobot] and [UCC-A] with the negative cash needed to operate the management company [PSPM] and we will let them determine who will pay what - [but] please show all other expected revenue sources."

Overt Act No. 8: On or about May 2, 2007, UCC-E emailed Hammer, with the subject "Cash forecast," reporting on a meeting UCC-E had with UCC-A and Drobot earlier in the day. UCC-E wrote, in part:

At least he has a good understanding what our costs are (for the nth time) and where our shortages lie. As of now

[UCC-A] and [Drobot] are in agreement to continue to support the PSPM operation via PHLB and CPM.

Overt Act No. 9: On or about August 28, 2007, UCC-E responded to an email from Hammer, with a subject "Sept/Oct/Nov Cash Review," and copied UCC-C and UCC-D, writing, in part: "we are paying [a Pacific Induced Surgeon] a 'management fee' so he will bring in surgeries, if we are not getting the benefit of his collections can't we least request a reimbursement for this fee from PHLB?"

Overt Act No. 10: On or about September 13, 2007, Hammer emailed UCC-D, UCC-E, and UCC-C, with a subject "Letter to Physicians," attaching a typewritten letter under Drobot's name to various PSPM-managed physicians. Hammer instructed UCC-D and UCC-C to "go ahead and sign the letters for [Drobot] and include them with the invoices we provide to each physician or hand deliver them to the physicians." In part, the attached letters stated:

In our continuing effort to stabilize PSPM so we can stay in business, we have initiated three activities. The first is using VQ Ortho care as our exclusive vend[o]r for DME [durable medical equipment]. We have been fairly successful in this effort and need your continued cooperation in ordering from VQ. The second is the use of Blackstone and Alpha-tech. These contracts are now in place and PSPM will be getting credit for this exclusivity. Both of these programs bring in needed cash flow helping to stabilize our management company.

Overt Act No. 11: On or about October 22, 2007, UCC-A and defendant CAPEN met for an Abrazos Board of Directors' Meeting at Pacific Hospital. During the meeting, according to the meeting

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minutes, UCC-A and defendant CAPEN elected executive officers for 2 Abrazos as follows: 3 President and Corporate Secretary: UCC-A Vice President: defendant CAPEN 5 CFO: Hammer 6 Overt Act No. 12: On or about October 22, 2007, Abrazos held 7 its annual meeting of shareholders, consisting of UCC-A and defendant CAPEN, at Pacific Hospital. During the meeting, according to the 8 9 meeting minutes, "[i]t was agreed that [Abrazos] shall increase the monthly stipend to [defendant CAPEN] to \$10,000." 10 11 Overt Act No. 13: On or about October 24, 2007, Hammer emailed UCC-C and UCC-E, with a subject "PSPM Review," writing, in part, "I 12 13 am assuming we are still about \$700,000 per month negative without PHLB and CPM?" 14 15 Overt Act No. 14: On or about November 3, 2007, defendant CAPEN responded to an October 18, 2007 email by UCC-A, copying Drobot 16 17 Jr., and writing: 18 [UCC-A and Drobot Jr.,] 19 To recap our meeting yesterday we reviewed expenses and 20 conclude[d] to agree in princip[le] that: 1[.] I would pay an additional 20K per month to PSPM[;]. 21 22 2[.] there would be an immediate formation of a spine co[mpany] 23 to provide all surgeons with fixation equipment for profit that would go 50/50 [to] Drobot and PSPM to effectively lower MD 24 25 costs[;] 26 3[.] Out of Mr. Drobot[']s share[,] he would do something for me for agreeing to this[;] 27 28

6[.] my name will go back on the Hunt purchase deal to be
examined next week[.]

Overt Act No. 15: On or about January 21, 2008, UCC-F emailed Drobot, UCC-C, and UCC-D, and copied UCC-A, with the subject "Implants and Blackstone," writing, "This should be circulated to the surgeons." The email included an article titled "Surgeon's Guilty Plea Could Shed New Light on Medical Kickbacks," dated January 21, 2008, which reported on a surgeon who pleaded guilty to receiving kickbacks "for using [] spinal-implant devices[, which] could lead to similar charges against other doctors across several states[.]" The article highlighted:

Just how big is the problem of medical kickbacks in the U.S.?

It's a question that may be of particular financial interest in states such as California, which have "pass-through" provisions that allow hospitals to bill the full cost -- plus an administrative mark-up -- for surgical implants.

The article highlighted that the relevant allegations arose from kickback payments disguised under a "bogus consulting contract" between Blackstone (a spinal equipment manufacturer) and the pleading doctor. The article also quoted a source stating that "California has a long history of doctors providing unnecessary medical treatment that just destroyed people's lives."

Overt Act No. 16: On or about March 21, 2008, UCC-A emailed Drobot regarding CPM and IPM, writing, in part:

Pacific Hospital and CPM/IPM are in a marketing partnership to support PSPM. Each derives benefit from this relationship[,] and each should pay a fair contribution. The current reverse marketing arrangement does not appear fair[,] and[,] in fact[,]

has prompted the doctors and myself to seek competition from another pharmacy partner.

Overt Act No. 17: On or about March 21, 2008, defendant CAPEN, who was either blind copied or otherwise forwarded the email identified in the preceding Overt Act, responded as follows:

Not that I am in the loop but it seems that PSPM support needs to continue for all MDs managed by PSPM and utilizing IPM.

The 50/50 split was always with the understanding that some pharmacy \$\$\$ went to support PSPM.

All MD parties utilizing PHLB for Marketing fee should be supported by the PHLB funds[,] however all [Downey Ortho-Affiliated Physicians] should be supported by both as IPM does make \$\$\$.

This should be an easily determined number from both groups[.]

I might suggest of the 50% to IPM that half be put in PSPM as

most competitive [pharmacy] arrangements are 75/25[.]

Overt Act No. 18: Between on or about March 24, 2008 and on or about April 2, 2008, defendant CAPEN and Drobot Jr., copying UCC-A and others, emailed each other about the then-current "Hunt/[defendant CAPEN] Pharmacy arrangement." In part, on or about March 24, 2008, Drobot Jr. proposed that defendant CAPEN "prescribe out of [Hunt's] cabinet when at Santa Ana."

Overt Act No. 19: On or about March 24, 2008, defendant CAPEN responded to the email identified in the preceding Overt Act, as follows:

[W]ith the intolerable deal I have with [UCC-I]/Paul Randall practice, I will NEVER rx from them. I only agreed to the

original deal to help PHLB [/] your dad and that was 4 yrs ago.

. . . We may be going for another Company or a Better deal."

Overt Act No. 20: On or about March 27, 2008, as part of the same email chain identified in the two preceding Overt Acts, defendant CAPEN wrote: "[A]lso is not PSPM = PHLB? Which is [UCC-A] and your dad [Drobot]? Help me as there are gaps."

Overt Act No. 21: On or about March 28, 2008, as part of the same email chain identified in the three preceding Overt Acts, Drobot Jr. responded to defendant CAPEN, in part:

Yes, my understanding is that PSPM is only in existence for PHLB. PSPM runs at a big loss, but this loss pails in comparison to the profit it brings PHLB.

Overt Act No. 22: On June 9, 2008, defendant CAPEN emailed UCC-A, writing, in part:

Legal opinion letters say there is an argument that the concept is legal. Also in the letter it says IF [I2] can list and document services[,] there can be some explanation for the mark-up, which is why Blackstone is still waiting so they can pay. Apparently that has never been done. My fear is that an argument that it is legal simply grants us the right to pay \$\$\$\$\$\$ in legal fees.

Overt Act No. 23: On June 28, 2008, defendant CAPEN emailed UCC-A, instructing UCC-A to "review with him [referring to an attorney from a spinal implant distributor - Attorney C] the non[-]acceptable and legal ways to have a Hospital, a physician management co[mpany,] and an equipment distribution co[mpany,] and how they could work together. Special note to \$\$\$ flow and who can own what and who can use what."

Overt Act No. 24: On or about July 9, 2008, defendant CAPEN emailed UCC-A, writing, in part:

As you and Mike are aware the new proposed [I2] has several areas of mandated compliance. As [Attorney C] outlined there are significant mandates. I would consider use of Alphatec if[:]

- 1. [Attorney C] clearly explains, in writing, that as a small owner of PHLB I am not violating anything[;] and
- 2. There is written documentation of Separation of ownership of all areas[:] [I2], PSPM, PHLB[;]
- 3. We all meet to discuss[.]

Overt Act No. 25: On September 8, 2008, a Pacific Hospital employee in the Accounting Department emailed UCC-K, UCC-B, UCC-G and others, writing that the account department received two checks from UCC-A, via interoffice mail. The checks were from Hunt and written out to Pacific Hospital and appeared to be rent checks. UCC-G forwarded the email to UCC-F, asking if UCC-F was aware of any existing rent contract from Hunt. UCC-F responded by attaching a medical office sublease between Pacific Hospital and Hunt, internally dated June 23, 2008, which provided for a sublease, commencing on June 26, 2008, of the premises located at "4237 Long Beach Boulevard" in Long Beach, California, for \$1,000 per month.

Overt Act No. 26: On an unknown date, Hunt executed a medical office sublease between Pacific Hospital and Hunt, internally dated June 23, 2008, which provided for a sublease, commencing on June 26, 2008, of the premises located at "4237 Long Beach Boulevard" in Long Beach, California, for \$1,000 per month. On September 20, 2008, UCC-A replied to an email from defendant CAPEN, and wrote, in part:

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"Regarding - no \$\$\$ in pharma - reminds me of the time someone told me the government was here to help me! If after CPM closed [Drobot] was supposed to pass through his share of the IPM profit to PSPM for your continued loyalty, it appears some money is due PSPM."

Overt Act No. 27: On or about October 10, 2008, defendant CAPEN forwarded to UCC-A a legal opinion letter concerning a competitor to I2 selling spinal hardware to various hospitals.

Overt Act No. 28: On or about October 10, 2008, UCC-A forwarded the opinion letter referenced in the preceding Overt Act to UCC-F and Hammer, writing, "This is our competition. What do you think of the agreement?"

Overt Act No. 29: As part of the same email chain identified in the preceding two Overt Acts, on or about October 10, 2008, UCC-F responded to UCC-A and Hammer, writing, in part, the following:

We were strongly advised not to involve physicians in the implant business. I have it in writing from Davis Wright Tremaine, and there has been some investigation into the Newport Beach company that is physician owned. . . . Anyone who gets involved in this is running a high risk. The so-called legal opinion is wishful thinking. The tip-off is that they advise not being involved with any Medicare or Medi-Cal surgeries. First, it is usually impossible to avoid Medicare orthopedic surgery unless you are a [defendant CAPEN][.] . . . Second, saying that Medicare should be avoided is really saying the scheme is illegal under Medicare. If it is illegal under Medicare, then it is illegal under California law because the Attorney General has said, in published AG Opinions it will rely upon Medicare anti-fraud rules in reviewing procedures done in

[California]. Third, Medicare has what is called the "one purpose test." This is a terrible rule that says if one purpose of the scheme is to induce referrals, then even a valid scheme is illegal. Fourth, . . . there are active investigations of physician involvement in various supply schemes, so this is a high risk adventure. Fifth, while the letter takes great pains to say there is no kickback, this scheme will pressure hospitals to use the new company, or lose the surgery to another hospital that will use the implants. Finally, as you know there are financial disclosure and other rules under state law, and it is possible a physician doing a surgery would have to disclose to patients they are using implants in which they have a financial interest. If not, and payors find out what is going on, they may stop paying. As part of the same email chain identified Overt Act No. 30:

Overt Act No. 30: As part of the same email chain identified in the preceding three Overt Acts, on or about October 10, 2008, UCC-A replied to UCC-F and Hammer, writing, in part, "Thanks for your strong arguments to avoid this jailbait contract. I'll call [defendant CAPEN] tonight."

Overt Act No. 31: On or about October 20, 2008, UCC-A and defendant CAPEN met for an Abrazos Shareholders' Meeting. During the meeting, according to the meeting minutes, UCC-A and defendant CAPEN "agreed that [Abrazos] shall continue the monthly stipend to [defendant CAPEN] in the amount of \$10,000."

Overt Act No. 32: On or about December 22, 2008, in connection with PSPM taking over the management of a San Diego clinic where defendant CAPEN saw patients with other physicians, UCC-C emailed Drobot, UCC-A, and UCC-D with a question about the scope of

collections PSPM would keep ($\underline{i.e.}$, collections preceding the management deal or only going forward collections).

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Overt Act No. 33: As part of the same email chain identified in the preceding Overt Act, on or about December 26, 2008, UCC-A replied to Drobot, UCC-C, and UCC-D, adding defendant CAPEN to the email, and asking "what surgeries has Pacific received from the San Diego clinic" and "What have we spent on the SD clinic . . . up to the hand off date?" UCC-A also asked: "[UCC-D]--any estimate as to number of spines that will be generated out of the San Diego clinic in the next 3 months?"

Overt Act No. 34: On or about January 14, 2009, Hammer responded to an outside accountant who emailed Hammer (with a subject "[defendant CAPEN]," initially writing "just want to confirm the numbers you left on my voicemail.") In his response, Hammer wrote: "please don't forget the Medical Directorship [defendant CAPEN] receives. It is \$10,000 per month and thus \$120,000 per year. This comes from Abrazos."

Overt Act No. 35: On or about January 16, 2009, UCC-I emailed UCC-A, with the subject "option agreement," writing:

[Hunt] asked that I drop you a line. I checked into upcoming spine surgeries to be preformed [sic] at PHLB in the next couple of months. So far we have two scheduled in January, one 2 level fusion and 1 laminoplasty. February has two schedule[d], 1 hardware removal and 1 fusion.

We have 22 pending response from the insurance carrier and another 10 that are in transcription. So as you can see the pipeline is filling up and I feel very positive about the future.

We are going to discuss with [defendant CAPEN] and will try to touch base with you tomorrow afternoon.

Overt Act No. 36: On or about January 29, 2009, UCC-I emailed UCC-F, with the subject "Option Agreement," writing, in part:

I dropped the signed Option Agreement off at PHLB yesterday. . . any idea when we will get the first check? I have the lease for Long Beach to sign and the Landlord wants a pretty substantial check to accompany the lease. So as you can imagine, I need the Option check in order to make it all happen."

Overt Act No. 37: On February 18, 2009, Canedo emailed Drobot and UCC-C, writing, "[w]e need more information as to which cases from [Hunt], Phil Sobol, and the San Diego office apply to the cases that [defendant CAPEN] should use [I2]." Canedo then cited an example of a specific surgery patient for whom scheduling information came from Downey Ortho, with a referral source listed as Sobol, and asked: "Would this have been one of the cases we would expect to have used I2?" UCC-C asked UCC-D if he wanted to check with another individual for a response, who then forwarded the email to defendant CAPEN.

Overt Act No. 38: On or about February 18, 2009, defendant CAPEN responded to the email identified in the previous Overt Act, as follows:

"[A]s you all can see there is clear coersion [sic] (or is it coercion[),] as Hospital is rewarding Hunt practice for 3 spines[.] I will use my choice after the 3rd[.] [A]s for Sobol[,] whoever is on the schedule was explained [I]nnovasis [would be used, so] - I will not change mid stream - or we

should hold re[garding] see[ing] the patient[,] re-explain[,]
and reschedule[.]

Overt Act No. 39: On February 22, 2009, defendant CAPEN emailed UCC-C, Hammer, and Drobot, stating, in part, "everyone should be careful about dictating spine instrument use as DOJ has 200 agents in Vegas to separate equip[ment] companies from docs[.]" Defendant CAPEN also complained about having a potential "non [email] address" for Drobot, so Hammer independently forwarded defendant CAPEN's email to Drobot.

Overt Act No. 40: On February 26, 2009, UCC-I called UCC-K regarding a transition with respect to Hunt's sublease agreement with Pacific Hospital (advising that Hunt would be taking over the lease directly). After receiving this message, UCC-K instructed UCC-B to remove Hunt's lease obligation from Pacific Hospital's accounts payable system.

Overt Act No. 41: Between March 30, 2009 and April 1, 2009, Drobot Jr. and defendant CAPEN emailed about a pharmacy deal with IPM, with a subject "IPM proposal." As part of the email thread, Drobot Jr. asked defendant CAPEN to "explain how the change takes care of PSPM needs?" Defendant CAPEN responded that PSPM "will take a % of the pharm[acy] collections to defray overhead as CPM used to do."

Overt Act No. 42: On March 31, 2009, a Downey Ortho office administrator emailed UCC-C with scheduled surgery statistics for Hunt and Sobol for March and April 2009. UCC-C forwarded the email to UCC-A with her comments. UCC-A then forwarded the email chain to Drobot, writing, "[w]e need to discuss this with Sobol - March-O and

April-0 for spine surgery[.] Hard to justify the marketing dollars we are spending[.]"

Overt Act No. 43: On April 7, 2009, defendant CAPEN emailed UCC-A, UCC-C, and UCC-D, writing, in part:

Friends, As you are all aware I have been directed to use Alphatech for certain cases[.] I have agreed, however due to financial constraints of PHLB[,] Innovasis has over 120 days and well over 100K in owings[.] As a result tomorrows case — a [personal injury] neck will be done by Alphatech[.] [But] I will do one of [San Diego], [Hunt], or Sobol cases of c-spine in the future for Alphatech. . . .

Overt Act No. 44: On or about May 14, 2009, UCC-C emailed a Downey Ortho assistant, copying Hammer, Drobot, UCC-D, and UCC-E, writing:

Per [Drobot] effective June 1st all non-surgical and surgical dme [durable medical equipment] will be ordered through Progressive Orthopedics in the Downey office. Please share this email with your surgery schedulers and physicians.

Overt Act No. 45: On or about May 15, 2009, as part of the same email chain identified in the preceding Overt Act, Hammer emailed Drobot, UCC-A, UCC-C, UCC-D, UCC-E writing:

With this ch[a]nge [w]ho is going to pick up the monthly \$45,000+ we will lose from VQ? Why this one? It is VQ's largest and I would expect to have the contract termed. Not sure who will pick up the cash shortage.

Overt Act No. 46: On or about May 15, 2009, as part of the same email chain identified in the preceding two Overt Acts, Drobot replied: "Progressive has demonstrated their ability to send spine

surgeries . . . I anticipate that the surgeries will bring in much more than \$45,000 per month."

Overt Act No. 47: On or about May 15, 2009, as part of the same email chain identified in the preceding three Overt Acts, Hammer responded to Drobot only (removing other recipients from the email chain): "I understand this I am just concerned about asking for the extra \$'s each month. We battle now and this is about a 10% [i]ncrease."

Overt Act No. 48: On or about May 20 and 21, 2009, Canedo, UCC-A, and UCC-G emailed each other regarding "Abrazos Board Minutes and Payment to [defendant CAPEN]." Canedo advised that "the section authorizing payments to [defendant CAPEN] are in the minutes dated 9/26/2006 and 10/22/2007, and UCC-A responded, "So other than a note in the shareholder meeting, there isn't a contract defining the terms of the stipend to [defendant CAPEN]?" After an additional email with UCC-G, UCC-A responded:

It's [UCC-F]'s call. But maybe we need more on paper to justify [defendant CAPEN's] payment. Can the current paperwork pass the scrutiny of future creditors, IRS, etc. The IRS question is worth running by [Hammer].

Overt Act No. 49: On or about June 5, 2009, Hammer emailed UCC-A and Drobot advising that he "reviewed the present situation with [defendant CAPEN]" regarding how IPM would be buying defendant CAPEN's old accounts receivables, with an agreement to purchase the dispensing receivables going forward without inclusion of PSPM and noting:

PSPM was presented to [defendant CAPEN] but he indicated the dollars [for] the purchase of the receivables should all go to

him. So we need to discuss this issue with defendant CAPEN if PSPM is to participate in these fees under its management agreement. As the management agreement is written[,] PSPM should be receiving its fees for this work.

Overt Act No. 50: On or about June 16, 2009, Hammer emailed UCC-C, requesting "a copy of whatever you pulled together showing what the spine activity has been since Jan [2009]? Need for [Drobot's] meeting with Sob[o]l tomorrow."

Overt Act No. 51: On or about August 5 and 6, 2009, Hammer emailed Canedo regarding payments out of a specified Pacific Hospital financial account, inquiring, in part: "[defendant CAPEN] was paid \$100,000 in May [-] what for and was he given a 1099? Dividend?" Canedo responded: "[defendant CAPEN] \$100,000 is part of the bonuses paid totaling \$1 million. UCC-A 510,000, [Drobot] \$390,000, [defendant CAPEN] \$100,000. ([UCC-A] and [Drobot] were paid through payroll and [defendant CAPEN] did get a 1099)." Canedo also highlighted a concern he raised when the bonuses were paid.

Overt Act No. 52: On or about September 24, 2009, UCC-C emailed UCC-A, copying Canedo, UCC-F, and UCC-D, with the subject "Hunt surgeries," writing: "[UCC-I] provided me with a list of 29 spine surgeries performed at PHLB. I will now cross reference this list with what was provided by the hospital and try to determine why the discrepancy."

Overt Act No. 53: On or about September 24, 2009, as part of the same email chain identified in the preceding Overt Act, UCC-F replied to UCC-C and copied UCC-A, writing, in part:

To further the point I made today, we probably aren't going to be able to compete with [Hunt], but we could sure use the option

money to do our own attorney marketing. I forget what we are paying for the option, is it 30 or 40 k? If 30K, the 29 surgeries over 8.5 months cost \$8,793, plus the 22K a surgery we pay for PSPM to manage [defendant CAPEN]. If we pay 40K a month, then [Hunt's] surgeries cost \$11,724 a piece, plus the [defendant CAPEN] subsidy. Getting perilously close to paying out more than we take in when you factor the cost of the surgery.

Overt Act No. 54: On or about September 24, 2009, as part of the same email chain identified in the preceding Overt Act, UCC-C responded, in part, "the amount paid to [Hunt] is \$4[0]k but then they give back \$5K each month, so I guess the amount is 35K."

Overt Act No. 55: On or about September 24, 2009, as part of the same email chain identified in the preceding two Overt Acts, UCC-F replied to UCC-C, writing: "If we close our eyes, we can pretend we're making money. We said PSPM cost about 22K a surgery, and now you add in the 10K or so we have to pay [Hunt], that can't leave much after the hospital expenses are taken into account."

Overt Act No. 56: On or about September 25, 2009, as part of the same email chain identified in the preceding three Overt Acts, UCC-A responded to Drobot only with the following:

This Tuesday we should do a close examination of our real costs in relation to marketing for spines. [UCC-F] is making some excellent points and we need to drill down and determine what an appropriate marketing cost is for our workers comp business. I believe we need to make some adjustments in our marketing payments.

Overt Act No. 57: On or about March 25, 2010, defendant CAPEN emailed Drobot and UCC-A, writing, in part:

[I]t is a little unsettling to hear that there is a legal batlle [sic] with Innovasis regarding money owed to I2 vs money owed to Innovasis as [accounts payable] from [PHLB]. At a time we are trying to sell [PHLB] is litigation of these types a danger? With all the skeletons do we need people nosing around? I am certain we do not. These lawsuits will absolutely kill any potential buyer, [] let alone place all of us at risk.

Overt Act No. 58: On or about October 1, 2010, defendant CAPEN emailed Drobot with the following message:

At some point we need to discuss ways of increasing my revenue stream [-] we touched upon urine testing. I see we are now using [Physician H's] brace company. No one discussed with me but we are using [Physician S] for monitoring. I would like to participate in - or chose my own people to take advantage of that. Also there are other avenues available. I am at PHLB sat[urday] am. Or we can meet next week. I need a [Ferarri] 458 you know.

Overt Act No. 59: On December 4, 2010, defendant CAPEN emailed Drobot, writing, in part: "I signed with IPM [to] start Jan 1 2011[.] I hope we are on track for a great 2011. . . . Hope we have enough for a large [year] end bonus and that in January we can bump up my Abrazos directorship[.] I continue to support the Drobot enterprises (can't keep up with the cars tho)[.]"

Overt Act No. 60: On April 6, 2011, defendant CAPEN emailed Drobot and UCC-K regarding potentially sending specimens to the "PHLB lab," noting that "there seems to be big money involved as offers are

flying in," and asking if "anyone ha[s] an answer for competitions offers?"

Overt Act No. 61: On April 22, 2011, UCC-B emailed Drobot stating that an auditor was asking about the nature of a \$100,000 payment to defendant CAPEN on January 13, 2011. UCC-B attached the payment authorization from Drobot, and inquired what time period the payment covered. The handwritten sheet of paper from Drobot to UCC-B read: "Please prepare a check for \$100,000 to [defendant CAPEN] for 'Workers Comp. Consulting' 1/12/11" and was signed by Drobot.

Overt Act No. 62: On or about June 6, 2011, defendant CAPEN emailed Drobot Jr., inquiring, in part, if Drobot Jr. was "making headway with" Hunt's practice, and "what again is the offer for all meds, UDT, scans [MRIs] from my own places"?

Overt Act No. 63: On or about June 7, 2011, as part of the same email chain identified in the preceding Overt Act, Drobot Jr. replied that he would pay defendant CAPEN "\$40K for ALL UDT" and noted that defendant CAPEN already had a "PSPM med contract at \$70K, and non-PSPM meds at \$17K. Scans could add another \$10K plus, need to know the volume of scans we are talking about."

Overt Act No. 64: On June 16, 2011, defendant CAPEN emailed UCC-D, copied Drobot and Drobot Jr., and wrote that Drobot Jr. "sends lots of referrals to the OC office," and that defendant CAPEN had told Drobot "a month ago that I would use [Drobot Jr.] there for UDT." Defendant CAPEN added: "Hopefully all are on the same page and referrals will continue." UCC-D forwarded defendant CAPEN's email to UCC-K writing, "FYI."

Overt Act No. 65: On June 28, 2011, Canedo emailed UCC-F inquiring whether UCC-F was "going to write a contract for the \$500,000 or so we'll pay [defendant CAPEN] this year?"

Overt Act No. 66: Between on or about July 9, 2011 and July 13, 2011, Drobot Jr. emailed defendant CAPEN regarding UDT referrals.

Drobot Jr. initially wrote, in part, "please let me know if I can come by Downey or [Sherman Oaks] next week to discuss options

8 regarding the post-PHLB sale future...I can guarantee \$40K more than 9 my father is offering." Defendant CAPEN replied regarding

scheduling, and Drobot Jr. added: "Plus if you come on board...with

UDT...I'll give you \$50 per cup for any leads...i.e. [a Downey Ortho-

Affiliated Physician], others around the country, etc. [Downey

Ortho-Affiliated Physician] must do 400 a month x \$50 = extra \$20K a

month[.]" Defendant CAPEN and Drobot Jr. then agreed to a Friday

15 meeting.

Overt Act No. 67: Between on or about July 25, 2011 and July 27, 2011, Drobot Jr. and defendant CAPEN emailed each other regarding Drobot Jr. paying for defendant CAPEN's ancillary referrals. On July 25, 2011, Drobot Jr. asked defendant CAPEN:

[W]hat is the latest with PSPM UDT program? Are you getting \$\$\$...? Forget about the 40-7=33...I would do an ADDITIONAL 40 for the PSPM UDT.

Overt Act No. 68: On or about July 25, 2011, as part of the same email chain identified in the preceding Overt Act, defendant CAPEN responded, in part:

Does intra-op monitoring make anything? Is it worth anything?

I am very close to doing just you.

BTW how did Hunt meet[ing] go Friday?--I was at a prior commitment.

Overt Act No. 69: On or about July 26, 2011, as part of the same email chain identified in the previous two Overt Acts, Drobot Jr. responded to defendant CAPEN:

[UCC-I] said she likes the offer...similar to yours...but she said she has a 30 day out clause with [Randall]...I thought you said that one of the reasons she wanted to switch is to be more legal and not having an agreement was one thing to improve upon? Regardless [UCC-I] will have our handsome offer agreement today. Overt Act No. 70: On or about July 27, 2011, defendant CAPEN

emailed Hunt and UCC-I, and copied Drobot, with the following message:

I have been involved in trying to get AMG [Allied Medical Group] a better deal[.] Have promised Mike sr [Drobot] that PHLB gets it all[.] Tim [Hunt] said over a yr ago he had a year to go with surgicenter[-]actually it was way over a yr ago[.] Now I see Randall has still been involved[.] I know I am an employee, but some practices need to change-unless all parties are cool with current deals.

Overt Act No. 71: Between on or about August 4 and 5, 2011, Martin emailed defendant CAPEN, soliciting his UDT referrals.

Overt Act No. 72: On or about August 4, 2011, as part of the same email chain identified in the preceding Overt Act, defendant CAPEN responded, stating that he was already doing urine testing through Drobot Jr.

Overt Act No. 73: On or about August 4, 2011, as part of the same email chain identified in the preceding two Overt Acts, after an

additional email from Martin soliciting defendant CAPEN to send his urine testing referrals to Pácific Hospital, through PMR, defendant CAPEN responded as follows:

Problem with [Drobot] Sr. is all I hear about is how much he subsidizes my practice. 4 yrs ago it was 600K[;] 2 yrs ago—300K[;] now 160[.] Wonder where \$\$\$ came from for all luxury trips with [others] and 4.5 mil house with 1 mil remodel. Sick of the shit—at least his kid pays on time[.]"

Overt Act No. 74: On September 12, 2011, UCC-B emailed Canedo asking about certain checks Drobot requested that he prepare. With respect to defendant CAPEN, UCC-B inquired: "I charge the \$20K for [defendant CAPEN] in UDT?" Canedo responded that the defendant CAPEN check "can get charged to 8610-2200. Call it 'Abrazos Stipend.'"

Overt Act No. 75: On October 7, 2011, defendant CAPEN emailed Drobot, writing:

It was good to speak with you. As I said[,] there are other money offers. We agreed that:

- 1[.] Abrazos check would be sent this week
- 2[.] That November first and each 1st of the month I would get
 22 Thousand per month as payment -- partial -- for 10% UDT
 company[.] In exchange[,] I will do UDT in Oxnard-Valley-Downey
 [offices]. Keep me informed on the sale[.]"
- Overt Act No. 76: On October 10, 2011, UCC-E emailed UCC-C a spreadsheet titled, "I2 Surgery Statistics," writing, in part:

The attached spreadsheet shows the number of fusions per month using [I2]. . . . [defendant CAPEN] and [a Downey Ortho-Affiliated Physician] have 1-2 cases per month where they use non-[I2] implants.

[Downey Ortho] averages \$360,000 in expenses per month. This includes all the locations. From [] [defendant CAPEN] and [another Downey Ortho-Affiliated Physician] we get about \$125,000 per month. In addition, we get about \$30,000 from the other guys. ([listing other Downey Ortho-Affiliated Physicians])

[The other Downey Ortho-Affiliated Physician] provides about \$66,000 from his management fee (32.5%). In addition, [] his pharmacy provides PSPM an[] additional \$35,000. His allocated share of monthly expenses is \$150,000. PSPM provides about \$50,000 for [the other Downey Ortho-Affiliated Physician][,] which includes his management fee and extra.

[Defendant CAPEN] provides about \$60,000 from his management fee (32.5%). He uses [Drobot Jr.'s] pharmacy so we don't get a share of that. His allocated share of expenses is about \$176,000. As you know[,] he is higher maintenance than [the other Downey Ortho-Affiliated Physician]. PSPM provides about \$116,000 for [defendant CAPEN,] which includes his management fee plus extra.

So the expenses are as follows:

\$360,000 avg monthly expenses for [Downey Ortho]
(\$101,000) provided by [the other Downey Ortho-Affiliated
Physician] from mgmt fees

(\$60,000) provided by [defendant CAPEN] from mgmt fees (\$30,000) provided by misc physicians from mgmt fees

(\$169,000) provided by PSPM over and above mgmt fee

Overt Act No. 77: On or about January 4, 2012, UCC-B emailed Canedo, with a subject "[defendant CAPEN's] Check for \$35K," advising that UCC-B:

did issue the check for [defendant CAPEN] today. However, I'm not sure why we describe it as an Abrazos stipend instead of PMR consulting fees. I might be asked this question by [auditors] in the future.

Overt Act No. 78: On or about January 4, 2012, in response to the email identified in the preceding Overt Act, Canedo replied: "UDT for the whole thing."

Overt Act No. 79: On or about January 4, 2012, UCC-E emailed Drobot the below chart as a "breakdown of PSPM expenses by month and by physician and other cost centers[:]"

PSPM Monthly Contribution to Physicians' Operations			
•	<u>Total</u>	Capen	
Monthly Operational Expenses	(512,934)	(189,055)	(142,083)
Funds 32.5% PSPM Mgnt Fees	159,890	60,343	43,374
Add'I funds required for exp. From PHLB	(353,043)	(128,712)	23,000 (75,709)
Total PSPM contributions per physician PSPM + PHLB	(512,934)	(189,055)	(119,083)

and [another Downey Ortho-Affilated Physician's] practice by about \$200,000 per month."

Overt Act No. 81: On or about January 20, 2012, UCC-B emailed Hammer, copying Canedo, attaching Pacific Hospital's 1099 Reports for 2011.

Overt Act No. 82: On or about January 25, 2012, as part of the email chain identified in the preceding Overt Act, Hammer responded

with comments, including the following: "[defendant CAPEN] - what are these payments for? He is a 10% owner so are these dividends?"

Overt Act No. 83: On or about January 27, 2012, as part of the email chain identified in the preceding two Overt Acts, UCC-B replied: "We've been paying [defendant CAPEN] for his stipend and not dividends."

Overt Act No. 84: On or about January 27, 2012, as part of the email chain identified in the preceding three Overt Acts, Canedo responded to both UCC-B and Hammer, clarifying "[t]he payments in 2011 to defendant CAPEN are unsupported by any contracts. The \$100,000 was written on a napkin and the other payments [were] paid for the UDT." "There is no contract in place for the [defendant CAPEN] UDT payments and [UCC-F] won't write one."

Overt Act No. 85: On or about January 27, 2012, as part of the email chain identified in the preceding four Overt Acts, Hammer dropped UCC-B from the email chain and emailed only Canedo the following: "Fine then let's make it a dividend and eliminate the problem. BILL"

Overt Act No. 86: On February 26, 2012, defendant CAPEN emailed Drobot, writing, in part:

When we last spoke you had mentioned things were tight. You said there was a need for you to loan 500k. As my Abrozos urine has stopped [--] we are December[,] Jan[,] Feb[,] behind[,] so I would prefer that the 105[,]000 be converted to a loan as your 500 is. Going forward let [UCC-E] reflect that my cost to PSPM is not 160 but 135[,] as you can keep the UDT Downey [generates] as a defrayal of expense. I would hope you would have [C]anedo restore the original Abrazos 10k until the hospital sells.

Overt Act No. 87: On April 17, 2012, defendant CAPEN emailed Drobot and Hammer, writing, in part:

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I was just reminding you both of the agreement. I had an Abrazos consulting agreement that was in place for 2011. It functioned until 12/[20]11. For 12/[20]11 til 3/[20]12[,] it was agreed upon by Mike and me that the 4 month period would be treated as a loan to PHLB. I wish to have the loan treated as a contract. I know [Drobot] and [UCC-A] both "loaned" to PHLB at a good interest. I would like the same loan opportunity[.] Also this is 4/16/12 - there still has been no Abrazos check[.] We need to address this[.]

Overt Act No. 88: On July 10, 2012, UCC-E emailed UCC-B asking if he "cut the checks for PMR expenses paid from PHLB?" UCC-E then asked UCC-B about two specific payments made in May 2012: Consulting fee \$70,000 and Purchased Svs \$32,000[.]"

Overt Act No. 89: On or about July 10, 2012, UCC-B replied to UCC-E, as part of the email chain identified in the preceding Overt Act, as follows:

Yes, the \$70K is for Dr. [defendant CAPEN] (2 checks at \$35,000 each). The \$32K is broken down between PMR (\$30K) and Professional Locksmith (\$2K).

Overt Act No. 90: On or about January 27, 2013, Drobot emailed defendant CAPEN a "Letter of Intent for Stock Purchase" for the sale of Pacific Hospital to a third party and solicited defendant CAPEN's thoughts on the arrangement.

Overt Act No. 91: On or about March 11, 2013, as part of the same email chain identified in the preceding Overt Act, defendant CAPEN forwarded the January 27, 2013 email to Hammer, writing: Bill

-- Hope you are on top of this[.] We did a deal you said [Drobot] was aware of[.] Since December-no Abrazos checks[.]"

Overt Act No. 92: On or about March 11, 2013, as part of a related thread to the email chain identified in the preceding two Overt Acts, Hammer emailed Canedo and UCC-B, writing: "Do we have a payable to [defendant CAPEN] for past due Med Director fees?"

Overt Act No. 93: On or about March 12, 2013, in response to the email from Hammer in the preceding Overt Act, Canedo replied: "It's never past due. We pay when [Drobot] orders [UCC-B] to cut a check. Plus mike combined it with the fee for urine drug testing."

Overt Act No. 94: On or about March 12, 2013, as part of the same email chain identified in the preceding four Overt Acts, defendant CAPEN emailed Drobot, writing:

Hope deal is going ahead[.] We do have a deal elsewhere[.]

Hope [Hammer] explained that with I2 and what I have

deferred[,] i.e[.,] 175 from old Abrazos—and last 3 months of

New Abrazos—we are a wash[.]

Overt Act No. 95: On March 25, 2013, UCC-I and defendant CAPEN exchanged emails concerning how UCC-D would be taking over the scheduling of defendant CAPEN's surgeries on patients originating from Allied Medical, and that all such surgeries would be moved away from Pacific Hospital to another specified hospital.

COUNT TWO

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[42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(A); 18 U.S.C. § 2]

- The United States Attorney hereby repeats and re-alleges paragraphs 1 through 30 and 32 through 36 of this Information as if fully set forth herein.
- On or about January 15, 2013, in Orange and Los Angeles Counties, within the Central District of California, and elsewhere, defendant DANIEL CAPEN ("defendant CAPEN") knowingly and willfully solicited and received, and willfully caused to be solicited and received, remuneration, directly and indirectly, overtly and covertly, in cash and in kind, that is, a discount on the management fee defendant CAPEN paid to PSPM, reflected in a \$10,639.30 management fee payment, in return for referring patients to Pacific Hospital for the furnishing and arranging for the furnishing of items and services, that is, Kickback Tainted Surgeries and Services, including the medical care of patient G.G., who defendant CAPEN performed surgery on at Pacific Hospital on or about December 8, 2012, for which payment was made in whole and in part under a Federal health care program, namely, the FECA program.

2.3

FORFEITURE ALLEGATION

[18 U.S.C. §§ 982(a)(7), 981(a)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c)]

- 1. Pursuant to Rule 32.2(a), Fed. R. Crim. P., notice is hereby given to defendant CAPEN ("defendant") that the United States will seek forfeiture as part of any sentence in accordance with Title 18, United States Code, Sections 982(a)(7) and 981(a)(1)(C) and Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), in the event of defendant's conviction under Count One or Count Two of this Information.
- 2. Defendant CAPEN shall forfeit to the United States the following property:
- a. all right, title, and interest in any and all property, real or personal, that constitutes or is derived, directly or indirectly, from the gross proceeds traceable to the commission of any offense set forth in Count One or Count Two of this Information; and
- b. a sum of money equal to the total value of the property described in subparagraph a.
- 3. Pursuant to Title 21, United States Code, Section 853(p), as incorporated by Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), and Title 18, United States Code, Section 982(b), defendant shall forfeit substitute property, up to the total value of the property described in the preceding paragraph if, as a result of any act or omission of defendant, the property described in the preceding paragraph, or any portion thereof (a) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; (b) has been transferred, sold to or deposited with a third party; (c) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the

1 Court; (d) has been substantially diminished in value; or (e) has been commingled with other property that cannot be divided without 3 difficulty. 4 TRACY L. WILKISON 5 Attorney for the United States, Acting Under Authority Conferred 6 by 28 U.S.C. § 515 7 8 9 LAWRENCE S. MIDDLETON Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division DENNISE D. WILLETT Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Santa Ana Branch Office JOSEPH T. MCNALLY Assistant United States Attorney Deputy Chief, Santa Ana Branch Office ASHWIN JANAKIRAM SCOTT D. TENLEY Assistant United States Attorneys

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