US Inventor, Inc. v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., No. 21-2894, 2024 WL 663367 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2024) (Chutkan, J.)
US Inventor, Inc. v. U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., No. 21-2894, 2024 WL 663367 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2024) (Chutkan, J.)
Re: Requests for records concerning United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) Director’s delegations of authority to its Commissioner and to various Administrative Patent Judges
Disposition: Denying plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment; granting defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment
- Litigation Considerations, Adequacy of Search: The court holds that “Defendant’s declaration demonstrates that its search in response to Plaintiff’s FOIA request was reasonable.” First, the court finds that “the record indicates that Defendant’s search in response to Request 1 was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” “[Defendant’s] detailed declaration shows that Defendant ‘made a good faith effort’ to uncover all relevant documents and used methods it ‘reasonably expected to produce the information requested.’” “The declaration explained in detail who conducted the searches, why those parties were enlisted to search, and what kinds of records were stored and searched by those parties.” “It also explained why the agency was unable to find some of the requested records . . . .” “Finally, Defendant averred that ‘using key word searches,’ . . . ‘was not the path to finding useful records for Plaintiff,’ as such a search would not have even resulted in finding the two responsive records.” Second, the court finds that “Plaintiff therefore fails to raise substantial doubt concerning the adequacy of Defendant’s search in response to Request 2.” The court relates that “[defendant] explain[ed] the various inquiries it made, both to verify that it did not file anything related to the Director vacancy and to seek out any reporting to the Comptroller General or Congress.” “Indeed, Defendant went beyond FOIA’s search requirements by finding and producing the Department of Commerce documents.” “Defendant [also] had the relevant office search for the records Plaintiff requested, and then, when that search did not turn up responsive records, verified with individual experts to ensure it had not missed the records.”
Finally, regarding the last two of plaintiff’s requests, the court relates that defendant, “[b]y confirming with leadership that authority was delegated only on an aggregate basis and not on an individual basis, and [by] releasing the documents outlining that delegation process, . . . ‘made a good faith effort’ and used methods it ‘reasonably expected to produce the information requested.’” Responding to plaintiff’s objections regarding documents that “it believes exist,” the court finds that “‘mere speculation that as yet uncovered documents may exist does not undermine the finding that the agency conducted a reasonable search for them.’” The court also relates that “Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s search was unreasonable because Defendant did not search the records of the APJs enumerated in Plaintiff’s request.” “Defendant, however, avers that it did not send its search request to each of the APJs listed in Plaintiff's request ‘because that effort would not have resulted in the production of responsive records.’” “According to Defendant, any records regarding the designation of authority to the APJs would have come from somewhere in the PTAB leadership chain, which Defendant consulted, and any records regarding APJ’s acceptances of authority would have then been received by leadership.” “Plaintiff gives no reason why this might not be the case.” “Instead, Plaintiff invites the court to ‘micro manage the executive branch’ by second guessing the agency’s ‘administrative judgment and expertise.’” “The court declines the invitation.” “Finally, [plaintiff] contends that Defendant improperly ‘narrowly interpreted’ these requests, . . . by reading Plaintiff’s request ‘as looking for formal statements granting or delegating authority to individual judges to institute and adjudicate cases, and the subsequent acceptance of such authority by those judges’ . . . .” “But even a ‘narrow’ interpretation of [a] FOIA request is permissible ‘as long as the narrowed scope is a reasonable interpretation of what the request seeks.’” “And Plaintiff does not explain why interpreting ‘all communications, documents, orders, or letters’ to mean ‘formal statements’ is so unreasonable.”