Magassa v. FBI, No. 19-01952, 2023 WL 5174335 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2023) (Cobb, J.)

Magassa v. FBI, No. 19-01952, 2023 WL 5174335 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2023) (Cobb, J.)

Re:  Request for records concerning plaintiff

Disposition:  Granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment; denying plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment

• Litigation Considerations, Adequacy of Search & Procedural Requirements, Searching for Responsive Records:  First, the court holds that “the FBI’s search for [plaintiff’s] full name was adequate because it was reasonably calculated to produce records that were responsive to [plaintiff’s] request for all ‘records concerning [him].’”  “[I]t is not clear how [plaintiff] expected the FBI to alter its search terms.”  “Searching the FBI’s immense records systems for [plaintiff’s] place of birth, for example, would potentially yield innumerable false positives, and it is unreasonable to expect the agency to wade through those records in the hope that additional responsive records might be identified.”  “Also, any additional records yielded from searches of [plaintiff’s] place of birth, birthdate, or social security number would have to somehow discuss [plaintiff] without using his name for them to be responsive yet undetected by the FBI’s initial search for “[plaintiff’s name].”  Second, the court finds that “the FBI fulfilled its obligations to search in places reasonably likely to produce information about [plaintiff].”  “In his declaration, [defendant] provided a high-level overview of the IT infrastructure housing the FBI’s records.”  “By searching Sentinel and ACS, . . . the FBI searched through all FBI records created after July 1, 2012, and 105 million records created before then . . . .”  “This is an adequate search in light of the broad request that [plaintiff] submitted, and particularly given the dates of [plaintiff’s] contact with the FBI.”  “The FBI looked in places that could be ‘reasonably expected to produce the information requested’ . . . .”

• Exemption 3:  The court relates that “[t]o support its invocation of Exemption 3, the FBI cited Section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 50 U.S.C. § 3024(i)(1), which provides that the Director of National Intelligence ‘shall protect from unauthorized disclosure intelligence sources and methods.’”  The court finds that “Section 3024(i)(1) is a valid Exemption 3 statute . . . because it leaves no room for discretion on whether the information should be withheld from the public – it unambiguously instructs the Director of National Intelligence to protect ‘intelligence sources and methods’ from unauthorized disclosure.”  “Having reviewed [defendant’s] declaration, as well as the additional information submitted for in camera review, the Court is satisfied that the FBI appropriately withheld information that would reveal intelligence sources and investigation methods if publicly disclosed.”  “As [defendant] represented in his declaration, ‘disclosure of this information [would] present[ ] a bona fide opportunity for individuals to develop and implement countermeasures, resulting in the loss of significant intelligence information, sources, and methods relied upon by national policymakers . . . to safeguard national security.’”

• Exemption 6; Exemption 7, Threshold; Exemption 7(C):  The court relates that “[t]he FBI argues that it properly invoked [Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C)] to redact personal identifying information of governmental employees and third-party individuals mentioned in the responsive records.”  “Although the FBI jointly asserted both exemptions to justify withholding certain information, it relies primarily upon Exemption 7(C) in its Motion for Summary Judgment.”  “The Court therefore starts its analysis with Exemption 7(C) and, because it finds that the FBI adequately justified its invocation of that exception, the Court does not also need to determine the applicability of Exemption 6.”  “[Defendant] stated that the withheld records ‘were compiled, created and/or shared in furtherance of the FBI’s law enforcement, national security, and intelligence missions.’”  “Because the FBI specializes in law enforcement, the Court affords this representation deference.”  “Taking into account [defendant’s] statement and the additional information provided by the FBI for in camera review, the Court determines that the withheld information was compiled for law enforcement purposes.”  “[Plaintiff] argues that the records in this case would ‘increase[e] the public's understanding of [ ] FBI operations and activities,’ in particular how the watch list might impair people’s ‘right to follow a chosen profession free from government interference and the right to travel, both domestically and abroad.’”  “Even assuming that this qualifies as a significant public interest, [plaintiff] has not shown how the material withheld would advance that interest.”  “[T]herefore the Court grants summary judgment to the FBI on this exemption.”

• Exemption 7(E):  “The Court also concludes that production of the information ‘would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.’”  “In his declaration, [defendant] grouped the information that was withheld into categories, including (1) information related to non-public FBI web addresses, (2) methods used by the FBI to collect and analyze information, (3) techniques for administering polygraph examinations, (4) sensitive investigative file numbers, (5) information related to the location and identify of an FBI squad, (6) information discussing the focus of a specific FBI investigation, and (7) information related to the types and dates of specific investigations.”  “[Defendant] then described how each category of information relates to law enforcement techniques and procedures.”  “This satisfactorily ‘demonstrate[s] logically how the release of the requested information might create a risk of circumvention of law.’”
  
  Separately, the court relates that “[h]ere, the FBI provided a Glomar response by refusing to confirm or deny whether [plaintiff] was listed on any government watch list.”  “[Defendant] . . . contended that non-disclosure was appropriate under Exemption 7(E) of FOIA, which exempts information ‘compiled for law enforcement purposes’ to the extent that the information ‘would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.’”  “[Defendant] argued that the criteria for placing individuals on watch lists is not publicly known, so revealing the identities of people on the watch list could allow others to deduce the criteria and change their behavior to avoid government detection.”  “Also, on a more granular level, informing an individual whether or not they are on a watch list could prompt that individual to alter their conduct and impede an FBI investigation.”  “These reasons are logical, and therefore the FBI’s Glomar response is adequate.”  “Watch lists are compiled in furtherance of the FBI’s law enforcement, national security, and intelligence goals. Disclosing whether an individual is on a watch list could lead that individual or others to alter their behavior in an effort to circumvent the law.”  “This reasoning justifies withholding the existence (or non-existence) of an individual's name on a watch list.”
   
• Litigation Considerations, “Reasonably Segregable” Requirement:  The court finds that “[t]he Vaughn Index, which lists all . . . documents [at issue], notes the specific reason that certain portions of responsive records were exempt from disclosure and not released.”  “[For some documents,] the FBI cited multiple exemptions to justify its withholding, including FOIA Exemptions 3 and 7(E).”  “This document-by-document analysis provides the sort of ‘detailed description’ needed to assess the FBI’s segregation efforts, and allows the Court to confirm that the FBI fulfilled its obligations.”