Louise Trauma Ctr. v. DHS, No. 21-2371, 2024 WL 3251225 (D.D.C. July 1, 2024) (Bates, J.)

Louise Trauma Ctr. v. DHS, No. 21-2371, 2024 WL 3251225 (D.D.C. July 1, 2024) (Bates, J.)

Re:  Requests for records concerning training for asylum and FOIA officers, as well as information about a DHS asylum research office

Disposition:  Granting in part and denying in part plaintiff’s motion for attorney fees and costs; awarding plaintiff $43,895 in attorney’s fees and costs

• Attorney Fees, Eligibility:  “[T]he Court concludes that [plaintiff] is ‘eligible’ for attorney’s fees because it substantially prevailed in the litigation.”  “DHS concedes that [plaintiff] is eligible for fees.”  “And the Court agrees for two reasons.”  “First, the Court issued a production order in this case, which has been held to render a requester the prevailing party.”  “Second, DHS’s unexplained failure to produce any documents in the year or more after the requests were submitted raises an ‘inference that the agency forgot about, or sought to ignore, [plaintiff’s] request,’ and that filing of this lawsuit caused DHS to change its position about responding at all.”

• Attorney Fees, Entitlement:  The court finds that “[plaintiff] is ‘entitled’ to fees because the public derived benefit from the requested information and DHS lacked a colorable basis for withholding the information prior to the onset of this litigation.”  “The first factor is whether the public derived benefit from [plaintiff’s] request.”  “DHS concedes that this factor of the test is met, and the Court concurs.”  “[Plaintiff’s] requests for information about the asylum process concern an important issue in the public discourse and satisfy the public benefit factor.”  “[Plaintiff] contends that it meets the second and third factors because it is a ‘non-profit organization’ whose interests are ‘not frivolous or purely commercial.’”  “DHS challenges the veracity of [plaintiff’s] self-characterization as a non-profit, noting that publicly available information suggests [plaintiff] is not registered as a tax-exempt organization with the IRS and that [plaintiff] is registered as a limited liability corporation with the D.C. government.”  “DHS further assails [plaintiff’s] description of itself as ‘dedicated to raising awareness’ and ‘help[ing] women who seek asylum,’ noting that [plaintiff’s] website is primarily a compilation of links to document files and that the posts on ILW.com mostly summarize document requests rather than providing analysis of the law.”  “The Court shares some of DHS’s concerns about the lack of support for [plaintiff’s] claims about its corporate identity and its interests in this case.”  “However, the Court disagrees with DHS that it can infer that [plaintiff’s] incentive is commercial or otherwise ‘personal’ merely from the lack of support for [plaintiff’s] claims on its website.”  “Moreover, the Court finds that [plaintiff] has made some public use of the documents it received, including sharing them online and including them in blog posts.”  “[Plaintiff] may not be very effective at sharing the information it receives, but there is at least some public interest in [plaintiff’s] pursuit and release of the records.”  “Ultimately balancing these considerations, the Court finds that the second and third factors weigh slightly against a fee award.”  Regarding the fourth factor, the court finds that “DHS has offered no explanation for why it failed to do anything more than assign processing numbers to [plaintiff’s] requests in the twelve to sixteen months between submission of the requests and filing of the lawsuit.”  “Accordingly, DHS has not met its burden to show that it had a reasonable basis for its sluggish response to [plaintiff’s] request.”  “Once this litigation commenced, DHS appears to have been generally cooperative – not ‘recalcitrant’ or ‘obdurate’ – working with [plaintiff] over the course of months and revisiting initial disclosure decisions to produce further information.”  “Cooperation was needed here, where [plaintiff’s] requests were in certain cases unclear.”  “That is all to DHS’s credit.”  “However, this late assistance cannot overcome DHS’s unexplained failure to begin processing the requests for more than a year after the requests were filed.”  “Because the first and fourth factors weigh in favor of fees, and the second and third factors weigh only slightly against awarding fees, the Court finds that [plaintiff] is entitled to fees in this case.”

• Attorney Fees, Calculations:  “[T]he Court finds that the requested fee award is not reasonable because [plaintiff’s] counsel billed time for some improper and excessive tasks and many of the time-keeping records lack sufficient detail to assure the Court that time was reasonably expended.”  “The Court will reduce the hours-billed figure by fifty percent to account for these significant defects and will award [plaintiff] $43,895 in fees, costs, and fees on fees.”  The court finds that “[plaintiff] has claimed reimbursement for time spent on non-compensable tasks,” such as “time spent drafting unsuccessful oppositions to DHS’s motions for extensions of time to respond to the complaint and unsuccessful ‘appeals’ relating to the request on which the Court finally granted summary judgment in favor of DHS.”  “DHS further contends that [plaintiff] billed excessive time for compensable tasks, including reviewing records, drafting documents, and conducting legal research.”  “The Court is . . . not convinced that time spent reviewing records was obviously excessive here.”  Additionally, “[w]hile the Court appreciates [plaintiff’s] attention to detail in the complaint, it should have been a quicker matter to draft, considering that it follows the same format as a similar complaint the same counsel filed in an earlier action.”  “Further, the Court does not find it reasonable to fully reimburse [plaintiff’s] counsel for time spent drafting individual status reports contrary to the Court’s orders that the parties submit joint status reports.”  “Finally, DHS asserts that discrepancies between the fees enumerated on the time sheet and requested in the motion ‘cast doubt on the precision of counsel’s recordkeeping.’”  “While this sloppiness is relevant to the ‘fees on fees’ entitlement, the Court does not find it so problematic as to cast significant doubt on the time sheets.”  “Because the time sheet is the only document that would enable the Court to determine the amount of time actually expended, the Court will work from the figures on the time sheets.”  “[T]he Court does share some of DHS’s concerns about [plaintiff’s] billing practices.”  “Most significantly, many of [plaintiff’s] billing records do not adequately describe how counsel’s time was spent.”  “Of specific concern to the Court are the entries describing the records review in this case, which often fail to identify what records were being reviewed, or for what purpose.”  However, while “the Court shares some of DHS’s concerns with the billing practices here [it] does not find them as egregious as the agency contends.”  Based on the above, the court finds that “[t]his is not a case where an outright denial of fees is warranted.”  “However, the issues discussed above do warrant a significant reduction.”  “For the following reasons, the Court considers a fifty-percent reduction in the time billed as fees to be appropriate.”  “First, around eight hours were improperly billed for clerical tasks or motions on which plaintiff was ultimately unsuccessful.”  “This included time spent ‘wrestling with defective disc,’ making packages to bring to the post office, opposing DHS’s motions for extensions of time, and reviewing records relating to the cause of action on which summary judgment was granted to DHS.”  “Second, around twenty-five hours were billed for excessive or unnecessary tasks, including some time spent drafting the complaint and time spent preparing single-party status reports, or replies to status reports submitted by DHS.”  “Third, many of counsel’s time entries were not sufficiently detailed to allow the Court to determine with a ‘high degree of certainty’ that the hours in this case were reasonably and actually expended.”  “Having thoroughly reviewed the extent of the deficiencies and taken account of the improperly and excessively billed time, the Court is satisfied that a fifty percent reduction in the fee award is warranted.”  “The Court considers the resulting figure reasonable to compensate counsel for his work on this case, while taking account of the serious deficiencies identified and their repeat nature.” 
  
  “Next, the Court must consider what fees should be awarded for work performed on the fee litigation in this case.”  “While the Court does not agree [with defendant] that a ninety percent reduction in fees on fees is warranted here, some reduction is warranted.”  “The fees-on-fees petition was only partially successful, justifying only 50% of the hours sought.”  “The Court accordingly finds that a 50 percent reduction of hours, parallel to the reduction ordered in the fees award, is appropriate here.”
  
  “Lastly, the Court considers the reasonable hourly rate.”  “Although the parties initially disputed the appropriate rates to apply, in its reply brief, [plaintiff] agreed to accept the rate matrix proposed by DHS, known as the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s Fitzpatrick Matrix.”  “Accordingly, the Court considers this issue conceded and will apply the Fitzpatrick rates.”  “The last disputed issue between the parties is whether the Court should apply the matrix rates for 2024 to all fees, as compensation for delay in payment, or the matrix rate applicable during the year the bills were incurred.”  “The Court agrees with DHS that the applicable rate is the rate in effect during the year that bills were incurred.”  “[T]he Court will grant the motion in part and award [plaintiff] $33,730 in fees, $9,763 in fees on fees, and $402 in costs.”