Hum. Rts. Def. Ctr. v. DOJ, No. 20-00674, 2024 WL 3744413 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 9, 2024) (Chun. J.)

Hum. Rts. Def. Ctr. v. DOJ, No. 20-00674, 2024 WL 3744413 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 9, 2024) (Chun. J.)

Re:  Request for records of claims against DEA that DEA resolved through payment of settlement or judgment

Disposition:  Denying defendants’ motion to alter or amend judgment or for relief from the judgment

• Litigation Considerations; Exemption 6:  The court relates that “[t]he DEA – relying on information provided in [its new] Declaration – contends that the Court undervalued the tortfeasor’s privacy interests and overvalued the public interest in access to the DEA files at issue.”  “[Plaintiff] responds that the information in [defendants’ new] Declaration is ‘untimely and should be disregarded’ because it comes from the DEA’s own files and could have been submitted ‘at any time in this litigation.’”  “Because a Rule 59(e) motion may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation, and [defendants’ new] Declaration includes information about DEA files that was available to Defendants at an earlier time, the Court does not consider the motion under that rule.”  “But because it is the ‘incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done in light of all the facts[,]’ and given the circumstances presented by this case, the Court exercises its discretion to consider the motion, and the information provided in [defendants’ new] Declaration, under Rule 60(b)(6).”
  
  Regarding the substance of the exemption, the court relates that, “[i]n its first summary judgment order, the Court considered the DEA’s reasons for nondisclosure – as they pertained to the tortfeasors’ privacy interests – to be ‘insufficient’ because they were ‘vague, conclusory allegations of prejudice and harassment.’”  “Assuming without deciding that all the alleged tortfeasors here were one-time offenders, as compared to the repeat offenders in [another case cited by the court], this distinction is not material to the propositions that the Court drew from [that cited case]:  that an agency may not categorically withhold names of its tortfeasor employees; identifying employees that engage in tortious conduct will shed light on the agency’s performance of statutory duties; and this is directly linked to the public’s interest in ensuring that those who engage in tortious activities will be held accountable.”  “Whether the alleged tortfeasors here are one-time or repeat offenders . . . is not a pivotal factual distinction that might discredit the notion that there is a public interest in an agency’s disciplinary measures or in the way an agency behaves when using public funds.”  “The Court does not deem the fact distinction raised by the DEA to be a manifest injustice to justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6).”
  
  “The DEA next addresses the Court’s ‘three-fold public interest in disclosure’ presented in its first summary judgment motion:  (1) to determine whether the DEA employees accused of wrongdoings are multiple offenders; (2) to know how much taxpayer money has been used to resolve claims against these employees; and (3) to discover whether any remain employed by the DEA.”  “The DEA contends that [defendants’ new] Declaration addresses all three of these public interest concerns.”  “First, the DEA says that ‘none of the DEA employees accused of wrongdoing is a “multiple offender.”’”  “Second, the DEA says that it has already disclosed how much taxpayer money it paid to resolve the claims at issue.”  “Third, the DEA says that ‘disclosing the names of the three DEA employees who were named as alleged tortfeasors for multiple claims would not inform [plaintiff] (or the public) whether those persons still worked for the DEA’ because none of them are currently employed by the DEA.”  “The Court agrees with [plaintiff].”  “The public interest in disclosure under FOIA is broader than the three interests discussed in the Court’s first summary judgment order.”  “The Court reiterates that no matter the factual scenario – whether the tortfeasors identified in the 156 files at issue were alleged or substantiated offenders, repeat offenders, or were identified in settlement agreements that expressly disclaimed admission of fault – the public interest analysis focuses on ‘the extent to which disclosure of the information sought would “she[d] light on an agency’s performance of its statutory duties” or otherwise let citizens know “what their government is up to.”’”  “Disclosure of the files related to the DEA tortfeasors would do just that.”