

FIL  
United States Court of Appeals  
Tenth Circuit

PUBLISH

June 23, 2023

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Christopher M. Wolpert  
Clerk of Court

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

No. 22-4053

DERALD WILFORD GEDDES

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the District of Utah  
(No. 1:15-CR-00093-C-1)

Josh Lee Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady Federal Public Defender with him on the briefs) Denver Colorado for Defendant - Appellant.

Gregory S. Knapp (David A. Hubbert Deputy Assistant Attorney General S. Robert Lyons Chief Criminal Appeals & Tax Enforcement Policy Section Katie Bagley and Joseph B. Syverson Tax Division Department of Justice with him on the brief) Washington D.C. for Plaintiff - Appellee.

Before **BENJAMIN H. KELLY** and **BRISCO E.** Circuit Judges.

**BENJAMIN H. KELLY** Circuit Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Derald Wilford Geddes was convicted by a jury of tax obstruction 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) tax evasion 26 U.S.C. § 7201 and three counts of willfully filing false tax returns in the years 2011 2012 and 2013 26 U.S.C.

§ 7206(1) as sentenced to five years in prison, three years of supervised release, and ordered to pay about 1.8 million in restitution. VI R 1037–38. On appeal, he argues that (1) restitution was impermissibly ordered to begin during his imprisonment; (2) 16 conditions of supervised release not pronounced orally at sentencing improperly appeared in the written judgment; and (3) one of those 16 conditions, the risk notification to third parties condition, is invalid under United States v. Cabral, 926 F.3d 687 (10th Cir. 2019). We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the district court to conform its written judgment consistent with our opinion.

### Background

Mr. Giddens worked as a dentist in Ogden, Utah. I.R. 35. After an audit and as of 2013, the IRS determined Mr. Giddens owed about 1.8 million in taxes, penalties, and interest. VI R 736–37. Mr. Giddens represented himself at trial with assistance of standby counsel. II R 91. The jury found Mr. Giddens guilty on all charges. VI R 1006–07. At sentencing, the district court confirmed that Mr. Giddens and standby counsel had reviewed the Presentence Report (PSR). Id. 1018. The PSR stated restitution “shall be ordered as a condition of supervised release.” V R 24. Restitution is a mandatory condition of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) and the Sentencing Guidelines § 5D1.3(a)(6). The district court orally imposed the restitution obligation, stating it would waive the accrual of interest and that some

payment d begin “ hi e incarceration.” VI R. 1039. The c r a s s a ed ha mee ing he payment sched e as a c ndi i n s pervised re ease. Id. 1038.

The ri en j dgmen inc ded res i i n in i s gr p manda ry c ndi i ns f s pervised re ease and in a sec i n en i ed “Crimina Mone ary Pena ies.” III R. 266, 269. In he sec i n ca ed “Sched e Payment s” ing he pena ies sec i n, he j dgmen inc ded ins r c i ns r payment begin d ring incarceration i n. Id. 270.

The PSR a s is ed r her c ndi i ns s pervised re ease ha are manda ry in b h he g ide ines and in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d): (1) pr hibi i n n c mmi ing an her crime, (2) pr hibi i n n p ssuming a c n r ed s bs ance, (3) he DNA samp e req iremen , and (4) he dr g es ing req iremen . V R. 25. A sen encing, he dis ric c r ra y s pended he dr g es ing req iremen . VI R. 1037. The dis ric c r hen s a ed ha Mr. Geddes d be s bjec he DNA samp e req iremen and reminded him ha as a c nvic ed e n, he cann p ssum a irearm. Id. B he dis ric c r did n ra y imp se he pr hibi i ns n c mmi ing an her crime r n p ssuming a c n r ed s bs ance. Id.

The PSR a s s a ed Mr. Geddes “sha c mp y i h he s andard c ndi i ns s pvisi n as ad p ed by his C r .” V R. 25. I did n is any he s andard c ndi i ns. A sen encing, he dis ric c r did n re er s andard c ndi i ns r imp se c ndi i ns s pervised re ease ri arge, and a s made n express s a emen ha i as ad p ing he PSR. VI R. 1016–42. The dis ric c r did ra y s a e nine specia c ndi i ns ha d app y Mr. Geddes’ erm s pervised

release, all conditions had been listed in the PSR and none were added as a restitutio in integrum condition. Id. 1037–39; III R. 26–27. Neither Mr. Geddes nor the government made objections during sentencing. At the end of the hearing, the district court asked the parties whether there was “[a]nything else?” and both replied that there was not. Id. 1040–42.

The written judgment contained the nine special conditions as stated by the district court. III R. 268. However, it also contained the 16 additional conditions for supervised release Mr. Geddes complies with here. That these conditions were statutory mandatory ones that had been written into the PSR: prohibited possession of a firearm, possession of a controlled substance. Id. 266; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). The other 14 conditions were classified as standard conditions for supervised release in the written judgment. III R. 267. Thirteen of these were standard conditions recommended, but not required, in every case by U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c). III R. 267. The 14th condition, consent to search, is listed as a special condition in the Guidelines for sex offenses but appears in the written judgment among the 13 “standard” conditions. Id.; see U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(7)(C). The government contends the consent-to-search condition is standard in the District of Utah. Aplee. Br. at 16.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Under the sentencing guidelines, this is a special condition recommended for sex offenses. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(d)(7)(C). The probaton certificate, not the court certificate, in the District of Utah lists this condition in a document called “Standard Conditions Supervised Release” that the other 13 conditions that the sentencing guidelines classify as standard. Standard Conditions Supervised Release

## Discussio

### et er t e district court erred by imposi g a freesta di g restitutio requireme t

We review his issue for plain error because Mr. Geddes made no objec ion a t sen encing. Thus, he mus show “(1) error (2) ha is clear or obvious under curren law, and which bo h (3) affec ed [his] subs an ial righ s and (4) undermined he fairness, in egri y, or public repu a ion of judicial proceedings.” Uni ed S a es v. Mullins, 613 F.3d 1273, 1283 (10 h Cir. 2010); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).

Res i u ion mus be au horized by s a u e and cour s do no have inheren power o order i . Uni ed S a es v. Delano, 981 F.3d 1136, 1139 (10 h Cir. 2020). Mr. Geddes argues he dis ric cour improperly imposed res i u ion as bo h a condi ion of supervised release ha required paymen ou side he erm of supervised release and as a frees anding obliga ion. Apl . Br. a 12. There is some ambigui y in t he wri en judgment as o he manner of res i u ion. III R. 268–70.

To he ex en ha paymen is required ou side of supervised release, he

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U ah, t

[h ps://www.u.p.uscourts.gov/sites/u.p/files/StandardConditionsOfSupervision.pdf](https://www.u.p.uscourts.gov/sites/u.p/files/StandardConditionsOfSupervision.pdf).

The condi ions do no appear o be in a general or s anding order for he dis ric cour or o herwise on he cour websi e. See Apl . Reply Br. a 11. As Mr. Geddes no es, here is no indica ion who prepared his document or where i came from. Id. a 11 n.3. Moreover, he proba ion office websi e s a es ha he cour “may” impose discre ionary condi ions and no hing abou he document or websi e indica es ha his lis is deemed imposed in all cases. Compare Pos -Convic ion Supervision, U.S. Proba ion & Pre rial Servs., [h ps://www.u.p.uscourts.gov/pos-convic-ion-supervision](https://www.u.p.uscourts.gov/pos-convic-ion-supervision), wi h Uni ed S a es v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291, 300 (4 h Cir. 2020) (discussing a s anding order which s a ed ha “[ ]he S anding Order i self expressly con empla es ha i will be incorpora ed orally a sen encing”).

governance on the plain error. Appellate Brief at 10. Title 26 tax offenses are not  
listed in the Violation of the National Prohibition Act (VWPA) or the Mandatory Violation  
Reimbursement Act (MVRA), which would allow for free and independent review. 18 U.S.C.  
§§ 3583(c), 3663(a)(1)(A), 3663A(c). Because review is not authorized by  
law, here it can only be imposed as a condition of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. §  
3583(c); Delano, 981 F.3d at 1139. Thus, the first two prongs of plain error are  
satisfied.

An error affects a defendant's substantial right when it "affects[] the outcome  
of the defendant's prosecution." Delano, 981 F.3d at 1140–41 (alteration in  
original (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). Because here  
it is not a statutory authority to extend the review requires that the error necessarily  
change the outcome of the defendant's prosecution and affect Mr. Geese's  
substantial right. See id. Finally, review is not warranted as a matter of course  
should be ordered because it is beyond the review authorized; thus, impermissibly  
affects the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings. See id. Mr. Geese has  
satisfied the plain error standard and the government does not overcome it.  
Therefore, we reverse the district court's opinion of review on the extension of supervised  
release of supervised release.

**B. Whether the district court erred by adding conditions of supervised release to  
the written judgment that were not orally pronounced at the sentencing hearing.**

**1. Standard of review**

The parties agree as to the standard of review regarding the 16 additional

condition o rvi d r l a . Th gov rnm ent gg t lain rror r vi w  
b ca Mr. G dd did not obj ct at nt ncing. A l . Br. at 14. Mr. G dd  
arg or ab o di cr tion r vi w incl ding d novo r vi w o l gal concl ion . ,  
A lt. Br. at 24–25. Wh n a d ndant ha no ad q at o ort nity to obj ct at th  
nt ncing h aring condition o rvi d r l a ar r vi w d or ab o  
di cr tion. Unit d Stat v. Br l y 15 F.4th 1279 1286 (10th Cir. 2021). Thi  
incl d l nary r vi w o wh th r th oral nt nc and writt n j dgm ent con lic.  
Id. Th w con id r wh th r Mr. G dd wa noti i d o th condition b ing  
im p d at nt ncing and had an ad q at o ort nity to obj ct. S Unit d Stat  
v. Diggl 957 F.3d 551 559 (5th Cir. 2020) ( n banc) c rt. d ni d 141 S.Ct. 825  
(2020).

Thi in t rn r q ir con id ration o th vario ty o condition o  
rvi d r l a . Titl 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) divid th m into two cat gori :  
mandatory and di cr tionary. Th nt ncing g id lin cat goriz th m a  
mandatory tandard cial and additional cial. U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3. Th  
mandatory condition in th nt ncing g id lin ar mat rially th am ea th  
mandatory condition in § 3583. Th g id lin ’ “ tandard ” “ cial ” and  
“additional” cial condition ar orm so di cr tionary condition nd r § 3583(d).  
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3; Diggl 957 F.3d at 559 & n.4; Unit d Stat v. Rog r 961  
F.3d 291 297 (4th Cir. 2020). Th di r nc b tw n th gro in th g id lin i  
that tandard condition ar r commend d in v ry ca whil cial and additional  
cial condition ar r commend d or c rtain ca . U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3. S ction ,

3583(d) standards screen conditions may only be imposed if the re-  
 “reasonably related” to some of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, involve no greater  
 deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary, and be consistent with the  
 Sentencing Commission’s policies. Here, the new special conditions are  
 unchallenged.<sup>2</sup>

Turning to the conditions imposed on Mr. Geddes, the mandatory  
 conditions issue were contained in the PSR. Because the conditions re-  
 mandatory, “[t]he defendant’s notice, versus the defendant will be  
 subject to those conditions is a matter of law.” Rogers, 961 F.3d 297. The district  
 court confirmed sentencing Mr. Geddes and his standby counsel reviewed the  
 PSR. Mr. Geddes used constructive notice through the defendant’s mandatory  
 notice from the PSR. These conditions would apply. But, because the PSR  
 notice sentence, see United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448, 1451 (10th Cir.  
 1987) (en banc), and the district court did not purport to adopt the PSR or otherwise  
 adopt fully the mandatory conditions sentencing, its close questions  
 owe Mr. Geddes the opportunity to object to sentencing despite giving  
 notice. See Duggles, 957 F.3d 561 & n.7 (“[I]n-court adoption of those conditions

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<sup>2</sup> As discussed in note 1, the consent to special conditions is a special  
 guideline and standard on the District of Columbia’s probation office website. As  
 special conditions may require further explanation for imposition. United States  
 v. Benvie, 18 F.4th 665, 671 (10th Cir. 2021). Even giving the government the  
 benefit of the doubt and erring “safely” in the District of Columbia, special  
 conditions and we evaluate the spirit of the group of screening  
 conditions.

is when he e en n n obje .”); Rogers, 961 F.3 295. Be se he o ome wo l be he s me n er ei her he pl in error or b se o is re ion s n r o review, we will ss me or p rposes o ppe l h he b se o is re ion s n r pplies. C. Br ley, 15 F.4 h 1286.

For he 14 is re ion ry on i ions, Mr. Ge es i no h ve no i e or n eq e oppor ni y o obje . The PSR only s e h Mr. Ge es “sh ll ompl y wi h he s n r on i ions o s persion s ope by his Co r.” V R. 25. Unlike he man ory on i ions, he PSR i no lis he s n r on i ions wi h spe i i i y. An he o r ma e no re eren e sen en ing o op ing ei her: (1) he s n r on i ions s lis e in he sen en ing g i elines or s lis e in he Dis ri o U h; or (2) he PSR. There w s no hing o in i e h Mr. Ge es sho l h ve obje e . See Rogers, 961 F.3 295 (“[N]o hing o u rre sen en ing h wo l h ve lere [he e en n] o he possibili y h his wri en j gmen migh in l e [hose] nmen ion e on i ions.” (emph sis e )).

Al ho gh his ir i oes no req ire o r s o make spe i i in ings be ore imposing s n r on i ions, “[i]n some ir ms n es, he p r ies’ obje ions [o s n r on i ions] may j s i y mo i i ion o voi n er in y over on i ion’s re h or o i he p r i l r ir ms n es.” Unie S es v. M ñoz, 812 F.3 809, 824 n.17 (10 h Cir. 2015). Th s, even ho gh hey re “s n r ,” he s n r on i ions re only “re ommen e ” n no inevi bly j s i ie in every se. The o r oes no h ve o op hem. As or he s gges ion h e en n h s responsibili y o obje o on i ions no lis e in he PSR, no or lly impose , n

not re re n e ery case, we reject t.<sup>3</sup>

Therefore, we w ll re ew the mpos t on of the two man atory an 14  
 scret onary con t ons n the wr tten j gment for ab se of scret on. str ct A  
 co rt ab ses ts scret on “when a r l ng s base on a clearly erroneo s f n ng of  
 fact, an erroneo s concl s on of law, or a clear error of j gment.” Muñoz, 812 F.3  
 at 817. “ n error of law s per se an ab se of scret on.” Un te States . Ellis, 23  
 F.4th 1228, 1238 (10th C r. 2022) ( ot ng Un te States . Lopez- la, 665 F.3  
 1216, 1219 (10th C r. 2011)).

## 2. Merits

Sentenc ng n a cr m inal case affects f n amental h man r ghts of l fe an  
 l berty. V llano, 816 F.2 at 1452. The sentenc ng j ge m ust anno nce the  
 sentence s ch that the efen ant s aware of the sentence when lea ng the  
 co rtroom. I . at 1452–53. The PSR s not the sentence — “[t]he sentence orally  
 pronon ce from the bench s the sentence.” I . at 1451. Tho gh the r ght s not  
 absol te, a efen ant has a const t t onal r ght to be present at the mpos t on of h s

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<sup>3</sup> The go ernment arg es that some of o r pr or caselaw mpl es that ex stence  
 of scret onary or stan ar con t ons n the sentenc ng g el nes an the D str ct  
 of Utah pro es constr ct e not ce. plee. Br. at 15–16 (c t ng Un te States .  
 Barajas, 331 F.3 1141, 1144–45 (10th C r. 2003)). Barajas a resses not ce n the  
 context of a str ct co rt’s mpos t on of a new con t on r ng sentenc ng tself  
 that was not n the PSR, an a efen ant’s fa l re to object orally. Here, Mr. Ge es  
 alleges the error occ rre when the str ct co rt a e con t ons to the wr tten  
 j gment, not r ng sentenc ng. Unl ke Barajas, here Mr. Ge es ha no  
 opport n ty to object at sentenc ng, regar less of whether he ha not ce of the  
 poss bl ty f rther con t ons may be mpose , beca se the str ct co rt not  
 anno nce any of these scret onary con t ons at sentenc ng.

or her sentence is herefore “present only when being sent from the bench.”

I. 1452 ( 9th Cir. 1997).

If written judgments normally pronounce sentence on flight, “[ ] is firmly established in the principle of federalism in which normally pronounce sentence on rolls.” I. 1450. The written judgments can be used to provide clarity to the sentence only if the oral sentences are ambiguous. United States v. Bruley, 568 F.3d 852, 855 (10th Cir. 2009). “[Ten hours] jurisprudence leaves no space for unsolicited unspoken judgments” and therefore sentence should rely on sentence judgments’ ambiguous words. I. 856–58.

To determine whether the oral pronounce sentence is ambiguous, courts “consider only the words used by the sentencing court in formally pronouncing sentence.” Bruley, 568 F.3d 856. Ambiguity includes, but is not limited to, “(1) when the words used have more than one meaning; (2) when otherwise ambiguous words are used in an unusual way; (3) the exclusion of the sentence cannot be inferred from the language used; or (4) the plain meaning of the words used leads to an irrational or absurd result.” Villano, 816 F.2d 1453 n.6. None of these circumstances are present here. The issue is whether sentence is ambiguous.

Villano notably notes that the sentence is an example of ambiguity. 816 F.2d 1454 (McKey, J., concurring) (noting his omission); \_\_\_, 1458 (Logan, J., concurring) (same); \_\_\_, 1460 (Anderson, J., concurring) (same). In Bruley, the court’s reliance on the definition of “will” to himself “with all the special terms” further revoking his former supervisory release and imposing new terms for the court.

imprisonment 15 F.4th 1286–87. In Harceux, the court found with respect to special conditions of supervision, which condition is a requirement of which the defendant was already aware, silence more likely to constitute ambiguity; but if the condition is imposed by the written judgment for the first time, it is more likely to constitute a categorical prohibition will control Brulley, 15 F.4th 1286–87.

We were the discretionary and mandatory conditions, which in this case, the district court's silence during sentencing categorical prohibition was more likely ambiguous.

**a. Discretionary conditions**

“As commonplaces, as has [discretionary] conditions may be across federal circuits, Congress has mandated the imposition.” United States v. Asic, 930 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2019). For purposes of whether the condition must be applied, the relevant discretion is between conditions mandated by the guidelines and those which are discretionary, if the sentencing guidelines further subcategorize the standard. S. United States v. Mahews, 54 F.4th 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2022); Rogers, 961 F.3d at 299; Diggles, 957 F.3d at 559 & 4. Section 3583 requires district courts to exercise discretion and make individualized assessments for all discretionary conditions, as does the sentencing guidelines 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)–(c); Mahews, 54 F.4th at 6. Thus, conditions which are discretionary under the guidelines are impliedly removed from supervision. We hold that district courts must apply

pronoun “retroactive” on the fact that by the time the  
 guidelines are applied.

In reaching this conclusion, we join the D.C., Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh  
 Circuits which have held that all retroactive provisions orally  
 pronounced. S. Matthews, 54 F.4th at 6; Rogers, 961 F.3d at 294; Duggl, 957  
 F.3d at 559; Ant, 930 F.3d at 910.<sup>4</sup> We clarify that the holding is not required  
 the district court to retroactively apply the holding. While that option, if the  
 provisions are written out in advance and the defendant has with the  
 they are fully written in the PSR or another document, the district court may  
 incorporate the by reference or explicitly say that the provisions are  
 provisions. S. Matthews, 54 F.4th at 6 n.2; Duggl, 957 F.3d at 560–62; Rogers,  
 961 F.3d at 299. Should the district court not retroactively apply the  
 provisions would apply to a defendant’s appeal, the government’s  
 responsibility to object. Although the district court not find the defendant  
 court of the provisions being applied an opportunity for the defendant to  
 object, the written judgment is that the provisions without regard to conflict.

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<sup>4</sup> We acknowledge an inclination to follow the Seventh Circuit’s holding in  
United States v. Trullio that retroactive provisions are not to be orally applied  
 because they are implicit in the nature of the appeal. 168 F.3d 61, 62–64 (2d  
 Cir. 1999). Notably, the Fifth Circuit recently followed Trullio, but in 2020  
 clarified that retroactive provisions are to be orally pronounced in the  
 review. Duggl, 957 F.3d 551. The Ninth Circuit also followed Trullio in United  
States v. Napier, 463 F.3d 1040, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006), but has now granted en banc  
 review to reconsider the holding in United States v. Montoya, 48 F.4th 1028, (9th Cir.),  
reh’g granted en banc on vacatur by 54 F.4th 1168 (9th Cir. 2022).

See Digg e 7 F.3d at 63.

Here upon review of the word used by the district court at sentencing ee Barwig 68 F.3d at 86 the court said nothing about other condition that may apply. “A defendant must be entitled to rely on a judge’s unambiguous word.” Barwig 68 F.3d at 88. Our case law rejects undiscussed and unspoken judicial intent. Id. at 86–7. A one-sentence reference in the PSR to the standard condition with no incorporation of the PSR or mention of “standard” condition in court during sentencing is insufficient to impose the condition. See Viano 816 F.2d at 142. A defendant always has a right to be present at the imposition of his sentence. Id. Mr. Gedde was not aware of his sentence when he left the courtroom.

There is nothing in the district court’s word that can be construed as ambiguous — the district court simply did not incorporate or impose any standard condition of supervised release. See Roger 61 F.3d at 293–300. Because Mr. Gedde was sentenced to supervised release with no mention of “standard condition” that would apply there is a conflict between his oral sentence and the written judgment. This is consistent with Bru ey which while only addressing special conditions found that adding previously unmentioned conditions in the written judgment create conflict rather than ambiguity. Cf. Bru ey 11 F.4th at 1287. We resolve that conflict with the well-established rule that the oral sentence controls. Therefore the district court committed an error of law and abused its discretion.

adding 1 di tiona y ondition of up vi d l a to th w itt n judgment.<sup>5</sup>

**b. Man atory con itions**

We tu n to th impo ition of th two mandato y ondition : p ohibition on ommitting anoth im eand on po ing a ont oll d ub tan . S. An ti, 930 F.3d at 909. R ga dl of it po ition on wh th di tiona y ondition mu t b o ally p onoun d, v y i uit to on id th i u ha found that mandato y ondition of up vi d l a n d not b p onoun d. S. Matth w, 5 F. th at 5; Rog, 961 F.3d at 296–97; Diggl, 957 F.3d at 557; An ti, 930 F.3d at 909; Unit d Stat v. Wa hington, 90 F.3d 20 , 208 (2d Ci . 2018); al o Unit d Stat v. D ap au, 6 F.3d 6 6, 656 (8th Ci . 2011); Unit d Stat v. V ga-O tiz, 25 F.3d 20, 22–23 (1 t Ci . 2005); Unit d Stat v. Napi, 63 F.3d 10 0, 10 3 (9th Ci . 2006); Unit d Stat v. Montoya, 8 F. th 1028 (9th Ci .) (Fo t, J., on u ing), h'g g ant d and opinion va at d by 5 F. th 1168 (9th Ci . 2022).

Th wa no o o abu of di tion in impo ing th two ondition in th w itt n judgment v n though th y w not o ally p onoun d. A di u d p viou ly, Mr. G dd had noti h would b ubj t to th two ondition b au th y app a in § 3538(d). S. An ti, 930 F.3d at 909. Th y w al o li t d in th PSR, whi h th di t i t judg onfi m æ at nt n ing that Mr. G dd and hi tandby oun l had vi w d. S. id. Mandato y ondition lik th do

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<sup>5</sup> In hi final i u on app al, Mr. G dd ub tantiv ly hall ng th i k notifi ation to thi d pa ti ondition. Thi ondition wa on of th l di tiona y ondition not impo d o ally. Thu , w n d not add th a gum ent b au w hold th ondition wa not impo d upon him.

not correct contact because the district court has no discretion to omit them. Rogers, 961 F.3d at 296–97.<sup>6</sup> Any objection to these two conditions would be unavailing. S. Duggins, 957 F.3d at 559. Or, pronouncement, then, does not give these mere “opportunity to defend” against these two conditions that the pronouncement of discretionary conditions does. Rogers, 961 F.3d at 296–97. Unlike the discretionary conditions, these two conditions in § 3583(d) “must be part of any term of supervised release.” Anstee, 930 F.3d at 909 (emphasis added).<sup>7</sup> Although we find these two mandatory conditions are “valid components” of Mr. Giddens’ sentence, it remains best practice to impose conditions of supervised release that are not necessary. Rogers, 961 F.3d at 296–97.

### 3. Scope of remedy

Tenth Circuit’s whole constellation held “unquaveringly that ‘no one is pronounced sentence controls over judgment and commitment order when the two conflict.’” United States v. Bowen, 527 F.3d 1065, 1080 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting

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<sup>6</sup> In reply and tort argument, Mr. Giddens raised the issue presented in Grain v. United States, 554 U.S. 237 (2008). The text set out in the preceding paragraph that “no private party may not be a defendant in a non-private party.” Id. at 244. There, the court of private spontaneous defendant’s sentence to meet the mandatory minimum for the defendant was sentence below that value, without cross-appeal from the government asking for sentence. Id. at 242–43.

Here, the government did not cross-appeal regarding the mandatory conditions, nor was there any need. As argued in its response brief, there was no error in the mandatory conditions were properly imposed in the written judgment. App. Br. at 19–20. Upholding the imposition of the two mandatory conditions is now why it is the sentence to the benefit of the non-private party.

<sup>7</sup> The two mandatory conditions that issue here unquaveringly give no room for discretion.

United States v. Alonzo-Zarate, 986 F.2d 378, 379 (10th Cir. 1993). Without ambiguity in when there is a conflict between the oral sentence and the written judgment, “the sentence, orally pronounced, shall not be altered.” Villano, 816 F.2d 1453. Because there is a conflict between the oral sentence and written judgment, the proper remedy is remand for the district court to conform the written judgment to the oral sentence. See id.

We note that Mr. George remains subject to the nine-month sentence. The condition of supervised release will also be subject to the mandatory condition. We clarify that this holding does not affect the district court’s ability under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) to modify the condition of supervised release pursuant to the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure. )

**Conclusion**

We REVERSE the district court’s imposition of retribution to the extent it would be paid over the term of supervised release. REMAND for the court to modify the written judgment in a manner consistent with this opinion. We AFFIRM the district court’s imposition of the mandatory condition of supervised release in the written judgment. REVERSE the imposition of the discretionary condition of supervised release. We REMAND for the district court to conform the written judgment to what was orally pronounced in a manner consistent with this opinion.