

19-2822 (L
ed S a es v. Swar z Family Trus

1 UN TED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
2 I FOR THE SECOND C RCU T
3

4 I August Term, 2021
5

6 I (Argued: April 4, 2022 Dec ded: May 5, 2023
7 I

8 I Docket No. 19-2822 (L , 21-334 (CON
9

10 I _____
11 I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
12 I
13

14 I *Appellee,*
15 I

16 I v.
17

18 SWARTZ FAMILY TRUST, ORIENTA INVESTORS, LLC, I
19

20 *Claimants-Appellants,*
21

22 I CHRISTOPHER SWARTZ,
23

24 *Defendant.*
25 I
26 _____
27

28 Before:
29

30 CALABRESI, LYNCH, and LOHIER, *Circuit Judges.*
31 I

32 I I plead guilty to wire fraud and tax evasion, Christopher Swartz
33 agreed to forfeit to the Government his shares in Jreck Subs, a franchise chain
34 of sandwich shops that he used to perpetrate his fraud. Claimants-Appellants
35 the Swartz Family Trust and Orienta Investors, LLC filed a hard-party petition to
36 assert that the Government forfeited property. The United States District Court I

for the rther tr ct of w York (Hurd, L) gra ted the Gover me t' mot o to d mi the pet to , f d g that the Tru t' pet to wa ot
 2 ubmitted before the th rty-day deadl e to fle uch pet to exp red a d that
 3 Or e ta fa led to tate a cla m u der the forfe ture tate, 2 U.S.C. § 853(), a
 4 1 e ther the holder of a tere t u per or to the Gover me t or a a bo a f de
 5 purcha er for value. The tr ct Court al o de ed Or e ta' mot o for
 6 reco derat o , a well a Or e ta' mot o for leave to ame d t pet to . We
 7 co clude that the Tru t' pet to wa correctly d mi ed a u t mely, a d that
 8 Or e ta' pet to doe ot tate a cla m. We rema d, however, to allow the
 9 tr ct Court to further co der Or e ta' mot o for leave to ame d t pet to
 0 with re pect to t cla m that t a bo a f de purcha er for value. Accord gly,
 2 the judgme t of the tr ct Court **AFFIRMED** part a d **VACATED** part,
 3 a d the ca e of ar a t relate to Or e ta **REMANDED** for further
 4 proceed g to permit the tr ct Court to reco der whether Or e ta hould be
 5 gra ted leave to ame d t bo a f de purcha er cla m.

6
 7 1 ELISSA HART-MAHAN, Attor ey (v d A. Hubbert,
 8 1 Act g A s ta t Attor ey Ge eral, S. Robert Lyo ,
 9 1 Ch ef, Cr mi al Appeal & Tax E forceme t Pol cy
 20 1 Sect o , Kat e Bagley, Jo eph B. Syver o , Attor ey , on
 2 the brief), Tax v o , Un t d State partme t of
 22 1 Ju t ce, for Arto ette T. Baco , Act g Un ted State
 23 Attor ey for the rther tr ct of w York,
 24 Syracu e, , fo Appellee Un ted State of Amer ca.

25
 26 1 STEVE L. KESSLER, Law Off ce of Steve L. Ke ler,
 27 w Rochelle, , fo Claimant-Appellant Swartz Family
 28 Tru t.

29 1
 30 1 SCOTT M. KESSLER, Akerma LLP, w York, Y
 3 (Jacquel e M. Ara go, Akerma LLP, Miami, FL,
 32 Kather e E. G idd g , Akerma LLP, Tallaha ee, FL,
 33 on the brief), for Claimant-Appellant Or e ta I ve tor , 1
 34 LLC.

35 1

1 LOHIER *u t Judge:*

2 w Christopher S rtz an entrepreneur from Waterto Ne York

3 masterminded a years-long scheme centered on his o ership and control of

4 Jreck Subs (“Jreck” or the “Asset”) a franchised chain of isand ch shops popular

5 in Central and Northern Ne York. After his ~~arrest~~ S rtz pleaded guilty in

6 ~~2016~~ to re fraud and tax evasion and ~~agreed~~ th the Government to forfeit his

7 interests in Jreck. Four claimants including Claimants-Appellants the S rtz

8 Family Trust (the “Trust”) and Orienta Investors LLC (“Orienta”) filed petitions

9 asserting an interest in Jreck Subs. The Government moved to dismiss the

10 petitions. ~~in~~ the t challenged orders before us the United States District Court

11 for the Northern District of Ne York (Hurd L) dismissed the petitions filed by

12 the Trust and Orienta after concluding that (1) the Trust’s petition s untimely

13 and (2) Orienta’s petition failed to state a claim either that Orienta had a superior

14 interest in Jreck or that it had a legal interest in the property as a bona fide

15 purchaser for value. The District Court also denied Orienta’s request for leave to

16 amend its petition as ll as Orienta’s subsequent motion for reconsideration of w

17 the dismissal of its petition. The Trust and Orienta appealed challenging the

1 District court's judgment dismissing the petitions and, in Orienta's case, the
2 denial of its motion for reconsideration.

3 y We conclude that both petitions were properly dismissed and that it was
4 not error for the District court to consider the record of Swartz's criminal
5 proceedings, including his plea agreement, in determining that the Asset was
6 subject to forfeiture. However, the technical basis for the District court's
7 dismissal of Orienta's bona fide purchaser claim persuades us to remand the case
8 insofar as it relates to that claim in order to give the District court an
9 opportunity to reconsider whether to grant Orienta leave to amend the claim.

10 Accordingly, the judgment of the District court is AFFIRMED in part and
11 VACATED in part, and the case relating to Orienta is REMANDED for further
12 proceedings to permit the District court to reconsider whether Orienta should be
13 granted leave to amend its bona fide purchaser claim.

14 **BACKGROUND**

15 The following background is based primarily on the District court's
16 recitation of the facts as supplemented by the record of Swartz's criminal
17 proceeding, and is focused only on the aspects of Swartz's scheme that impact
18 the viability of the ownership claims of the Trust and Orienta.

1 - I. Fact a ac ro nd

2 - Swartz engaged in a decades long criminal scheme involving frequent
3 transfers of Jreck's ownership among several entities created by Swartz and
4 others. After the scheme unraveled, Swartz admitted that these transfers, along
5 with "multiple name changes to businesses he controlled," were designed "to
6 make the traceability of ownership more difficult" and to complicate and
7 forestall "seizure and collection" by his creditors. App'x 54.

8 - Jreck was founded in the 1960s by five individuals, including Swartz's -
9 father, Thomas. Thomas purchased a minority interest in Jreck in 1972 and
10 acquired full ownership in 1991 by issuing promissory notes to the other four
11 founders. In 1996, the same year that Thomas was convicted of various financial -
12 crimes in federal court, see United States v. Pack, No. 96 CR 2, 1996 WL 760178,
13 at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 1996), he transferred Jreck to Swartz. Swartz quickly
14 took the private franchise company public using a reverse merger and renamed
15 the new public company "Jreck Subs Group, Inc." -

16 In 2000 Swartz, by then Jreck's Chief Executive Officer and Director,
17 renamed the company "Ultimate Franchise Systems, Inc." Swartz then bought -
18 more restaurants by misappropriating funds from Ultimate Franchise,

1 improper e i pecia preferred stock to ew i ve tor a d i ui
2 promi or ote to other i ve tor . Swartz' effort re u ted i a dec i e i the
3 va ue of U timate Fra chi e stock. deed, u ti 2004, U timate Fra chi e ever
4 reported a operati profit or paid a i come tax.
5 I 2002 Swartz formed a ew compa , Grace Ve ture Group, c., a d
6 cau ed U timate Fra chi e to " e " a 80 perce t take i the A s et to Grace
7 Ve ture for ear \$2 mi io , co i ti of a \$1.3 mi io promi or ote a d a
8 purported \$696,000 ca h pa me t rai ed from other ource . B 2004 Swartz had
9 cau ed U timate Fra chi e to write off the \$1.3 mi io promi or ote i
10 excha e for a purported o e-time pa me t of \$475,000 from Grace Ve ture to I
11 U timate Fra chi e. Swartz ater admitted that U timate Fra chi e did ot
12 actua keep the remai i 20 perce t take i the A s et becau e he u ed fu d I
13 fro ted b other i ve tor to acquire fu owner hip of the A s et u i a
14 promi or ote from Grace Ve ture that he ever i te ded to repa . A sa
15 re u t, Swartz ai ed fu co tro over the A s et at a ub ta tia di cou t. 2005 I
16 Swartz ou ht to co cea hi o oi co tro of the A s et from creditor b
17 a i i hi 100 perce t take i Grace Ve ture (a d thu the A s et) to the I
18 Swartz Fami Tru t.

1 A The Dis i u f und ha "[b]u f h[e] f audulen ansfe G r e
2 Ven u es, Swa z would n have b ained full n A d f he se a ha ime,"
3 and ha he ansfe "was in fa a sham ansa i n made in fu he an e f
4 he . . . f audulen s he ap." Sp. p'x 21. The Dis i u hus de e mined
5 ha A n e n i e se ep esen ed p eeds f Swa z's wi e s heme and was
6 f fei able in 2002, when G r e Ven u es was f med, a he la es in 2005,
7 when Swa z assigned n l ve he se he T us .

8 A By 2009 s me f Swa z's edi s had filed lawsui s e ve hei
9 funds. In esp nse, as he Dis i u f und, Swa z en e ed in a \$1.5
10 milli n deal wi h H dding api al G r up, In . ("HCG"), a p iva e equi y fi m,
11 whe eby: (1) Swa z ea ed seve al new en i ies, in luding J e k H ddings, LL ;
12 (2) Swa z and he T us ves ed wne ship f he se in J e k H ddings;
13 (3) Swa z spli wne ship f he h lding mpany be ween he T us
14 (app xima ely 70 pe en) and an HCG en i y (app xima ely 30 pe en); and
15 (4) HCG l aned Swa z a leas \$639,000 in ex hange f addi i nal p miss y A
16 n es.

17 In O be 2011 HCG sued Swa z f defaul ing n i s p miss y n es.
18 Swa z esp nded by enaming seve al f he J e k en i ies (f example, "J e k

1 Holdin came “Focu Acqui ition) and kin n w inv tor to uy out
2 HCG tak in th company. Swartz fri nd, “W.R., alon with on of W.R.
3 cli nt , “E.S.O., formed Ori nta, in which th y had qual tak , to inv t in th
4 HCG uyout. In May 2012 Ori nta purcha d HCG 30 p rc nt tak in Jr ck
5 Holdin /Focu Acqui ition and acquir d HCG promi ory not for
6 approximat ly \$1 million.

7 By 2013 th total amount of civil jud ment from claims rou ht y
8 variou l nd r and inv tor a ain t Swartz xc d d \$6 million. In 2015, with
9 th h lp of Dan Patt r on, Swartz fath r-in-law and th Tru t v ntual
10 tru t , Swartz att mpt d to tak Jr ck Su pu lic a cond timethrou h
11 anoth r r v r mer r. But th Gov rnment criminal pro cution pr v nt d
12 any pu licly trad d har from in old, and th pu lic off rin wa
13 unwound followin Swartz uilty pl a.

14 **II. Procedural History**

15 On S pt mb r 19, 2016, Swartz pl ad d uilty to wir fraud in violation of
16 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and tax va ion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. Swartz al o
17 con nt d to th ntry of an ord r, pur uant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and 28
18 U.S.C. § 2461(c), dir ctin th forb itur of “any and all int r t h had in th

1 Jreck S r nchi e, incl ding r nchi e right , tr demark , nd other r nd-
 2 rel ted intellect l property. Sp. App'x 1 . A sp rt o hi ple greement,
 3 Sw artz dmitted th t he "w a in control o , nd exerci ed dominion over, the
 4 Jreck S r nchi e etween 2002 nd 2015 nder v rio entity n me ," App'x
 5 47, nd th t, in order to void hi creditor , he "contin ed to di g i e hi tr e
 dominion over nd control o ine e ing l yer o nominee entitie ,
 7 incl ding, t not limited to, the [] Tr t," App'x 54. In J ly 2017 Sw artz w a
 8 entenced to 150 month ' impri onment nd ordered to p y \$21,041,249 in
 9 re tit tion to the victims o hi r d nd \$4, 19,340 to the Intern l Reven e
 10 Service or t x ev ion.

11 6 On September 23, 201 , the Di trict Co rt entered prelimin ry order o
 12 or eit re. A sreq ired y t t te, the Government eg n noti ying potenti l
 13 cl imant o t the order. Among the cl imant were P tter on, y then the
 14 Tr t' tr tee ("Tr tee"), who w a noti ed on Fe r ry 1 , 2017, nd Orient , 6
 15 which received notice on J ne 5, 2017. Orient timely iled petition nder 21 6
 1 U.S.C. § 853(n) on J ly 3, 2017, cl iming th t it h d cogniz le intere t in the
 17 A s et.

1 5 On August 1, 2017, the District Court entered an amended preliminary
 order of forfeiture to add a money judgment in the amount of \$1,300. The
 3 entry of the amended preliminary order of forfeiture spurred the filing of four
 petitions asserting a claim on the Asset. As relevant here, on August 31, 2017, the
 Trust moved for leave to file a petition acknowledging that the filing deadline
 6 had passed and that its petition was therefore untimely. A temporary order of
 7 interim filing the Trust filed a new petition on September 1, 2017
 8 purporting to respond to the amended preliminary order of forfeiture in lead. 5
 9 Oriana also filed an amended petition on September 1, 2017 after receiving
 10 notice of the amended preliminary order of forfeiture.¹

11 On September 6, 2017, the Government moved to dismiss the Trust's first
 12 petition as untimely. Then, on November 7, 2017, the Government moved for a
 13 protective order. The District Court did not rule on the Government's motion to
 14 dismiss. Instead, on November 30, 2017, it denied the Government's motion for
 15 a protective order and directed the Government to respond to the claim
 16 submitted by the Trust, Oriana, and another petitioner. On December 30,
 17 2017, the Government filed an omnibus motion to dismiss all of the petitions

¹ Oriana's amended petition merely added arguments regarding another petitioner, Change Capital. See App'x 390-91, 391-99.

1 includin rus 's p i ion for whic i s ori inal mo ion o dismiss was s ill
2 ou s andin . On Marc 16, 2018, Go rnmn wi dr wi s mo ion o
3 dismiss Ori n a's p i ion, no in a "fur r fac ual d lopmen rou
4 disco ry" would b n d d o d rmin if Ori n a's p i ion s a d a claim.
5 App'x 986.

6 v A f w mon s la r, in May 2018, Go rnmn mo d und r F d ral
7 Rul of Criminal Proc dur 32.2(b)(7) for a cour -ord r d in rlocu ory sal of
8 Ass . For i s par , Ori n a mo d o njoin Go rnmn from amendin
9 c r ain ndor con rac s, ar uin a con rac amendmen s would d alu
10 Ori n a's in r s in Ass . On Au us 9, 2019, Dis ric Cour ran d v
11 Go rnmn 's mo ion o dismiss wi r sp c o rus 's p i ion, d ni d
12 Ori n a's mo ion for injunc i r li f, and ran d Go rnmn 's mo ion for
13 an in rlocu ory sal of Ass .²

14 v In July 2020, followin limi d disco ry, Go rnmn r n wed i s
15 mo ion o dismiss Ori n a's p i ion. On January 7, 2021, Dis ric Cour v

²Al ou pr cis da Ass was sold is no n ir ly cl ar from r cord,
r cord su s s a sal "clos d a nd of 2019 or ry b innin of 2020."
App'x 1216.

1 dismissed the 's petition, on February 23, 2021, denied the 's
2 subsequent motion for reconsideration.

3 D This appeal followed.

4 DISCUSSION

5 D I. Legal Standards

6 D Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32.2 and 21 U.S.C. § 853 govern
7 the proceedings following a civil forfeiture. See United States v. Watts,
8 786 F.3d 152, 159–61 (2d Cir. 2015). Under Rule 32.2(b)(2)(A), the court
9 must make a similar forfeiture determination (that is, decide whether the property is
10 forfeitable) “with regard to the defendant’s interest in the property.” Fed. R. D
11 Civ. P. 32.2(b)(2)(A). Because the court determines whether the civil
12 defendant’s interest in the property is forfeitable, Section 853(c) provides that
13 “[a]ll rights, in law, die in the property [subject to civil forfeiture] vests in
14 the United States upon the commission of the criminal offense.” 21
15 U.S.C. § 853(c). “[Section] 853(c) reflects the application of the long-recognized
16 default principle of vesting in law of the property of a defendant, in the United States, D

1 at the time of the final act giving rise to the claim.” Caplin & Dysdale,
2 Cha te ed v. United States, 4 1 U.S. 617, 627 (1 8).

3 9 The Government must publicize the de cision and, “to the extent
4 p a ti able, p rovide die t w ritten n tice to any p e s n kn wn t have alleged an
5 inte est in the p p e ty that is the subje t of the de cision.” 21
6 U.S.C. § 853(n)(1). Thi d parties may lai an inte est in the p p e ty unde
7 eitable unde Se ti n 853(n). A thi d pa ty “asse ting a legal inte est in
8 p p e ty whi h has been de ed eited t the United States pu suant t this
9 se ti n y, within thi ty days of the inal publi ati n n tice his e eipt
10 [di e t] n tice . . . whi heve is ea lie , petiti n the u t a hea ing t
11 adjudi ate the validity of his alleged inte est in the p p e ty.” Id. § 853(n)(2).
12 The thi d-pa ty petiti n “shall set th the natu e and extent of the petiti ne ’s
13 ight, title, inte est in the p p e ty, the ti e and mis u tan es of the
14 petiti ne ’s a quisiti n of the ight, title, inte est in the p p e ty, any
15 additi nal a ts supp ting the petiti ne ’s, lai and the elie s ught.” Id.
16 § 853(n)(3).

17 9 A thi d-pa ty petiti ne has nly tw o statut y g ounds t asse t a legal
18 inte est in eited p p e ty. The petiti nne y sh w “that he p ssessed a

1 'super' as the measure of § 853()(6)(A),"
2 also a value "has he was a 'burden of purchase of value' easily with u
3 cause believe has he person was subject of fee under § 853()(6)(B)."
4 Wass, 786 F.3d at 175. "Because his would mislead claims, he person
5 authorizes challenges he effectively a defendant's person
6 evidence in disputes." Id.
7 York If a defendant files a person, he discontinue immediately when he
8 defendant has a valid evidence person. The discontinuation may
9 be amended leave unaltered the final default fee, as appropriate. 21
10 U.S.C. § 853()(6); Fed. R. C. m. P. 32.2(c)(2); see Wass, 786 F.3d at 160–61. While
11 the same scheme accounts a hearing adjudicate a defendant evidence
12 the person, see 21 U.S.C. § 853()(2), Rule 32.2(c)(1)(A) permits he discontinue
13 continue, " [a] motion, dismiss the person for lack of a good, faith value
14 same a claim, for a the lawful eas , " with a formal hearing, Fed. R.
15 C. m. P. 32.2(c)(1)(A); see Pacheco v. Seedeusk, 393 F.3d 348, 352 (2d Cir. y
16 2004). Such a motion "should be heard like a motion dismiss a civil
17 complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)." Wass, 786 F.3d at 161
18 (quoting Maeks mi ed). Thus, see York, "the person need not same

1 enough to show that the relief is plausible on its face.” Id. (cited
 2 up); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 2.2(b)(1)(A) (“For purposes of the motion [to dismiss],
 the case or information re-assumed to be true.”).

4 We review the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss aird-p r y
 5 petition de novo. Wass, 786 F.3d 161. We assume that the alleged in e
 6 petition re-true and will affirm dismissal “only where the plain facts o
 7 the denial of relief on the face of the complaint show that the government’s
 8 case is entitled to relief.” Id. (quoting Wass, 786 F.3d at 161).

9 3 **II. The Trust’s Petition**

10 As previously described, Section 85 (n)(2) requires aird-p r y
 11 petition be filed “within thirty days of the institution of a no i e or [a
 12 petitioner’s] receipt of [direct] notice, . . . whichever is earlier.” 21 U.S.C.
 1 § 85 (n)(2). The Trust does not dispute that it received direct notice of e
 14 District Court’s preliminary order on February 16, 2017, when the
 15 Trustee signed or executed the order on behalf of the Government’s subsidiary no i e. 3
 16 See Trust Br. 52; App’x 279. By way of example, the Trustee’s signature was
 17 in printed due to a medical condition “at the time of the Trustee’s receipt and 3
 18 or a few weeks surrounding its receipt.” App’x 279. But the district court’s

1 “discarded the Government’s certified letter by accident in May 2017,” after
 2 had “sained his]cognitive functions.” App’x 284. The Trust’s petition was
 3 not filed until August 31, 2017, more than six months after the Government’s
 4 initial notice and, in accepting the Trust’s excuse, the months after he
 5 “discarded” the letter in May 2017. This obviously falls well after the thirty-day
 6 period within which the Trust should have filed its petition.

7 Understood, the Trust asserts that its petition was not untimely for
 8 two principal reasons.³ First, the Trust contends that the Government’s notice of
 9 the preliminary forfeiture was premature because it was sent before Swartz
 10 was sentenced. See Trust B . 51–54. It is true that the Government served the
 11 notice of forfeiture in February 2017 and that Swartz’s sentencing (when the
 12 forfeiture would become final as to him) happened in July 2017. But

³The Trust alternatively asserts that its petition was timely because (1) the Government abandoned its initial motion to dismiss the Trust’s petition before filing its omnibus motion, and as a result, (2) the Trust was permitted to litigate its petition for two years before the District Court dismissed it. Neither of these developments, however, sheds light on whether the petition itself was untimely. To the contrary, the petition was filed as an exhibit along with a motion for a late filing an untimely petition under Rule 60(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In its brief in support of its Rule 60(b) motion, the Trust sought to “lift the preclusive effect of the Trust’s failure to timely adhere to the filing requirements of 21 U.S.C. § 853(n).” App’x 376. The nature of the Trust’s quest for its late filing undermines the Trust’s assertion that its petition was timely. But, for the reasons that follow, the Trust’s arguments also fail in the end.

1 that do not do the other part. The District Court was required to
2 make a preliminary finding of fact that “[a]nno a practical effect . . . a
3 plan of utility . . . accepted,” Fed. R. C. m. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A), and to “the
4 preliminary order sufficiently advance of the fact to allow the party to
5 use the order to modify or be forced to come forward with
6 the facts,” Fed. R. C. m. P. 32.2(b)(2)(B). Rule 32.2 and Section 853() also
7 permit the Government to be called upon by the party to
8 answer the preliminary finding of fact. S Fed. R. C. m. P.
9 32.2(b)(3) (“The duty of a preliminary finding of fact authorizes [the
10 Government] . . . to commence proceedings that comply with a statutory
11 provision of the party’s . . .”); 21 U.S.C. § 853() (1); United States v. Ma
12 562 F.3d 1330, 1339 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[O]n a preliminary finding of fact
13 the court, whether before or after the preliminary judgment, the
14 government authorizes to commence proceedings of the party
15 . . .”). The date of the finding of fact is relevant to the calling
16 proceedings only to the extent that the statute requires the party
17 property. Fed. R. C. m. P. 32.2(b)(4)(A), (c)(2); also at (c)(4) (“A calling
18 proceedings of the party . . .”).

1 . We conclude that the Government was not required to wait in *Swarz's*
2 sentencing to begin notifying potential perpetrators of the preliminary order of
3 forfeiture or about the ancillary proceeding. See Marion, 562 F.3d at 1339 (“[T]he
4 thirty-day period will begin not from the triggering date, even if it is before
5 criminal judgment is entered.”) For the same reasons, we are not persuaded by
6 the Trust’s reassurances that, having received notice of the
7 preliminary order of forfeiture, it would have been premature for the Trust to file
8 its petition before order potential claimants also receive notice.
9 The Trust’s second response is that the District Court’s August 15, 2017
10 amended preliminary order of forfeiture rescheduled the thirty-day clock for a
11 ninety-day period. This response is no more persuasive than the first. The amended
12 preliminary order merely added a money judgment. As Rule 32.2 makes
13 clear, “no ancillary proceeding is required to be entered after forfeiture
14 consists of a money judgment.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(1); see also United States
15 v. Toiver, 730 F.3d 1216, 1233 (10th Cir. 2013). Relying on decisions unrelated to
16 forfeiture, the Trust contends that an amended civil complaint generally
17 suspends an individual’s initial complaint upon service. I argue that the same
18 principles should apply to the District Court’s amended preliminary order of

1 forfeit re We re npers ded by his n logy bec se i is he Tr s 's own
2 v pe i ion, no he co r -iss ed mended prelimin ry order of forfei re, h
3 oper es s he eq i len of ci il compl in in his c se See Uni ed S es
4 Dagerd s, 892 F 3d 545, 552 (2d Cir 2018) ("On mo ion o dismiss, § 853(n)
5 v pe i ion is e l ed on he s me s nd rd s ci il compl in on mo ion
6 nder R le 12(b)(6) " (emph sis dded)); Fed R Crim.P 32 2(c)(1)(A); 21 U S C
7 § 853(n)(7) Accordingly, we gree wi h he Dis ric Co r h he mended
8 prelimin ry forfei re order did no res r he Tr s 's hir y-d y ime period o
9 file i s pe i ion

10 For hese re sons we ffirm he Dis ric Co r 's j dgmens o he Tr s v

11 **III. Oriental's Petition**

12 **A. Oriental's Statutory Standing to Petition**

13 Unlike he Tr s 's pe i ion, here is no q es ion h Oriental's pe i ion was
14 imely filed For Oriental, he ini i l q es ion is whe her i h s s ory s nding v
15 v o pe i ion he Dis ric Co r nder Sec ion 853(n)(2) S ory s nding is
16 "simply q es ion of whe her he p r ic l r pl in iff 'h s c se of c ion nder
17 v he s e'" Am Psychi ric Ass'n An hem He l h Pl ns, Inc, 821 F 3d 352, v

359 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v Static Control Components, Inc.,

2 572 U.S. 118, 128 (2014)).

3 c. In order to have standing to bring a claim under Section 853(n)(2), a

4 petitioner must demonstrate a “legal interest” in the property at issue. Watts,

5 786 F.3d at 60–61; 2 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2). “Where the petitioner has no valid

6 interest in the property under state law, the inquiry ends, and the claim fails for

7 lack of standing.” Watts, 786 F.3d at 61 (quotation marks omitted).

8 c. Orenta asserts two legal interests in the Asset: (1) a security interest in the

9 Asset derived from the promissory notes it acquired from HCG, and (2) an

0 equity ownership interest based on its shares of Jack Holdings, which later

became Focus Auctions. The Government agrees that Orenta’s security

2 interest in the Asset based on the promissory notes satisfied Section 853(n)(2)’s

3 “statutory standing” requirement—that is, it permitted Orenta to petition on the

4 District Court to adjudicate the validity of that interest under Section 853(n)(2).

5 But the Government maintains that Orenta’s “ownership of stock in a

6 corporation that owns a corporation that owns the Asset does not” confer

7 statutory standing to petition on that basis. Gov’t B-58. The District Court

8 agreed with the Government that “the 35 percent equity ownership component

1 of [Or 's] cl m would b subj c o d smiss l b c us Or , by s own
2 dmiss o , s mer ly sh r hold r l s wo corpor l v ls r mov d from
3 y l g l r s h Ass "4 Sp App'x 52 7 (quo o marks omi d)
4 We gr wih h D ð r c Cour "Th x of p o r's r s
5 forf d prop r y s d r mi d c cord c wih s l w" Ws, 786
6 F 3d 161 R solv g h cho c -of-l w qu s o r l g o Or 's l g l
7 r s h Ass s o sy sk Af r ll, Jr ck Hold gs d Focus
8 Acqu s o s r bo h corpor d D ð w æ , bu Jr ck Hold gs pp r s o .
9 h v b formed New York, wh l h D ð r c Cour fou d h h Ass
10 w æ r sf rr d 2015 from Focus Acqu s o s o Focus Flor d , Flor d
11 comp y h Focus Acqu s o s fully own d A tf rs blush would s m h
12 D ð w æ l w ppl s o d r mi wh h r Or 's qu y own rsh p s
13 "l g l r s" h Ass ; bu for u ly for us, ur sou h h sw æ r o
14 h qu s o s h s me u d r D ð w æ , New York, or Flor d l w, hus
15 r l v g us of h du y o choos h ppl c bl l w I ll hr S s,
16 memb r of LLC h s o l g l r s h s s h b lo g o h LLC S .
17 D ð Cod An 6, § 18-701 ("A memb r h s o r s sp c f cl m d

⁴R c ll h Or v u lly h d 35 p rc qu y s k Jr ck Hold gs/Focus
Acqu s o s, h LLC wih s k h Ass .

1 liability a y A erty."); N.Y. Ltd. Liab. C . Law § 601 (" erhab
2 i terest i s e ifi r erty f the li ted liability a y."); Fla. Stat.
3 § 605.0110(4) (" eren h li ted liability a y has i terest i a y
4 s e ifi li ited liability a y r erty."). It f ll ws that Orieta's equity
5 i terest i Jre k Hddi gs rF us quisiti s is t a legal i terest i the set
6 suffi ie t t fer statut ry sta di g t halle ge the f rfeiture f the sset. See
7 Stefa D. Cassella, SSET FORFEITURE L W N THE UNITED ST ES, § 23-13(h) (3d
8 ed. 2022) ("Be ause they la k a y wnershi i terest i the assets f the
9 r rati , shareh lders d t have sta di g t halle ge the f rfeiture f
10 r rate assets. The rule is the sa f r e ers fba LLC."); see als U rited A
11 States v. Walla h, 935 F.2d 445, 462 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[S]hareh lders d t h ld
12 legal title t a y f the r rati 's assets. I stead, the r rati —the e tity A
13 itself—is vested with the title.").

14 Under these mis u ta es, we lude that Orieta la ks sta di g u der
15 Se ti 853() (2) t ursue a lai based its equity wnershi i terest i Jre k
16 Hddi gs/F us quisiti s. A

1 c **B. Ori s Superior I r s Cl im**

2 c The District Court concluded that Orienta failed to state a plausible claim
 3 that it enjoyed a superior interest because Orienta’s security interest vested, at
 4 the earliest, in 2009 (when HCG, from whom Orienta bought its stake, executed
 5 its deal with Swartz),⁵ and the Government’s interest vested, at the latest, in 2005
 6 (the last year that the Asset could have become forfeitable as proceeds of
 7 Swartz’s wire fraud scheme). On appeal, Orienta faults the District Court for
 8 relying on facts outside of the petition—namely, facts from the record of Swartz’s
 9 criminal proceedings—to land on 2005 as the year the Asset became forfeitable.
 10 We disagree.

11 To establish a superior interest claim under Section 853(n), a petitioner
 12 must demonstrate that it “has a legal right, title, or interest in the
 13 property . . . [that] was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant or was
 14 superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the
 15 commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property.” 21
 16 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(A). “Because forfeitable property vests in the government

⁵ Whether a potential claimant who acquired its interest from a third party may assert its claim as derivative of the preexisting owner’s claim appears to be an open question in our Court. Because we conclude either way that Orienta’s claim arose after the Government’s interest vested, we need not, and do not, address the question. c

1 immediate on the commission of a criminal act, a bird-arrangement
 2 under § 853(n)(6)(A) on the basis of a finding that he had a legal interest in the
 3 forfeited property before the underlying crime was committed—*that is, before*
 4 *the government's interest vested.* Wass, 786 F.3d at 166 (quotation marks
 5 omitted). Under Rule 32.2(c)(1)(B), “[t]he court’s determination” as to
 6 forfeiture is “made based on evidence available in the [criminal] record,
 7 including an written plea agreement” and “an additional evidence or
 8 information submitted by the parties and accepted by the court as relevant and
 9 relevant.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(1)(B); see United States v. Caccoccia, 503 F.3d at
 10 103, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that a district court is permitted to consider
 11 prior evidence in determining forfeiture).
 12 b We hold that a district court may rely on the record of a defendant’s
 13 criminal proceedings to determine whether it is subject to forfeiture under
 14 [Section 853].” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2(c)(1)(A). In addition, a district court may
 15 rely on a preliminary order of forfeiture in determining whether a bird-arrangement
 16 defendant has a claim to the forfeited property, so long as the bird-arrangement
 17 defendant has an opportunity to challenge the fact-finding made in support
 18 of the order after it has been entered. See Dagerdas, 892 F.3d at 557–58. The

1 District Court is therefore entitled to rely on the facts contained in both the
 2 preliminary forfeiture order and Surtz's plea agreement and the criminal
 3 proceedings in concluding that Orienta had failed to state a superior interest
 4 claim to the set—especially since Orienta's petition did not challenge any of
 5 the factual findings in the preliminary order that are relevant to deciding whether
 6 the set be a forfeitable. See id.; United States v. 101 House, LLC, 22 F.4th
 7 843, 848–49 (9th Cir. 2022).

8 As it did in the District Court, Orienta also claims that it has a superior title
 9 to the set by virtue of a constructive trust, which "entitl[es] its beneficiary to
 10 any property acquired by the settlor from him." Watts, 786 F.3d at
 11 168. We easily reject the claim that a constructive trust exists in Orienta's favor.
 12 "[T]he law of constructive trusts does not necessarily entitle every crime victim to a
 13 priority over a defendant's other general creditors." Fed. Ins. v. United
 14 States, 882 F.3d 348, 373 (2d Cir. 2018). "Rather, a constructive trust attaches only
 15 to the specific property appropriated from a claimant by the offender or that can
 16 be traced thereto." Id.; see also Cassella, supra, at § 23-15(g). Because Orienta
 17 does not allege that Surtz assigned its funds to acquire the set, the District Court
 18 is right to reject its constructive trust claim.

1 1 C. Ori s Bo Fid Purch s r for V du Cl im

2 1 Finally, we address Orienta’s claim that it has a legal interest in the Asset
 3 as a bona fide purchaser for value. To prevail on such a claim, a petitioner must
 4 establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it is “a bona fide purchaser for
 5 value of the right, title, or interest in the property and was at the time of
 6 purchase reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to
 7 forfeiture under this section.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B). A bona fide purchaser
 8 claim “allow[s] a limited category of petitioners who acquired an interest in the
 9 forfeited property after the government’s interest vested to prevail at an ancillary
 10 hearing.” Watts, 786 F.3d at 169 (quotation marks omitted).

11 The District Court understandably determined that Orienta’s petition did
 12 not state a bona fide purchaser claim *arguendo*, if not entirely, because Orienta
 13 failed to describe its claim as such and, to make matters worse, neglected to cite
 14 Section 853(n)(6)(B), which authorizes such a claim. See Sp. App’x 50–51. We
 15 agree with the District Court that Orienta’s petition fails to state a bona fide
 16 purchaser claim. Specifically, Orienta does not allege facts establishing that it
 17 obtained a legal interest in the Asset “reasonably without cause to believe that
 18 the property was subject to forfeiture.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B). Orienta comes

1 closes o s bo f de purch ser cl m whe descr bes self s
 2 “ oce v c m[]” of Sw ar z’s fr ud App’x 110 d lle es h Sw ar z
 3 “fr udule ly duced Ore oe er o purch se reeme ” App’x 101.
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1 develop a necessary order to resolve the parties' dispute and a bona
 2 fide purchaser for value claim. In October 2019, the Governor obtained a
 3 order authorizing discovery related to Orietta's deposition. However, she has
 4 tried, but failed, to settle the case. The, in July 2020, the Governor moved to
 5 dismiss the deposition and stay discovery.

6 z "The equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel provides that, "[w]here a party
 7 has successfully litigated a legal proceeding, and succeeded in obtaining
 8 a judgment, he may not thereafter, solely because his interests have changed,
 9 maintain a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of how a party
 10 has acquiesced in the judgment formerly made by him." Udavi v. Weeks
 11 Mari e, I c., 418 F.3d 138, 147 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Ne Hampshire v. Maine,
 12 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)). The doctrine applies if "1) a party's later position is
 13 clearly inconsistent with his earlier position; 2) the party's former position has
 14 been adopted in some way by the court in the earlier proceeding; and 3) the
 15 party asserting the position should derive an unfair advantage against the
 16 party seeking to establish it." DeRosa v. National E-velo e Cor ., 595 F.3d 99, 103 (2d
 17 Cir. 2010) (quoting Markis v. [redacted]). "A district court's decision to invoke

1 judici opp i r vi wed for bu of di cr ion." Ashmor v. CGI Grp., Inc.,
 2 92 F. d 260, 271 (2d Cir. 2019).

We conc ud h h Di ric Cour c d wi hin i di cr ion wh n i h d 3
 4 h h judici opp doc rin do no pp y opr v n h Gov rnmn
 5 from rguing h Ori n ' p i on f i d o bon fid purch r for
 6 v u c im. In vo un ri y wi hdr wing i mo ion o di mi wi hou pr judic ,
 7 h Gov rnmn did no conc d h h p i on d uch c im. S 3
 8 Merri Lynch, Pi rc , F nn r & Smi h, Inc. v. G ørgi di, 90 F.2d 109, 114 (2d
 9 Cir. 1990) (conc uding h wh r h prior c wa "di mi d vo un ri y in
 10 ccord nc wi h ipu ion," judici opp did no pp y). Nor did h
 11 Di ric Cour dop or r y on h Gov rnmn' wi hdr wa wh n i p rmi d
 12 di cov ry r ing o Ori n ' c im o proc d.

1 3 Nor, for h ma r, did h Gov rnmn ob in ny unf ir dv n g
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 15 c ims o h v uff r d n "unf ir d rimen" du o incr d i ig ion co
 16 oci d wi h ddi ion di cov ry. Bu " i ig ion" g n r co , o we
 17 h v difficu y ing how ny ddi ion co Ori n may h v incurr d
 18 con i u " n' unf ir d rimen' h wou d d o judici opp ." Ashmor,

923 F.3d 29 . . . Finally, we are persuaded by Orietta's unfounded
 2 suggestion that the Government withdrew its motion to dismiss to avoid the
 3 entirety of temporary restraining order and to accelerate her interlocutory sale of
 4 the Assets.

5 v **D. Leave to Amend**

6 v The District Court dismissed Orietta's petition with prejudice and
 "refus[ed] to permit me to file the petition" because "the 30-day time period
 8 in which to file a first-petition under § 853() (2) is ordinarily strictly
 9 construed." Sp. App'x 52, 55. The District Court's disposition relies on Section
 0 853() (2), which provides that a first petitioner "within thirty
 days" of receiving notice, was misled. The 30-day deadline is strictly
 2 always fulfilled. It is indeed proper to file for the Government because "[i]f
 3 a first-petition files a petition within the prescribed time (or opportunity
 4 periods), the Government emerges with 'clear title to [the forfeited] property.'" United States v. Bradley, 882 F.3d 390, 393 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting 2 U.S.C.
 6 § 853() ()). Where, as here, a first-petition files a petition before the deadline
 and moves promptly to amend, rejection of the motion does not always
 8 further the purpose. Rather, in limited circumstances, it may be appropriate to

1 permi e pe i i er me dis pe i i u side e 30-d y wi d w. See
2 Daugerd_s, 892 F.3d 552-53 & . (rema di g ll w e pe i i er “ ry
3 cure e defec by ple di g ddi i lf c s b u e c mmi gli g f fu ds
4 s e c e ds ccurred,” eve ug e pe i i er did seek le ve me d
5 e dis ric c ur).

6 7 Orie imely filed i s i i l pe i i , d b e Dis ric C ur d e
G over me u ders d i i e ded pursue i s cl im e Asse . Here, 7
8 wo i g s p e i lly ip e sc les i f v r fgr i g Orie le ve me d
9 i s b fide purc ser cl im. Firs , e Dis ric C ur b sed i s dismiss l f 7
10 cl im prim rily ec ic l issue: Orie d f iled describe i s b fide
11 purc ser cl im s suc d eglec ed ci e Sec i 853()(6)(B), whic
12 u rizes suc cl im. Sec d, e G over me ck wledged ddi i l
13 f c u l devel pme w as ecess ry res lve whe er Orie ’s pe i i s ed
14 b fide purc ser f r v lue cl im. Under ese circums ces, i may be
15 “se sible give cl ima s e pp r u i y me d eir pe i i pr vide 7
16 i f r mai s isfy [Sec i] 853()(3) (if ey ve i).” Unied S es v.
17 Fur_d, 40 F.4 56 , 5 9–80 (Cir. 2022) (fi di g e dis ric c ur d
18 erred i dismissi g, su sp_e, pe i i i c r c erized s “c clus ry”

1 ~~am~~ care and n r the d str ct c urt t “pr v de e ther a hear n r an
2 pp rtun tyte a and the pet t n”).

3 w Because the D istr ct C urt bel eved that the statut ~~ny~~ era rk
4 cate r cally preclud ed a m end nt a ter the 30-day deadl ne, t d es n t appear
5 t have c nsid er ed ~~the~~ a m end nt uld ther se have been pr per.

6 Acc r d e ly, vacate ~~and~~ care and t the D istr ct C urt t rec ns der hether
7 Or enta sh uld be ranted leav ~~te~~ a and ts b na de purchaser cla .

8 w **CONCLUSION**

9 We have c ns der ed the pet t ~~ns~~ are n n rare u nts and c nclude
10 that they are th ut r t r ~~a~~band ned. See United States v. Black, 918 F.3d
11 243, 256 (2d C r. 2019). F r the re n reas ns, ~~the~~ ~~jud~~ nt the D str ct
12 C urt s **AFFIRMED** n part and **VACATED** n part, and the case relat n t
13 Or enta s **REMANDED** r urther pr ceed n s t per t the D istr ct C urt t
14 rec ns der ~~the~~ Or enta sh uld be ranted leave t a and t ~~e~~ b na de
15 purchas ~~m~~ cla w