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### UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

### FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v.

COMMERCEWEST BANK,

Defendant.

SACR15-00025

## INFORMATION

[31 U.S.C. §§ 5318(g), 5322(a), 31 C.F.R. § 1020.320: Willful Failure to Report Suspicious Transactions]

The United States Attorney charges:

# INTRODUCTORY ALLEGATIONS

At all times material to this information:

- Defendant COMMERCEWEST BANK was a federally insured commercial bank based in Irvine, California.
- 2. The Bank Secrecy Act ("BSA"), Title 31 U.S.C. Sections 5311 et seq., and its implementing regulations, which Congress enacted to address an increase in criminal money laundering activities utilizing financial institutions, required domestic banks, insured banks, and other financial institutions to maintain programs designed to detect and report suspicious activity that might be indicative of money laundering and other financial crimes, and to maintain certain

records and file reports related thereto that are especially useful in criminal, tax or regulatory investigations or proceedings.

3. Defendant COMMERCEWEST BANK was required to file a Suspicious Activity Report ("SAR") with the Treasury Department for any transaction conducted or attempted by, at, or through the bank, involving or aggregating at least \$5,000 in funds, where the bank knew, suspected, or had reason to suspect that the transaction involved funds derived from illegal activities. Defendant COMMERCEWEST BANK was required to file a SAR no later than 30 calendar days after the date of initial detection by the bank of facts that may constitute a basis for filing a SAR.

# B. <u>DEFENDANT COMMERCEWEST BANK AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH A THIRD-PARTY PAYMENT PROCESSOR</u>

- 4. From December 2011 to July 2013, defendant COMMERCEWEST BANK provided banking services to a third-party payment processor (hereinafter referred to as "the processor"). The processor opened accounts at the bank and acted as an intermediary between various merchant-clients and defendant COMMERCEWEST BANK.
- 5. On behalf of its merchant-clients, the processor withdrew funds from the bank accounts of consumers across the country and deposited the funds into accounts at defendant COMMERCEWEST BANK using a payment device called a demand draft (also referred to as a remotely-created check ("RCC") and/or a remotely-created payment order ("RCPO")). A demand draft is a check created not by the account holder but rather by a third party using the account holder's name and bank account information. Unlike ordinary checks, demand drafts are not signed by the account holder. In place of the account

holder's signature, a demand draft contains a statement claiming that the account holder has authorized the check. The merchant or third-party payment processor creates a demand draft in the name of the consumer and deposits it in the merchant's - or payment processor's - own bank account. In this case, the processor deposited demand drafts into its account at COMMERCEWEST BANK.

6. Many of the demand drafts created by the processor's merchants were reversed or "returned" by consumers' banks. Consumers' banks indicated that the reasons for these returns the consumer had not authorized the debit; the merchant had breached a warranty; the account did not exist; the account was closed or frozen; the account owner had blocked checks to a certain payee; or there were insufficient funds to cover the check. "Unauthorized" and "breach of warranty" returns typically require the consumer to fill out an affidavit, signed under penalty of perjury, stating that he or she did not authorize the check. Regulators have warned that high return rates may be indicative of fraudulent practices by the merchant. See, e.g., FDIC Financial Institution Letter: Revised Guidance on Payment Processor Relationships (January 31, 2012) ("Financial institutions should be alert to an increase in consumer complaints about payment processors and/or merchant clients or an increase in the amount of returns or chargebacks, all of which may suggest that the originating merchant may be engaged in unfair or deceptive practices or may be inappropriately obtaining or using consumers' personal account information to create unauthorized RCCs or ACH debits.").

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merchant-clients, the processor deposited more than 1.3 million demand drafts into its accounts at COMMERCEWEST BANK. In aggregate, these deposits totaled more than \$45 million. Approximately 50% of the demand drafts deposited by the processor on behalf of these three merchants were returned by consumers' banks. In 2012, COMMERCEWEST BANK found it necessary to hire temporary workers to process the volume of returns generated by the processor.

8. In 2012 and 2013, COMMERCEWEST BANK received letters and

From April 2012 through July 2013, on behalf of three

- 8. In 2012 and 2013, COMMERCEWEST BANK received letters and calls from several banks complaining of fraud and warning COMMERCEWEST BANK of unauthorized demand drafts debited from their customer's accounts. The letters and calls related to the processor's transactions. On several occasions in 2012 and 2013, COMMERCEWEST BANK agreed to block the processor from charging customers of complaining banks but allowed the processor to continue charging customers of other banks.
- 9. COMMERCEWEST BANK attempted, but was unable, to obtain evidence that the processor processed legitimate transactions.
- 10. Despite these and other warnings signs received by defendant COMMERCEWEST BANK, the bank willfully failed to file a SAR reporting the processor, its owners or employees during the period of time that the processor sent payments through the bank.

## C. THE BANK SECRECY ACT VIOLATION

11. From in or about April 2012, and continuing through July 2013, in the Central District of California and elsewhere, defendant COMMERCEWEST BANK did knowingly and willfully fail to report suspicious transactions, as required by the Secretary of the Treasury.

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ROBERT E. DUGDALE

Assistant United States Attorney Chief, Criminal Division

GREGORY W. STAPLES
Assistant United States Attorney

JOHN W. BURKE Trial Attorney Consumer Protection Branch United States Department of Justice