Elder Abuse and Elder Financial Exploitation Statutes

(1) A person shall not through fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, coercion, or unjust enrichment obtain or use or attempt to obtain or use a vulnerable adult's money or property to directly or indirectly benefit that person knowing or having reason to know the vulnerable adult is a vulnerable adult.

(2) If the money or property used or obtained, or attempted to be used or obtained, has a value of less than $200.00, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 93 days or a fine of not more than $500.00 or 3 times the value of the money or property used or obtained or attempted to be used or obtained, whichever is greater, or both imprisonment and a fine.

(3) If any of the following apply, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 1 year or a fine of not more than $2,000.00 or 3 times the value of the money or property used or obtained or attempted to be used or obtained, whichever is greater, or both imprisonment and a fine:

(a) The money or property used or obtained, or attempted to be used or obtained, has a value of $200.00 or more but less than $1,000.00.

(b) The person violates subsection (2) and has 1 or more prior convictions for committing or attempting to commit an offense under this section.

(4) If any of the following apply, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 5 years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00 or 3 times the value of the money or property used or obtained or attempted to be used or obtained, whichever is greater, or both imprisonment and a fine:

(a) The money or property used or obtained, or attempted to be used or obtained, has a value of $1,000.00 or more but less than $20,000.00.

(b) The person violates subsection (3)(a) and has 1 or more prior convictions for committing or attempting to commit an offense under this section. For purposes of this subdivision, however, a prior conviction does not include a conviction for a violation or attempted violation of subsection (2) or (3)(b).

(5) If any of the following apply, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not more than $15,000.00 or 3 times the value of the money or property used or obtained or attempted to be used or obtained, whichever is greater, or both imprisonment and a fine:

(a) The money or property used or obtained, or attempted to be used or obtained, has a value of $20,000.00 or more but less than $50,000.00.

(b) The person violates subsection (4)(a) and has 2 or more prior convictions for committing or attempting to commit an offense under this section. For purposes of this subdivision, however, a prior conviction does not include a conviction for a violation or attempted violation of subsection (2) or (3)(b).

(6) If any of the following apply, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine of not more than $15,000.00 or 3 times the value of the money or property used or obtained or attempted to be used or obtained, whichever is greater, or both imprisonment and a fine:

(a) The money or property used or obtained, or attempted to be used or obtained, has a value of $50,000.00 or more but less than $100,000.00.

(b) The person violates subsection (5)(a) and has 2 or more prior convictions for committing or attempting to commit an offense under this section. For purposes of this subdivision, however, a prior conviction does not include a conviction for a violation or attempted violation of subsection (2) or (3)(b).

(7) If any of the following apply, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years or a fine of not more than $50,000.00 or 3 times the value of the money or property used or obtained or attempted to be used or obtained, whichever is greater, or both imprisonment and a fine:

(a) The money or property used or obtained, or attempted to be used or obtained, has a value of $100,000.00 or more.

(b) The person violates subsection (6)(a) and has 2 or more prior convictions for committing or attempting to commit an offense under this section. For purposes of this subdivision, however, a prior conviction does not include a conviction for a violation or attempted violation of subsection (2) or (3)(b).

(8) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the values of money or property used or obtained or attempted to be used or obtained in separate incidents pursuant to a scheme or course of conduct within any 12-month period may be aggregated to determine the total value of money or personal property used or obtained or attempted to be used or obtained. If the scheme or course of conduct is directed against only 1 person, no time limit applies to aggregation under this subsection.

(9) If the prosecuting attorney intends to seek an enhanced sentence based upon the defendant having 1 or more prior convictions, the prosecuting attorney shall include on the complaint and information a statement listing the prior conviction or convictions. The existence of the defendant's prior conviction or convictions shall be determined by the court, without a jury, at sentencing or at a separate hearing for that purpose before sentencing. The existence of a prior conviction may be established by any evidence relevant for that purpose, including, but not limited to, 1 or more of the following:

(a) A copy of the judgment of conviction.

(b) A transcript of a prior trial, plea-taking, or sentencing.

(c) Information contained in a presentence report.

(d) The defendant's statement.

(10) If the sentence for a conviction under this section is enhanced by 1 or more prior convictions, those prior convictions shall not be used to further enhance the sentence for the conviction under section 10, 11, or 12 of chapter IX of the code of criminal procedure, 1927 PA 175, MCL 769.10, 769.11, and 769.12.

(11) A financial institution or a broker or a director, officer, employee, or agent of a financial institution or broker is not in violation of this section while performing duties in the normal course of business of a financial institution or broker or a director, officer, employee, or agent of a financial institution or broker.

(13) The court may order a sentence imposed for a violation of subsection (4), (5), (6), or (7) to be served consecutively to any other sentence imposed for a violation of this section.

(14) This section does not prohibit a person from being charged with, convicted of, or punished for any other violation of law the person commits while violating this section.

(15) As used in this section:

(a) "Broker" means that term as defined in section 8102 of the uniform commercial code, 1962 PA 174, MCL 440.8102.

(b) "Financial institution" means a bank, credit union, saving bank, or a savings and loan chartered under state or federal law or an affiliate of a bank, credit union, saving bank, or savings and loan chartered under state or federal law.

(c) "Vulnerable adult" means that term as defined in section 145m, whether or not the individual has been determined by the court to be incapacitated.

(16) If the office of services to the aging becomes aware of a violation of this section, the office of services to the aging shall promptly report the violation to the department of human services.

History: Add. 2000, Act 222, Eff. Sept. 25, 2000 ;-- Am. 2004, Act 255, Eff. Sept. 1, 2004 ;-- Am. 2012, Act 172, Imd. Eff. June 19, 2012 ;-- Am. 2013, Act 34, Imd. Eff. May 21, 2013

 For the purpose of sections 260.32 and 260.34 of this article, the following definitions shall apply:
  1. "Caregiver" means a person who (i) assumes responsibility for the care of a vulnerable elderly person pursuant to a court order; or (ii) receives monetary or other valuable consideration for providing care for a vulnerable elderly person.
  2. "Sexual contact" means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not married to the actor for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party. It includes the touching of the actor by the victim, as well as the touching of the victim by the actor, whether directly or through clothing.
  3. "Vulnerable elderly person" means a person sixty years of age or older who is suffering from a disease or infirmity associated with advanced age and manifested by demonstrable physical, mental or emotional dysfunction to the extent that the person is incapable of adequately providing for his or her own health or personal care.
  4. "Incompetent or physically disabled person" means an individual who is unable to care for himself or herself because of physical disability, mental disease or defect.

(a) Whoever commits or attempts to commit upon a vulnerable victim, a violent felony as defined in 9 GCA, § 80.70, or theft as a second degree or third degree felony under 9 GCA, § 43.15, § 43.20, § 43.30, § 43.35, § 43.40, § 43.45, § 43.50, § 43.55, or § 43.60, or crimes of forgery or fraudulent practices under 9 GCA, § 46.10, § 46.15, § 46.20, § 46.25, § 46.35, § 46.50, § 46.75, or § 46.80, shall, in addition to the sentence imposed for the commission of such felony, be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years nor more than twenty-five years, or shall, in addition to the sentence imposed for the commission of a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor, be imprisoned for a term of not less than sixty days nor more than one year.
(b) A sentence imposed under Subsection (a) of this Section for a felony shall include a special parole term of not less than three years nor more than five years, in addition to the term of imprisonment. No person convicted and sentenced under this Section for a felony shall be eligible for parole or probation until he serves at least five years in prison, or no person convicted and sentenced under this Section for a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor shall be eligible for probation until he serves at least sixty days in jail or prison.
(c) A vulnerable victim is defined as the following:
(1) an elderly person or senior citizen who is fifty-five years old or older at the time of the crime committed upon him or her;
(2) a child who is thirteen years old or younger at the time of the crime committed upon him or her;
(3) a tourist or visitor (A) who is a citizen and resident of a country other than the United States, or its territories, and visiting Guam with a round-trip airline ticket for a duration of no more than forty-five days, or (B) who is a citizen or national or permanent resident of the United States, but is not a resident of Guam, and is visiting Guam with a round-trip airline ticket for a duration of no more than forty-five days;
(4) an individual who at the time of the crime committed upon him or her has a physical or mental disability or disabilities, as defined in a provision of local or federal law, or as certified by a physician or mental health professional; or
(5) any person who is a victim of a crime, as identified in this Act, committed by two or more individuals.

(a) The following words, when used in this section and sections twenty-nine-a [§ 61-2-29a] and twenty-nine-b [§ 61-2-29b] of this article, have the meaning ascribed, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:

(1) “Abuse” means the intentional infliction of bodily injury on an incapacitated adult;

(2) “Bodily injury” means substantial physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition;

(3) “Caregiver” means any person who has assumed the legal responsibility or a contractual obligation for the care of an incapacitated adult, or has voluntarily assumed responsibility for the care of an incapacitated adult. The term includes a facility operated by any public or private agency, organization or institution which provides services to, and has assumed responsibility for the care of an incapacitated adult.

(4) “Incapacitated adult” means any person eighteen years of age or older who by reason of advanced age, physical, mental or other infirmity is unable to carry on the daily activities of life necessary to sustaining life and reasonable health;

(5) “Neglect” means the unreasonable failure by a caregiver to provide the care necessary to assure the physical safety or health of an incapacitated adult; and

(6) “Serious bodily injury” means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death, which causes serious or prolonged disfigurement, prolonged impairment of health or prolonged loss or impairment of the function of any bodily organ.

(b) A caregiver who neglects an incapacitated adult or who knowingly permits another person to neglect an incapacitated adult is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $500 or confined in jail for not more than one year, or both fined and confined.

(c) A caregiver who abuses an incapacitated adult or who knowingly permits another person to abuse an incapacitated adult is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $500 or confined in jail for not less than ninety days nor more than one year, or both fined and confined.

(d) A caregiver of an incapacitated adult who intentionally and maliciously abuses or neglects an incapacitated adult and causes the incapacitated adult bodily injury is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than $100 nor more than $1,000 and imprisoned in a state correctional facility not less than two years nor more than ten years.

(e) A caregiver of an incapacitated adult who intentionally and maliciously abuses or neglects an incapacitated adult and causes the incapacitated adult serious bodily injury is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than $1,000 nor more than $5,000 and imprisoned in a state correctional facility not less than three years nor more than fifteen years.

…

726.8 Wanton neglect or nonsupport of a dependent adult.
1. A caretaker commits wanton neglect of a dependent adult if the caretaker knowingly
acts in a manner likely to be injurious to the physical, mental, or emotional welfare of a
dependent adult. Wanton neglect of a dependent adult is a serious misdemeanor.
2. A person who has legal responsibility either through contract or court order for support
of a dependent adult and who fails or refuses to provide support commits nonsupport.
Nonsupport is a class “D” felony.
3. A person alleged to have committed wanton neglect or nonsupport of a dependent adult
shall be charged with the respective offense unless a charge may be brought based upon a
more serious offense, in which case the charge of the more serious offense shall supersede
the less serious charge.
4. For the purposes of this section, “dependent adult” means a dependent adult as defined
in section 235B.2, subsection

(a) It is an offense for any person to knowingly, other than by accidental means, abuse, neglect or exploit any adult within the meaning of the provisions of this part.
(b) A violation of this section is a Class E felony.

In chs. 939 to 948 and 951, the following words and phrases have the designated meanings unless the context of a specific section manifestly requires a different construction or the word or phrase is defined in s. 948.01 for purposes of ch. 948:
(2) “Airgun" means a weapon which expels a missile by the expansion of compressed air or other gas.
(3) “Alcohol concentration" has the meaning given in s. 340.01 (1v).
(4) “Bodily harm" means physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.
(5) “Commission warden" means a conservation warden employed by the Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission.
(6) “Crime" has the meaning designated in s. 939.12.
(9) “Criminal gang" means an ongoing organization, association or group of 3 or more persons, whether formal or informal, that has as one of its primary activities the commission of one or more of the criminal acts, or acts that would be criminal if the actor were an adult, specified in s. 939.22 (21) (a) to (s); that has a common name or a common identifying sign or symbol; and whose members individually or collectively engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.
(9g) “Criminal gang member" means any person who participates in criminal gang activity, as defined in s. 941.38 (1) (b), with a criminal gang.
(9r) “Criminal intent" has the meaning designated in s. 939.23.
(10) “Dangerous weapon" means any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded; any device designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or great bodily harm; any ligature or other instrumentality used on the throat, neck, nose, or mouth of another person to impede, partially or completely, breathing or circulation of blood; any electric weapon, as defined in s. 941.295 (1c) (a); or any other device or instrumentality which, in the manner it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm.
(11) “Drug" has the meaning specified in s. 450.01 (10).
(12) “Felony" has the meaning designated in s. 939.60.
(14) “Great bodily harm" means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or which causes a permanent or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ or other serious bodily injury.
(15) “Hazardous inhalant" means a substance that is ingested, inhaled, or otherwise introduced into the human body in a manner that does not comply with any cautionary labeling that is required for the substance under s. 100.37 or under federal law, or in a manner that is not intended by the manufacturer of the substance, and that is intended to induce intoxication or elation, to stupefy the central nervous system, or to change the human audio, visual, or mental processes.
(16) “Human being" when used in the homicide sections means one who has been born alive.
(18) “Intentionally" has the meaning designated in s. 939.23.
(19) “Intimate parts" means the breast, buttock, anus, groin, scrotum, penis, vagina or pubic mound of a human being.
(20) “Misdemeanor" has the meaning designated in s. 939.60.
(20d) “Offense against an elderly or vulnerable person" means a violation of s. 940.285 (2) (a) that caused death, great bodily harm, or bodily harm to the victim or s. 940.295 (3) (b) that caused death, great bodily harm, or bodily harm to the victim.
(20m) “Offense related to ethical government" means a violation of s. 13.69 (6m), 19.58 (1) (b), or 946.12.
(20s) “Offense related to school safety" means a violation of s. 948.605 or 948.61 (2) (b).
(21) “Pattern of criminal gang activity" means the commission of, attempt to commit or solicitation to commit 2 or more of the following crimes, or acts that would be crimes if the actor were an adult, at least one of those acts or crimes occurs after December 25, 1993, the last of those acts or crimes occurred within 3 years after a prior act or crime, and the acts or crimes are committed, attempted or solicited on separate occasions or by 2 or more persons:
(a) Manufacture, distribution or delivery of a controlled substance or controlled substance analog, as prohibited in s. 961.41 (1).
(b) First-degree intentional homicide, as prohibited in s. 940.01.
(c) Second-degree intentional homicide, as prohibited in s. 940.05.
(d) Battery, as prohibited in s. 940.19 or 940.195.
(e) Battery, special circumstances, as prohibited in s. 940.20.
(em) Battery or threat to witness, as prohibited in s. 940.201.
(f) Mayhem, as prohibited in s. 940.21.
(g) Sexual assault, as prohibited in s. 940.225.
(h) False imprisonment, as prohibited in s. 940.30.
(i) Taking hostages, as prohibited in s. 940.305.
(j) Kidnapping, as prohibited in s. 940.31.
(k) Intimidation of witnesses, as prohibited in s. 940.42 or 940.43.
(L) Intimidation of victims, as prohibited in s. 940.44 or 940.45.
(m) Criminal damage to property, as prohibited in s. 943.01.
(mg) Criminal damage to or threat to criminally damage the property of a witness, as prohibited in s. 943.011 or 943.017 (2m).
(n) Arson of buildings or damage by explosives, as prohibited in s. 943.02.
(o) Burglary, as prohibited in s. 943.10.
(p) Theft, as prohibited in s. 943.20.
(q) Taking, driving or operating a vehicle, or removing a part or component of a vehicle, without the owner's consent, as prohibited in s. 943.23.
(r) Robbery, as prohibited in s. 943.32.
(s) Sexual assault of a child, as prohibited in s. 948.02.
(t) Repeated acts of sexual assault of the same child, as prohibited in s. 948.025.
(u) Sexual assault of a child placed in substitute care under s. 948.085.
(22) “Peace officer" means any person vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests for crime, whether that duty extends to all crimes or is limited to specific crimes. “Peace officer" includes a commission warden and a university police officer, as defined in s. 175.42 (1) (b).
(23) “Petechia" means a minute colored spot that appears on the skin, eye, eyelid, or mucous membrane of a person as a result of localized hemorrhage or rupture to a blood vessel or capillary.
(24) “Place of prostitution" means any place where a person habitually engages, in public or in private, in nonmarital acts of sexual intercourse, sexual gratification involving the sex organ of one person and the mouth or anus of another, masturbation or sexual contact for anything of value.
(28) “Property of another" means property in which a person other than the actor has a legal interest which the actor has no right to defeat or impair, even though the actor may also have a legal interest in the property.
(30) “Public officer"; “public employee". A “public officer" is any person appointed or elected according to law to discharge a public duty for the state or one of its subordinate governmental units. A “public employee" is any person, not an officer, who performs any official function on behalf of the state or one of its subordinate governmental units and who is paid from the public treasury of the state or subordinate governmental unit.
(32) “Reasonably believes" means that the actor believes that a certain fact situation exists and such belief under the circumstances is reasonable even though erroneous.
(33) “Restricted controlled substance" means any of the following:
(a) A controlled substance included in schedule I under ch. 961 other than a tetrahydrocannabinol.
(b) A controlled substance analog, as defined in s. 961.01 (4m), of a controlled substance described in par. (a).
(c) Cocaine or any of its metabolites.
(d) Methamphetamine.
(e) Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol.
(34) “Sexual contact" means any of the following if done for the purpose of sexual humiliation, degradation, arousal, or gratification:
(a) The intentional touching by the defendant or, upon the defendant's instruction, by a third person of the clothed or unclothed intimate parts of another person with any part of the body, clothed or unclothed, or with any object or device.
(b) The intentional touching by the defendant or, upon the defendant's instruction, by a third person of any part of the body, clothed or unclothed, of another person with the intimate parts of the body, clothed or unclothed.
(c) The intentional penile ejaculation of ejaculate or the intentional emission of urine or feces by the defendant or, upon the defendant's instruction, by a third person upon any part of the body, clothed or unclothed, of another person.
(d) Intentionally causing another person to ejaculate or emit urine or feces on any part of the actor's body, whether clothed or unclothed.
(36) “Sexual intercourse" requires only vulvar penetration and does not require emission.
(37) “State-certified commission warden" means a commission warden who meets the requirements of s. 165.85 (4) (a) 1., 2., and 7. and has agreed to accept the duties of a law enforcement officer under the laws of this state.
(38) “Substantial bodily harm" means bodily injury that causes a laceration that requires stitches, staples, or a tissue adhesive; any fracture of a bone; a broken nose; a burn; a petechia; a temporary loss of consciousness, sight or hearing; a concussion; or a loss or fracture of a tooth.
(40) “Transfer" means any transaction involving a change in possession of any property, or a change of right, title, or interest to or in any property.
(42) “Under the influence of an intoxicant" means that the actor's ability to operate a vehicle or handle a firearm or airgun is materially impaired because of his or her consumption of an alcohol beverage, hazardous inhalant, of a controlled substance or controlled substance analog under ch. 961, of any combination of an alcohol beverage, hazardous inhalant, controlled substance and controlled substance analog, or of any other drug, or of an alcohol beverage and any other drug.
(44) “Vehicle" means any self-propelled device for moving persons or property or pulling implements from one place to another, whether such device is operated on land, rails, water, or in the air. “Vehicle” does not include a personal delivery device, as defined in s. 340.01 (43fg).
(46) “With intent" has the meaning designated in s. 939.23.
(48) “Without consent" means no consent in fact or that consent is given for one of the following reasons:
(a) Because the actor put the victim in fear by the use or threat of imminent use of physical violence on the victim, or on a person in the victim's presence, or on a member of the victim's immediate family; or
(b) Because the actor purports to be acting under legal authority; or
(c) Because the victim does not understand the nature of the thing to which the victim consents, either by reason of ignorance or mistake of fact or of law other than criminal law or by reason of youth or defective mental condition, whether permanent or temporary.
History: 1971 c. 219; 1973 c. 336; 1977 c. 173; 1979 c. 89, 221; 1981 c. 79 s. 17; 1981 c. 89, 348; 1983 a. 17, 459; 1985 a. 146 s. 8; 1987 a. 332, 399; 1993 a. 98, 213, 227, 441, 486; 1995 a. 69, 436, 448; 1997 a. 143, 295; 2001 a. 109; 2003 a. 97, 223; 2005 a. 273, 277, 435; 2007 a. 27, 97, 127; 2009 a. 28, 276; 2011 a. 35; 2013 a. 83, 214, 265; 2017 a. 13.
It was for the jury to determine whether a soft drink bottle, with which the victim was hit on the head, constituted a dangerous weapon. Actual injury to the victim is not required. Langston v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 288, 212 N.W.2d 113 (1973).
An unloaded pellet gun qualified as a “dangerous weapon" under sub. (10) in that it was designed as a weapon and, when used as a bludgeon, was capable of producing great bodily harm. State v. Antes, 74 Wis. 2d 317, 246 N.W.2d 671 (1976).
A jury could reasonably find that numerous cuts and stab wounds constituted “ serious bodily injury" under sub. (14) even though there was no probability of death, no permanent injury, and no damage to any member or organ. The phrase, “or other serious bodily injury," was designed as an intentional broadening of the scope of the statute to include bodily injuries that were serious, although not of the same type or category as those recited in the statute. La Barge v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 327, 246 N.W.2d 794 (1976).
A jury must find that acts of prostitution were repeated or were continued in order to find that premises are “a place of prostitution" under sub. (24). Johnson v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 672, 251 N.W.2d 834 (1977).
Sub. (14), either on its face or as construed in La Barge, is not unconstitutionally vague. Cheatham v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 112, 270 N.W.2d 194 (1978).
Definitions of “under the influence" in this section and in s. 346.63 (1) (a) are equivalent. State v. Waalen, 130 Wis. 2d 18, 386 N.W.2d 47 (1986).
To determine whether an infant was “born alive" under sub. (16), the s. 146.71 standard to determine death is applied, as, “if one is not dead he is indeed alive." State v. Cornelius, 152 Wis. 2d 272, 448 N.W.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1989).
A dog may be a dangerous weapon under sub. (10). State v. Sinks, 168 Wis. 2d 245, 483 N.W.2d 286 (Ct. App. 1992).
Portions of the defendant's anatomy are not dangerous weapons under sub. (10). State v. Frey, 178 Wis. 2d 729, 505 N.W.2d 786 (Ct. App. 1993).
An automobile may constitute a dangerous weapon under sub. (10). State v. Bidwell, 200 Wis. 2d 200, 546 N.W.2d 507 (Ct. App. 1996), 95-0791.
A firearm with a trigger lock is within the definition of a dangerous weapon under sub. (10). State v. Norris, 214 Wis. 2d 25, 571 N.W.2d 857 (Ct. App. 1997), 96-2158.
When a mother agreed to the father taking a child on a camping trip, but the father actually intended to permanently take the child and did abscond to Canada with the child, the child was taken based on the mother's “mistake of fact," which under s. 939.22 (48) rendered the taking of the child to be “without consent" and in violation of s. 948.31. State v. Inglin, 224 Wis. 2d 764, 592 N.W.2d 666 (Ct. App. 1999), 97-3091.
The definitions in subs. (9) and (9g) are sufficiently specific that when incorporated into a probation condition they provide fair and adequate notice as to the expected course of conduct and provide an adequate standard of enforcement. State v. Lo, 228 Wis. 2d 531, 599 N.W.2d 659 (Ct. App. 1999), 98-2490.
Sub. (19) includes female and male breasts as each is “the breast of a human being." The touching of a boy's breast constitutes “sexual contact" within the meaning of s. 948.02 (2). State v. Forster, 2003 WI App 29, 260 Wis. 2d 149, 659 N.W.2d 144, 02-0602.
“Materially impaired" as used in sub. (42) does not have a technical or peculiar meaning in the law beyond the time-tested explanations in standard jury instructions. Therefore, the circuit court's response to the jury question to give all words not otherwise defined their ordinary meaning was not error, comported with s. 990.01, and did not constitute an erroneous exercise of discretion. State v. Hubbard, 2008 WI 92, 313 Wis. 2d 1, 752 N.W.2d 839, 06-2753.
Shooting a person in the thigh at a range of 16 to 18 feet with a shotgun is practically certain to cause at least a protracted loss or impairment of the function of the victim's leg, and is injury constituting “great bodily harm" within the meaning of sub. (14). The fact that the defendant's conduct was intended to neutralize the threat posed by the victim did not negate the fact that, by firing the shotgun at the victim's thigh, the defendant intended to cause great bodily harm by committing an act that he was aware was practically certain to result in great bodily harm to the victim. State v. Miller, 2009 WI App 111, 320 Wis. 2d 724, 772 N.W.2d 188, 07-1052.
939.23 Criminal intent.
(1) When criminal intent is an element of a crime in chs. 939 to 951, such intent is indicated by the term “intentionally", the phrase “with intent to", the phrase “with intent that", or some form of the verbs “know" or “believe".
(2) “Know" requires only that the actor believes that the specified fact exists.
(3) “Intentionally" means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause that result. In addition, except as provided in sub. (6), the actor must have knowledge of those facts which are necessary to make his or her conduct criminal and which are set forth after the word “intentionally".
(4) “With intent to" or “with intent that" means that the actor either has a purpose to do the thing or cause the result specified, or is aware that his or her conduct is practically certain to cause that result.
(5) Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge of the existence or constitutionality of the section under which the actor is prosecuted or the scope or meaning of the terms used in that section.
(6) Criminal intent does not require proof of knowledge of the age of a minor even though age is a material element in the crime in question.
History: 1979 c. 89; 1987 a. 332 s. 64; 1987 a. 399; 1993 a. 486.
Judicial Council Note, 1988: Subs. (3) and (4) are conformed to the formulation of s. 2.02 (2) (b) ii of the model penal code. [Bill 191-S]
A person need not foresee or intend the specific consequences of an act in order to possess the requisite criminal intent and is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of the act. State v. Gould, 56 Wis. 2d 808, 202 N.W.2d 903 (1973).
Instructions on intent to kill created a permissible rebuttable presumption that shifted the burden of production to the defendant, but not the burden of persuasion. Muller v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 450, 289 N.W.2d 570 (1980).
The court properly refused to instruct the jury on a “mistake of fact" defense when the accused claimed that the victim moved into the path of a gunshot intended only to frighten the victim. State v. Bougneit, 97 Wis. 2d 687, 294 N.W.2d 675 (Ct. App. 1980).
The constitutionality of sub. (3) is upheld. State v. Smith, 170 Wis. 2d 701, 490 N.W.2d 40 (Ct. App. 1992).
The trial court's wholesale exclusion of the defendant's proffered expert and lay testimony regarding posttraumatic stress disorder from the guilt phase of a murder trial without valid justification violated the defendant's right to present a defense and to testify on her own behalf. Morgan v. Krenke, 72 F. Supp. 2d 980 (1999).