

No. 16-847

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**In the Supreme Court of the United States**

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LORETTA E. LYNCH, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL.,  
PETITIONERS

*v.*

DANIEL BINDERUP, ET AL.

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*ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI  
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT*

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**PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI**

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IAN HEATH GERSHENGORN  
*Acting Solicitor General  
Counsel of Record*  
BENJAMIN C. MIZER  
*Principal Deputy Assistant  
Attorney General*  
MICHAEL R. DREEBEN  
*Deputy Solicitor General*  
BRIAN H. FLETCHER  
*Assistant to the Solicitor  
General*  
MARK B. STERN  
MICHAEL S. RAAB  
PATRICK G. NEMEROFF  
*Attorneys*  
*Department of Justice  
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001  
SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov  
(202) 514-2217*

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### **QUESTION PRESENTED**

Whether petitioners are entitled to relief from the longstanding federal statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), based on their as-applied Second Amendment claim that their criminal offenses and other particular circumstances do not warrant a firearms disqualification.

**PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING**

Petitioners are Loretta E. Lynch, in her official capacity as the Attorney General of the United States, and Thomas E. Brandon, in his official capacity as the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

Respondents are Daniel Binderup and Julio Suarez.

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## PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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The Acting Solicitor General, on behalf of the Attorney General of the United States, et al., respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to review the judgments of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in these consolidated cases.

### OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (App., *infra*, 1a-161a) is reported at 836 F.3d 336. The opinions of the district courts (App., *infra*, 162a-239a, 243a-271a) are not published in the Federal Supplement but are available at 2014 WL 4764424 and 2015 WL 685889.

### JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on September 7, 2016. On November 21, 2016, Justice Alito extended the time within which to file a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including January 5,

2017. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

**CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY  
PROVISIONS INVOLVED**

Pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions are set forth in the appendix to this petition. App., *infra*, 274a-277a.

**STATEMENT**

1. This case involves as-applied Second Amendment challenges to the longstanding federal law prohibiting felons from possessing firearms.

a. Federal law has long restricted the possession of firearms by certain categories of individuals. By far the most frequently applied disqualification is 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), which generally prohibits the possession of firearms by any person “who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” the traditional definition of a felony. Congress enacted that disqualification in 1968 based on its determination that the “ease with which” firearms could be acquired by “criminals \* \* \* and others whose possession of firearms is similarly contrary to the public interest” was “a matter of serious national concern.” S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1968); see Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, Tit. IV, §§ 901(a)(2), 902, 82 Stat. 225, 230-231.<sup>1</sup>

Section 922(g)(1) does not apply to certain offenses “relating to the regulation of business practices” or to offenses that are labeled misdemeanors under state

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<sup>1</sup> See also Gun Control Act of 1968 (1968 Act), Pub. L. No. 90-618, Tit. I, § 102, 82 Stat. 1220 (codifying this prohibition in Section 922(g)(1)).

law and are punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less. 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20). Congress has also specified that a conviction does not bar a person from possessing a firearm if the conviction has been “expunged” or “set aside,” or if the person “has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored.” *Ibid.*

b. Congress previously allowed an individual to obtain relief from Section 922(g)(1)’s firearms disability by demonstrating to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) that “the circumstances regarding the disability, and [his] record and reputation, are such that [he] will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.” 18 U.S.C. 925(c). Since 1992, however, Congress has suspended that program by enacting annual provisions barring the use of appropriated funds to process applications for relief. *Logan v. United States*, 552 U.S. 23, 28 n.1 (2007). The Senate Appropriations Committee explained that determining whether applicants were “a danger to public safety” was “a very difficult and subjective task” that required “approximately 40 man-years \* \* \* annually” and that “could have devastating consequences for innocent citizens if the wrong decision is made.” S. Rep. No. 353, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 20 (1992) (1992 Senate Report). A later House Report added that “too many \* \* \* felons whose gun ownership rights were restored went on to commit violent crimes with firearms.” H.R. Rep. No. 183, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1996) (1996 House Report).

c. In *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), this Court held that the Second Amendment protects “the right of law-abiding, responsible citi-

zens” to possess handguns for self-defense in the home. *Id.* at 635. In so doing, the Court emphasized that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt” on a variety of established firearms regulations, including “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” *Id.* at 626. Two years later, a plurality of the Court “repeat[ed] those assurances,” reiterating that the Second Amendment right recognized in *Heller* does not undermine the validity of felon-in-possession laws. *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010).

2. Respondents Daniel Binderup and Julio Suarez are Pennsylvania residents who have been convicted of crimes that disqualify them from possessing firearms under Section 922(g)(1).

In 1996, when Binderup was 41 years old, he engaged in repeated acts of sexual intercourse with his 17-year-old employee. Binderup pleaded guilty in Pennsylvania court to corrupting a minor, an offense classified as a first-degree misdemeanor and punishable by up to five years of imprisonment. He was sentenced to three years of probation. App., *infra*, 6a, 173a-174a.

In 1990, police arrested Suarez for drunk driving and found a loaded handgun concealed under his jacket. Suarez was convicted in Maryland court of unlawfully carrying a handgun without a license, an offense classified as a misdemeanor and punishable by not less than 30 days or more than three years of imprisonment. He was sentenced to 180 days of imprisonment, suspended, and a year of probation. App., *infra*, 6a-7a, 262a-263a.

In 2009, respondents successfully petitioned Pennsylvania courts for relief from a state statute that

prohibited them from possessing firearms because of their convictions. But respondents remain subject to Section 922(g)(1) because they were convicted of qualifying offenses (state-law misdemeanors punishable by more than two years of imprisonment) and because they have not had their convictions expunged or set aside, been pardoned, or had their civil rights restored. App., *infra*, 7a; see 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20).<sup>2</sup>

3. Respondents filed separate suits in Pennsylvania district courts asserting that Section 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment as applied to them. Both courts concluded that the Second Amendment bars the application of Section 922(g)(1) to any person who can establish “that he poses no greater threat of future violent criminal activity than the average law-abiding citizen.” App., *infra*, 167a (Binderup); see *id.* at 258a-259a (Suarez). After examining respondents’ offenses, their subsequent conduct, and their personal circumstances, the courts held that respondents had made the requisite showing. *Id.* at 215a-238a (Binderup); *id.* at 262a-270a (Suarez).

4. The court of appeals sua sponte consolidated the cases for en banc consideration and affirmed by an 8-7

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<sup>2</sup> Although Binderup had his state-law firearms restriction removed by a Pennsylvania court, he has not had his civil rights restored for purposes of 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20) because Pennsylvania continues to prohibit him from serving on a jury. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4502(a)(3) (West 2004) (providing that a citizen may not serve on a jury if he or she “has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year and has not been granted a pardon or amnesty therefor”). Suarez has not had any of his civil rights restored by Maryland, the State in which he was convicted. See *Beecham v. United States*, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994) (explaining that the Section 921(a)(20) determination “is governed by the law of the convicting jurisdiction”).

vote. App, *infra*, 1a-161a. No opinion garnered a majority on the Second Amendment issue.<sup>3</sup>

a. Judge Ambro issued an opinion announcing the judgment of the court. App., *infra*, 2a-42a. A portion of that opinion joined by a seven-judge plurality adopted a two-step framework for resolving as-applied challenges to Section 922(g)(1). *Id.* at 12a-28a. The plurality concluded that, under *Heller*, felons generally do not enjoy Second Amendment rights. *Id.* at 13a-14a. But it stated that an as-applied challenger can show that the application of Section 922(g)(1) burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment if he “distinguish[es] his circumstances from those of persons in the historically barred class.” *Id.* at 21a. If an individual makes that showing, the plurality concluded, the government must justify the application of Section 922(g)(1) under intermediate scrutiny. *Id.* at 21a-22a.

With respect to the first step of its framework, the plurality explained that felons are excluded from the Second Amendment because “persons who have committed serious crimes forfeit the right to possess firearms much the way they ‘forfeit other civil liberties.’” App., *infra*, 26a (citation omitted). The plurality noted that the right to keep and bear arms recognized in the Second Amendment was historically “‘tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry’” and that “[t]he view that anyone who commits a serious crime loses the right to keep and bear arms dates back to our founding era.” *Id.* at 23a, 25a (citation omitted). The plurality thus concluded that Section 922(g)(1) is valid as

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<sup>3</sup> The court of appeals unanimously rejected respondents’ statutory argument that their offenses are not covered by Section 922(g)(1). App., *infra*, 9a-12a, 44a, 108a n.70.

applied to any individual convicted of a “serious” offense. *Id.* at 26a-28a.

b. In a portion of the opinion joined by only two other judges, Judge Ambro relied on the plurality’s framework to hold that Section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to respondents. App., *infra*, 28a-42a. At the first step, he stated that “there are no fixed criteria for determining whether crimes are serious enough to destroy Second Amendment rights.” *Id.* at 30a. But Judge Ambro concluded that respondents’ crimes did not qualify as “serious” because they were classified as misdemeanors; because they did not involve the use or attempted use of force; because respondents received relatively light sentences; and because, in his view, “there is no cross-jurisdictional consensus” on the seriousness of the offenses. *Id.* at 33a; see *id.* at 31a-34a.

Judge Ambro then concluded that Section 922(g)(1) does not satisfy intermediate scrutiny as applied to respondents. App., *infra*, 35a-40a. He acknowledged that the statute furthers a compelling interest in protecting public safety. *Id.* at 35a. He also acknowledged that the government had offered evidence that felons—including those convicted of offenses like respondents’—are more likely to commit violent crimes. *Id.* at 35a-38a. But Judge Ambro rejected that evidence as too general, concluding that, taking into account “how [respondents] have lived their lives since committing crimes,” the government had failed to show that Section 922(g)(1) “serves an important interest \* \* \* as applied to people *like* [respondents], let alone to [respondents] themselves.” *Id.* at 37a n.7, 39a n.8; see also *id.* at 40a (finding the fit between Section 922(g)(1) and the government’s compelling

interests insufficient as applied to persons with “isolated, decades-old, non-violent misdemeanors,” who have lived “many years of apparently responsible behavior”).

c. Judge Hardiman, joined by four other judges, concurred in part and concurred in the judgments. App., *infra*, 43a-92a. He disagreed with the plurality’s conclusion that individuals who commit “serious” crimes forfeit their Second Amendment rights. Instead, he stated that the Second Amendment excludes only those who “have demonstrated that they are likely to commit violent crimes.” *Id.* at 71a. Judge Hardiman stated that Section 922(g)(1) is “categorically” unconstitutional as applied to individuals outside that class, even if it would survive heightened scrutiny. *Id.* at 56a, 88a n.26. And he concluded that Section 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to respondents because, in his view, the government had not introduced evidence that respondents “ha[d] been, or would be, dangerous, violent, or irresponsible with firearms.” *Id.* at 86a.

d. Judge Fuentes, joined by six other judges, concurred in part and dissented in part. App., *infra*, 93a-161a. He emphasized that “[n]o federal appellate court has yet upheld a challenge, facial or as-applied, to the felon in possession statute.” *Id.* at 95a. And he warned that the majority’s decision to recognize a right to seek individualized exceptions would “saddle district court judges with a seemingly unending obligation to review as-applied challenges” without “any workable standards.” *Id.* at 93a, 94a.

Judge Fuentes agreed with the plurality that a person convicted of a “serious” crime forfeits his Second Amendment rights. App., *infra*, 109a. But he



disagreed with Judge Ambro's conclusion that courts must determine seriousness "on a case-by-case basis." *Id.* at 127a. Instead, he concluded that Congress's decision to treat crimes covered by Section 922(g)(1) as categorically disqualifying was consistent with "history," "tradition," and this Court's decision in *Heller*. *Ibid.*

In the alternative, Judge Fuentes concluded that Section 922(g)(1) would survive intermediate scrutiny even if convicted felons were within the scope of the Second Amendment. App., *infra*, at 127a-150a. He explained that the evidence offered by the government established "a connection between past criminal conduct and future gun violence" and that Section 922(g)(1) is "reasonably tailored to preventing such violence." *Id.* at 138a. Judge Fuentes rejected respondents' contention that the government must justify Section 922(g)(1) based on the "individual characteristics" of each as-applied challenger. *Id.* at 139a. He explained that intermediate scrutiny demands a "reasonable fit," not a perfect one. *Id.* at 142a (citation omitted). And he concluded that a categorical disqualification is particularly appropriate in this context because Congress previously allowed the administrative equivalent of as-applied challenges based on individual showings of non-dangerousness, but suspended that program after concluding that it was "unworkable" and produced "too many mistakes." *Ibid.* Judge Fuentes explained that judicial attempts to administer a regime of individual challenges would encounter even greater obstacles. *Id.* at 150a-159a.

**REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION**

In a “fractured decision,” App., *infra*, 41a, a bare majority of the en banc Third Circuit held a long-standing federal statute unconstitutional as applied to respondents—and opened the courthouse doors to an untold number of future challenges by other individuals based on their own particular offenses, histories, and personal circumstances. The court of appeals’ decision contradicts the historical understanding of the right to bear arms and this Court’s assurances that the Second Amendment does not cast doubt on felon-in-possession laws. It also departs from the decisions of other circuits. Indeed, the Third Circuit “stand[s] entirely alone” in finding Section 922(g)(1) unconstitutional in any of its applications. *Id.* at 108a (Fuentes, J.). Finally, the decision below threatens public safety and poses serious problems of judicial administration because it requires judges to make ad hoc assessments of the risks of allowing convicted felons to possess firearms—a high-stakes task that Congress has already determined cannot be performed with sufficient reliability, and one for which the judiciary is particularly ill-suited. This Court’s review is warranted.

**A. The Court Of Appeals Erred In Holding That Section 922(g)(1) Is Subject To Individualized Second Amendment Challenges**

In *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), this Court held that the Second Amendment protects “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens” to possess handguns for self-defense in the home. *Id.* at 635. Consistent with that understanding, the Court stated that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt” on several well-established

firearms regulations, including “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.” *Id.* at 626.<sup>4</sup> The Court described those “permissible” measures as falling within “exceptions” to the protected right to keep and bear arms. *Id.* at 635. And the Court incorporated those exceptions into its holding, stating that the plaintiff in *Heller* was entitled to keep a handgun in his home “[a]ssuming that [he] is not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights,” *ibid.*—that is, assuming “he is not a felon and is not insane,” *id.* at 631. Two years later, a plurality of the Court “repeat[ed]” *Heller*’s “assurances” that its holding “did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.’” *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010) (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626).

In stating that felon-in-possession laws are consistent with the Second Amendment, this Court’s decision in *Heller* adopted a conclusion urged by the plaintiff in that case, by the United States, and by numerous other amici supporting the recognition of an individual right to keep and bear arms.<sup>5</sup> That conclu-

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<sup>4</sup> In a footnote, the Court stated that it identified “these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples,” not as an “exhaustive” list of permissible firearms regulations. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26.

<sup>5</sup> See Resp. Br. at 57, *Heller, supra* (No. 07-290) (“The prohibition on possession of guns by felons, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), \* \* \* would easily survive strict scrutiny.”); U.S. Amicus Br. at 25, *Heller, supra* (No. 07-290) (“Abundant historical evidence makes clear that Section 922(g)(1)’s ban on firearm possession by felons \* \* \* is consistent with the Framers’ intent.”); see also, *e.g.*, Nat’l Rifle Ass’n Amicus Br. at 21-22, *Heller, supra* (No. 07-290) (classifying “bans on ownership by felons” as among the “many valid

sion was correct then, and it remains correct today. Congress may impose a firearms disability as a collateral consequence of a felony conviction, and Section 922(g)(1) is thus valid in all of its applications. That is true both because convicted felons are outside the scope of the Second Amendment, and also because Section 922(g)(1) would withstand scrutiny even if it imposed some burden on Second Amendment rights.

***1. Section 922(g)(1) is valid in all of its applications because convicted felons have forfeited Second Amendment rights***

a. *Heller* held that the “core” right protected by the Second Amendment is “the right of *law-abiding, responsible citizens* to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” 554 U.S. at 634, 635 (emphasis added). As the plurality opinion below explained, that description is consistent with the Framing-era understanding of the right to keep and bear arms: “Most scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the government could disarm unvirtuous citizens.” App., *infra*, 23a (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., *United States v. Carpio-Leon*, 701 F.3d 974, 979-980 (4th Cir. 2012) (same), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 58 (2013); *United States v. Yancey*, 621 F.3d 681, 684-685 (7th Cir. 2010) (same).

The Second Amendment thus incorporates a “common-law tradition that permits restrictions di-

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restrictions on the right to keep and bear arms”); Texas Amicus Br. (Texas *Heller* Br.) at 35-36, 7a-16a, *Heller*, *supra* (No. 07-290) (collecting “the many state laws prohibiting felons in possession” and arguing that such laws are “reasonable regulations” consistent with the Second Amendment).

rected at citizens who are not law-abiding and responsible,” and it “‘does not preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous (i.e. criminals).’” *United States v. Bena*, 664 F.3d 1180, 1183 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Don B. Kates, Jr., *The Second Amendment: A Dialogue*, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 143, 146 (1986)); see App., *infra*, 23a-25a (collecting sources). That understanding is reflected in the background of the Second Amendment itself. “*Heller* identified \* \* \* as a ‘highly influential’ ‘precursor’ to the Second Amendment the Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents.” *United States v. Skoien*, 614 F.3d 638, 640 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 604, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1303 (2011)). That report expressly recognized the permissibility of imposing a firearms disability on convicted criminals, stating that “citizens have a personal right to bear arms ‘*unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury.*’” *Ibid.* (emphasis added) (quoting 2 Bernard Schwartz, *The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History* 665 (1971)).

In this respect, the right to bear arms is analogous to other civic rights that have historically been subject to forfeiture by individuals convicted of crimes, including the right to vote, see *Richardson v. Ramirez*, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974), the right to serve on a jury, 28 U.S.C. 1865(b)(5), and the right to hold public office, *Spencer v. Kemna*, 523 U.S. 1, 8-10 (1998). Just as Congress and the States have required persons convicted of felonies to forfeit other civic rights, Section 922(g)(1) permissibly imposes a firearms disability “as a legitimate consequence of a felony conviction.” *Tyler v. Hillsdale Cnty. Sherriff’s Dep’t*, 837 F.3d 678,

708 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Sutton, J., concurring in most of the judgment).

Whatever the outer limits of Congress’s authority to identify crimes that warrant a firearms disability upon conviction, Section 922(g)(1) comports with the historical understanding of the Second Amendment because it applies only to serious offenses that satisfy the traditional definition of a felony: “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); see 18 U.S.C. 3559(a); 1 Wayne R. LaFare, *Substantive Criminal Law* § 1.6(a), at 48 (2d ed. 2003).<sup>6</sup>

b. Ten of the 15 judges on the court of appeals’ en banc panel recognized that individuals convicted of serious crimes forfeit their Second Amendment rights. App., *infra*, 23a-28a; *id.* at 111a-122a (Fuentes, J.). But Judge Ambro and two of his colleagues concluded that some offenses covered by Section 922(g)(1) do not qualify as “serious,” and that judges must instead decide seriousness on a case-by-case basis using a novel four-factor test. *Id.* at 28a-35a. That was error.

Judge Ambro’s multifactor test differs markedly from the approach this Court has used to identify “serious” offenses in other constitutional contexts. For example, the Court has held that the Sixth

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<sup>6</sup> Congress has separately imposed a firearms disability on individuals convicted of certain offenses subject to lesser punishment because those offenses reflect a particularly serious risk of violence. See 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(9) (prohibiting the possession of firearms by any person “who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence”); see also *United States v. Castleman*, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1409 (2014) (explaining that Congress enacted Section 922(g)(9) “to close a dangerous loophole in the gun control laws”) (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).

Amendment right to trial by jury applies to “serious offenses” but not “petty crimes or offenses.” *Lewis v. United States*, 518 U.S. 322, 325 (1996) (citation omitted). In determining whether an offense qualifies as “serious,” the Court looks to “the maximum penalty attached to the offense” because that penalty “reveals the legislature’s judgment about the offense’s severity.” *Id.* at 326. The Court relies on that “objective indication of the seriousness with which society regards the offense” rather than “the particularities of an individual case.” *Id.* at 328 (brackets and citation omitted). Consistent with that approach, the Court has held that an offense is “serious” for purposes of the jury-trial guarantee if it “carries a maximum authorized prison term of greater than six months.” *Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas*, 489 U.S. 538, 542 (1989). Similarly, the test for determining whether an offense is an “infamous crime” triggering the Fifth Amendment’s right to indictment by a grand jury turns on the authorized punishment, and a crime is “infamous” if it is punishable by “imprisonment for more than a year.” *Branzburg v. Hayes*, 408 U.S. 665, 687 n.24 (1972); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(a).

Section 922(g)(1) encompasses only offenses that are “serious” for purposes of the right to trial by jury and “infamous” under the Fifth Amendment. Yet Judge Ambro’s approach would require courts to identify some ill-defined subset of those offenses as insufficient to trigger a firearms disability—and to do so using a test with no foundation in this Court’s decisions or the history of the right to bear arms. For example, Judge Ambro concluded that “a state legislature’s classification of an offense as a misdemeanor is a powerful expression of its belief that the offense is

not serious enough to be disqualifying.” App., *infra*, 31a. But as this Court has emphasized, the distinction between felonies and misdemeanors “is minor and often arbitrary,” and “numerous misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous than many felonies.” *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985). When a crime’s “maximum penalty” is more than one year, that penalty, not the crime’s label, is the appropriate gauge of “the legislature’s judgment about the offense’s severity.” *Lewis*, 518 U.S. at 326.<sup>7</sup>

Judge Ambro’s remaining factors require courts to make offense-by-offense—and offender-by-offender—judgments about severity. See App., *infra*, 31a-34a (requiring courts to examine the elements of the offense, the particular sentence imposed on the offender, and the treatment of the underlying conduct in other jurisdictions). That approach contravenes this Court’s admonition that “[t]he judiciary should not substitute its judgment as to seriousness for that of a legislature, which is far better equipped to perform the task.” *Lewis*, 518 U.S. at 326

Judge Ambro’s opinion also provides no guidance on how to weigh the various factors it identifies. And the indeterminacy of an ad hoc judicial inquiry into the “seriousness” of particular criminal offenses is confirmed by the fact that a majority of the judges to consider the question “disagree[d] with Judge Ambro’s conclusions as to seriousness in this very case.” App., *infra*, 159a n.227 (Fuentes, J.). The scope of the

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<sup>7</sup> Judge Ambro’s focus on an offense’s misdemeanor classification is particularly misplaced because Congress specified that a state-law misdemeanor triggers Section 922(g)(1) only if it is punishable by more than two years of imprisonment—double the traditional threshold for a felony. 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(20)(B).



Second Amendment should not turn on such an unpredictable standard. Instead, as seven judges concluded below, all of the offenses covered by Section 922(g)(1) justify the forfeiture of Second Amendment rights upon conviction. *Id.* at 127a.<sup>8</sup>

**2. Section 922(g)(1) is valid in all of its applications because it is reasonably tailored to serve the government’s compelling interest in public safety**

a. Section 922(g)(1) would withstand constitutional scrutiny even if it burdened some conduct protected by the Second Amendment. The courts of appeals have uniformly held that, to the extent that the firearms disabilities in 18 U.S.C. 922(g) burden Second Amendment rights at all, those prohibitions are not subject to strict scrutiny or per se invalidation. App., *infra*, 15a-16a (collecting cases); see *Tyler*, 837 F.3d at 691-693 (opinion of Gibbons, J.) (same); *United States*

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<sup>8</sup> Judge Hardiman’s more categorical, and seemingly broader, approach, which would preclude application of Section 922(g)(1) to “non-dangerous persons convicted of offenses unassociated with violence,” App., *infra*, 45a, is unfounded as matter of principle and no more administrable than Judge Ambro’s approach. As an initial matter, Judge Hardiman’s limitation of felon-firearm disabilities to some amorphous category of violent offenders, *id.* at 45a-46a, departs from the broader principle of Second Amendment law that firearms rights can be forfeited by conduct inconsistent with being a “law-abiding, responsible citizen[.]” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635. Beyond that, Judge Hardiman offered a variety of definitions and factors to identify whether a felon is “likely to commit violent offenses” in the future, App., *infra*, 64a, conducting a detailed analysis of qualifying offenses, including an inquiry into the felon’s post-conviction conduct, *id.* at 81a-86a. That case-specific approach affords no clear guidance on which offenses are deemed “violent” and what facts are relevant to show future danger. It cannot serve as an administrable Second Amendment test.

v. *Mahin*, 668 F.3d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 2012) (same). Instead, courts have applied a form of intermediate scrutiny derived from analogies to this Court’s First Amendment decisions. App., *infra*, 16a Under that approach, “the asserted governmental end” must be “‘significant,’ ‘substantial,’ or ‘important,’” and “the fit between the challenged regulation and the asserted objective” must be “reasonable.” *United States v. Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1158 (2011); see *United States v. Chovan*, 735 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining that “all forms” of intermediate scrutiny applied by the courts of appeals share these features), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 187 (2014). Section 922(g)(1) satisfies that test.

First, Section 922(g)(1) serves the government’s “substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interests in public safety and crime prevention.” *Kachalsky v. County of Westchester*, 701 F.3d 81, 97 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013); see, e.g., *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (“[T]he Government’s general interest in preventing crime is compelling.”). As this Court has explained, “[t]he history of the 1968 Act reflects [Congress’s] \* \* \* concern with keeping firearms out of the hands of categories of potentially irresponsible persons.” *Barrett v. United States*, 423 U.S. 212, 220 (1976). “In order to accomplish this goal, Congress obviously determined that firearms must be kept away from persons, such as those convicted of serious crimes, who might be expected to misuse them.” *Dickerson v. New Banner Inst.*, 460 U.S. 103, 119 (1983).

Second, Section 922(g)(1)’s prohibition on the possession of firearms by felons is substantially related to

the government's compelling interests. "It is well-established that felons are more likely to commit violent crimes than are other law-abiding citizens." *United States v. Barton*, 633 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2011). For example, "numerous studies" establish the connection "between past criminal conduct and future crime, including gun violence." App., *infra*, 135a-136a (Fuentes, J.); see *id.* at 136a n.160 (citing examples). And under intermediate scrutiny, Congress's "predictive judgments" in defining the scope of Section 922(g)(1)'s firearms disability warrant "substantial deference." *Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC*, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (citation omitted). "[T]he legislature is 'far better equipped than the judiciary' to make sensitive public policy judgments (within constitutional limits) concerning the dangers in carrying firearms and the manner to combat those risks." *Kachalsky*, 701 F.3d at 97 (quoting *Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC*, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994)).

b. In concluding that Section 922(g)(1) does not satisfy intermediate scrutiny, Judge Ambro acknowledged that the statute serves compelling interests. App., *infra*, 35a. He also did not question Congress's determination that persons convicted of felonies are more likely to misuse firearms. But he nonetheless concluded that the government had not carried its burden because it had not introduced sufficient evidence that *respondents themselves* are likely to do so. *Id.* at 35a-39a & notes 7-8.

Judge Ambro's requirement that the government justify Section 922(g)(1) based on respondents' particular circumstances is inconsistent with the entire premise of evaluating a statute under intermediate scrutiny. That standard demands that "the fit be-

tween the challenged regulation and the asserted objective be reasonable, not perfect.” *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 98; accord, e.g., *Heller v. District of Columbia*, 801 F.3d 264, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2015). It necessarily follows that “the validity of the regulation depends on the relation it bears to the overall problem the government seeks to correct, not on the extent to which it furthers the government’s interests in a particular case.” *Ward v. Rock Against Racism*, 491 U.S. 781, 801 (1989); accord *United States v. Edge Broad. Co.*, 509 U.S. 418, 430-431 (1993).

The history of Section 922(g)(1) reveals why a judicially crafted, individualized approach is unsound in principle and unworkable in practice. Congress adopted a categorical firearms disqualification as a “prophylactic” measure. *Dickerson*, 460 U.S. at 118. Respondents contend that firearms disqualification should instead depend on a case-by-case assessment of the danger posed by particular felons. But Congress has already found such an approach inadequate. Until 1992, individuals could obtain relief from Section 922(g)(1) by demonstrating to the ATF that they would “not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety.” 18 U.S.C. 925(c); see p. 3, *supra*. Congress abandoned that regime of case-by-case exceptions after concluding that it presented “a very difficult and subjective task which could have devastating consequences for innocent civilians if the wrong decision is made,” 1992 Senate Report 19, and that “too many of the[] felons whose gun ownership rights were restored went on to commit violent crimes with firearms,” 1996 House Report 15. In other words, “Congress tried [respondents’] way of doing things and concluded that it was too error-prone to support the

government’s objective of preventing armed violence.” App., *infra*, 142a (Fuentes, J.). That experience, which “should have a profound impact on [the] tailoring analysis,” further confirms that Section 922(g)(1)’s categorical disqualification survives intermediate scrutiny. *Ibid.*

**B. The Decision Below Departs From The Decisions Of Other Courts Of Appeals**

Until the decision below, the courts of appeals were “unanimous” in holding “that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional, both on its face and as applied.” *United States v. Moore*, 666 F.3d 313, 316 (4th Cir. 2012). The Third Circuit thus “stand[s] entirely alone” in finding Section 922(g)(1) unconstitutional in any of its applications. App., *infra*, 108a (Fuentes, J.).

1. The Fifth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that Section 922(g)(1) is not subject to individualized as-applied challenges. The Fifth Circuit “had already recognized an individual right to bear arms” before this Court’s decision in *Heller*, and it “had determined that criminal prohibitions on felons (violent or non-violent) possessing firearms did not violate that right.” *United States v. Scroggins*, 599 F.3d 433, 451, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 867 (2010); see, e.g., *United States v. Darrington*, 351 F.3d 632, 633-634 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1080 (2004). The Fifth Circuit has “reaffirmed [its] prior jurisprudence on this point since *Heller* was decided.” *Scroggins*, 599 F.3d at 451. Similarly, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have interpreted *Heller* to mean that “statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.” *United States v. Rozier*, 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 958

(2010); see *United States v. McCane*, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047 (10th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 559 U.S. 970 (2010); see also *id.* at 1049-1050 (Tymkovich, J., concurring).<sup>9</sup>

2. Other courts of appeals have left open the “theoretical[]” possibility of successful as-applied challenges to Section 922(g)(1). *Moore*, 666 F.3d at 320; see, e.g., *United States v. Woolsey*, 759 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2014); *Schrader v. Holder*, 704 F.3d 980, 990-991 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 512 (2013); *United States v. Torres-Rosario*, 658 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1766 (2012); *United States v. Williams*, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1092 (2010). But no other circuit has held Section 922(g)(1) unconstitutional in any of its applications. To the contrary, the courts “have consistently upheld applications of § 922(g)(1) even to *non-violent felons*” like respondents. *United States v. Pruess*, 703 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases). And no court has adopted a standard resembling Judge Ambro’s multifactor test for identifying offenses that are sufficiently “serious” to warrant a firearms disqualification (or Judge Hardiman’s view that Section 922(g)(1) is constitutional only as applied

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<sup>9</sup> The Ninth Circuit, too, has held that “[n]othing in *Heller* can be read legitimately to cast doubt on the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)” because “felons are categorically different from the individuals who have a fundamental right to bear arms.” *United States v. Vongxay*, 594 F.3d 1111, 1114, 1115, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 921 (2010). A subsequent panel decision reaffirmed that *Vongxay* “foreclose[d]” an as-applied challenge to Section 922(g)(1) by a nonviolent felon, but appeared to leave open the possibility of some “limits on Congress’s and the States’ ability to define” minor offenses as felonies triggering Section 922(g)(1)’s firearms disqualification. *United States v. Phillips*, 827 F.3d 1171, 1174, 1176 n.5 (9th Cir. 2016).

to felons whose crimes, conduct, or subsequent behavior “demonstrate[] that they are likely to commit violent crimes,” App., *infra*, 71a).

Furthermore, even some of the circuits that have not completely foreclosed as-applied challenges have expressed skepticism about the sort of individualized approach adopted by the decision below. The First Circuit observed that “such an approach, applied to countless variations in individual circumstances, would obviously present serious problems of administration, consistency and fair warning.” *Torres-Rosario*, 658 F.3d at 113. And in rejecting an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to another provision of Section 922(g), the en banc Seventh Circuit emphasized that “categorical disqualifications are permissible” and that “Congress is not limited to case-by-case exclusions of persons who have been shown to be untrustworthy with weapons, nor need these limits be established by evidence presented in court.” *Skoien*, 614 F.3d at 641.

### C. The Question Presented Warrants This Court’s Review

The court of appeals’ creation of a circuit conflict by holding that a longstanding Act of Congress violates the Constitution as applied to respondents (and persons like them) warrants this Court’s review. Section 922(g)(1) is by far the most frequently applied of Section 922(g)’s firearms disqualifications, forming the basis for thousands of criminal prosecutions and tens of thousands of firearm-purchase denials each year.<sup>10</sup> In addition, “[b]ans on the possession of fire-

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<sup>10</sup> U.S. Sent. Comm’n, *Quick Facts: Felon in Possession of a Firearm* (July 2016), [http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Quick\\_Facts\\_Felon\\_in\\_Possession\\_FY15](http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/quick-facts/Quick_Facts_Felon_in_Possession_FY15).

arms by convicted felons are the most common type of gun control regulation” in the States, Adam Winkler, *Scrutinizing the Second Amendment*, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 721 (2007), and many States “apply the standard definition of felony to bar persons convicted of crimes punishable by imprisonment for more than one year.”<sup>11</sup> If left undisturbed, the court of appeals’ conclusion that Section 922(g)(1) and other felon-in-possession laws are subject to individualized as-applied challenges would pose serious problems of public safety and judicial administration.

The court of appeals’ approach will require courts to create “an entirely new judicial process for resolving as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1).” App., *infra*, at 150a (Fuentes, J.). That process will demand precisely the sort of individualized assessment of the risks of restoring firearms rights to convicted felons that Congress found to be “unworkable” and “too prone to error.” *Id.* at 141a-142a (emphasis omitted). In fact, the regime imposed by the decision below would be far less feasible than the system of administrative relief that Congress abandoned, because courts “possess neither the resources to conduct the requisite investigations nor the expertise to predict accurately which felons may carry guns without threatening the public’s safety.” *Pontarelli v. United*

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pdf; Fed. Bureau of Investigation, *Federal Denials*, [https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/federal\\_denials.pdf/view](https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/federal_denials.pdf/view) (last visited Jan. 4, 2017).

<sup>11</sup> Law Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence, *Categories of Prohibited People*, <http://smartgunlaws.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/background-checks/categories-of-prohibited-people/> (last visited Jan. 4, 2017); see Texas *Heller* Br. 7a-16a (collecting state felon-in-possession laws).



*States Dep't of the Treasury*, 285 F.3d 216, 231 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc).

Moreover, by authorizing as-applied challenges under an ill-defined multifactor standard, the court of appeals' decision "places an extraordinary administrative burden on district courts handling criminal prosecutions under § 922(g)(1)." App., *infra*, 154a (Fuentes, J.). Those courts "will find themselves in an ever-thickening morass of as-applied precedent, trying to make fine-grained distinctions about whether individual felon-in-possession prosecutions can proceed." *Ibid.* As seven judges concluded below, "nothing in the Second Amendment \* \* \* compels [the courts] to abandon the current system of administrable firearms regulation for such an uncertain future." *Id.* at 159a.

#### CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

IAN HEATH GERSHENGORN  
*Acting Solicitor General*  
BENJAMIN C. MIZER  
*Principal Deputy Assistant  
Attorney General*  
MICHAEL R. DREBEN  
*Deputy Solicitor General*  
BRIAN H. FLETCHER  
*Assistant to the Solicitor  
General*  
MARK B. STERN  
MICHAEL S. RAAB  
PATRICK G. NEMEROFF  
*Attorneys*

JANUARY 2017

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS  
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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Nos. 14-4549 & 14-4550

DANIEL BINDERUP, APPELLANT (No. 14-4550)

*v.*

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;  
DIRECTOR BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS  
& EXPLOSIVES, APPELLANTS (No. 14-4549)

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Filed: Sept. 7, 2016

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Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-13-cv-06750)  
District Judge: Honorable James Knoll Gardner

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2a

Nos. 15-1975 & 15-1976

JULIO SUAREZ, APPELLANT (No. 15-1976)

*v.*

ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;  
DIRECTOR BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO FIREARMS  
& EXPLOSIVES, APPELLANTS (No. 15-1975)

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Argued: June 1, 2016

Filed: Sept. 7, 2016

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Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-14-cv-00968)  
District Judge: Honorable William W. Caldwell

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**OPINION OF THE COURT**

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Before: MCKEE, Chief Judge, AMBRO, FUENTES\*,  
SMITH, FISHER, CHAGARES, JORDAN, HARDIMAN,  
GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, RE-  
STREPO, NYGAARD\*, and ROTH\*, Circuit Judges

AMBRO, Circuit Judge, announced the judgments of  
the Court and delivered the opinion for a unanimous

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\* Judges Nygaard and Roth sat for the consolidated argument but participated as members of the *en banc* Court only in Nos. 14-4549 and 14-4550 pursuant to 3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.6.4. Judge Sloviter participated in the panel argument and conference in Nos. 15-1975 and 15-1976, but assumed inactive status on April 4, 2016, before rehearing *en banc* and the filing of this opinion. Judge Fuentes assumed senior status on July 18, 2016, after rehearing *en banc* but before the filing of this opinion.

Court with respect to Parts I and II, an opinion with respect to Parts III.A, III.B, III.C.1, III.C.2, and III.C.3.a, in which FUENTES, SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, KRAUSE, and ROTH, Circuit Judges, joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts III.C.3.b, III.D, and IV, in which SMITH and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges, joined. FUENTES, Circuit Judge, filed an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgments, in which MCKEE, Chief Judge, VANASKIE, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and ROTH, Circuit Judges, joined. HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge, filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgments, in which FISHER, CHAGARES, JORDAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges, joined.

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Federal law generally prohibits the possession of firearms by any person convicted in any court of a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Excluded from the prohibition is “any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.” *Id.* § 921(a)(20)(B). And there is also an exemption for “[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored,” where the grant of relief does not expressly preserve the firearms bar. *Id.* § 921(a)(20).

In *United States v. Marzzarella* we adopted a framework for deciding facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). Then in *United States v. Barton* we held that the prohibition of § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment on its face, but we stated that it remains subject to as-applied constitutional challenges. 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011).

Before us are two such challenges. In deciding them, we determine how a criminal law offender may rebut the presumption that he lacks Second Amendment rights. In particular, a majority of the Court concludes that *Marzzarella*, whose two-step test we reaffirm today, drives the analysis.<sup>1</sup> Meanwhile, a

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<sup>1</sup> Parts III.A-C.3.a preserve the *Marzzarella* framework for deciding Second Amendment challenges and overrule aspects of *Barton* that are inconsistent with it. Seven Judges join those Parts expressly. Chief Judge McKee and Judges Shwartz and Restrepo, who join Judge Fuentes’s opinion, agree that *Marzzarella* controls the Second Amendment analysis, but do not join any of

separate majority holds that the two as-applied challenges before us succeed. Part IV of this opinion sets out how, for purposes of future cases, to make sense of our fractured vote.

### I. Background

In 1996 Daniel Binderup began a consensual sexual relationship with a 17-year-old female employee at his bakery. Binderup was 41 years old at the time and was aware that his employee was a minor, though she was over the legal age of consent in Pennsylvania (16). Two years later, Binderup pled guilty in a Pennsylvania state court to corrupting a minor, a misdemeanor subject to possible imprisonment for up to five years. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 6301(a)(1)(i), 1104. Despite this, Binderup’s sentence was the colloquial slap on the wrist: probation (three years) and a \$300 fine plus court costs and restitution. His criminal record shows no subsequent offenses.

In 1990 police stopped Julio Suarez on suspicion of driving while intoxicated. During the stop, police noticed that Suarez was carrying a .357 Magnum handgun, as well as two “speed loaders” (devices that allow one to load all chambers of a revolver mechanically rather than inserting bullets one-by-one). He had no permit for the gun. He later pled guilty in a Maryland state court to unlawfully carrying a handgun without a license, a misdemeanor subject to possible imprisonment for “not less than 30 days and not [more than] three years or a fine of not less than \$250 and not

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Part III because they reject the notion that the *Marzzarella* framework can be reconciled with any aspect of *Barton*’s as-applied Second Amendment analysis, which they would overrule entirely.

[more than] \$2,500 or both.” Md. Code Ann. art. 27, § 36B(b) (1990) (now codified at Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law § 4-203). Suarez nonetheless received a suspended sentence of 180 days’ imprisonment and a \$500 fine, followed by a year of probation that he completed successfully. Eight years later, he was convicted again in a Maryland state court, this time for the state-law misdemeanor of driving under the influence of alcohol. Only the first of the convictions was subject to § 922(g)(1). Suarez now lives in Pennsylvania and since 1998 has led a life free of run-ins with the law. He holds a “Secret” federal government security clearance in connection with his job as a consultant for a government contractor.

Pennsylvania law disqualified Binderup and Suarez (collectively, the “Challengers”) from possessing firearms due to their convictions, but in 2009 they successfully petitioned the Pennsylvania courts to remove that prohibition. Federal law, however, continues to bar them from possessing firearms because their convictions have not been expunged or set aside, they have not been pardoned, and their civil rights have not been restored. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20); *Logan v. United States*, 552 U.S. 23, 37 (2007). Nor has the Attorney General granted them relief under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), which allows her to remove the prohibition on a case-by-case basis “if it is established to [her] satisfaction” that a barred individual “will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.”

Binderup and Suarez want to obtain guns to defend themselves and their families within their homes, but



they have not attempted to do so for fear of violating § 922(g)(1). As a result, each filed a complaint in federal District Court (Binderup in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Suarez in the Middle District of Pennsylvania) seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. They claim as a matter of statutory construction that § 922(g)(1) does not apply to their convictions and, if it does, the statute is unconstitutional as applied. The Government opposed the lawsuits, and the parties in both cases filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

The District Courts rejected the Challengers' statutory argument but held that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Binderup because he “distinguishe[d] himself from those individuals traditionally disarmed as the result of prior criminal conduct and demonstrate[d] that he poses no greater threat of future violent criminal activity than the average law-abiding citizen.” *Binderup v. Holder*, No. 13-cv-6750, 2014 WL 4764424, at \*1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2014). The Court did not analyze the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) under any form of means-ends scrutiny, meaning it did not evaluate the law to assess whether its purpose—the end sought—matches appropriately the means chosen to achieve it. *Id.* at \*20-21. Depending on the importance of the rights involved and the nature of the burden on them, a law's purpose may need to be only legitimate and the means to achieve it rational (called rational basis scrutiny); the purpose may need to be important and the means to achieve it substantially related (called intermediate scrutiny); or the purpose may need to be compelling and the means to achieve it narrowly tailored, that is,

the least restrictive (called strict scrutiny). The latter two tests we refer to collectively as heightened scrutiny to distinguish them from the easily met rational basis test.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania applied “a two[-]prong test for Second Amendment challenges” derived from our case law. *Suarez v. Holder*, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 1:14-CV-968, 2015 WL 685889, at \*6-7 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2015). It found first that Suarez has Second Amendment rights notwithstanding his 1990 conviction because he demonstrated that “he is no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen.” *Id.* at \*10. Then the Court applied means-ends scrutiny (in that case, strict scrutiny) and determined that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him due to the severity of the burden it imposes. *Id.* at \*7 & n.9.

The Government appealed the summary judgments, and the Challengers’ cross-appealed the District Courts’ interpretations of the dispossession statute. The District Courts had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, 1346, 2201, and 2202. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

Separate panels heard the appeals, and the Court *sua sponte* consolidated them for rehearing *en banc*. Our review is plenary. *InterVest, Inc. v. Bloomberg, L.P.*, 340 F.3d 144, 158 (3d Cir. 2003).

## II. The Challengers’ Statutory Argument

Section 922(g)(1), as noted, does not cover state misdemeanors “punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B). The Challengers argue that the exception includes any

state misdemeanor that, like theirs, could have been punished by less than two years' imprisonment.

We disagree. The exception in § 921(a)(20)(B) covers any crime that *cannot* be punished by more than two years' imprisonment. It does not cover any crime that *can* be punished by more than two years in prison. In other words, § 921(a)(20)(B)'s use of "punishable by" means "subject to a maximum penalty of." Although we have never explicitly defined it this way, we have at least twice relied on that understanding in interpreting the relationship between § 921(a)(20)(B) and § 922(g)(1). See *United States v. Essig*, 10 F.3d 968, 969-71 (3d Cir. 1993) (relying on an understanding of "punishable" that refers to whether the maximum potential sentence for a state misdemeanor exceeds two years, not whether a lesser sentence might be imposed); *United States v. Schoolcraft*, 879 F.2d 64, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1989) (explaining that a "misdemeanor punishable [by] up to seven years in prison" was "not a misdemeanor subject to a sentence of two years or less"). The D.C. Circuit's opinion in *Schrader v. Holder* supports our decision, as it distinguishes crimes carrying a maximum term of imprisonment of more than two years from those "punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less" under § 921(a)(20)(B). 704 F.3d 980, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2013). And the Supreme Court drew a similar distinction in *Logan*. See 552 U.S. at 34 ("[Section] 921(a)(20)(B) . . . places within [§ 922(g)(1)'s] reach state misdemeanor convictions *punishable by more than two years' imprisonment.*" (emphasis added)). Although this language is a *dictum*, "we should not idly ignore" its inclusion in the Supreme Court's thorough discus-

sion of § 921(a)(20)(B). *In re McDonald*, 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2000).

Even if we were writing on a blank slate, we would reject the Challengers' interpretation. When considering a crime's potential punishment, we ordinarily refer only to the maximum punishment a court may impose. As the District Court in *Suarez* perceptively observed, when a crime has maximum and minimum possible punishments, we describe it as being "punishable" by that specific range; and when a crime references only a maximum punishment, "we ordinarily identify only the upper boundary" of that range, as "[a]ll lower possible terms of imprisonment are included by implication." 2015 WL 685889, at \*3. That is why we would not describe a crime carrying a specified term of imprisonment of up to three years as one "punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less." By contrast, a misdemeanor carrying a ceiling of 18 months' imprisonment would properly be described in the criminal law context as a crime "punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less" and on its face would not trigger the bar on gun possession. Accordingly, "subject to a maximum possible penalty of" is the best reading of the phrase "punishable by" as used in § 921(a)(20)(B).

Our interpretation also makes sense in light of similar language in the United States Sentencing Guidelines. They provide three distinct grades of probation and supervised release violations—Grades A, B, and C—with Grade A violations treated most severely and Grade C least severely. *See* U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(a), 7B1.4(a). The Challengers' interpretation of the phrase "punishable by" would erode those distinctions.

Since Grade C applies only to offenses “punishable by a term of imprisonment of one year or less,” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(3), the Challengers’ interpretation would render offenses punishable by more than a year (Grade B), as well as even more serious offenses described as Grade A, eligible for Grade C treatment. This would be an absurd result.

In a last-ditch effort, the Challengers argue that § 921(a)(20)(B)’s use of “punishable” merits application of the rule of lenity (that ambiguous criminal laws be construed in favor of defendants) or the constitutional avoidance doctrine (that ambiguous statutory language be construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts). Both of these principles require ambiguity in the statute. See *Voisine v. United States*, 579 U.S. \_\_\_, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2282 n.6 (2016). As there isn’t any here, they give no plausible defense.

In sum, the Challengers’ argument that their convictions fall within § 921(a)(20)(B)’s exception to § 922(g)(1) has no traction. Their misdemeanor convictions were punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment. Hence they cannot seek refuge in § 921(a)(20)(B) and are subject to the bar of § 922(g)(1).

### **III. The Challengers’ Constitutional Argument**

#### **A. The Second Amendment**

The Challengers contend that, notwithstanding how we rule on their statutory argument, § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to them. The Second Amendment states: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. In *District of Columbia v.*

*Heller*, the Supreme Court invalidated a law that “totally ban[ned] handgun possession in the home” and “require[d] that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock at all times, rendering it inoperable.” 554 U.S. 570, 628 (2008). In so doing, the Court held the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess a firearm “unconnected with militia service.” *Id.* at 582. At the “core” of the Second Amendment is the right of “law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” *Id.* at 634-35; *Barton*, 633 F.3d at 170-71; *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 89. Two years after *Heller*, in *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment “incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in *Heller*” because the right is “fundamental” to “our system of ordered liberty.” 561 U.S. 742, 778, 791 (2010).

Although the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right, it is “not unlimited.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626; see *United States v. Huitron-Guizar*, 678 F.3d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012); Eugene Volokh, *Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda*, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1443 (2009).<sup>2</sup> *Heller*

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<sup>2</sup> Professor Volokh’s taxonomy of possible gun regulations divides them into

[(1)] “what” restrictions (such as bans on machine guns, so-called “assault weapons,” or unpersonalized handguns), [(2)] “who” restrictions (such as bans on possession by felons, misdemeanants, noncitizens, or [juveniles]), [(3)] “where” restrictions (such as bans on carrying in public, in places that serve alcohol, or in parks, or bans on possessing [guns] in public housing projects), [(4)] “how” restrictions (such as storage regulations), [(5)] “when” restrictions (such as waiting peri-

catalogued a non-exhaustive list of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” that have historically constrained the scope of the right. 554 U.S. at 626-27 & n.26; see *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 91 (treating the “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” listed in *Heller* as “exceptions to the right to bear arms”). They include, but are not limited to, “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, [] laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, [and] laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626-27; see *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 786. These measures comport with the Second Amendment because they affect individuals or conduct unprotected by the right to keep and bear arms. See *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 631, 635 (suggesting that one is “disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights” if he is “a felon” or “insane”). For example, bans on “weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns,” are permissible because those weapons fall outside the historical “scope of the right.” *Id.* at 625; see *United States v. One (1) Palmetto State Armory PA-15 Machinegun Receiver/Frame, Unknown Caliber Serial No. LW001804*, 822 F.3d 136, 141-44 (3d Cir. 2016); *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 91-93.

As to cases involving burdens on Second Amendment rights, *Heller* did not announce which level of scrutiny applies but cautioned that challenges based

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ods), [(6)] “who knows” regulations (such as licensing or registration requirements), and [(7)] taxes and other expenses.

Volokh, 56 UCLA L. Rev. at 1443.

on those rights are not beaten back by the Government supplying a rational basis for limiting them. 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (“If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.”).

Some judges—including Judge Hardiman and those colleagues who join his opinion concurring in the judgments—and commentators have interpreted *Heller* to mean that any law barring persons with Second Amendment rights from possessing lawful firearms in the home even for self-defense is *per se* unconstitutional; that is, no scrutiny is needed. See Hardiman Op. Typescript at 13-19; *Heller v. District of Columbia*, 670 F.3d 1244, 1272-73 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); Volokh, 56 UCLA L. Rev. at 1462; Joseph Blocher, *Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis*, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 375, 377, 380 (2009); see also *United States v. McCane*, 573 F.3d 1037, 1047-50 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring). But neither the Supreme Court nor any court of appeals has held that laws burdening Second Amendment rights evade constitutional scrutiny. Rather, when faced with an as-applied Second Amendment challenge, they agree that some form of heightened scrutiny is appropriate after it has been determined that the law in question burdens protected conduct. See, e.g., *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 97-101 (applying intermediate scrutiny and, in the alternative, strict scrutiny to § 922(k)’s prohibition on possession of any firearm with a destroyed serial number); *United States v. Williams*, 616 F.3d 685, 692-93 (7th Cir. 2010) (applying intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(1)); *United*



*States v. Chovan*, 735 F.3d 1127, 1141-42 (9th Cir. 2013) (same with respect to § 922(g)(9)’s disarmament of a domestic-violence misdemeanant); *United States v. Chester*, 628 F.3d 673, 682-83 (4th Cir. 2010) (same); *United States v. Reese*, 627 F.3d 792, 802-05 (10th Cir. 2010) (same with respect to § 922(g)(8)’s dispossession of certain persons subject to a domestic restraining order); *Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t*, 775 F.3d 308, 326-29 (6th Cir. 2014) (applying strict scrutiny to § 922(g)(4)’s dispossession of any person “who has been committed to a mental institution”), *reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated* (Apr. 21, 2015).

That individuals with Second Amendment rights may nonetheless be denied possession of a firearm is hardly illogical. It is no different than saying that the Government may prevent an individual with First Amendment rights from engaging in First Amendment conduct—even conduct at the core of the First Amendment—if it makes the showing necessary to surmount heightened scrutiny. *See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life*, 551 U.S. 449, 464-65 (2007) (applying strict scrutiny to a statute prohibiting political speech at the core of the First Amendment); *United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell*, 330 U.S. 75, 102-03 (1947) (upholding the constitutionality of prohibitions on certain political activities by federal employees notwithstanding the First Amendment). Thus burdens on Second Amendment rights are subject to scrutiny in much the way that burdens on First Amendment rights are. *Drake v. Filko*, 724 F.3d 426, 434-36 (3d Cir. 2013); *see* NRA Amicus Br. at 13-15 (asserting that burdens on core Second Amendment rights should be subject to strict scrutiny). Far from subjecting the Second Amendment to an “entirely different body of

rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees,” *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 780 (plurality opinion), this view uses “the structure of First Amendment doctrine [to] inform our analysis of the Second Amendment,” *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 89 n.4; *see id.* (“*Heller* itself repeatedly invokes the First Amendment in establishing principles governing the Second Amendment.”).

Even if a law that “completely eviscerates the Second Amendment right” would be *per se* unconstitutional under *Heller*, Hardiman Op. Typescript at 18, § 922(g)(1) is no such law. Notwithstanding that provision (and as already noted), persons convicted of disqualifying offenses may under some circumstances possess handguns if (1) their convictions are expunged or set aside, (2) they receive pardons, or (3) they have their civil rights restored. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). And were Congress to fund 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), they could ask the Attorney General to lift the ban in their particular cases. Though some of these statutory avenues for relief are closed to Binderup and Suarez, *see infra* Part III.D, the remaining opportunities for them to overcome the ban contrast starkly with the District of Columbia law in *Heller* that made it a crime to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibited entirely the registration of handguns by individuals; there was nothing Mr. Heller could do to possess a handgun lawfully while outside his job as a District of Columbia special police officer guarding the Federal Judicial Center (in other words, he guarded judges). *See* 554 U.S. at 574 (citing D.C. Code §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), 7-2502.02(a)(4) (2001)); *Parker v. District of Columbia*, 478 F.3d 370, 373-74 (D.C. Cir. 2007); *cf. United States v. Skoien*, 614 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (noting that disarmament under

§ 922(g)(9) is ordinarily not “perpetual” because of exceptions similar to those under § 922(g)(1)); *Chovan*, 735 F.3d at 1138 (same).

To say that § 922(g)(1) is *per se* unconstitutional as applied to anyone with Second Amendment rights notwithstanding the statute’s escape hatches is a bridge too far. For starters, that would condemn without exception all laws and regulations containing preconditions for the possession of firearms by individuals with Second Amendment rights. By that reasoning, any law prohibiting an individual from possessing a handgun unless he passes a physical examination (to show he is capable of handling a firearm safely) or completes firearm training (to show he knows how to handle a firearm safely) would similarly be *per se* unconstitutional, even if it is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling government interest. There is no precedent for crippling the Government’s ability to regulate gun ownership in this manner. And to guarantee absolutely the ability to keep and bear arms even in cases where disarmament would survive heightened scrutiny would be a radical departure from our post-*Heller* jurisprudence and risk undermining many commonplace constitutional gun regulations.

#### B. The Framework for As-Applied Second Amendment Challenges

Unlike a facial challenge, an as-applied challenge “does not contend that a law is unconstitutional as written but that its application to a particular person under particular circumstances deprived that person of a constitutional right.” *United States v. Mitchell*, 652 F.3d 387, 405 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting *United States v. Marcavage*, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010)); *see*

*Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New England*, 546 U.S. 320, 329 (2006) (“It is axiomatic that a statute may be invalid as applied to one state of facts and yet valid as applied to another.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, our review of *Binderup*’s and *Suarez*’s as-applied challenges requires us to consider whether their particular circumstances remove them from the constitutional sweep of § 922(g)(1).

Two of our precedents—*Marzzarella* and *Barton*—have guided how we approach as-applied Second Amendment challenges. The former involved an as-applied challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), which bars the possession of any firearm with an obliterated serial number. It derived from *Heller* a “two-pronged approach to Second Amendment challenges” to firearm restrictions. 614 F.3d at 89. We first consider “whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.” *Id.* If not, the challenged law must stand. But if the law burdens protected conduct, the proper course is to “evaluate the law under some form of means-end scrutiny,” *id.*, that form in *Marzzarella* being intermediate scrutiny, *id.* at 97. “If the law passes muster under [the] standard [applied], it is constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid.” *Id.* at 89. As to § 922(k), we held that the law withstood intermediate scrutiny “even if it burden[ed] protected conduct” by fitting reasonably with the important “law enforcement interest in enabling the tracing of weapons via their serial numbers.” *Id.* at 95, 98. (We also noted in a *dictum* that the law would survive strict scrutiny, were that the test, because the provision serves a compelling interest through the least-restrictive means. *Id.* at 99-101.)

Nearly every court of appeals has cited *Marzzarella* favorably. See, e.g., *N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo*, 804 F.3d 242, 254 n.49 (2d Cir. 2015); *Chovan*, 735 F.3d at 1136-37; *Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives*, 700 F.3d 185, 194-96 (5th Cir. 2012); *GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. v. Georgia*, 687 F.3d 1244, 1260 n.34 (11th Cir. 2012); *United States v. Greeno*, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); *Heller*, 670 F.3d at 1252-53; *Ezell v. City of Chicago*, 651 F.3d 684, 701-04 (7th Cir. 2011); *Chester*, 628 F.3d at 680-83; *Reese*, 627 F.3d at 800-05. Indeed, it has escaped disparagement by any circuit court.

A year after *Marzzarella* we decided *Barton*, which involved a felon convicted under the provision now before us—§ 922(g)(1). *Barton* raised facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to the firearm ban. After dispensing with his facial challenge and confirming the availability of as-applied challenges under the Second Amendment, we ruled that “the common law right to keep and bear arms did not extend to those who were likely to commit violent offenses.” 633 F.3d at 173. Because *Barton*’s prior convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and for receipt of a stolen firearm (as well as his illegal post-conviction sale of a firearm with an obliterated serial number) were “closely related to violent crime,” we concluded that he lacked Second Amendment rights. *Id.* at 174. Put another way, *Barton* did not present “facts about himself and his background that distinguish[ed] his circumstances from those of persons historically barred from Second Amendment protections,” *id.*, so he was “disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights,” *id.* at 174 (quoting

*Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635), and his as-applied challenge could not succeed.

Read together, *Marzzarella* and *Barton* lay out a framework for deciding as-applied challenges to gun regulations. At step one of the *Marzzarella* decision tree, a challenger must prove, per *Barton*, that a presumptively lawful regulation burdens his Second Amendment rights. This requires a challenger to clear two hurdles: he must (1) identify the traditional justifications for excluding from Second Amendment protections the class of which he appears to be a member, *id.* at 173, and then (2) present facts about himself and his background that distinguish his circumstances from those of persons in the historically barred class, *id.* at 174.

No doubt a challenger cannot prevail merely on his say-so. Courts must find the facts to determine whether he has adequately distinguished his circumstances from those of persons historically excluded from Second Amendment protections. Not only is the burden on the challenger to rebut the presumptive lawfulness of the exclusion at *Marzzarella*'s step one, but the challenger's showing must also be strong. That's no small task. And in cases where a statute by its terms only burdens matters (*e.g.*, individuals, conduct, or weapons) outside the scope of the right to arms, it is an impossible one. But if the challenger succeeds at step one, the burden shifts to the Government to demonstrate that the regulation satisfies some form of heightened scrutiny, discussed further below, at step two of the *Marzzarella* analysis.

The Challengers, the District Court in *Binderup*, and some of our colleagues claim that *Marzzarella* and

*Barton* set standards for different types of as-applied Second Amendment challenges and that only *Barton* controls challenges to § 922(g)(1); *Marzzarella* has no role in the analysis. Our view is that, at least in pertinent part, each complements the other for an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to a presumptively lawful regulatory measure like § 922(g)(1). *Barton* identifies the two hurdles that an individual presumed to lack Second Amendment rights must overcome to rebut the presumption at step one of the *Marzzarella* framework.<sup>3</sup> Rebutting it permits testing the law or regulation under heightened scrutiny at step two. With this understanding, *Marzzarella* and *Barton* are neither wholly distinct nor incompatible.

### C. Step One of the *Marzzarella* Framework

#### 1. *The Challengers Presumptively Lack Second Amendment Rights*

*Heller* teaches that “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” are “presumptively lawful.” 554 U.S. at 626 & 627 n.26. Traditionally, “felons” are people who have been convicted of any crime “that is punishable by death or imprisonment for more than one year.” 1 Wayne R. LaFave, *Substantive Criminal Law* § 1.6 (2d ed. 2015);

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<sup>3</sup> Though *Barton* clarifies the types of showings that a challenger must make at step one of the *Marzzarella* framework, it defines too narrowly the traditional justification for why a criminal conviction may destroy the right to arms (*i.e.*, it limits felon disarmament to only those criminals likely to commit a violent crime in the future) and, by extension, defines too broadly the class of offenders who may bring successful as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) (*i.e.*, it allows people convicted of serious crimes to regain their right to arms). See *infra* Parts III.C.1-3.a.

*cf. Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder*, 560 U.S. 563, 567 (2010) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)).

Section 922(g)(1) bars the possession of firearms by anyone convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” This means that its prohibition extends to anyone convicted of a crime meeting the traditional definition of a felony, though Congress excluded anyone convicted of a “State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor” unless it is punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B).

Binderup and Suarez were each convicted of a misdemeanor subject to § 922(g)(1): Binderup’s was punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment; Suarez’s by up to three years in prison. The Pennsylvania and Maryland legislatures classify their respective offenses as misdemeanors. However, based on their maximum possible punishments, they meet the traditional definition of a felony, and Congress treats them as felonies for purposes of § 922(g)(1). As a result, Binderup and Suarez are subject to a firearm ban that is, per *Heller*, “presumptively lawful.”

2. *The Traditional Justification for Denying Felons the Right to Arms*

Turning to the first hurdle of step one, we look to the historical justification for stripping felons, including those convicted of offenses meeting the traditional definition of a felony, of their Second Amendment rights. “[M]ost scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the government could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens.’”



*United States v. Yancey*, 621 F.3d 681, 684-85 (7th Cir. 2010); *see, e.g.*, Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, *A Well Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of Gun Control*, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 487, 491-92 (2004); Saul Cornell, “Don’t Know Much about History”: *The Current Crisis in Second Amendment Scholarship*, 29 N. Ky. L. Rev. 657, 679 (2002); David Yassky, *The Second Amendment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change*, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 588, 626-27 (2000); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, *A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment*, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 461, 480 (1995); Don B. Kates, Jr., *The Second Amendment: A Dialogue*, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 1986, at 143, 146; Don B. Kates, Jr., *Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment*, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 204, 266 (1983). Several of our sister circuits endorse the “virtuous citizen” justification for excluding felons and felon-equivalents from the Second Amendment’s ambit. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Carpio-Leon*, 701 F.3d 974, 979-80 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[F]elons were excluded from the right to arms because they were deemed unvirtuous.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); *Yancey*, 621 F.3d at 684-85; *United States v. Vongxay*, 594 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he right to bear arms does not preclude laws disarming . . . unvirtuous citizens (*i.e.*, criminals).” (quoting Kates, Jr., 49 Law & Contemp Probs. at 146)); *United States v. Rene E.*, 583 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (“In the parlance of the republican politics of the time, these limitations were sometimes expressed as efforts to disarm the ‘unvirtuous.’”).

People who have committed or are likely to commit “violent offenses”—crimes “in which violence (actual or attempted) is an element of the offense,” *Skoien*,

614 F.3d at 642; see *Voisine*, 136 S. Ct. at 2280—undoubtedly qualify as “unvirtuous citizens” who lack Second Amendment rights. *Barton*, 633 F.3d at 173-74; see *United States v. Bena*, 664 F.3d 1180, 1184 (8th Cir. 2011) (recognizing “a common-law tradition that the right to bear arms is limited to peaceable or virtuous citizens”); C. Kevin Marshall, *Why Can't Martha Stewart Have A Gun?*, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 695, 727-28 (2009). But *Heller* recognized “long-standing prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons,” not just violent felons. 554 U.S. at 626. The category of “unvirtuous citizens” is thus broader than violent criminals; it covers any person who has committed a serious criminal offense, violent or non-violent. See *Skoien*, 614 F.3d at 640-41; *United States v. Everist*, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 2004); Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, *Second Amendment Limitations & Criminological Considerations*, 60 Hastings L.J. 1339, 1363-64 (2009); see also *Vongxay*, 594 F.3d at 1115 (“[F]elons are categorically different from the individuals who have a fundamental right to bear arms.”). To the extent *Barton* suggests that people who commit serious crimes retain or regain their Second Amendment rights if they are not likely to commit a violent crime, 633 F.3d at 174, it is overruled. See *infra* Part III.C.3.a.

The view that anyone who commits a serious crime loses the right to keep and bear arms dates back to our founding era. “*Heller* identified . . . as a ‘highly influential’ ‘precursor’ to the Second Amendment the Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents.” *Skoien*, 614 F.3d at 640 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 604). That report “asserted that citizens

have a personal right to bear arms ‘unless for *crimes committed*, or real danger of public injury.’” *Id.* (emphasis added) (quoting 2 Bernard Schwartz, *The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History* 662, 665 (1971)). “[C]rimes committed”—violent or not—were thus an independent ground for exclusion from the right to keep and bear arms. And there is reason to believe that felon disarmament has roots that are even more ancient. See Kates, Jr., 82 Mich. L. Rev. at 266 (“Felon[s] simply did not fall within the benefits of the common law right to possess arms.”).

The takeaway: persons who have committed serious crimes forfeit the right to possess firearms much the way they “forfeit other civil liberties, including fundamental constitutional rights.” *Barton*, 633 F.3d at 175.

### 3. *The Challengers’ Circumstances*

#### a. Distinguishing the Historically Barred Class

Having identified the traditional justification for denying some criminal offenders the right to arms—that they are “unvirtuous” because they committed serious crimes—we turn to how other criminal offenders may distinguish their circumstances from those of people who historically lacked the right to keep and bear arms. *Barton* suggests two ways to satisfy this second hurdle of step one: the first is that a challenger may show that he never lost his Second Amendment rights because he was not convicted of a serious crime; the second is that a challenger who once lost his Second Amendment rights by committing a serious crime may regain them if his “crime of conviction is

decades-old” and a court finds that he “poses no continuing threat to society.” 633 F.3d at 174.

We agree with *Barton* only insofar as it stands for the unremarkable proposition that a person who did not commit a serious crime retains his Second Amendment rights. Setting aside what makes a crime “serious” in the Second Amendment context and whether § 922(g)(1) covers any non-serious crimes—issues we address in Part III.C.3.b and on which there is disagreement, *see* Fuentes Op. Typescript at 19-20—being convicted of a non-serious crime does not demonstrate a lack of “virtue” that disqualifies an offender from exercising those rights.

But our agreement with *Barton* ends there. We reject its claim that the passage of time or evidence of rehabilitation will restore the Second Amendment rights of people who committed serious crimes. That view stems from *Barton*’s misplaced focus at *Marzzarella*’s step one on the probability of violent recidivism and is inconsistent with the true justification for the disarmament of people who commit serious crimes: they are “unvirtuous.” *See supra* Part III.C.2. A challenger’s risk of violent recidivism tells us nothing about whether he was convicted of a serious crime, and the seriousness of the purportedly disqualifying offense is our sole focus throughout *Marzzarella*’s first step.

There is no historical support for the view that the passage of time or evidence of rehabilitation can restore Second Amendment rights that were forfeited. To the extent Congress affords such a remedy in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) or 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), that is a matter of legislative grace; the Second Amendment does

not require that those who commit serious crimes be given an opportunity to regain their right to keep and bear arms in that fashion. Indeed, the Supreme Court and our Court have recognized in the Second Amendment context that the Judicial Branch is not “institutionally equipped” to conduct “a neutral, wide-ranging investigation” into post-conviction assertions of rehabilitation or to predict whether particular offenders are likely to commit violent crimes in the future. *United States v. Bean*, 537 U.S. 71, 77 (2002); see *Pontarelli v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury*, 285 F.3d 216, 230-31 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc); cf. S. Rep. 102-353, at 19 (1992) (doubting that even the Executive Branch could feasibly grant individualized exceptions to § 922(g)(1) based on an offender’s supposed rehabilitation because doing so is “a very difficult and subjective task” that “could have devastating consequences for innocent citizens if the wrong decision is made”).

In short, only the seriousness of the purportedly disqualifying offense determines the constitutional sweep of statutes like § 922(g)(1) at step one. To the extent *Barton* holds that people convicted of serious crimes may regain their lost Second Amendment rights after not posing a threat to society for a period of time, it is overruled.

b. Application to the Challengers

We now consider whether the Challengers have shown that their crimes are not serious. As a preliminary matter, we note that Judge Fuentes, those colleagues joining his opinion dissenting from the judgment, and the Government deny the possibility of successful as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1). See, e.g., Gov’t *Binderup* Br. at 14; Gov’t

*Suarez* Br. at 15; Fuentes Op. Typescript at 18-40. In their view, § 922(g)(1), at least in its current form, is constitutional in all its applications because it does not burden the Second Amendment rights of felons or felon-equivalents who, because of their convictions, lack Second Amendment rights. Put another way, they believe that all crimes subject to § 922(g)(1) are disqualifying because their maximum possible punishments are conclusive proof they are serious.

But that view puts the rabbit in the hat by concluding that all felons and misdemeanants with potential punishments past a certain threshold lack the right to keep and bear arms when, despite their maximum possible punishment, some offenses may be “so tame and technical as to be insufficient to justify the ban.” *United States v. Torres-Rosario*, 658 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011). *Heller* confirms such a showing is possible, as it describes prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons as only “presumptively lawful.” 554 U.S. at 626-27 & n.26. Unless flagged as irrebuttable, presumptions are rebuttable. *See Barton*, 633 F.3d at 173; *Williams*, 616 F.3d at 692. Indeed, under the approach of Judge Fuentes and those colleagues who join his opinion dissenting from the judgments, the Government could make an end-run around the Second Amendment and undermine the right to keep and bear arms in contravention of *Heller*. A crime’s maximum possible punishment is “purely a matter of legislative prerogative,” *Rummel v. Estelle*, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980), subject only to “constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws,” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27; *see United States v. Walker*, 473 F.3d 71, 79 (3d Cir. 2007). Yet *Heller* teaches that the Government needs more than a rational basis “to overcome the

right to keep and bear arms.” 554 U.S. at 628 n.27; see *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 95-96. Therefore, to determine whether the Challengers are shorn of their Second Amendment rights, *Heller* requires us to consider the maximum possible punishment but not to defer blindly to it.

At the same time, there are no fixed criteria for determining whether crimes are serious enough to destroy Second Amendment rights. Unlike the “historically unprotected categories of speech” that are First Amendment exceptions “long familiar to the bar,” *United States v. Stevens*, 559 U.S. 460, 468, 470 (2010), the category of serious crimes changes over time as legislative judgments regarding virtue evolve. For example, though only a few exceedingly serious crimes were “felonies” at early common law, by the time of our country’s founding “many new felonies were added by English statute.” 1 *Wharton’s Criminal Law* § 17 (15th ed. 2015); see, e.g., 4 William Blackstone, *Commentaries* \*18 (“[N]o less than a[ ] hundred and sixty [actions] have been declared by act of parliament to be felonies without benefit of clergy; or, in other words, to be worthy of instant death.”); Francis Bacon, *Preparation for the Union of Laws of England and Scotland*, in 2 *The Works of Francis Bacon, Lord Chancellor of England* 163-64 (1841) (listing dozens of felonies, including “[w]here a man stealeth certain kinds of hawks” or “invokes wicked spirits”). The upshot is that “exclusions need not mirror limits that were on the books in 1791” to comport with the Second Amendment. *Skoien*, 614 F.3d at 641. Rather, we will presume the judgment of the legislature is correct and treat any crime subject to § 922(g)(1) as disqualifying unless there is a strong reason to do otherwise.

Here, upon close examination of the Challengers' apparently disqualifying convictions, we conclude that their offenses were not serious enough to strip them of their Second Amendment rights. For starters, though the Challengers' crimes meet the generic definition of a felony and Congress's definition of a felony for purposes of § 922(g)(1), the Pennsylvania and Maryland legislatures enacted them as misdemeanors. Misdemeanors are, and traditionally have been, considered less serious than felonies. See *Baldwin v. New York*, 399 U.S. 66, 70 (1970); *misdemeanor*, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); 1 LaFare, *Substantive Criminal Law* § 1.6. Congress tried to ensure that only serious crimes would trigger disarmament under § 922(g)(1) by exempting from the ban any state-law misdemeanant whose crime was punishable by less than two years' imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B). But we believe that accommodation still paints with too broad a brush, for a state legislature's classification of an offense as a misdemeanor is a powerful expression of its belief that the offense is not serious enough to be disqualifying.

This is not to say that state misdemeanors cannot be serious. No doubt "some misdemeanors are . . . 'serious' offenses," *Baldwin*, 399 U.S. at 70, and "numerous misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous than many felonies," *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985). See *Johnson v. United States*, 559 U.S. 133, 149-50 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting) ("At common law . . . many very serious crimes, such as kidnapping and assault with the intent to murder or rape, were categorized as misdemeanors."). And the maximum possible punishment is certainly probative of a misdemeanor's seriousness. But Congress may not



overlook so generally the misdemeanor label, which, in the Second Amendment context, is also important.

Other considerations, however, confirm our belief that the Challengers' crimes were not serious. As explained above, violent criminal conduct—meaning a crime “in which violence (actual or attempted) is an element of the offense,” *Skoien*, 614 F.3d at 642; *see Voisine*, 136 S. Ct. at 2280—is disqualifying. *See* Part III.C.2. But neither Challenger's offense had the use or attempted use of force as an element.<sup>4</sup> Though, as explained, it is possible for non-violent crimes to be serious, the lack of a violence element is a relevant consideration.

Also important is that each Challenger received a minor sentence by any measure: Binderup was sentenced to three years' probation (a condition of which was to avoid contact with his employee) and a \$300 fine plus court costs and restitution, while Suarez received a suspended sentence of 180 days' imprisonment and a \$500 fine. That is because severe punishments are typically reserved for serious crimes. Additionally, punishments are selected by judges who have first-hand knowledge of the facts and circumstances of the cases and who likely have the benefit of pre-sentence

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<sup>4</sup> Though we look only to a crime's elements rather than to the way it actually was committed, we note as an aside that the District Court in *Binderup* explained that “[t]here is simply nothing in the record here which would support a reasonable inference that [Binderup] used any violence, force, or threat of force to initiate or maintain the sexual relationship with his seventeen-year-old employee” or “that he even engaged in any violent or threatening conduct.” 2014 WL 4764424, at \*22. Similarly, the District Court in *Suarez* described Suarez's misdemeanor as “minor and non-violent.” 2015 WL 685889, at \*9.

reports prepared by trained professionals. With not a single day of jail time, the punishments here reflect the sentencing judges' assessment of how minor the violations were.

Finally, there is no cross-jurisdictional consensus regarding the seriousness of the Challengers' crimes. Some states treat consensual sexual relationships between 41 and 17 year olds as serious crimes, *see* Gov't *Binderup* Br. at 17-19 & n.4, but the vast majority of states do not, *see* Asaph Glosser *et al.*, *Statutory Rape: A Guide to State Laws and Reporting Requirements* 6-7 (Dec. 15, 2004), *available at* <https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/75531/report.pdf> (last visited Aug. 25, 2016). *Binderup's* conduct arguably would have been criminal in a few other states because his 17-year-old sexual partner was his employee, yet it still would have been legal in many states. Similarly, though some states punish the unlicensed carrying of a concealed weapon as a serious crime, *see* Gov't *Suarez* Br. at 16-17 n.5, more than half prescribe a maximum sentence that does not meet the threshold of a traditional felony (more than one year in prison) and others do not even require a specific credential to carry a concealed weapon, *see* Thomson Reuters, *50 State Survey: Right to Carry a Concealed Weapon (Statutes)* (October 2015); U.S. Gov't Accountability Off., *States' Laws and Requirements for Concealed Carry Permits Vary Across Nation* 73-74 (2012), *available at* <http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592552.pdf> (last visited Aug. 25, 2016); Law Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence, *Concealed Weapons Permitting*, <http://smartgunlaws.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/firearms-in-public-places/concealed-weapons-permitting/> (last visited Aug. 25, 2016). Were the Challengers unable to show that so

many states consider their crimes to be non-serious, it would be difficult for them to carry their burden at step one. But because they have shown that there is no consensus regarding the seriousness of their crimes, their showing at step one is that much more compelling.<sup>5</sup>

In sum, the Challengers have carried their burden of showing that their misdemeanors were not serious offenses despite their maximum possible punishment.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Judge Fuentes and those colleagues who join his opinion dissenting from the judgments caution that this approach is not “workable” and “places an extraordinary administrative burden on district courts,” Fuentes Op. Typescript at 2, 71, but the criteria we use to assess the seriousness of a misdemeanor subject to § 922(g)(1)—the elements of the offense, the actual sentence, and the state of the law—are easily administrable. These objective indications of seriousness are well within the ambit of judgment exercised daily by judges. Courts are also well suited to the task of identifying serious crimes in the Second Amendment context, as in other constitutional contexts the Judicial Branch is charged with discerning “objective criteria reflecting the seriousness with which society regards [an] offense.” *Baldwin*, 399 U.S. at 68; *see, e.g., Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas*, 489 U.S. 538, 543-44 (1989) (Sixth Amendment); *Welsh v. Wisconsin*, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1985) (Fourth Amendment); *Smith v. United States*, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959) (Fifth Amendment).

<sup>6</sup> Our decision is limited to the cases before us, which involve state-law misdemeanants bringing as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1). This is important because when a legislature chooses to call a crime a misdemeanor, we have an indication of non-seriousness that is lacking when it opts instead to use the felony label. We are not confronted with whether an as-applied Second Amendment challenge can succeed where the purportedly disqualifying offense is considered a felony by the authority that created the crime. On the one hand, it is possible to read *Heller* to leave open the possibility, however remote, of a successful as-

This leads us to conclude that Binderup and Suarez have distinguished their circumstances from those of persons historically excluded from the right to arms. That, in turn, requires the Government to meet some form of heightened scrutiny at the second step of the *Marzzarella* framework.

D. Step Two of the *Marzzarella* Framework

Next, we consider whether § 922(g)(1) survives heightened scrutiny as applied. On this record, it does not. No doubt § 922(g)(1) is intended to further the government interest of promoting public safety by “preventing armed mayhem,” *Skoien*, 614 F.3d at 642, an interest that is both important and compelling. But whether we apply intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny—and we continue to follow the lead of *Marzzarella* in choosing intermediate scrutiny, 614 F.3d at 97—the Government bears the burden of proof on the appropriateness of the means it employs to further its interest. *See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox*, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); *Johnson v. California*, 543 U.S. 499, 505, 506 n.1 (2005).

Here the Government falls well short of satisfying its burden—even under intermediate scrutiny. The record before us consists of evidence about the Challengers’ backgrounds, including the time that has passed since they last broke the law. It contains no evidence explaining why banning people like them (*i.e.*, people who decades ago committed similar misde-

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applied challenge by someone convicted of such an offense. At the same time, even if that were so, the individual’s burden would be extraordinarily high—and perhaps even insurmountable. In any event, given that neither Challenger fits that description, we need not decide the question.

meanors) from possessing firearms promotes public safety. The Government claims that someone like Suarez is “particularly likely to misuse firearms” because he belongs to a category of “potentially irresponsible persons,” Gov’t *Suarez* Br. at 27-28, and that someone like Binderup is “particularly likely to commit additional crimes in the future,” Gov’t *Binderup* Br. at 35. But it must “present some meaningful evidence, not mere assertions, to justify its predictive [and here conclusory] judgments.” *Heller*, 670 F.3d at 1259. In these cases neither the evidence in the record nor common sense supports those assertions.

The Government relies on a number of off-point statistical studies to argue that it is reasonable to disarm the Challengers because of their convictions. It notes that felons generally commit violent crimes more frequently than non-felons, *see* Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, *Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994*, at 6 (2002), and that the “denial of handgun purchases [to convicted felons] is associated with a reduction in risk for later criminal activity of approximately 20-30%,” Mona A. Wright *et al.*, *Effectiveness of Denial of Handgun Purchase to Persons Believed to Be at High Risk for Firearm Violence*, 89 *Am. J. of Pub. Health* 88, 89 (1999). But these studies estimate the likelihood that incarcerated felons will reoffend after their release from prison. The Challengers were not incarcerated and are not felons under state law; they are state-law misdemeanants who spent no time in jail. The Government cannot draw any reasonable conclusions about the risk posed by their possession of firearms from such obviously distinguishable studies. It claims that even criminals placed on probation rather than sent to prison have a

heightened risk of recidivism, but the study it cites found that, “[g]enerally, the risk of recidivism was highest during the first year after admission to probation,” and that “[a]s released prisoners and probationers age, they tend to exhibit lower rates of recidivism.” Iowa Div. of Crim. & Juvenile Justice Planning, *Recidivism Among Iowa Probationers 2* (July 2005), available at <http://publications.iowa.gov/15032/> (last visited Aug. 25, 2016). Binderup’s and Suarez’s offenses are 20 and 26 years old, respectively, so that study tells us little, if anything, about the risk of recidivism in these cases.<sup>7</sup>

The Government also claims to have studies of particular relevance to each Challenger’s situation, but this argument too misses the mark. As to Binderup, the Government cites studies from several states that it contends would classify him as a sex offender on account of his criminal conduct. See Gov’t *Binderup*

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<sup>7</sup> As discussed, evidence of how individuals have lived their lives since committing crimes is irrelevant under *Marrzarella*’s first step, as there is no historical support for rehabilitation being a consideration in determining whether someone has Second Amendment rights. However, at step two of the analysis the question is no longer whether the Challengers fall within the Second Amendment’s protections. They do. Our task now is to decide whether the Government can disarm them despite these protections. Whereas our obligation at step one is to draw constitutional lines—separating those who have Second Amendment rights from those who do not—at step two we must ask whether the Government has made a strong enough case for disarming a person found after step one to be eligible to assert an as-applied challenge. This turns in part on the likelihood that the Challengers will commit crimes in the future. Thus, under the right circumstances the passage of time since a conviction can be a relevant consideration in assessing recidivism risks.

Br. at 33-34; *see also id.* at 28 n.8 (citing a Pennsylvania study showing that individuals convicted of certain sexual offenses have a 50-60% chance of rearrest within three years of release from prison). Binderup unsurprisingly disputes that label. We need not delve into the weeds here, as, much like the more general studies discussed above, the sex-offender specific studies focus on people who were incarcerated. It is not helpful to draw inferences about the usefulness of disarming Binderup from those off-point studies.

As to Suarez, the Government emphasizes that persons arrested for “weapons offenses” are rearrested at high rates, Gov’t *Suarez* Br. at 30 & nn.10-11 (citing studies), and relies on a study indicating that California handgun purchasers in 1977 “who had prior convictions for nonviolent firearm-related offenses such as carrying concealed firearms in public, but none for violent offenses,” were more likely than people with no criminal histories to be charged later with a violent crime, *see* Garen J. Wintemute *et al.*, *Prior Misdemeanor Convictions as a Risk Factor for Later Violent and Firearm-Related Criminal Activity Among Authorized Purchasers of Handguns*, 280 *Am. Med. Ass’n* 2083, 2086 (1998). Yet that study only addresses the risk of recidivism within 15 years of a conviction for an unspecified “nonviolent firearm-related offense[.]” *id.* at 2086. Common sense tells us that recidivism rates would change with the passage of an additional 11 years (Suarez was convicted 26 years ago) and vary based on the circumstances of the prior conviction.

This is not to say that empirical studies are irrelevant to as-applied Second Amendment challenges. Parties may use statistics to show that people who

commit certain crimes have a high (or low) likelihood of recidivism that warrants (or does not warrant) disarmament, even decades after a conviction. In these cases, empirical studies could have demonstrated an appropriate fit between the Challengers' total disarmament and the promotion of public safety if they contained reliable statistical evidence that people with the Challengers' backgrounds were more likely to misuse firearms or were otherwise irresponsible or dangerous. The Government simply presented no such evidence.<sup>8</sup>

Additionally, that federal law gives Binderup and Suarez opportunities to escape the effect of § 922(g)(1) does not save the statute from unconstitutionality under the circumstances. For starters, several avenues are closed to them altogether: they may not apply for relief under § 925(c) because that provision has been unfunded for years, *see Logan*, 552 U.S. at 28 n.1; and Suarez is ineligible for expungement or the restoration of his civil rights, *see Md. Code, Crim. P., § 10-105; Logan*, 552 U.S. at 31-32. Those avenues that remain open to them do not satisfy even intermediate scrutiny.

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<sup>8</sup> Judge Fuentes and those colleagues who join his opinion dissenting from the judgments suggest that our heightened scrutiny analysis boils down to the Challengers asking us to trust that they will not misuse firearms because we cannot make predictive judgments about the need to disarm the Challengers “with any degree of confidence.” Fuentes Op. Typescript at 55. We disagree. Under either form of heightened scrutiny it is the Government’s burden to prove that the restriction is appropriately tailored. The problem in our cases is that because the Government’s evidence sweeps so broadly, it does not establish that the restriction serves an important interest even as applied to people *like* the Challengers, let alone to the Challengers themselves.



Binderup's record may be expunged only after he reaches age 70 (or is dead for three years), 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9122(b), but as there is no evidence showing it is reasonable to ban Binderup from possessing a firearm today, there is certainly no evidence to show that it is reasonable to keep that ban in place until his 70th birthday. The only remaining option is for Binderup and Suarez to receive pardons from the Governors of Pennsylvania and Maryland, respectively. (Pardons are, as already noted, an independent ground for relief from the firearm disability in § 922(g)(1), and Binderup must receive a pardon to restore his civil rights. *See* 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4502(a)(3).) But the Government has presented no evidence or explanation as to why a Governor's decisions about pardons—"a classic example of unreviewable executive discretion," *Bowens v. Quinn*, 561 F.3d 671, 676 (7th Cir. 2009)—are reasonably related to the risk posed by the Challengers' possession of firearms. Though a pardon would reflect well on Binderup and Suarez, it is hardly reasonable to treat the absence of a pardon—rare by any measure—as adequate proof of a continuing need to disarm them indefinitely.

The Challengers' isolated, decades-old, non-violent misdemeanors do not permit the inference that disarming people like them will promote the responsible use of firearms. Nor is there any evidence in the record to show why people like them remain potentially irresponsible after many years of apparently responsible behavior. Without more, there is not a substantial fit between the continuing disarmament of the Challengers and an important government interest. Thus, § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to them.

#### IV. Conclusion

When sorting out a fractured decision of the Court, the goal is “to find a single legal standard” that “produce[s] results with which a majority of the [Court] in the case articulating the standard would agree.” *United States v. Donovan*, 661 F.3d 174, 182 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting *Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey*, 947 F.2d 682, 693 (3d Cir. 1991), *modified on other grounds*, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). We have at times “looked to the votes of dissenting [judges] if they, combined with votes from plurality or concurring opinions, establish a majority view on the relevant issue.” *id.* And when no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the support of a majority of the Court, its holding “may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” *Marks v. United States*, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting *Gregg v. Georgia*, 428 U.S. 153, 69 n.15 (1976) (plurality opinion)).

Applying those interpretive tools here, the following is the law of our Circuit: (1) the two-step *Marzzarella* framework controls all Second Amendment challenges, including as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1); (2) a challenger will satisfy the first step of that framework only if he proves that the law or regulation at issue burdens conduct protected by the Second Amendment; (3) to satisfy step one in the context of an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1), a challenger must prove that he was not previously convicted of a serious crime; (4) evidence of a challenger’s rehabilitation or his likelihood of recidivism is not relevant to the step-one analysis; (5) as the narrowest ground sup-

porting the Court's judgments for Binderup and Suarez, the considerations discussed above will determine whether crimes are serious (*i.e.*, disqualifying) at step one; and (6) if a challenger makes the necessary step-one showing, the burden shifts to the Government at step two to prove that the regulation at issue survives intermediate scrutiny.

In the cases before us, though Binderup and Suarez fail to show that their misdemeanor offenses are not subject to § 922(g)(1), they have rebutted the presumption that they lack Second Amendment rights by distinguishing their crimes of conviction from those that historically led to exclusion from Second Amendment protections. This meets the first-step test of *Marzzarella*. At step two, the Government has failed to present sufficient evidence to demonstrate under even intermediate scrutiny that it may, consistent with the Second Amendment, apply § 922(g)(1) to bar Binderup and Suarez from possessing a firearm in their homes. Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the District Courts.

*Daniel Binderup v. Attorney General of the United States; Director Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms & Explosives*

Nos. 14-4550, 14-4549

*Julio Suarez v. Attorney General of the United States; Director Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms & Explosives*

Nos. 15-1975, 15-1976

HARDIMAN, *Circuit Judge*, concurring in part and concurring in the judgments, joined by FISHER, CHAGARES, JORDAN, and NYGAARD, *Circuit Judges*.

The Second Amendment secures an individual “right of the people” to keep and bear arms unconnected to service in the militia. *District of Columbia v. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). This “pre-existing” right was included in the Bill of Rights in light of the troubles the colonists experienced under British rule and the Founders’ appreciation of the considerable power that was transferred to the new federal government. Without a specific guarantee in our fundamental charter, it was feared that “the people” might one day be disarmed. *See id.* at 598-99. At the same time, the Founders understood that not everyone possessed Second Amendment rights. These appeals require us to decide who count among “the people” entitled to keep and bear arms.

The laws of the United States prohibit felons and certain misdemeanants from possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Guided by the Supreme Court’s characterization of felon dispossession as “presumptively lawful” in *Heller*, we held in *United States v. Barton* that this prohibition does not on its face violate

the Second Amendment. 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011). In doing so we stated that § 922(g)(1) remains subject to as-applied constitutional challenges. *Id.* at 172-75. These consolidated appeals present two such challenges. Daniel Binderup and Julio Suarez—each permanently barred from possessing firearms because of prior misdemeanor convictions—contend that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to them.

It is. The most cogent principle that can be drawn from traditional limitations on the right to keep and bear arms is that dangerous persons likely to use firearms for illicit purposes were not understood to be protected by the Second Amendment. And because Binderup and Suarez have demonstrated that their crimes of conviction were nonviolent and that their personal circumstances are distinguishable from those of persons who do not enjoy Second Amendment rights because of their demonstrated proclivity for violence, the judgments of the District Courts must be affirmed.

## I

We agree with all our colleagues that Binderup and Suarez are subject to disarmament under the plain terms of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).<sup>1</sup> We also agree with Judges Ambro, Smith, and Greenaway that the District Court correctly held that § 922(g)(1) is unconsti-

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<sup>1</sup> Given the Court's universal agreement that § 922(g)(1) is *unambiguous* as to whom it covers and what it criminalizes, we have trouble comprehending the Dissent's fears that our approach for assessing the statute's as-applied constitutionality under the Second Amendment (set forth *infra*) puts it at risk of being declared unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause. *See* Dissent at 71-74. Our view is simply that certain applications of this pellucid statute might be unconstitutional.

tutional as applied to *Binderup* and *Suarez*. But we perceive flaws in Judge Ambro’s opinion.<sup>2</sup>

To begin with, our colleagues misapprehend the traditional justifications underlying felon dispossession, substituting a vague “virtue” requirement that is belied by the historical record. Then, under the guise of “reaffirm[ing]” the two-step test of *United States v. Marzzarella*, Ambro Op. 6, they actually expand that test—and along with it, the judicial power. For our colleagues hold that even with respect to persons entitled to Second Amendment rights, judges may pick and choose whom the government may permanently disarm if the judges approve of the legislature’s interest balancing. Despite *Binderup*’s and *Suarez*’s success today, our colleagues have retained “the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the [Second Amendment] right is *really worth* insisting upon.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 634. This is demonstrated by the fact that all but three of our dissenting colleagues—who have concluded that *all* as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) must fail—join the bulk of Judge Ambro’s constitutional analysis. By contrast, we would hold—consistent with *Heller*—that non-dangerous persons convicted of offenses unassociated with violence may rebut the presumed constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) on an as-applied basis, and that when a law eviscerates the core of the Second Amendment right to keep and

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<sup>2</sup> Although a majority of the Court joins two portions of Judge Ambro’s opinion and a plurality joins others, the outcome-determinative sections are supported by only three judges. To minimize confusion, we will refer to the opinion as “Judge Ambro’s opinion” and will indicate whether the relevant portion thereof was backed by a majority or not where necessary.

bear arms (as § 922(g)(1) does by criminalizing exercise of the right entirely), it is categorically unconstitutional.

## A

The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. In *Heller*, the Supreme Court held the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected to service in a militia, and to use that weapon for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. 554 U.S. at 595. The Second Amendment “elevates above *all* other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home”—a right that is at the “core” of the Second Amendment. *Id.* at 635 (emphasis added). Two years after *Heller*, in *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, the Court held the Fourteenth Amendment “incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in *Heller*,” explaining that the right is “fundamental” to “our system of ordered liberty.” 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010).

Although the Second Amendment is an enumerated fundamental right, it is “not unlimited.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626. “No fundamental right—not even the First Amendment—is absolute.” *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 802 (Scalia, J., concurring). A range of “who,” “what,” “where,” “when,” and “how” restrictions relating to firearms are permitted—many based on the scope of the Second Amendment and others based on their satisfaction of some level of heightened scrutiny. See Eugene Volokh, *Implementing the Right to Keep*

*and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and A Research Agenda*, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1443, 1443 (2009) (distinguishing between “‘what’ restrictions (such as bans on machine guns, so-called ‘assault weapons,’ or unpersonalized handguns), ‘who’ restrictions (such as bans on possession by felons, misdemeanants, noncitizens, or 18-to-20-year-olds), ‘where’ restrictions (such as bans on carrying in public, in places that serve alcohol, or in parks, or bans on possessing [guns] in public housing projects), ‘how’ restrictions (such as storage regulations), [and] ‘when’ restrictions (such as waiting periods)”); *United States v. Huitron-Guizar*, 678 F.3d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 2012) (applying the same heuristic).

For instance, the right is “not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626. Likewise, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the “historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, *Heller* catalogued a non-exhaustive list of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” that have historically constrained the parameters of the right. *Id.* at 627 n.26. These include “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, . . . laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, [and] laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”<sup>3</sup> *Id.* at 626-27. Critically,

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<sup>3</sup> At least one of our sister courts has characterized *Heller*’s list of “presumptively lawful” regulations as dicta. See *United States v. Scroggins*, 599 F.3d 433, 451 (5th Cir. 2010). But “[c]ourts often



such “traditional restrictions go to show the *scope* of the right, not its lack of fundamental character.” *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 802 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). The reason, for example, that the Second Amendment “does not protect those weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns,” is that they fall outside the historical “scope of the right” —not that the right yields to some important or compelling government interest. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 625; see also *United States v. Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010).

The Supreme Court has not yet heard an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to a presumptively lawful ban on firearms possession. But that fact makes *Heller* and *McDonald* no less binding on our inquiry here.

## B

### 1

Two of our decisions pertain to Binderup’s and Suarez’s as-applied challenges in these appeals.

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limit the scope of their holdings, and such limitations are integral to those holdings.” *United States v. Vongxay*, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010) (treating *Heller*’s “presumptively lawful” language as binding); see also *United States v. Rozier*, 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]o the extent that this portion of *Heller* limits the Court’s opinion to possession of firearms by *law-abiding* and *qualified* individuals, it is not dicta.”). Moreover, the Court doubled down on this language in *McDonald*. See 561 U.S. at 786. Hence, we have concluded that *Heller*’s list constitutes a limitation on the scope of its holding and does not qualify as dicta. See *Barton*, 633 F.3d at 171; *United States v. Huet*, 665 F.3d 588, 600 (3d Cir. 2012).

*United States v. Marzzarella* involved an as-applied challenge to a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), which prohibits the possession of a handgun with an obliterated serial number—a “what” restriction limiting possession of a certain category of firearms. 614 F.3d at 87. Because this statute was not included in *Heller*’s list of presumptively lawful firearm regulations, we gleaned from *Heller* a “two-pronged approach to Second Amendment challenges.” *Id.* at 89. We first consider “whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.” *Id.* If the conduct lies outside the Second Amendment’s scope, the right does not apply and the challenged law must stand. But if the law burdens protected conduct, we determined that the proper course is to “evaluate the law under some form of means-end scrutiny.” *Id.* “If the law passes muster under that standard, it is constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid.” *Id.*

Applying that test to § 922(k)’s ban on the possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers, we held that the law “would pass constitutional muster even if it burdens protected conduct.” *Id.* at 95. In other words, we skipped the first step and proceeded to apply means-ends scrutiny. We chose intermediate scrutiny<sup>4</sup> because “[t]he burden imposed by the law does not severely limit the possession of firearms” and does not bar possession of an entire class of firearms.

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<sup>4</sup> Intermediate scrutiny “require[s] the asserted governmental end to be more than just legitimate, either ‘significant,’ ‘substantial,’ or ‘important,’” and requires “the fit between the regulation and the asserted objective be reasonable, not perfect.” *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 98 (citations omitted).

*Id.* at 97. Under that standard, we concluded that the law is constitutional because it fits reasonably with the substantial or important “law enforcement interest in enabling the tracing of weapons via their serial numbers.” *Id.* at 98. We also opined that the law would pass strict scrutiny<sup>5</sup> because it serves a compelling government interest through the “least-restrictive” means. *Id.* at 100.

A year after *Marzzarella* we decided *Barton*, which involved facial and as-applied challenges to the very law in question here: § 922(g)(1). Unlike the law at issue in *Marzzarella*—the “what” restriction codified in § 922(k)—the statute at issue in *Barton* (and in these appeals) was a presumptively lawful “who” restriction that prohibits certain people from possessing guns because of their membership in a criminal class. *Barton* was a felon who had been convicted of possessing firearms and ammunition in violation of § 922(g)(1). *Barton*, 633 F.3d at 169. We readily concluded that his facial challenge “must fail” in light of *Heller*’s list of presumptively lawful firearm regulations. *Id.* at 172. We reasoned that since a facial challenge requires a showing that the challenged law “is unconstitutional in all of its applications,” *Heller* foreclosed a facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) because it is “presumptively lawful,” meaning that, “under most circumstances, [it] regulate[s] conduct which is unprotected by the Second Amendment.” *Id.*

Most relevant to these appeals is our analysis of *Barton*’s as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1). In that

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<sup>5</sup> “Strict scrutiny asks whether the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.” *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 96 n.14

regard, we first determined that “*Heller*’s statement regarding the presumptive validity of felon gun dis-possession statutes does not foreclose” an as-applied challenge. *Id.* at 173. We reasoned that “[b]y describing the felon disarmament ban as presumptively lawful, the Supreme Court implied that the presumption may be rebutted.”<sup>6</sup> *Id.* at 173 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).

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<sup>6</sup> At times, the Government seems to reject even the possibility of an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to a presumptively lawful regulation. *See, e.g.*, Gov’t Suarez Br. 15 (“In recognizing section 922(g)(1) as a ‘presumptively lawful regulatory measure[,]’ the Supreme Court did not suggest that the statute nonetheless could be subject to a successful as-applied constitutional challenge.” (internal citation omitted)); Gov’t Binderup Br. 14 (same, verbatim). The Government retreated from that proposition somewhat at oral argument, reframing its position as an objection merely to as-applied challenges that rely on individualized review of whether a law is unconstitutional in light of the challenger’s particular circumstances. But some degree of individualized assessment is part and parcel of all as-applied challenges. *See, e.g., United States v. Marcavage*, 609 F.3d 264, 273 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that an as-applied challenge “does not contend that a law is unconstitutional as written but that its application to a *particular person* under *particular circumstances* deprived that person of a constitutional right” (emphases added)).

And our determination in *Barton* that § 922(g)(1) is subject to as-applied challenges is by no means an outlier. Several of our sister courts have either accepted or allowed the possibility of as-applied Second Amendment challenges to presumptively lawful regulations. *See, e.g., United States v. Williams*, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010) (“*Heller* referred to felon disarmament bans only as ‘presumptively lawful,’ which, by implication, means that there must exist the possibility that the ban could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied challenge.”); *United States v. Carpio-Leon*, 701 F.3d 974, 981 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The *Heller* Court’s holding that defines the core right to bear arms by law-abiding,

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responsible citizens does not preclude some future determination that persons who commit some offenses might nonetheless remain in the protected class of ‘law-abiding, responsible’ persons.”); *Schrader v. Holder*, 704 F.3d 980, 991 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (indicating willingness to consider an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) but concluding it had not been raised properly).

Although the Dissent rests its conclusion on its determination that all persons covered by § 922(g)(1) fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment, it too expresses doubt as to the availability of as-applied constitutional challenges to this “presumptively lawful” statute. See Dissent at 21 (stating that *Marzzarella* “concluded that the ‘better reading’ of *Heller* was that [the list of presumptively lawful] measures were complete ‘exceptions to the right to bear arms’”) (quoting *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 91 and adding emphasis). *Marzzarella* held no such thing (indeed, it did not even involve a challenge to one of the presumptively lawful longstanding regulations identified by *Heller*). Rather, its examination of *Heller*’s list was geared toward determining whether such regulations were “presumptively lawful” based on the step-one question (the scope of the Second Amendment) or the step-two question (means-end scrutiny). Its conclusion that the former is the correct understanding of *Heller* meant that “these longstanding limitations are exceptions to the right to bear arms.” *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 91. *Barton*’s characterization mirrored *Marzzarella*’s: it stated that a “lawful” longstanding regulation “regulates conduct ‘fall[ing outside] the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.’” *Barton*, 633 F.3d at 172 (quoting *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 91). But neither *Marzzarella* nor any other of our precedents has ever implied that *Heller*’s incomplete list of “presumptively lawful” firearm regulations “‘under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.’” Dissent at 10 (quoting *United States v. Rozier*, 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010) and adding emphasis). To so hold would ignore the meaning of the word “presumption.” A presumption of constitutionality “is a presumption . . . [about] the existence of factual conditions supporting the legislation. As such it is a *rebuttable* presumption.” *Borden’s Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin*, 293 U.S. 194, 209 (1934) (emphasis added). We do not disagree that the *Heller* Court included this “presumptively lawful” language to provide some “assurance[.]” that its decision “did not

Next, we explained what was required to mount a successful as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1). We looked to the “historical pedigree” of the statute to ascertain “whether the traditional justifications underlying the statute support a finding of permanent disability in this case.” *Id.*; *see also id.* at 175 (noting that the constitutionality of the felon dispossession statute under the Second Amendment right depends “upon *whom* the right was intended to protect”) (emphasis in original). Our analysis revealed that although persons convicted of violent crimes have been barred from firearm possession since 1931, it wasn’t until thirty years later that Congress dispossessed nonviolent felons. *Id.* at 173. The historical record demonstrated that “the common law right to keep and bear arms did not extend to those who were likely to commit violent offenses.” *Id.* Accordingly, we determined that the exclusion of felons and other criminals from the scope of the Second Amendment’s protections was tethered to the time-honored practice of keeping firearms out of the hands of those likely to commit violent crimes. *Id.*

For the reasons discussed, we concluded that “[t]o raise a successful as-applied challenge, [one] must pre-

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provide a basis for future litigants to upend any and all restrictions on the right to bear arms.” Dissent at 36. Indeed, we have concluded that § 922(g)(1) is *facially* valid for this very reason. *See Barton*, 633 F.3d at 172. But we doubt the Supreme Court couched its first definitive characterization of the nature of the Second Amendment right so as to completely immunize this statute from any constitutional challenge whatsoever. Put simply, we take the Supreme Court at its word that felon dispossession is “*presumptively* lawful.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26 (emphasis added).

sent facts about himself and his background that distinguish his circumstances from those of persons historically barred from Second Amendment protections.” *Id.* at 174. We explained further:

For instance, a felon convicted of a minor, non-violent crime might show that he is no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen. Similarly, a court might find that a felon whose crime of conviction is decades-old poses no continuing threat to society.

*Id.* (internal citation omitted).

We had no trouble concluding that Barton failed to make this showing because he could not demonstrate that he was “no more likely than the typical citizen to commit a crime of violence.” *Id.* To begin with, his prior disqualifying convictions were for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and for receipt of a stolen firearm. *Id.* As we explained, “[c]ourts have held in a number of contexts that offenses relating to drug trafficking and receiving stolen weapons are closely related to violent crime”—again, the relevant historical justification for excluding the class of which Barton was a member from the Second Amendment’s protections. *Id.* The record also indicated that Barton had not been rehabilitated such that he was “no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen.” *Id.* Indeed, he had recently admitted to selling a firearm with an obliterated serial number to a police informant. *Id.* For those reasons, we rejected Barton’s as-applied challenge because he had failed “to demonstrate that his circumstances place him outside the intended scope of § 922(g)(1).” *Id.*

Our decisions in *Marzzarella* and *Barton* show that the threshold question in a Second Amendment challenge is one of scope: whether the Second Amendment protects the person, the weapon, or the activity in the first place. This requires an inquiry into “text and history.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 595. “Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.” *Id.* at 634-35. The “critical tool of constitutional interpretation” in this area is “examination of a variety of legal and other sources to determine *the public understanding* of a legal text in the period after its enactment or ratification.” *Id.* at 605 (emphasis in original); *see also Ezell v. City of Chicago*, 651 F.3d 684, 702 (7th Cir. 2011) (“*Heller* suggests that some federal gun laws will survive Second Amendment challenge because they regulate activity falling outside the scope of the right as publicly understood when the Bill of Rights was ratified; *McDonald* confirms that if the claim concerns a state or local law, the ‘scope’ question asks how the right was publicly understood when the Fourteenth Amendment was proposed and ratified.”). Hence, the scope of the right is discerned with reference to the “historical justifications” underlying traditional limits on the right’s coverage. *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635. The test we enunciated in *Barton* was directed at this very question. *See Barton*, 633 F.3d at 173 (“[T]o evaluate [an] as-applied challenge [to § 922(g)(1)], we look to [its] historical pedigree . . . to determine whether the traditional justifications underlying the



statute support a finding of permanent disability in this case.”).

The fact that *Barton* speaks to scope does not mean, as our colleagues and the Government insist, that it requires application of means-end scrutiny once it is determined that a presumptively lawful regulation has dispossessed someone who falls within the protection of the Second Amendment. It is true that courts typically apply some form of means-end scrutiny to as-applied challenges once it has been determined that the law in question burdens protected conduct. But when, as in these appeals, it comes to an as-applied challenge to a presumptively lawful regulation that *entirely bars* the challenger from exercising the core Second Amendment right, any resort to means-end scrutiny is inappropriate once it has been determined that the challenger’s circumstances distinguish him from the historical justifications supporting the regulation. This is because such laws are categorically invalid as applied to persons entitled to Second Amendment protection—a matter of scope.

This principle is based on *Heller* itself. That decision invalidated a municipal law that banned handgun possession in the home and required any lawful firearm to be kept disassembled and bound by a trigger lock at all times, rendering it inoperable.<sup>7</sup> *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 628. Especially significant for these appeals, the Court eschewed means-end scrutiny in assessing

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<sup>7</sup> *McDonald* involved a similar handgun ban, but the Court limited its analysis to the incorporation question and remanded the case. 561 U.S. at 791. The City of Chicago subsequently lifted the ban and replaced it with a less restrictive ordinance. See *Ezell*, 651 F.3d at 689.

the constitutionality of the ban. Because the law precluded individuals from possessing an important class of firearms in the home even for self-defense (the right at the “core” of the Second Amendment) and required that all firearms within the home be rendered inoperable, it was unconstitutional without regard to governmental interests supporting the law or their overall “fit” with the regulation. *See Heller*, 554 U.S. at 629-30.

*Heller*’s reasoning bears this out. Specifically, with respect to the District of Columbia’s requirement that all firearms in the home be “kept inoperable at all times,” the Court said: “[t]his makes it impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and *is hence unconstitutional.*” *Id.* at 630 (emphasis added). Conspicuously absent from the Court’s analysis is any mention of means-end scrutiny. Instead, the Court reasoned categorically: (1) the regulation entirely deprives protected persons from exercising the core of the Second Amendment right; (2) it’s therefore unconstitutional. The same went for the District of Columbia’s handgun ban. After concluding that the Second Amendment includes handguns, the Court didn’t mince words: “[w]hatever the reason, handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete prohibition of their use is *invalid.*” *Id.* at 629 (emphasis added). A nineteenth century authority quoted by the Supreme Court in the paragraph preceding this conclusion should eliminate any doubt regarding the Court’s categorical approach: “A statute which, under the pretence of regulating, *amounts to a destruction of the right*, or which requires arms to be so borne as to render them wholly useless for the pur-

pose of defence, would be *clearly unconstitutional*.” *Id.* (quoting *State v. Reid*, 1 Ala. 612, 616-617 (1840)) (emphases added); see also *Bliss v. Com.*, 12 Ky. 90, 91 (1822) (suggesting that a regulation that “import[s] an entire destruction of the right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the state” would be plainly unconstitutional). Hence, a law that burdens persons, arms, or conduct protected by the Second Amendment and that does so with the effect that the core of the right is eviscerated is unconstitutional.<sup>8</sup>

We are not the first to recognize this categorical rule. As the Seventh Circuit has explained, “[b]oth *Heller* and *McDonald* suggest that broadly prohibitory laws restricting the core Second Amendment right—like the handgun bans at issue in those cases, which prohibited handgun possession even in the home—are *categorically unconstitutional*.” *Ezell*, 651 F.3d at 703; see also Joseph Blocher, *Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis*, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 375, 380 (2009) (“Rather than adopting one of the First Amendment’s many Frankfurter-inspired balancing approaches, the majority endorsed a categorical test under which some types of ‘Arms’ and arms-usage are protected absolutely from bans and some types of ‘Arms’ and people are excluded entirely from constitutional coverage.”); *Heller v. D.C.*,

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<sup>8</sup> The *Heller* Court declined to detail which form of scrutiny might apply in cases involving less severe burdens on Second Amendment rights but cautioned that rational basis scrutiny would never apply. *Id.* at 629 n.27. “If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis,” the Court explained, “the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.” *Id.*

670 F.3d 1244, 1272-73 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“As to the ban on handguns[,] . . . the Supreme Court in *Heller* never asked whether the law was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest (strict scrutiny) or substantially related to an important government interest (intermediate scrutiny). If the Supreme Court had meant to adopt one of those tests, it could have said so in *Heller* and measured D.C.’s handgun ban against the relevant standard. But the Court did not do so; it instead determined that handguns had not traditionally been banned and were in common use—and thus that D.C.’s handgun ban was unconstitutional.”); *Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego*, 742 F.3d 1144, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he rare law that ‘destroys’ the [core Second Amendment] right” requires “*Heller*-style per se invalidation.”) (O’Scannlain, J.), *rev’d on reh’g en banc*, 2016 WL 3194315 (9th Cir. June 9, 2016).

Although we suspect that most firearm regulations probably will not trigger this categorical rule, § 922(g)(1) certainly does. As applied to someone who falls within the protective scope of the Second Amendment, § 922(g)(1) goes even further than the “severe restriction” struck down in *Heller*: it completely eviscerates the Second Amendment right.<sup>9</sup> *Cf. United*

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<sup>9</sup> The Government wrongly asserts that we have recognized that “even laws that actually burden Second Amendment rights must only have a ‘reasonable, not perfect,’ fit with an important government interest.” Gov’t Br. 26 (quoting *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 98). The Dissent agrees that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard here. *See* Dissent at 41-45. But *Marzzarella* applied intermediate scrutiny (before going on to apply strict scrutiny, just in case) because the law under attack did not even “come

*States v. McCane*, 573 F.3d 1037, 1049 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (recognizing that “the broad scope of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—which *permanently* disqualifies *all* felons from possessing firearms—would conflict with the ‘core’ self-defense right embodied in the Second Amendment” to the extent that its presumptive validity does not attach) (emphasis in original). Indeed, the Government’s contention that one can fall within the protective scope of the Second Amendment yet nevertheless be permanently deprived of the right transforms what it means to possess a “right.” Boiled down to its essence, the Government’s position goes something like this: “You have the right to keep and bear arms, but you may never exercise that right because we have supplied good reasons.” This understanding of the Second Amendment is too parsimonious a view of a constitutional right because a “right” that entitles its holder to nothing whatsoever “is no constitutional guarantee at all.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 634. When the Second Amendment applies, its core guarantee cannot be withdrawn by the legislature or balanced away by the courts.<sup>10</sup> Rather, “[t]he very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case

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close” to a ban on the possession of firearms in the home. *Marzarella*, 614 F.3d at 97.

<sup>10</sup> See *Crawford v. Washington*, 541 U.S. 36, 67-68 (2004) (“By replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to their design. Vague standards are manipulable . . .”).

basis whether the right is *really worth* insisting upon.”  
*Id.* at 634.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Judges Ambro and Fuentes deny that § 922(g)(1) eviscerates the right to keep and bear arms. In Judge Ambro’s view, because “persons convicted of disqualifying offenses may possess handguns if (1) their convictions are expunged or set aside, (2) they receive pardons, or (3) they have their civil rights restored,” the statute is akin to run-of-the-mill regulations imposing “preconditions” to firearm possession by individuals with Second Amendment rights, such as safety training requirements. Ambro Op. 17-18. Far from it. To begin with, the “only . . . option” available to Binderup and Suarez to satisfy the so-called “precondition” imposed by § 922(g)(1) is to receive pardons. *Id.* at 39. To frame this moon-shot as a mere condition precedent to arms possession not unlike a training-course requirement strains credulity. Section 922(g)(1) is a *ban* on firearms possession subject to a few statutory exceptions, not a mere regulatory proviso that simply conditions exercise of the right on the completion of a background check or safety class.

Indeed, *Heller* itself shows the “precondition” characterization of § 922(g)(1) to be unavailing. The handgun ban and disassembly ordinance struck down in that case likewise had exceptions that could be abstractly framed as “conditions precedent” to exercise of the Second Amendment right: the handgun ban was subject to an exception that the Chief of Police could issue one-year handgun licenses at his discretion and the disassembly ordinance allowed residents to keep lawful firearms in the home so long as they were rendered inoperable. *See Heller*, 554 U.S. at 574-75. But the Supreme Court did not understand the licensing exception as a condition precedent to handgun possession or the disassembly rule as a mere precondition on keeping firearms in the home; it viewed these carve-outs as “minor exceptions” and struck down both ordinances as unconstitutional destructions of the Second Amendment right. *Id.* at 575 n.1, 629-30. The Dissent’s retort that *Heller* is distinguishable because there the “core ‘right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home’” was implicated and here it is not because Binderup and Suarez’s misdemeanors place them outside of that class puts the rabbit in the hat. Dissent at 45 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635).

For the reasons stated, *Barton* alone provides the standard for an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to a presumptively lawful regulatory measure (like § 922(g)(1)) that denies a core Second Amendment right to a certain class of persons. And our opinion in that case explains the two things an individual must do to mount a successful as-applied challenge. First, he must identify the traditional justifications for excluding from Second Amendment protections the class of which he is a member. *See Barton*, 633 F.3d at 172. Only justifications with “historical pedigree” are relevant for regulations imposing a permanent disability. *Id.* Second, he must present facts about himself and his background that distinguish his circumstances from those of persons in the historically barred class. *Id.* at 174. These facts must speak to the traditional justifications that legitimize the class’s disability. In *Barton* we noted at least two ways of doing this: (1) “a felon convicted of a minor, non-violent crime might show that he is no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen,” or (2) “a court might find that a felon whose crime of conviction is decades-old poses no continuing threat to society.”<sup>12</sup> *Id.*

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If Binderup’s and Suarez’s offenses *are not* of the type that were historically understood to remove them from the class of persons entitled to Second Amendment rights, § 922(g)(1) effects the same type of untenable “conditions” that were deemed unconstitutional in *Heller*.

<sup>12</sup> Our colleagues reject *Barton*’s mention of the possibility that “the passage of time or evidence of rehabilitation [might] restore the Second Amendment rights of people who committed serious

This does not mean, of course, that a dispossessed individual can win an as-applied challenge by promising to behave well in the future.<sup>13</sup> Courts must dili-

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crimes.” Ambro Op. 26. We have not been presented with historical evidence one way or another whether this might be a route to restoration of the right to keep and bear arms in at least some cases, so we would leave for another day the determination whether that turns out to be the case.

<sup>13</sup> The Government’s and the Dissent’s repeated citations on this point to *Pontarelli v. U.S. Department of Treasury* are inapposite. That case involved an appropriations ban that suspended the ability of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) to consider petitions from convicted felons for restoration of their firearms privileges under 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), a statute that also gives federal district courts jurisdiction to review applications denied by ATF. 285 F.3d 216, 217 (3d Cir. 2002). We concluded that “because the appropriations ban suspends ATF’s ability to issue the ‘denial’ that § 925(c) makes a prerequisite, it effectively suspends that statute’s jurisdictional grant.” *Id.* Given that “[e]valuating a § 925(c) application requires a detailed investigation of the felon’s background and recent conduct,” which includes “interviewing a wide array of people, including the felon, his family, his friends, the persons whom he lists as character references, members of the community where he lives, his current and former employers, his coworkers, and his former parole officers,” we noted as a “[p]olicy [c]onsideration[]” that without prior ATF involvement and an adversarial process, “courts are without the tools necessary to conduct a systematic inquiry into an applicant’s background.” *Id.* If courts “reviewed applications *de novo*,” we reasoned, “they would be forced to rely primarily—if not exclusively—on information provided by the felon,” which “would be dangerously one-sided.” *Id.* (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Contrary to the Government’s and the Dissent’s characterizations, a constitutional inquiry into a presumptively lawful statute is distinct from the one-sided, fact-intensive inquiry that would have been called for were courts required to assess § 925(c) petitions in the first instance. Reviewing an as-applied constitutional challenge based on facts alleged by a challenger and weighing those facts against competing



gently inquire into the facts to determine whether a challenger has adequately distinguished his own circumstances from those of persons historically barred from Second Amendment protections. *Heller* and *Barton* place the burden on the challenger to rebut the presumptive lawfulness of § 922(g)(1). *See Barton*, 633 F.3d at 174. That’s no easy task. Government evidence regarding one’s criminal history will require the challenger to make a strong showing to distinguish himself from others with criminal records. But to deny one even the opportunity to “develop [a] factual basis” in support of his constitutional claim would run afoul of both Supreme Court guidance regarding the scope of the Second Amendment and the concept of an as-applied challenge. *Id.* at 174.

## II

### A

We agree with the District Courts that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to Binderup and Suarez. As far as the historical justification for felon dispossession goes, we explained it in *Barton*: the time-honored principle that the right to keep and bear arms does not extend to those likely to commit violent offenses. Because the Supreme Court declined to “expound upon the historical justifications” for the list of presumptively lawful firearm exclusions in *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26, 635—leaving that task to us—*Barton*’s rationale warrants further explication. As stated,

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evidence proffered by the Government is not only something courts are equipped to do, it is our constitutional duty. *See* U.S. Const. arts. III and VI, cl. 2; *Marbury v. Madison*, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).

*Heller* instructs that the public understanding of the scope of the right to keep and bear arms at the time of the Second Amendment's enactment dictates the scope of the right today. *Id.* at 605. In undertaking this inquiry, we are reminded that “[h]istorical analysis can be difficult; it sometimes requires resolving threshold questions, and making nuanced judgments about which evidence to consult and how to interpret it.” *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 803-04 (Scalia, J., concurring).

The most germane evidence available directly supports the conclusion that the founding generation did not understand the right to keep and bear arms to extend to certain categories of people deemed too dangerous to possess firearms. At the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, Constitutionists and other opponents of the Federalists proposed language stating that “no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them *unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals.*” The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania to their Constituents, *reprinted in* Bernard Schwartz, 2 *The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History* 662, 665 (1971) (emphasis added). Likewise, at the Massachusetts ratifying convention just months later, Samuel Adams offered a proposal that the “Constitution be never construed to authorize Congress . . . to prevent the people of the United States, *who are peaceable citizens*, from keeping their own arms.” *Journal of Convention: Wednesday February 6, 1788, reprinted in Debates and Proceedings in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Held in the Year 1788*, at 86 (Boston, William White 1856) (emphasis added). And the New Hampshire convention proposed that “Congress shall

never disarm any Citizen unless such as are or have been in Actual Rebellion.” Schwartz, 2 *The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History* at 761.

These proposals show that there was broad consensus between Federalists and their opponents on the existence and nature of the “natural right” to keep and bear arms for defensive purposes; what was controversial was whether the Constitution required a Bill of Rights to ensure the right to keep and bear arms (as so-called Anti-Federalists contended) or whether such an explicit guarantee was unnecessary in light of Congress’s limited delegated powers and might in fact backfire by minimizing other, unenumerated liberties (as Federalists argued). See Stephen P. Halbrook, *The Founders’ Second Amendment* 190-215 (surveying the debates at the ratifying conventions and highlighting the commonplace understanding that “dangerous persons could be disarmed”). Indeed, it is telling that in the crucibles of the ratifying conventions, such public declarations of the scope of the right to keep and bear arms did not provoke any apparent disagreement. See *id.* As we summarized in *Barton*, the “[d]ebates from the Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and New Hampshire ratifying conventions, which were considered ‘highly influential’ by the Supreme Court in *Heller* . . . confirm that the common law right to keep and bear arms did not extend to those who were likely to commit violent offenses.” 633 F.3d at 174. Hence, the best evidence we have indicates that the right to keep and bear arms was understood to exclude those who presented a danger to the public.

A number of firearms restrictions from the founding and pre-founding era support this conclusion.

Aside from “complete bans on gun ownership by free blacks, slaves, Native Americans, and those of mixed race” (each of which today would be plainly unconstitutional), the founding generation also disarmed those who refused to pledge their loyalty to the Revolution, state, or nation. Adam Winkler, *Heller’s Catch-22*, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 1551, 1562 (2009). As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “[a]lthough these Loyalists were neither criminals nor traitors, American legislators had determined that permitting these persons to keep and bear arms posed a potential danger.” *Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives*, 700 F.3d 185, 200 (5th Cir. 2012); see also *United States v. Carpio-Leon*, 701 F.3d 974, 980 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that Massachusetts required participants in Shays’ Rebellion to obtain a pardon for taking up arms against the state, to swear allegiance to the state, and to give up their firearms for three years). This principle had some roots in the English arms tradition, wherein the Crown had the authority “to disarm not only papists, but dangerous and disaffected persons as well.” Patrick J. Charles, “*Arms for Their Defence*?”: *An Historical, Legal, and Textual Analysis of the English Right to Have Arms and Whether the Second Amendment Should Be Incorporated in McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 57 Clev. St. L. Rev. 351, 382 (2009); cf. Robert H. Churchill, *Gun Regulation, the Police Power, and the Right to Keep Arms in Early America: The Legal Context of the Second Amendment*, 25 L. & Hist. Rev. 139, 164 (2007) (noting that although “English law supplied ample precedent” to disarm “‘dangerous’ citizens,” the power was rarely practiced by early American governments). In short, “from time immemorial, various jurisdictions recog-

nizing a right to arms have . . . taken the step of forbidding suspect groups from having arms,” and “American legislators at the time of the Bill of Rights seem to have been aware of this tradition.” Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, *Second Amendment Limitations and Criminological Considerations*, 60 *Hastings L.J.* 1339, 1360 (2009); *see also* Marshall, 32 *Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y* at 711-12 (examining later laws (upheld in courts) barring possession of firearms while intoxicated and possession of firearms by “tramps” (roaming beggars) and construing them in terms of the “present danger” of misconduct presented by such persons were they to carry firearms).

Although the debates from the ratifying conventions point strongly toward a limit on Second Amendment rights centered on dangerousness, dispossessory regulations enacted to that end were few and far between in the first century of our Republic. Consequently, some have reckoned that “[t]he historical evidence” regarding the scope of the Second Amendment “is inconclusive at best.” *United States v. Skoien*, 614 F.3d 638, 650 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting). We disagree. Even though “[t]he Founding generation had no laws . . . denying the right [to keep and bear arms] to people convicted of crimes,” Winkler, 56 *UCLA L. Rev.* at 1563, novelty does not mean unconstitutionality. After all, “[t]he paucity of eighteenth century gun control laws might have reflected a lack of political demand rather than constitutional limitations.” Nelson Lund, *The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence*, 56 *UCLA L. Rev.* 1343, 1354 (2009).

Thus, a common thread running through the words and actions of the Founders gives us a distinct principle to inform our understanding of the original public meaning of the text of the Second Amendment. See, e.g., Marshall, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 698 (“[A]ctual ‘longstanding’ precedent in America and pre-Founding England suggests that a firearms disability can be consistent with the Second Amendment to the extent that . . . its basis credibly indicates a present danger that one will misuse arms against others and the disability redresses that danger.”); *id.* at 727-28 (“[T]o the extent that one can distill any guidance from the English disability and the Revolutionary disarmament, it would seem at most to be that persons who by their actions—not just their thoughts—betray a likelihood of violence against the state may be disarmed.”); Stephen P. Halbrook, *What the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to ‘Bear Arms’*, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 151, 161 (1986) (concluding that “*violent criminals*, children, and those of unsound mind may be deprived of firearms” (emphasis added)). In sum, the historical record leads us to conclude that the public understanding of the scope of the Second Amendment was tethered to the principle that the Constitution permitted the dis-possession of persons who demonstrated that they would present a danger to the public if armed.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> In arguing generally that all persons with criminal records are not entitled to Second Amendment rights, the Government and the Dissent emphasize the fact that “[w]e as a society require persons convicted of crimes to forfeit any number of rights and privileges, including the right to sit on a jury, the right to hold elective office, and the right to vote.” Dissent at 2. But these forfeitable rights have different histories and different constitutional dimensions.

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Consider the right to vote, which like the right to keep and bear arms has been declared fundamental by the Supreme Court. See *Reynolds v. Sims*, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). Although the Supreme Court has concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause does not require states to advance a compelling interest before denying citizens who have been convicted of crimes the right to vote, *Richardson v. Ramirez*, 418 U.S. 24, 54 (1974), that result was demanded by the Constitution's text. Specifically, the Court relied on the "understanding of those who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, as reflected in [ ] express language" of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment that affirmatively contemplates criminal disenfranchisement, despite Section 1's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. *Id.* Accordingly, felons fall outside the scope of the fundamental right to vote. See *Wesley v. Collins*, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he right of felons to vote is not fundamental."). Probably due to the breadth of this exclusion from the right to vote, the Supreme Court has not indicated that a disenfranchised criminal might succeed in demonstrating that such disenfranchisement is unconstitutional as applied to him in light of the historical understanding of the right. Rather, a challenger's only option is to show that a particular disenfranchisement provision is either irrational or discriminatory. *Richardson*, 418 U.S. at 56; *Hunter v. Underwood*, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985). Thus, the scope of the right to vote is historically and textually distinct from the Second Amendment right.

Nor do limits on jury service or eligibility for public office offer any insight into the scope of the Second Amendment, not least because they are not fundamental rights. See *Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene Cnty.*, 396 U.S. 320, 332 (1970) ("The States remain free to confine the selection to citizens, to persons meeting specified qualifications of age and educational attainment, and to those possessing good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair character."); James M. Binnall, *Sixteen Million Angry Men: Reviving A Dead Doctrine to Challenge the Constitutionality of Excluding Felons from Jury Service*, 17 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 1, 3 (2009) ("The Supreme Court does not recognize the right to sit on a jury as fundamental."); *Lindsay v. Bowen*, 750 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting that there is no "fundamental right to run for public office"); U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. Const. amend. X.

Section 922(g)(1) sweeps much more broadly than this traditional ground for disarmament. *See Barton*, 633 F.3d at 173 (“Although 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) was meant to keep firearms out of the hands of presumptively risky people, Congress did not bar non-violent felons from possessing guns until 1961.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); *United States v. Booker*, 644 F.3d 12, 24 & n.14 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[I]n covering only those with a record of violent crime, § 922(g)(9) [(dispossession of domestic violence misdemeanants)] is arguably more consistent with the historical regulation of firearms than § 922(g)(1),” which “applies to all individuals convicted of a federal felony, thus encompassing individuals convicted of crimes as disparate as tax evasion and bank robbery. This breadth, and particularly the inclusion of nonviolent offenses, constitutes a significant departure from earlier understandings of a ‘felony.’ At common law, for example, ‘[o]nly the most serious crimes’ were considered to be felonies.” (internal citations omitted)); *supra* n.14. The upshot of all this is that the as-applied constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is tied to its historical justification: people who have demonstrated that they are likely to commit violent crimes have no constitutional right to keep and bear arms.<sup>15</sup>

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These defeasible civil rights cannot be invoked to justify disarming *Binderup* and *Suarez*. They are different rights, with different histories and scopes, subject to different constitutional analyses.

<sup>15</sup> This rationale is consonant with the governmental interest usually offered today as justification for dispossession: public safety. But the traditional principle that constrained the class of persons not entitled to keep and bear arms still governs. *See Heller*, 554 U.S. at 634-35 (“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the



## B

The Government’s divergent reading of the historical scope of the Second Amendment—also adopted in different ways by Judges Ambro and Fuentes—is unconvincing. Relying on the republican notion of “civic virtue,” the Government maintains that Binderup’s and Suarez’s misdemeanor convictions place them outside the class of “those members of the polity who were deemed capable of exercising [the right to keep and bear arms] in a virtuous manner.” Gov’t Suarez Br. 14 (quoting Saul Cornell, “*Don’t Know Much about History: The Current Crisis in Second Amendment Scholarship*,” 29 N. Ky. L. Rev. 657, 679 (2002)). To be sure, “[s]ome scholarship suggests that at the time of the nation’s founding, the right to bear arms was not understood to extend to those convicted of a felony, either because they were not believed to be among ‘the people’ whose right to bear arms was protected, or because they lacked the requisite ‘virtue’ necessary for firearm possession.” Alexander C. Barrett, Note, *Taking Aim at Felony Possession*, 93 B.U. L. Rev. 163, 194-95 & n.197 (2013) (citing Don B. Kates, Jr., *The Second Amendment: A Dialogue*, 49 L. & Contemp. Probs. 143, 146 (1986) (offering that the right to keep and bear arms was tied to the idea of the “virtuous citizen,” such that “the right to arms does not preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous (*i.e.*, criminals) or those who, like children or the mentally unbalanced, are deemed incapable of virtue”)); *see also* Don B. Kates, Jr. & Clayton E. Cramer, *Second Amendment Limita-*

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scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.”).

*tions and Criminological Considerations*, 60 *Hastings L.J.* 1339, 1360 (2009) (“[T]here is every reason to believe that the Founding Fathers would have deemed persons convicted of any of the common law felonies not to be among ‘the [virtuous] people’ to whom they were guaranteeing the right to arms.”) (alteration in original).

This “virtue” standard—especially in the pliable version articulated by the Government—is implausible because the “civic republican” view of the scope of the Second Amendment is wrong. Although courts, scholars, and litigants have cited this supposed limitation,<sup>16</sup> this virtuous-citizens-only conception of the

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<sup>16</sup> See, e.g., *United States v. Yancey*, 621 F.3d 681, 684-85 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (“Whatever the pedigree of the rule against even nonviolent felons possessing weapons . . . most scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the government could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens.’”) (cited in *Govt. Binderup Br. 13* and *Govt. Suarez Br. 13-14*); *United States v. Vongxay*, 594 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[W]e observe that most scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was ‘inextricably . . . tied to’ the concept of a ‘virtuous citizen[ry]’ that would protect society through ‘defensive use of arms against criminals, oppressive officials, and foreign enemies alike,’ and that ‘the right to bear arms does not preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous citizens (i.e. criminals).’ We recognize, however, that the historical question has not been definitively resolved.” (internal citations omitted)) (cited in *Govt. Binderup Br. 12-13* and *Govt. Suarez Br. 13-14*).

*Yancey* relies on a 19th century treatise by Thomas M. Cooley for the proposition that the Constitution “protect[s] rights for “the People” excluding, among others, “the idiot, the lunatic, and the felon.” 621 F.3d at 685 (citing Cooley, *A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations* 29 (Boston, Little Brown & Co. 1868)). But this interpretation of Cooley’s *Treatise* has been thoroughly debunked

right to keep and bear arms is closely associated with pre-*Heller* interpretations of the Second Amendment by proponents of the “sophisticated collective rights model” who *rejected* the view that the Amendment confers an individual right and instead characterized the right as a “civic right . . . exercised by citizens, not individuals . . . who act together in a collective manner, for a distinctly public purpose: participation in a well regulated militia.” Saul Cornell & Nathan DeDino, *A Well Regulated Right: The Early American Origins of Gun Control*, 73 *Fordham L. Rev.* 487, 491-92 (2004).<sup>17</sup>

Moreover, this supposed limitation on the Second Amendment stems from a misreading of an academic

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(and, indeed, already had been prior to *Yancey*’s publication). See Marshall, 32 *Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y* at 709-10 (“The . . . discussion in Cooley [cited for felon dispossession] . . . concerns classes excluded from *voting*. These included women and the property-less—both being citizens and protected by arms rights. When Cooley does address the right to keep and bear arms, one finds this: “[H]ow far it may be in the power of the legislature to regulate the right we shall not undertake to say. Happily there neither has been, nor, we may hope, is likely to be, much occasion for the examination of that question by the courts.”) (quoting Cooley, *Treatise* at 499 (Victor H. Lane ed., 7th ed. 1903)).

<sup>17</sup> Cf. *Parker v. District of Columbia*, 478 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007), *aff’d sub nom. Heller*, 554 U.S. 570 (rejecting the view that “the Second Amendment protects private possession of weapons *only* in connection with performance of *civic duties* as part of a well-regulated citizens militia organized for the security of a free state” (second emphasis added, internal quotation marks omitted)); David T. Hardy, 15 *Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J.* 1237, 1241-84 (2007) (reviewing Saul Cornell, *A Well-Regulated Militia: The Founding Fathers and the Origin of Gun Control in America* (2006)) (marshaling considerable historical evidence against Cornell’s “civic right only” approach).

debate about “ideological interpretation,” Cornell & DeDino, 73 *Fordham L. Rev.* at 528 n.29, the gist of which concerns the extent to which the Founders were civic republicans or libertarians as well as what bearing these ideologies might have had on how they understood the right to keep and bear arms. See Robert E. Shalhope, *The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment*, 69 *J. Am. Hist.* 599, 599-601 (1982) (the article that served as contemporary scholars’ principal source for the “virtuousness” limitation). Unfortunately, this literature sheds no light on “who” was thought to enjoy the right to keep and bear arms (at least, none beyond the now-settled individual-versus-collective right interpretation). Rather, it relates to the *rationale* for having a right to keep and bear arms in the first place. See *id.* at 606-07 (characterizing the right to keep and bear arms as one with both individual- and collective-right elements and claiming that the Founders’ unique blend of republicanism and libertarianism led them to “perceive[] a vital relationship between vigorous republican husbandmen and the possession of arms” and believe that a “man capable of defending himself with arms if necessary was prerequisite for maintaining the moral character to be a good republican”); Robert E. Shalhope, *The Armed Citizen in the Early Republic*, 49 *L. & Contemp. Probs.* 125, 132 (1986) (explaining that strains of civic republicanism in early-American culture viewed arms possession as critical to the virtue of the citizenry and the spirit of the state, but never characterizing the *possession* of virtue as a prerequisite to arms rights).

This literature does not help us identify the types of people who were not entitled to exercise Second

Amendment rights.<sup>18</sup> Contemporary advocates of a “virtuousness” limitation have projected that constraint onto the right to keep and bear arms based on the fact that the very *existence* of the right was informed by republican philosophical principles.<sup>19</sup> That is not enough. We have found no historical evidence on the public meaning of the right to keep and bear arms indicating that “virtuousness” was a limitation on one’s qualification for the right—contemporary insistence to the contrary falls somewhere between guesswork and *ipse dixit*.

Furthermore, it is hard to understand what the Government’s proposed “virtuousness” limitation would even require. The Government has offered no guidance in this regard, except to urge that we defer to legislative judgments about what sorts of offenses or characteristics render one insufficiently “virtuous” to enjoy a fundamental right. The Dissent and to a lesser extent Judge Ambro have accepted this approach. The legislative judgments set forth in the margin are

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<sup>18</sup> Not least because it rests largely on a theoretical foundation that the Supreme Court has twice now rejected. See *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 595; *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 767-68. And as at least one scholar has surmised: “[i]f the Second Amendment *does* provide a right to own guns for self-defense, republicanism cannot supply the intellectual foundation for it.” Williams, 101 Yale L.J. at 559 (emphasis added).

<sup>19</sup> One of the primary proponents of this school of thought has conceded that “[h]istorical scholarship has abandoned the notion that American political culture can be understood in terms of any single ideological tradition, and has embraced a more pluralistic conception of the intellectual world of the founders,” though he remains a devotee of the civic-virtue limitation. Cornell & DeDino, 73 Fordham L. Rev. at 492.

but a few illustrations of its deep flaws.<sup>20</sup> We doubt the Founders designed a fundamental constitutional

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<sup>20</sup> Were we to adopt the Government’s proposed standard, consider a few examples of offenses that would (and currently do) render one permanently disqualified from possessing firearms. In Arizona, simple possession of any amount of marijuana is a felony punishable by enough jail time that any conviction triggers § 922(g)(1). *See* Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3405. As the Government would have it, the last three Presidents of the United States would have been forever barred from possessing firearms had their youthful indiscretions been prosecuted in the Copper State. Or consider Michigan, which has a generous (10-cents-per-container) repayment policy for recyclable cans and bottles returned to the state—so long as the beverage containers were purchased *in state*. But one who returns out-of-state containers is subject to a felony count of beverage return of nonrefundable bottles punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment (thus disabling the conniving interstate recycler under § 922(g)(1)). *See* Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.574a(1)(d). This spells disqualification for Kramer, Newman, and at least one recent real-life offender. *See Seinfeld: The Bottle Deposit* (NBC television broadcast May 2, 1996); *Seinfeld-inspired ‘Michigan bottle deposit scam’ lands Kramer wannabe in hot water* (RT America Jun. 15, 2016), available at <https://www.rt.com/viral/346835-seinfeld-michigan-bottle-deposit/>. Finally, library theft in Pennsylvania constitutes a (federally disabling) misdemeanor of the first degree—punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment—if the value of the material is \$150 or more. 18 Pa. Stat. and Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3929.1. These examples illustrate the saliency of *Heller’s* admonition that “[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures . . . think that scope too broad.” 554 U.S. 634-35. We would contravene this instruction and set dangerous precedent for other constitutional rights were we to blithely accept that “[i]f the citizens of a particular state believe that a criminal offense is too minor to trigger disarmament, their remedy is to petition the state legislature to amend the law—not to seek redress in the federal courts.” Dissent at 61.

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The Government's theory is all the more questionable when analogized to other constitutional rights, such as the First Amendment's free-speech guarantee. Like limitations on the scope of the Second Amendment, the unprotected status of obscenity, fighting words, and the like is rooted in our history. See *R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn.*, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992). These free-speech exceptions mean that while Congress can sharply restrict speech that amounts to obscenity or fighting words as traditionally understood, it may not substantially redefine what *counts as* obscenity or fighting words in order to reach otherwise protected expression. See, e.g., *Speiser v. Randall*, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958) (“[T]he line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely drawn.”); *Cantwell v. Connecticut*, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (“[T]he power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom.”); *Gooding v. Wilson*, 405 U.S. 518, 521-25 (1972) (statute that state claimed would only reach “fighting words” was unconstitutionally overbroad where its terms criminalized expression that a listener would find merely offensive or insulting). For instance, it would be plainly unconstitutional for a legislature to redefine “obscenity” in order to capture expression that would otherwise escape the traditional scope of obscenity as defined by the Supreme Court. See *Janicki v. Pizza*, 722 F.2d 1274, 1276 (6th Cir. 1983); *Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal.*, 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002). In other words, the historical scope of the First Amendment—not Congress—determines the parameters of the right.

The import of this analogy for the Second Amendment is straightforward: although certain types of criminals are excluded from the right to keep and bear arms, this traditional limitation on the scope of the right may not be expanded by legislative fiat. To hold otherwise would treat the Second Amendment “as a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees.” *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 780 (plurality opinion). The historical record indicates that the right to keep and bear arms was publicly understood at the time of the Constitution's enactment to secure a broadly held natural right that did not extend to violent criminals. To redefine the type of

right to turn on such vagaries. Although it “befits a diverse nation of fifty sovereign States and countless municipalities . . . [that] gun regulation in the United States resembles a patchwork quilt that largely reflects local custom,” *Drake v. Filko*, 724 F.3d 426, 440 (3d Cir. 2013) (Hardiman, J., dissenting), to make an individual’s entitlement to the Second Amendment right itself turn on the predilections of the legislature governing his or her patch is deference the Constitution won’t bear. See *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 750 (holding that “the Second Amendment right is *fully* applicable to the States” (emphasis added)).

Even if we were to attempt to apply the notion of civic virtue to felon dispossession, it is doubtful the Government would prevail. Although felons at common law “were essentially stripped of property and other rights,” the term “felony” “applied only to a few very serious, very dangerous offenses such as murder, rape, arson, and robbery”—in other words, crimes closely associated with violence. *Kates & Cramer*, 60 *Hastings L.J.* at 1362. *But see* Marshall, 32 *Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y* at 715-16 (casting doubt on the claim that a felony conviction necessarily entailed permanent dispossession). Indeed, one of the scholars cited by the Government concludes that insofar as a statute

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“criminal” that would qualify for dispossession via a malleable “virtuousness” standard in order to capture former nonviolent misdemeanants who are in all other respects indistinguishable from normal, law-abiding citizens would be akin to redefining “fighting words” to encompass run-of-the-mill “trash talk.” The Constitution takes each of these temptations “off the table.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 636.



“would seek to bar arms possession by” persons who have been convicted of a nonviolent “felony” in the modern sense, “those laws would seem to be invalid.” Kates & Cramer, 60 Hastings L.J. at 1363. See Barrett, 93 B.U. L. Rev. at 196 (“[E]ven if some felons were historically understood to be barred from possessing firearms, the common law term ‘felony’ applied to only a few select categories of serious crimes at the time the Second Amendment was ratified, while in modern times, vast categories of ‘non-dangerous’ activities qualify as felonious.”); Marshall, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 729-30 (explaining that the first federal felony dispossession laws applied only to a core group of crimes including “murder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, aggravated assault . . . robbery, burglary, housebreaking, and attempt to commit any of these crimes”). And at least one of our sister courts faced with the virtuousness argument treated “virtue” as basically synonymous with “non-dangerous.” See *United States v. Rene E.*, 583 F.3d 8, 16 (1st Cir. 2009) (“To be sure, there is an ongoing debate among historians about the extent to which the right to bear arms in the founding period turned on concerns about the possessor’s ‘virtue,’ *i.e.*, on a legislative judgment that possession of firearms by a certain class of individuals would pose a *serious danger to the public.*” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, we reject the Government’s suggestion that Second Amendment protections are limited “to those members of the polity who were deemed capable of exercising [the right to keep and bear arms] in a virtuous manner.” Gov’t Suarez Br. 14.

All this means that Binderup and Suarez must distinguish themselves and their circumstances from those of persons not entitled to keep and bear arms because of their propensity for violence. And as the District Courts found, both men did so. Specifically, each is a misdemeanor convicted of a non-violent crime who has shown “that he is no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen.” *See Barton*, 633 F.3d at 174. While we agree with the Government that the felony-misdemeanor distinction is “minor and often arbitrary,” especially since “numerous misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous than many felonies,” Gov’t Binderup Br. 19 and Gov’t Suarez Br. 18 (quoting *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985)), that is beside the point here. Our focus must remain on the legitimate (*i.e.*, traditional) concern that justifies the dispossession of certain offenders: we cannot trust them not to commit violent crimes with firearms. The Government concedes that “the Supreme Court might find some felonies so tame and technical as to be insufficient to justify the ban,”<sup>21</sup> Gov’t Binderup Br. 15 and Gov’t Suarez Br. 15 (quoting *United States v. Torres-Rosario*, 658 F.3d 110, 113 (1st Cir. 2011)), but it insists that Binderup’s and Suarez’s misdemeanors do not qualify. We disagree.

For purposes of the traditional justifications animating § 922(g)(1), both Binderup’s corruption of minors offense and Suarez’s licensing violation were non-

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<sup>21</sup> The Dissent acknowledges this view, but expresses confidence that “institutional considerations” will prevent particularly absurd disarmaments. Dissent at 61. In our view, questionable disarmaments raise questions of constitutional law.

violent misdemeanors. In *Barton*, we described the violent crimes of the sort that motivated felon dispossession since 1938 in the following way: “For nearly a quarter century, § 922(g)(1) had a narrower basis for a disability, limited to those convicted of a ‘crime of violence.’ ‘Crimes of violence’ were commonly understood to include only those offenses ‘ordinarily committed with the aid of firearms.’” *Barton*, 633 F.3d at 173 (quoting Marshall, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 698, 702 (2009)) (some internal quotation marks omitted); see also *United States v. Chovan*, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that the “Federal Firearms Act of 1938 only restricted firearm possession for those individuals convicted of a ‘crime of violence,’ defined as ‘murder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, burglary, housebreaking, and certain forms of aggravated assault—assault with intent to kill, commit rape, or rob; assault with a dangerous weapon, or assault with intent to commit any offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year’”). Dispossession on the basis of a conviction for these sorts of crimes comports with the original public understanding of the scope of the right to keep and bear arms.

Neither Binderup’s improper relationship with an employee capable of consent nor Suarez’s possession of a handgun that he could have possessed lawfully had he acquired a license meets this description. Nor did their offenses involve any actual violent behavior. It is true that a small handful of States would classify Binderup’s offense as statutory rape<sup>22</sup> or sexual abuse.

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<sup>22</sup> As the District Court pointed out, however, Black’s Law Dictionary “defines ‘statutory rape’ as ‘[u]nlawful sexual intercourse with a person *under the age of consent* (as defined by statute), re-

And there are certainly circumstances in which an inappropriate and illegal relationship like Binderup's might involve implicit or genuine violence. Such facts would make his a much different case. But as the District Court explained:

There is simply nothing in the record here which would support a reasonable inference that [Binderup] used any violence, force, or threat of force to initiate or maintain the sexual relationship with his seventeen-year-old employee. Moreover, there is no record evidence present here which would support a reasonable inference that [he] was convicted of any crime of violence (or that he even engaged in any violent or threatening conduct) before or after his November 1997 conviction for [c]orruption of minors.

*Binderup*, 2014 WL 4764424, at \*22. Nor is there any “record evidence [that] supports a reasonable inference that he has a propensity to commit violent acts, sexual or otherwise.” *Id.* at \*23. In a real stretch, the Government likens Binderup's conduct to that which was felonized by a 1576 English statute that forbade “carnal[] knowl[edge]” of “any woman child under the age of ten years.” Gov't Binderup Br. 15-16 (quoting Mortimer Levine, *A More Than Ordinary Case of “Rape,” 13 and 14 Elizabeth I*, 7 *Am. J. Legal Hist.* 159, 163 (1963)). Deplorable as it was, however, Binderup's conduct involved a seventeen-year-old cap-

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ardless of whether it is against that person's will.” *Binderup v. Holder*, 2014 WL 4764424, at \*24 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2014) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1374 (9th ed. 2009)) (emphasis added).

able of consent,<sup>23</sup> was not subject to criminal sanction at the time of the founding, and—most importantly—did not involve violence, force, or threat of force.

The nonviolent nature of Suarez’s offense is evident as well. The Government’s unremarkable observation that Maryland’s licensing requirement relates to public safety does not make Suarez’s offense a violent crime. It neither involved the actual use or threatened use of force, nor was it “closely related to violent crime” in the way that drug trafficking and receiving stolen weapons are. See *Barton*, 633 F.3d at 174. *Heller* characterized the Second Amendment as guaranteeing “the right of *law-abiding, responsible* citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” 554 U.S. at 635 (emphasis added). The Government relies on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in *United States v. Pruess* to argue that Suarez’s violation of a lawful, well-established firearm regulation demonstrates that he is not a responsible, law-abiding citizen. That reliance is misplaced.

In *Pruess*, the Fourth Circuit rejected an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) by a felon whose disqualifying convictions related to his prior sales of illegal arms, concluding that Pruess could not “rebut the presumption of lawfulness of the felon-in-possession prohibition as applied to him.” 703 F.3d 242, 246 (4th Cir. 2012). Although Pruess, like Suarez, had committed regulatory violations, his circumstances were dissimilar from Suarez’s in every other way. For example, Pruess had committed “repeated violations of the firearms

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<sup>23</sup> Cf. *Commonwealth v. Hughlett*, 378 A.2d 326, 329 (Pa. Super. 1977) (noting that “[i]t is axiomatic that females under the age of 16 may not legally assent to sexual acts of . . . any kind”).

laws, leading to at least twenty prior convictions,” and admitted that although he “did not intend to use them for violence himself . . . he believed that [certain] weapons and ammunition underlying his convictions were stolen.” *Id.* His repeated dealings in stolen, illegal weapons—such as fully automatic AK-47’s and grenades—appropriately led the court to conclude that Pruess had committed acts “closely related to violent crime” and “flunk[ed] the ‘law-abiding responsible citizen’ requirement.” *Id.* at 244, 246. Suarez, by comparison, committed a nonviolent firearms licensing offense with respect to an otherwise lawful weapon decades ago, the circumstances of which were unassociated with violence.<sup>24</sup>

In addition to showing that neither their offenses nor the circumstances surrounding them involved any violence or threat of violence, Binderup and Suarez have also demonstrated that their subsequent behavior confirms their membership among the class of responsible, law-abiding citizens to whom Second Amendment protection extends. As the District Courts

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<sup>24</sup> A number of other cases have applied *Barton* in rejecting as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1). Like Pruess, the challengers in those cases have little in common with Suarez. See *United States v. Moore*, 666 F.3d 313, 319-20 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[T]hree prior felony convictions for common law robbery and two prior convictions for assault with a deadly weapon on a government official clearly demonstrate that [Moore] is far from a law-abiding, responsible citizen.”); *United States v. Smoot*, 690 F.3d 215, 221-22, 221 & n.8 (4th Cir. 2012) (32 arrests and 16 convictions for offenses such as assault of a police officer, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and destruction of property); *United States v. Woolsey*, 759 F.3d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 2014) (three prior felony convictions for aggravated assault and resisting arrest).

found, both men presented compelling evidence that they are responsible citizens, each with a job, a family, and a clean record since 1997 and 1998. Their home State has seen fit to reinstate their right to keep and bear arms. And though it's by no means dispositive in Suarez's case, the fact that the United States deems him upright enough to entrust him with the Nation's secrets is further evidence that he is a "typical law-abiding citizen." *Barton*, 633 F.3d at 174.

The Government has presented no evidence that either Binderup or Suarez has been, or would be, dangerous, violent, or irresponsible with firearms.<sup>25</sup> For all these reasons, the District Courts did not err when they found § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to Binderup and Suarez.

#### D

The Government cites a number of recidivism studies as a final justification for permanently disarming Binderup and Suarez. It notes that felons commit violent crimes more frequently than nonfelons. *See* Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, *Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994* at 6 (2002) (finding that, within a population of 234,358 federal inmates released in 1994, the rates of arrest for homicides were 53 times the national average). Relatedly, it highlights a 1994 study finding that approximately one in five offenders imprisoned for nonviolent crimes

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<sup>25</sup> To be sure, Suarez's 1998 DUI conviction was a dangerous act—but not in the sense of the traditional concerns motivating felon dispossession. *See, e.g., Begay v. United States*, 553 U.S. 137, 145 (2008) (holding that drunk driving is not a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act because it does not involve "purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct").

were rearrested for violent offenses within three years of their release. See Bureau of Justice Statistics Fact Sheet, *Profile of Nonviolent Offenders Exiting State Prisons*, tbl.11 (Oct. 2004), available at <http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pnoesp.pdf>. The Government's second piece of evidence is a study comparing denials of handgun purchases to convicted felons with successful purchases by persons arrested but not convicted of a felony. The study found that the "denial of handgun purchases is associated with a reduction in risk for later criminal activity of approximately 20% to 30%." Mona A. Wright et al., *Effectiveness of Denial of Handgun Purchase to Persons Believed to Be at High Risk for Firearm Violence*, 89 Am. J. of Pub. Health 88, 89 (1999).

Finally, with respect to Binderup, it notes that "[s]ex offenders" (which Binderup is not) "present a high risk of recidivism." Gov't Binderup Br. 28 (citing Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, *Recidivism Report*, 21 tbl. 12 (Feb. 8, 2013), available at <http://www.nationalcia.org/wp-content/uploads/2013-PA-DOC-Recidivism-Report.pdf>) (finding that 50 percent of persons convicted of *statutory rape* and 60.2 percent of those convicted of "[o]ther [s]exual [o]ffenses" were rearrested or reincarcerated within three years of release from Pennsylvania prison) and U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, *Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994*, 8 tbls.9, 15, available at <http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf> (finding a 41.4 percent rearrest rate among persons convicted for "other sexual assault"). And with respect to Suarez, the Government emphasizes that persons arrested for "weapons offenses" are rearrested at high rates within



a few years. Gov't Br. 30 & nn. 10-11 (citing studies). In addition, it relies upon a study indicating that California handgun purchasers in 1977 “who had prior convictions for nonviolent firearm-related offenses such as carrying concealed firearms in public, but none for violent offenses,” were over four times more likely to be charged with a later violent offense than a person with no criminal history. See Garen J. Wintemute et al., *Prior Misdemeanor Convictions as a Risk Factor for Later Violent and Firearm-Related Criminal Activity Among Authorized Purchasers of Handguns*, 280 Am. Med. Ass'n 2083, 2086 (1998).

The Government presents this evidence in its argument that § 922(g)(1) satisfies intermediate scrutiny as applied to Binderup and Suarez.<sup>26</sup> But as we have

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<sup>26</sup> Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Dissent agrees with the Government that—to the extent that Binderup and Suarez are protected by the Second Amendment—their permanent disarmament under § 922(g)(1) is a “‘reasonable fit’ to carry out the Government’s purpose[s].” Dissent at 65. Should we be incorrect that § 922(g)(1) is categorically unconstitutional as applied to challengers who fall within the protective scope of the Second Amendment, we find Judge Ambro’s analysis more persuasive. Of course, the gap between Judge Ambro’s and the Dissent’s applications of *Marzzarella’s* “step two” assessment in this case highlights our concern that such interest-balancing exercises are too malleable when it comes to laws that eviscerate fundamental rights. Indeed, we fear that the winners and losers of “heightened” scrutiny contests are increasingly reflective of what rights—enumerated or not—“scrutinizing” judges favor or disfavor. As a Ninth Circuit judge presciently noted: “Judges know very well how to read the Constitution broadly when they are sympathetic to the right being asserted . . . . When a particular right comports especially well with our notions of good social policy, we build magnificent legal edifices on elliptical constitutional phrases—or even the white spaces between lines of constitutional text. But . . . when we’re

explained, that inquiry is inappropriate in this case. Applying some form of means-end scrutiny in an as-applied challenge against an absolute ban—after it has already been established that the individual has a right to keep and bear arms—eviscerates that right via judicial interest balancing in direct contravention of *Heller*. See *McDonald*, 561 U.S. at 785 (“In *Heller* . . . we expressly rejected the argument that the scope of the Second Amendment right should be determined by judicial interest balancing.”). What matters, when it comes to a presumptively lawful regulation that eliminates the right to keep and bear arms, is whether *Binderup* and *Suarez* can distinguish themselves as responsible, law-abiding citizens in contrast to the class of persons historically understood to be excluded from Second Amendment protection.

Even if the Government’s generalized studies are recast as addressing the issue of scope,<sup>27</sup> they still fall short. Perhaps the Government might use statistics to demonstrate that persons who commit certain non-violent crimes have a high likelihood of violent recidivism, even decades later. But that conclusion would stretch the notion of “close association” and the historical roots of felon disarmament. Moreover, it would

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none too keen on a particular constitutional guarantee, we can be equally ingenious . . . .” *Silveira v. Lockyer*, 328 F.3d 567, 568 (9th Cir. 2003) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc of a panel decision adopting the “collective right” interpretation of the Second Amendment), *panel decision abrogated by Heller*, 554 U.S. 570.

<sup>27</sup> Judge Gardner astutely observed that “the contentions [that the Government] contend[s] these studies support are . . . pertinent to the analysis of [an] as-applied challenge under the *Barton* framework.” *Binderup*, 2014 WL 4764424, at \*26.

require untangling a number of complicating variables, such as the effects of incarceration. Recidivism studies of this type would be better suited to demonstrating a means-end fit for less restrictive firearm regulations on criminals otherwise protected by the Second Amendment (such as waiting periods or licensing requirements). Either way, the studies cited by the Government don't cut it.

First, Binderup and Suarez were not convicted of felonies and have never been incarcerated, which renders irrelevant most of the Government's studies. The Government argues that even criminals placed on probation rather than sent to prison have a heightened risk of recidivism. But the study it cites found that "[g]enerally, the risk of recidivism was highest during the first year after admission to probation," and that "[a]s released prisoners and probationers age, they tend to exhibit lower rates of recidivism." Iowa Div. of Crim. & Juvenile Justice Planning, *Recidivism Among Iowa Probationers*, at 2 (July 2005), available at <http://publications.iowa.gov/15032/> (last visited Sept. 3, 2016). Given Binderup's and Suarez's ages, the study cited by the Government would predict that they pose a negligible chance of being arrested for a violent crime and a zero percent chance of being arrested for a violent felony. *Id.* at 39-40. Second, the denial-of-handgun survey was restricted to felons with extensive criminal records and conceded not only that the "modest benefit" it observed "may reflect the fact that the members of both study groups had extensive criminal records and therefore were at high risk for later criminal activity," but also that "this study was too small to determine whether the differences occurred by chance." Wright et al., 89 Am. J. of Pub. Health at 89.

Finally, the Government's sex-offender recidivism evidence paints with too broad a brush. Binderup's misdemeanor was not classified as a sexual offense and did not trigger a duty to register as a sex offender. *Compare* 18 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 6301(a)(1)(i), *with* 18 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 3103-3144. The report does not appear to cover corruption-of-minors recidivists and lumps Binderup together with an amalgam of persons guilty of a broad range of unspecified sexual offenses. *See* U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, *Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994*, 8 tbls.9, 15. The same goes for the dated firearm-offense recidivism study the Government invokes against Suarez, which covers a wide, unspecified range of "nonviolent firearm-related offenses." Wintemute, 280 Am. Med. Ass'n at 2086. Common sense dictates that violent recidivism rates are different for drug dealers carrying unlicensed firearms to protect their turf and ordinary citizens carrying unlicensed firearms for self-defense (behavior that several states do not even criminalize). *See* GAO, *States' Laws and Requirements for Concealed Carry Permits Vary Across Nation* 8-9 (2012), available at <http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592552.pdf> (last visited Sept. 3, 2016).

Without more, the Government's studies don't support the application of § 922(g)(1) to Binderup and Suarez. Given the uncontroverted evidence they have presented distinguishing themselves from persons who are not entitled to keep and bear arms, the Government needs to offer more than regression analyses of recidivism (largely by felons who, unlike Binderup and Suarez, were incarcerated). An as-applied challenge ultimately rests on the question of whether "applica-

tion [of a statute] to a *particular person* under *particular circumstances* deprive[s] that person of a constitutional right.” *Marcavage*, 609 F.3d at 273 (emphases added). Binderup and Suarez have presented un rebutted evidence that their offenses were nonviolent and now decades old, and that they present no threat to society, which places them within the class persons who have a right to keep and bear arms. Accordingly, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to them.

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In the years since the Supreme Court’s decision in *Heller*, courts have had to wrestle with difficult Second Amendment questions. Although these questions can be challenging and the stakes high—the guarantee is one to deadly weapons, after all—it is no answer to say that legislatures “have near total control” over the right. Dissent at 61. That is not how constitutional rights work. Because their personal circumstances are distinguishable from those of the class of persons historically excluded from Second Amendment protections due to their propensity for violence, Daniel Binderup and Julio Suarez fall outside the proper scope of the felon dispossession statute. And their Second Amendment rights cannot be withdrawn merely because § 922(g)(1) broadly serves the public good. Where the Second Amendment’s guarantees apply, as they do for Binderup and Suarez, “certain policy choices” are “necessarily” taken “off the table.” *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 636. Forever prohibiting them from possessing any firearm is one of those policy choices.

FUENTES, *Circuit Judge*, concurring in part, dissenting in part, and dissenting from the judgments, with whom MCKEE, *Chief Judge*, and VANASKIE, SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, RESTREPO, and ROTH, *Circuit Judges*, join.

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The plaintiffs ask us to do something that no federal appellate court has done before: to hold that, even though they were both convicted of crimes punishable by multiple years in prison, Congress may not constitutionally prevent them from owning firearms. They ask us to do this notwithstanding a long tradition in this country of preventing criminals from owning guns, and despite the fact that the felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), has been in force for over half a century.<sup>1</sup> Most troubling of all, they ask us to saddle district court judges with a seemingly unending obligation to review as-applied challenges like theirs,

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<sup>1</sup> Section 922(g)(1) makes it “unlawful for any person . . . who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”

Under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), “[t]he term ‘crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year’ does not include . . . any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.” We therefore refer to § 922(g)(1) as the “felon-in-possession” ban. Courts commonly use this shorthand even though the statute itself does not use the term “felon,” and even though it includes within its scope certain individuals who committed offenses labeled as “misdemeanors.” *See, e.g., Logan v. United States*, 552 U.S. 23, 27 (2007).

even as they fail to provide us with any workable standards that would make such a regime administratively feasible or doctrinally coherent.

Judges Ambro and Hardiman believe that the Second Amendment requires us to sustain the plaintiffs' challenges, although they arrive at that conclusion along different routes and would shape our Second Amendment doctrine in divergent ways. By contrast, I would hold that the plaintiffs' as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) must fail. The Second Amendment, important as it may be, does not prevent Congress from deciding that convicted criminals should not have access to firearms. We as a society require persons convicted of crimes to forfeit any number of rights and privileges, including the right to sit on a jury, the right to hold elective office, and the right to vote.<sup>2</sup> However much the plaintiffs may see unfairness in the fact that their law-abiding peers can legally own firearms and they cannot, that disparity is a consequence of their own unlawful conduct. Because I believe that the Second Amendment permits Congress to disarm persons who commit serious crimes, and because § 922(g)(1) reasonably circumscribes what counts as such a crime, I would reject the plaintiffs' as-applied challenges and reverse the judgments of the District Courts.

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<sup>2</sup> Nothing herein should be interpreted as taking any position on the validity of statutes that deprive convicted felons of the right to vote. The issue of felon disenfranchisement is not presented here, and there may well be very different considerations that distinguish a felon's loss of the right to vote from the loss of the right to possess a gun.

What's more, even if we were to apply intermediate scrutiny to test the validity of § 922(g)(1), I would conclude that the statute is reasonably tailored to promote the substantial government interest of suppressing armed violence. Congress itself previously created and then defunded an administrative regime for providing individualized exceptions to the felon-in-possession ban.<sup>3</sup> When it terminated that program, it stated that the review of such applications was “a very difficult and subjective task which could have devastating consequences for innocent citizens if the wrong decision is made,”<sup>4</sup> and warned that “too many of these felons whose gun ownership rights were restored went on to commit violent crimes with firearms.”<sup>5</sup> These congressional judgments stand in stark contrast to the plaintiffs' arguments. Congress has already experimented with a system of what were, in effect, as-applied challenges and concluded that it was unworkable and dangerous.

I therefore concur with Judge Ambro's opinion in part, dissent from it in part, and dissent from the majority's decision to affirm the judgments of the District Courts.

**I. The Current State of the Law Regarding Challenges to § 922(g)(1)**

No federal appellate court has yet upheld a challenge, facial or as-applied, to the felon-in-possession statute. It may therefore be helpful to begin by summarizing the Supreme Court's limited guidance on this

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<sup>3</sup> See 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).

<sup>4</sup> S. Rep. No. 102-353, at 19 (1992).

<sup>5</sup> H.R. Rep. No. 104-183, at 15 (1995).



issue and to explore how our sister circuits have applied that guidance in the context of § 922(g)(1).

**A. The Meaning of *Heller***

The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”<sup>6</sup> The touchstone in any Second Amendment case is *District of Columbia v. Heller*,<sup>7</sup> the Supreme Court decision holding that the Second Amendment protects the “right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”<sup>8</sup> While *Heller* recognized an individual right to bear arms, it also explained that, “[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.”<sup>9</sup> The Court went on to provide us with important guidance about the Second Amendment’s scope:

[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.<sup>10</sup>

In a footnote, the Court described these laws collectively as “presumptively lawful regulatory measures,”

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<sup>6</sup> U.S. Const. amend. II.

<sup>7</sup> 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

<sup>8</sup> *Id.* at 635.

<sup>9</sup> *Id.* at 626.

<sup>10</sup> *Id.* at 626-27.

making clear that “[the] list does not purport to be exhaustive.”<sup>11</sup> The Court also stated that people have the right to keep a loaded firearm in their homes for self-defense, provided that they are “not disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights.”<sup>12</sup>

Two interpretive questions about *Heller* therefore arise again and again. First, what does it mean to say that the felon-in-possession ban is “presumptively lawful”? Second, what does it mean to say that a person may only possess a firearm if he or she has not been “disqualified from the exercise of Second Amendment rights”? As we shall see, our sister circuits have already done yeoman’s work exploring these questions and suggesting possible answers.

### **B. Four Circuits Have Rejected As-Applied Challenges Altogether**

Four circuits—the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh—have concluded that as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are not permissible, at least with respect to felons.

We begin with the Fifth Circuit, which held years before *Heller* that the Second Amendment protects an

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<sup>11</sup> *Id.* at 627 n.26. Elsewhere in the opinion, the Supreme Court described these regulations as “permissible” and as “exceptions” to the Second Amendment. *Id.* at 635. And two years later, in *McDonald v. City of Chicago*, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), without otherwise expounding on *Heller*’s delineation of the scope of the Second Amendment right, the Court recapitulated the list of “longstanding regulatory measures” in *Heller* and “repeat[ed] [*Heller*’s] assurances” that such laws were not “imperil[ed]” by the Second Amendment. *Id.* at 786.

<sup>12</sup> *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635.

individual right to bear arms.<sup>13</sup> In another pre-*Heller* case, *United States v. Everist*,<sup>14</sup> the Fifth Circuit held that the felon-in-possession ban was constitutional with respect to both violent and nonviolent offenders.<sup>15</sup> In the Fifth Circuit’s view, “[i]rrespective of whether his offense was violent in nature, a felon has shown manifest disregard for the rights of others” and “[h]e may not justly complain of the limitation on his liberty when his possession of firearms would otherwise threaten the security of his fellow citizens.”<sup>16</sup> The issue of the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) arose again after *Heller* in *United States v. Scroggins*.<sup>17</sup> The Fifth Circuit there said that nothing in *Heller* caused it to question its prior conclusion in *Everist* that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional even as applied to non-violent felons.<sup>18</sup>

The Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of as-applied challenges in *United States v. Vongxay*.<sup>19</sup> The defendant there raised both a facial and an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1). With respect to the defendant’s facial challenge, the Ninth Circuit concluded that

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<sup>13</sup> *United States v. Emerson*, 270 F.3d 203, 229 (5th Cir. 2001).

<sup>14</sup> 368 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 2004).

<sup>15</sup> *See id.* at 519 (“It is not inconsistent with the Second Amendment to limit the ability of convicted felons to keep and possess firearms.”).

<sup>16</sup> *Id.*

<sup>17</sup> 599 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2010).

<sup>18</sup> *Id.* at 451; *see also United States v. Anderson*, 559 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2009) (stating that “*Heller* provides no basis for reconsidering” whether § 922(g) is constitutional) (citing *United States v. Darrington*, 351 F.3d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Section 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment.”)).

<sup>19</sup> 594 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).

“[n]othing in *Heller* can be read legitimately to cast doubt on the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).”<sup>20</sup> With respect to the defendant’s as-applied challenge, *Vongxay* concluded that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional even as applied to non-violent felons. The Ninth Circuit articulated several rationales for this conclusion. First, it noted that the right to bear arms could be restricted at common law. Second, it observed “that to date no court that has examined *Heller* has found 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) constitutionally suspect.”<sup>21</sup> Third, it stated that “[d]enying felons the right to bear arms is . . . consistent with the explicit purpose of the Second Amendment to maintain ‘the security of a free State.’”<sup>22</sup> To that end, “[f]elons are often, and historically have been, explicitly prohibited from militia duty.”<sup>23</sup> Lastly, it stated that “most scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was ‘inextricably . . . tied to’ the concept of a ‘virtuous citizen[ry]’” and that “‘the right to bear arms does not preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous citizens,’” including criminals.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> *Id.* at 1114.

<sup>21</sup> *Id.* at 1117 (internal quotation marks omitted).

<sup>22</sup> *Id.* (quoting U.S. Const. amend. II).

<sup>23</sup> *Id.*

<sup>24</sup> *Id.* at 1118 (alteration in original) (quoting Don B. Kates, Jr., *The Second Amendment: A Dialogue*, 49 *Law & Contemp. Probs.* 143, 146 (1986)). As discussed *infra*, the strength of this historical interpretation has since been challenged by other scholars. See, e.g., Carlton F.W. Larson, *Four Exceptions in Search of a Theory: District of Columbia v. Heller and Judicial Ipse Dixit*, 60 *Hastings L.J.* 1371, 1374-75 (2009) (analyzing sources cited by earlier scholars); C. Kevin Marshall, *Why Can't Martha Stewart Have a Gun?*, 32 *Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y* 695, 714 (2009).

A recent Ninth Circuit decision, *United States v. Phillips*,<sup>25</sup> re-affirmed *Vongxay*, although with some skepticism. The defendant there argued that his prior criminal conviction could not support disarmament under § 922(g)(1) because his crime, which consisted of concealing an ongoing felony from federal officials, was “a non-violent, passive crime of inaction.”<sup>26</sup> The Ninth Circuit said that “there may be some good reasons to be skeptical about the correctness of the current framework of analyzing the Second Amendment rights of felons,”<sup>27</sup> but it nonetheless concluded that *Heller* and *Vongxay* foreclosed the defendant’s argument.<sup>28</sup>

The Tenth Circuit rejected a constitutional challenge to § 922(g)(1) in *United States v. McCane*.<sup>29</sup> It focused on the fact that the Supreme Court “explicitly stated in *Heller* that ‘nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the

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<sup>25</sup> --- F.3d ---, 2016 WL 3675450 (9th Cir. July 6, 2016).

<sup>26</sup> *Id.* at \*2 (internal quotation marks omitted).

<sup>27</sup> *Id.* at \*5.

<sup>28</sup> *Id.* at \*4 (“[A]ssuming the propriety of felon firearm bans—as we must under Supreme Court precedent and our own—there is little question that Phillips’s predicate conviction . . . can constitutionally serve as the basis for a felon ban.”); *see also Van Der Hule v. Holder*, 759 F.3d 1043, 1050-51 (9th Cir. 2014) (“We addressed whether § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment in [*Vongxay*] and determined that it did not.”). *But see United States v. Duckett*, 406 F. App’x 185, 187 (9th Cir. 2010) (Ikuta, J., concurring) (stating that it might be constitutionally problematic to prevent non-violent felons from possessing firearms).

<sup>29</sup> 573 F.3d 1037 (10th Cir. 2009).

possession of firearms by felons.”<sup>30</sup> While Judge Tymkovich complained in concurrence that “[t]he Court’s summary treatment of felon dispossession in dictum forecloses the possibility of a more sophisticated interpretation of § 922(g)(1)’s scope,”<sup>31</sup> the Tenth Circuit has not revisited the issue. To the contrary, it said in a later case that it had “already rejected the notion that *Heller* mandates an individualized inquiry concerning felons pursuant to § 922(g)(1).”<sup>32</sup>

Lastly, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in *United States v. Rozier*.<sup>33</sup> That opinion focused on the Supreme Court’s language in *Heller* regarding “disqualifi[cation] from the exercise of Second Amendment rights.”<sup>34</sup> Interpreting this language, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that one of *Heller*’s implied premises was that certain persons can be permissibly disqualified from exercising their Second Amendment rights altogether. The court went on to say that *Heller*’s list of “longstanding prohibitions” indicated that “statutes disqualifying felons from possessing a firearm *under any and all circumstances* do not offend the Second Amendment.”<sup>35</sup> As a result, it concluded that “statutory restrictions of firearm possession, such as § 922(g)(1), are a constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment right

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<sup>30</sup> *Id.* at 1047 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626).

<sup>31</sup> *Id.* at 1049.

<sup>32</sup> *In re United States*, 578 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009).

<sup>33</sup> 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010).

<sup>34</sup> *Id.* at 770 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635).

<sup>35</sup> *Id.* at 771 (emphasis added).

of certain classes of people,” and that “Rozier, by virtue of his felony conviction, falls within such a class.”<sup>36</sup>

**C. Three Circuits Are Wary of As-Applied Challenges**

The First Circuit has expressed skepticism about as-applied challenges to the federal firearms laws, although it has not foreclosed such challenges. In *United States v. Torres-Rosario*,<sup>37</sup> the First Circuit considered a defendant’s as-applied challenge to his conviction under § 922(g)(1). The defendant’s prior convictions were for possession with intent to distribute and distribution of controlled substances, and the court concluded that the defendant’s challenge failed because “drug dealing is notoriously linked to violence.”<sup>38</sup> In reaching that conclusion, the First Circuit stated that the “Supreme Court may be open to claims that some felonies do not indicate potential violence and cannot be the basis for applying a categorical ban,” and likewise “might even be open to highly fact-specific objections.”<sup>39</sup> Even so, the court observed that permitting “such an approach, applied to countless variations in individual circumstances, would obviously present serious problems of administration, consistency and fair warning.”<sup>40</sup> The First Circuit thus suggested that defendants could bring as-applied challenges, even while recognizing the difficulties that considering such challenges would create.

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<sup>36</sup> *Id.*

<sup>37</sup> 658 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 2011).

<sup>38</sup> *Id.* at 113.

<sup>39</sup> *Id.*

<sup>40</sup> *Id.*

The Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in *United States v. Bogle*.<sup>41</sup> It did not analyze the issue in great depth. Instead, it pointed to *Heller*'s language about “longstanding prohibitions” and “join[ed] every other circuit to consider the issue in affirming that § 922(g)(1) is a constitutional restriction on the Second Amendment rights of convicted felons.”<sup>42</sup> The court did not distinguish between facial and as-applied challenges.<sup>43</sup>

Meanwhile, the jurisprudence of the Sixth Circuit appears to be in flux. That court dealt with challenges to § 922(g)(1) in two non-precedential opinions. In one, *United States v. Frazier*,<sup>44</sup> the court rejected a challenge to § 922(g)(1) on the view that “congressional regulation of firearms [remained] constitutional” even post-*Heller*.<sup>45</sup> In another, *United States v. Khami*,<sup>46</sup> the court recognized the theoretical possibility of an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) but said that, on the facts before it, “[e]ven an as applied challenge would be difficult . . . to mount.”<sup>47</sup> A later precedential

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<sup>41</sup> 717 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2013).

<sup>42</sup> *Id.* at 281-82.

<sup>43</sup> *Bogle* did not raise an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) on the basis of the Second Amendment. Even so, the Second Circuit's broad language and its citations to numerous courts that have considered such challenges suggest that it intended to broadly approve restrictions on the Second Amendment rights of individuals who are not law-abiding.

<sup>44</sup> 314 F. App'x 801 (6th Cir. 2008).

<sup>45</sup> *Id.* at 807.

<sup>46</sup> 362 F. App'x 501 (6th Cir. 2010).

<sup>47</sup> *Id.* at 508.



opinion, *United States v. Carey*,<sup>48</sup> stated flatly that “prohibitions on felon possession of firearms do not violate the Second Amendment.”<sup>49</sup> And most recently, the Sixth Circuit has considered the issue of whether the federal statute making it unlawful to possess a firearm after having been committed to a mental institution, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4), permits as-applied challenges. That issue, which raises a doctrinal conundrum similar to the one we confront here, has also triggered *en banc* review.<sup>50</sup>

#### D. Four Circuits Permit As-Applied Challenges

The Fourth,<sup>51</sup> Seventh,<sup>52</sup> Eighth,<sup>53</sup> and D.C. Circuits<sup>54</sup> have left the door open to a successful as-

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<sup>48</sup> 602 F.3d 738 (6th Cir. 2010).

<sup>49</sup> *Id.* at 741.

<sup>50</sup> *Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t*, 775 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 2014), *reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated* (Apr. 21, 2015).

<sup>51</sup> *United States v. Moore*, 666 F.3d 313, 320 (4th Cir. 2012) (“We do not foreclose the possibility that a case might exist in which an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) could succeed.”).

<sup>52</sup> *Baer v. Lynch*, 636 F. App’x 695, 698 (7th Cir. 2016) (“We have not decided if felons historically were outside the scope of the Second Amendment’s protection and instead have focused on whether § 922(g)(1) survives intermediate scrutiny. As to violent felons, the statute does survive intermediate scrutiny, we have concluded, because the prohibition on gun possession is substantially related to the government’s interest in keeping those most likely to misuse firearms from obtaining them.” (internal citations omitted)); *United States v. Williams*, 616 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2010) (“*Heller* referred to felon disarmament bans only as ‘presumptively lawful,’ which, by implication, means that there must exist the possibility that the ban could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied challenge.”).

<sup>53</sup> *United States v. Woolsey*, 759 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2014).

applied challenge. Even so, none of these courts has yet upheld one.

In many instances, these courts have also narrowed the universe of as-applied challenges that are permissible. The Fourth Circuit, which has repeatedly said that it might affirm an as-applied challenge in the right circumstances, has rejected the proposition that Congress may disarm only persons who commit violent crimes. In *United States v. Pruess*,<sup>55</sup> the court considered a challenge to § 922(g)(1) brought by a firearms dealer and collector who also had over twenty prior convictions for failing to comply with various gun laws, although none of those convictions were for violent crime. *Pruess* held “that application of the felon-in-possession prohibition to allegedly non-violent felons . . . does not violate the Second Amendment.”<sup>56</sup>

There is also some ambiguity in the jurisprudence of the Eighth Circuit. That court upheld the facial constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) in *United States v. Seay*.<sup>57</sup> It also addressed as-applied challenges to

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<sup>54</sup> *Schrader v. Holder*, 704 F.3d 980, 991-92 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (rejecting as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) brought by common-law misdemeanants as a class).

<sup>55</sup> 703 F.3d 242 (4th Cir. 2012).

<sup>56</sup> *Id.* at 247.

<sup>57</sup> 620 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2010). *Seay* technically addressed § 922(g)(3), which prohibits gun possession by drug users. In reviewing the Eighth Circuit’s precedents, *Seay* stated that a prior non-precedential opinion upholding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) was correct. *See id.* at 924 (citing *United States v. Irish*, 285 F. App’x 326 (8th Cir. 2008)). The Eighth Circuit rejected a facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) a second time in *United States v. Joos*, 638 F.3d 581, 586 (8th Cir. 2011).

§ 922(g)(1) in *United States v. Woolsey*,<sup>58</sup> where it cited one of its prior non-precedential opinions, *United States v. Brown*,<sup>59</sup> that in turn relied on our decision in *United States v. Barton*.<sup>60</sup> Following *Barton*'s logic, *Woolsey* rejected a defendant's as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) because he had not "presented 'facts about himself and his background that distinguish his circumstances from those of persons historically barred from Second Amendment protections.'"<sup>61</sup>

Even so, another Eighth Circuit decision, *United States v. Bena*,<sup>62</sup> suggests that as-applied challenges might rest on shaky ground. *Bena* involved a facial challenge to § 922(g)(8), which bars possession of firearms by those subject to a restraining order. In addressing that challenge, *Bena* stated that the *Heller*'s list of "longstanding prohibitions" suggested that the Supreme Court "viewed [those] regulatory measures . . . as presumptively lawful because they do not infringe on the Second Amendment right."<sup>63</sup> In support of that conclusion, the court cited our own analysis in *United States v. Marzzarella*.<sup>64</sup> The Eighth Circuit also pointed to the fact that, as a historical matter, several states viewed the right to bear arms as limited to peaceable, responsible citizens. The court expressly declined to consider the question of "whether § 922(g)(8) would be constitutional as applied to a

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<sup>58</sup> 759 F.3d 905.

<sup>59</sup> *Id.* at 909 (citing *Brown*, 436 F. App'x 725 (8th Cir. 2011)).

<sup>60</sup> 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011).

<sup>61</sup> *Woolsey*, 759 F.3d at 909 (quoting *Brown*, 436 F. App'x at 726).

<sup>62</sup> 664 F.3d 1180 (8th Cir. 2011).

<sup>63</sup> *Id.* at 1183.

<sup>64</sup> 614 F.3d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 2010).

person who is subject to an order that was entered without evidence of dangerousness.”<sup>65</sup>

Meanwhile, the D.C. Circuit considered the issue of as-applied challenges in *Schrader v. Holder*.<sup>66</sup> In that case, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had brought, at most, a challenge to § 922(g)(1) “as applied to common-law misdemeanants as a class,” not as applied to Schrader individually.<sup>67</sup> The court easily rejected that challenge. It stated that the “plaintiffs [had] offered no evidence that individuals convicted of [common-law misdemeanors] pose an insignificant risk of future armed violence.”<sup>68</sup> It also adopted the view that even if “*some* common-law misdemeanants . . . may well present no such risk . . . ‘Congress is not limited to case-by-case exclusions of persons who have been shown to be untrustworthy with weapons, nor need these limits be established by evidence presented in court.’”<sup>69</sup>

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As this survey of cases demonstrates, federal judges face an almost complete absence of guidance from the Supreme Court about the scope of the Second

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<sup>65</sup> *Bena*, 664 F.3d at 1185.

<sup>66</sup> 704 F.3d 980 (D. C. Cir. 2013).

<sup>67</sup> *Id.* at 991.

<sup>68</sup> *Id.* at 990.

<sup>69</sup> *Id.* at 990-91 (quoting *United States v. Skoien*, 614 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc)) (emphasis in original). *Schrader* suggested that, had the plaintiffs properly raised an as-applied challenge by arguing “that the statute is invalid as applied to Schrader specifically,” then “*Heller* might well dictate a different outcome” than the decision the court reached with respect to the class-wide challenge. *Id.* at 991.

Amendment right. Even so, only four of our sister courts have clearly stated that as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are even permissible. In taking the further step of upholding such a challenge, we stand entirely alone.

With this background in mind, it is possible to explain where I agree—and disagree—with my colleagues.<sup>70</sup>

## II. *Marzzarella* Step-One and Exclusions from the Second Amendment Right

Our decision in *Marzzarella* establishes a two-step test for assessing challenges to the constitutionality of statutes under the Second Amendment:

First, we ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee. If it does not, our inquiry is complete. If it does, we evaluate the law under some form of means-end scrutiny. If

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<sup>70</sup> As an initial matter, I agree with both Judge Ambro and Judge Hardiman that the plaintiffs’ statutory arguments are unavailing. The two statutory provisions here are straightforward: § 922(g)(1) makes it unlawful for anyone to possess a firearm after having been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison, and § 921(a)(20)(B) removes from that prohibition persons convicted of misdemeanors with a maximum punishment of two years or less.

In other words, the only persons subject to § 922(g)(1) are (i) felons and (ii) misdemeanants whose crimes are punishable by more than two years in prison. I therefore join Parts I and II of Judge Ambro’s opinion.

the law passes muster under that standard, it is constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid.<sup>71</sup>

I agree with Judge Ambro that *Marzzarella* provides the correct framework for assessing challenges to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). I also agree with him that, at *Marzzarella* step-one, persons who commit serious crimes are disqualified from asserting their Second Amendment rights.<sup>72</sup>

Unfortunately, Judge Ambro and I disagree over how to decide whether any *particular* crime is serious enough to cause a loss of firearm rights. Judge Ambro believes that the category of “serious crime” is amorphous. While some crimes may be serious by definition, including those in which the actual or attempted use of violence is an element of the offense,<sup>73</sup> other crimes may be serious—or not—depending on the circumstances. In Judge Ambro’s view, the seriousness inquiry therefore requires district courts to engage in person-specific assessments based on the facts of any particular case. By contrast, I would hold that *Heller* itself tells us that felons are disqualified from exercising their Second Amendment rights.

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<sup>71</sup> *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 89 (internal citation and footnote omitted).

<sup>72</sup> Accordingly, I join Parts III.A, III.B, III.C.1, III.C.2, and III.C.3.a of Judge Ambro’s opinion in their entirety. I would also vote to overrule *Barton*, at least insofar as it states that as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are permissible as that statute is currently codified. In my view, they are not.

Chief Judge McKee, Judge Shwartz, and Judge Restrepo join only Parts I and II of Judge Ambro’s opinion. (*See* Ambro Op. Typescript at 6-7 n.1.)

<sup>73</sup> *See* Ambro Op. Typescript at 24, 31.

Because there is no principled basis, at least in this context, for distinguishing felons from misdemeanants who commit crimes punishable by more than two years in prison, all crimes currently within § 922(g)(1)'s scope are serious by definition. I would therefore hold that the plaintiffs' challenges fail at *Marzzarella* step-one, full stop.

**A. Congress May Permissibly Disarm Felons at *Marzzarella* Step-One**

In applying step-one of the *Marzzarella* analysis, we ask whether § 922(g)(1) burdens any Second Amendment right. At least as to the prohibition on felons possessing firearms, *Heller* and *Marzzarella* answer that question directly.

The *Heller* Court was careful to tell us that “nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.”<sup>74</sup> It also referred to the felon-in-possession ban as one of several “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.”<sup>75</sup> In *Marzzarella*, we concluded that the “better reading” of *Heller* was that these measures were complete “*exceptions* to the right to bear arms.”<sup>76</sup> On this view, felons do not simply have narrower Second Amendment rights than their law-abiding counterparts; they “are disqualified from exercising their Second Amendment rights” altogether.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> 554 U.S. at 626.

<sup>75</sup> *Id.* at 627 n.26.

<sup>76</sup> 614 F.3d at 91 (emphasis added).

<sup>77</sup> *Id.* at 91-92; see also Jeff Golimowski, Note, *Pulling the Trigger: Evaluating Criminal Gun Laws in a Post-Heller World*, 49 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1599, 1616 (2012) (contending that felons forfeit

While felons certainly have an interest in using firearms “for defense of hearth and home,” *Marzzarella* stated that “a felony conviction disqualifies an individual from asserting that interest.”<sup>78</sup>

At the time *Marzzarella* came down, this reading of *Heller* was in accord with the views of several of our sister courts.<sup>79</sup> Other circuits have since adopted the same position,<sup>80</sup> and we ourselves have recommitted to it.<sup>81</sup>

Apart from the text of *Heller* itself, history and tradition also support *Marzzarella*’s conclusion that the felon-in-possession ban is a permissible exclusion from the Second Amendment right. Without “engaging in a round of full-blown historical analysis,”<sup>82</sup> it suffices for now to say that numerous courts have reviewed the historical record and concluded that Founding-era

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Second Amendment rights through affirmative decisions to violate the social contract).

<sup>78</sup> 614 F.3d at 92.

<sup>79</sup> See *Rozier*, 598 F.3d at 770-71 (“Prior to taking into account Rozier’s purpose for possessing the handgun, we must determine whether he is qualified to possess a handgun.”); *Vongxay*, 594 F.3d at 1113 (“[F]elons are categorically different from the individuals who have a fundamental right to bear arms, and Vongxay’s reliance on *Heller* is misplaced.” (footnote omitted)).

<sup>80</sup> See, e.g., *Bena*, 664 F.3d at 1183 (“It seems most likely that the Supreme Court viewed the regulatory measures listed in *Heller* as presumptively lawful because they do not infringe on the Second Amendment right.”).

<sup>81</sup> See *Drake v. Filko*, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013) (reiterating that “certain longstanding regulations are ‘exceptions’ to the right to keep and bear arms, such that the conduct they regulate is not within the scope of the Second Amendment”).

<sup>82</sup> *Id.*



sources support the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) even as applied to non-violent felons.<sup>83</sup>

With respect to the Founding generation, the Eighth Circuit points us to Blackstone, who “explained that English subjects enjoyed a right to have arms for their defense, ‘suitable to their condition and degree’ and ‘under due restrictions.’”<sup>84</sup> As to the Founders themselves, several judges—including Judge Hardiman—have recounted how “[s]hortly after the Pennsylvania ratifying convention for the original Constitution . . . the Anti-Federalist minority recommended the following amendment: ‘That the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and their own state, or the United States . . . and no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals.’”<sup>85</sup> *Heller* identified this

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<sup>83</sup> See, e.g., *Bena*, 664 F.3d at 1183 (“Scholarship suggests historical support for a common-law tradition that permits restrictions directed at citizens who are not law-abiding and responsible.”); *Vongxay*, 594 F.3d at 1113 (“[M]ost scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms ‘was . . . inextricably tied to’ the concept of ‘virtuous citizen[ry]’ . . . .” (all alternations except first in original) (quoting *Kates*, *supra* note 24)); *Emerson*, 270 F.3d at 226 n.21 (citing sources for the proposition that “the Second Amendment does not prohibit legislation such as [the felon-in-possession ban]”).

<sup>84</sup> *Bena*, 664 F.3d at 1183 (quoting 1 William Blackstone, *Commentaries* 139).

<sup>85</sup> *Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives*, 700 F.3d 185, 201 (5th Cir. 2012) (emphasis removed) (quoting Saul Cornell, *Commonplace or Anachronism: The Standard Model, the Second Amendment, and the Problem of History in Contemporary Constitutional Theory*,

proposal as a “precursor” that was “highly influential” to the ratification of the Second Amendment.<sup>86</sup>

The Seventh Circuit has also done helpful work mining the historical sources. Sitting *en banc*, the court highlighted the fact that, during the Founding era, “[m]any of the states, whose own constitutions entitled their citizens to be armed, did not extend this right to persons convicted of crime.”<sup>87</sup> In *United States v. Yancey*,<sup>88</sup> the court stated that “[w]hatever the pedigree of the rule against even nonviolent felons possessing weapons . . . most scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was tied to the concept of a virtuous citizenry and that, accordingly, the government could disarm ‘unvirtuous citizens.’”<sup>89</sup> *Yancey* also noted that, “while felon-in-possession laws could be criticized as ‘wildly overinclusive’ for encompassing nonviolent offenders, every state court in the modern era to consider the propriety of disarming felons under analogous state constitutional provisions has concluded that step to be permissible.”<sup>90</sup>

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16 Const. Comment. 221, 233 (1999)); *see also* Hardiman Op. Type-script at 24 (discussing the same proposal).

<sup>86</sup> 554 U.S. at 604.

<sup>87</sup> *Skoien*, 614 F.3d at 640 (citing Stephen P. Halbrook, *The Founders’ Second Amendment* 273 (2008); Marshall, *Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?*, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y at 700-13).

<sup>88</sup> 621 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 2010).

<sup>89</sup> *Id.* at 684-85 (considering a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which makes it unlawful to possess firearms as a person who is “an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance”).

<sup>90</sup> *Id.* at 685 (quoting Adam Winkler, *Scrutinizing the Second Amendment*, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 683, 721 (2007)).

The federal statutory ban on convicts possessing firearms itself has a lengthy pedigree. In 1932, Congress passed a law imposing restrictions on the possession of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, and certain other weapons in the District of Columbia.<sup>91</sup> That law also made it illegal for any “person who has been convicted in the District of Columbia or elsewhere of a crime of violence [to] own or have in his possession a pistol, within the District of Columbia.”<sup>92</sup> In 1938, Congress passed a broader statute—the Federal Firearms Act—that made it unlawful for those who had been convicted of a “crime of violence” to “receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”<sup>93</sup> Congress removed the “crime of violence” limitation in 1961<sup>94</sup> and “changed the ‘receipt’ element of the 1938 law to ‘possession’ [in 1968], giving § 922(g)(1) its current form.”<sup>95</sup> The stated purpose of the 1968 revision was “to curb crime by keeping ‘firearms out of the hands of those not legally entitled to

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<sup>91</sup> Act of July 8, 1932, ch. 465, § 14, 47 Stat. 650, 654.

<sup>92</sup> *Id.* § 3, 47 Stat. at 651. The 1932 Act defined a “crime of violence” as “[m]urder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem, maliciously disfiguring another, abduction, kidnaping, burglary, housebreaking, larceny, any assault with intent to kill, commit rape, or robbery, assault with a dangerous weapon, or assault with intent to commit any offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary,” or “an attempt to commit any of the same.” *Id.* § 1, 47 Stat. at 650.

<sup>93</sup> Act of June 30, 1938, ch. 850, §§ 1(6), 2(f), 52 Stat. 1250, 1250-51.

<sup>94</sup> Act of Oct. 3, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-342, 75 Stat. 757.

<sup>95</sup> *Skoien*, 614 F.3d at 640 (statutory citation truncated).

possess them because of age, criminal background, or incompetency.’’<sup>96</sup>

The development of § 922(g) also evinces Congress’s desire to keep guns away from persons other than those whose past unlawful conduct indicates a likelihood of future dangerousness. The current iteration of § 922(g) prohibits nine groups of persons from possessing guns, including fugitives, drug addicts, persons previously committed to mental institutions, persons under a court order for threatening a partner or child, and persons with misdemeanor convictions for crimes of domestic violence. The other prohibitions of § 922(g), however, rest on a slightly different rationale. In 1968, Congress expanded what is now § 922(g) to cover undocumented or non-immigrant aliens, persons dishonorably discharged from the military, and persons who have renounced their U.S. citizenship. These additions, which were “enacted in response to the wave of political and civil rights assassinations during the 1960s,”<sup>97</sup> reflected Congress’s judgment that persons within these categories “may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society.”<sup>98</sup> Rather than disarm persons based on a rigid link between past violent acts and future dangerousness, these restrictions—consistent with the tradition at the Founding of tying gun rights to civic

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<sup>96</sup> *Huddleston v. United States*, 415 U.S. 814, 824 (1974) (quoting S. Rep. No. 90-1501, at 22 (1968)).

<sup>97</sup> *United States v. Toner*, 728 F.2d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 1984).

<sup>98</sup> *Scarborough v. United States*, 431 U.S. 563, 572 (1977) (quoting 114 Cong. Rec. 14,773 (1968)); see also *Stevens v. United States*, 440 F.2d 144, 146-49, 152-70 (6th Cir. 1971) (recounting the relevant legislative history).

virtue—disarm groups whose members Congress believes are unable or unwilling to conduct themselves in conformity with the responsibilities of citizenship.<sup>99</sup>

To be fair, one might quibble with this kind of historical explanation for § 922(g)(1)’s scope. With regard to the statute itself, one might ask if 50 years is a long enough period of time to entrench a constitutional tradition—although several courts have said as much when assessing Second Amendment challenges.<sup>100</sup> And with respect to Founding-era sources, some judges have expressed the view that the historical record is too infirm a platform on which to rest hard-and-fast decisions about the scope of the Second Amendment right.<sup>101</sup> Our Court’s multiple opinions in this case

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<sup>99</sup> I note that permitting plaintiffs to bring as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) opens the door to similar challenges under these other provisions. For example, once a plaintiff can challenge application of the felon-in-possession ban on the ground that his or her prior crime does not indicate a likelihood of future dangerousness, the next case might involve an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(6), the provision concerning dishonorable discharge from the Armed Forces, for the same reason.

<sup>100</sup> See, e.g., *Pruess*, 703 F.3d at 245 n.1 (rejecting the argument that the ban on non-violent felons possessing firearms is not “long-standing,” since it has been in place “for more than half a century”).

<sup>101</sup> See, e.g., *United States v. Chester*, 628 F.3d 673, 680-81 (4th Cir. 2010) (stating that the relevant historical scholarship is, at best, “not conclusive” as to how the Founding generation treated felon dispossession); *Skoien*, 614 F.3d at 650 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“[S]cholars disagree about the extent to which *felons*—let alone misdemeanants—were considered excluded from the right to bear arms during the founding era.”); *McCane*, 573 F.3d at 1048 (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (“But more recent authorities have *not* found evidence of longstanding dispossession laws. On the contrary, a number have specifically argued such laws did not exist

illustrate just how contested Founding-era historiography can be.

Even so, my review of the relevant history leads me to conclude that § 922(g)(1)'s categorical ban on felons possessing firearms is rooted deeply enough in our tradition to operate as a *bona fide* disqualification from the Second Amendment right.

**B. Misdemeanors Within § 922(g)(1)'s Scope Are Functionally Felonies**

Having established that felons are categorically disqualified from asserting their Second Amendment rights, the next question is whether misdemeanants, like the plaintiffs, are situated differently. The plaintiffs insist that they are. In their view, “[w]hen *Heller* spoke of ‘felons,’ it spoke of a traditional common-law classification known to the Framers, not a late-twentieth century statute including some vast (if disputed) number of misdemeanor offenses.”<sup>102</sup> Judge Ambro is sympathetic to that notion.<sup>103</sup> I am not.

As an initial matter, nothing in *Heller* suggests that the felony-misdemeanor distinction is a meaningful one. It is true, of course, that *Heller*'s list of “presumptively lawful regulatory measures” includes “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.”<sup>104</sup> One could perhaps read those

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and have questioned the sources relied upon by the earlier authorities.”).

<sup>102</sup> Binderup Br. at 55-56.

<sup>103</sup> See, e.g., Ambro Op. Typescript at 30-31 (“Congress may not overlook entirely the misdemeanor label, which, in the Second Amendment context, is also important.”).

<sup>104</sup> 554 U.S. at 626-27 & n.26.

words and conclude that the Supreme Court was purposefully placing felons—and only felons—in the category of persons who may be permissibly disqualified from the exercise of their Second Amendment rights. Still, one could just as easily conclude that the Court was using shorthand to refer to § 922(g)(1) as a whole. After all, the Court was careful elsewhere in *Heller* to say that the Second Amendment protects “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”<sup>105</sup> Neither felons nor misdemeanants are the kinds of “law-abiding” citizens whose rights *Heller* vindicated.<sup>106</sup>

More fundamentally, the notion that there is a sharp distinction between felonies and misdemeanors, at least within the universe of crimes covered by § 922(g)(1), is not correct. Our own Court has long recognized that, in the modern world, a “felony” is any crime punishable by at least one year and one day in prison.<sup>107</sup> And the Supreme Court has explained that, in contemporary law, “the distinction [between felonies and misdemeanors] is minor and often arbitrary.”<sup>108</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> *Id.* at 635.

<sup>106</sup> *Heller* also underscored that its list of longstanding prohibitions “does not purport to be exhaustive,” while emphasizing that the list flows from “historical justifications.” *Id.* at 627 n.26, 635. This guidance suggests a more practical approach than focusing on the word “felon” alone.

<sup>107</sup> See, e.g., *Thorm v. United States*, 59 F.2d 419, 419 (3d Cir. 1932) (noting that Congress has historically defined felonies as crimes punishable by a prison term exceeding one year).

<sup>108</sup> *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1, 14 (1985) (“[T]he assumption that a ‘felon’ is more dangerous than a misdemeanant [is] untenable. Indeed, numerous misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous than many felonies.”).

The kinds of misdemeanors within the scope of § 922(g)(1)—those punishable by more than two years in prison—are effectively felonies in all but name.<sup>109</sup>

Indeed, we have previously held that Congress has the power to define a “felony” for purposes of federal law in ways that depart even from the year-and-a-day rule. In *United States v. Graham*,<sup>110</sup> we considered how to apply Congress’s definition of an “aggravated felony” to a provision of the Sentencing Guidelines that “increase[d] the penalty for the crime of reentering the country after deportation.”<sup>111</sup> The issue in the case was two-fold. First, the federal statute defined the term “aggravated felony” as an offense punishable by at least one year in prison—not, as is more typical,

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<sup>109</sup> The Supreme Court’s recent decision in *Voisine v. United States*, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (2016), also addressed the distinction between misdemeanors and felonies. That case raised an issue of statutory interpretation regarding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”

Because *Voisine* did not involve a challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(9), it bears on these cases only indirectly. Still, *Voisine* recognized that Congress passed § 922(g)(9) “to close [a] dangerous loophole in the gun control laws.” *Id.* at 2276 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, Congress enacted § 922(g)(9) to address the fact that “many perpetrators of domestic violence are charged with misdemeanors rather than felonies, notwithstanding the harmfulness of their conduct.” *Id.* Congress believed that closing this loophole was important because, in the Supreme Court’s words, “[f]irearms and domestic strife are a potentially deadly combination.” *Id.* (alteration in original) (quoting *United States v. Hayes*, 555 U.S. 415, 427 (2009)).

<sup>110</sup> 169 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 1999).

<sup>111</sup> *Id.* at 789 (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) and U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(B)).



an offense punishable by *more than* one year in prison.<sup>112</sup> Second, the prior state offense that triggered the defendant’s federal sentencing enhancement was technically a misdemeanor under New York law.<sup>113</sup>

*Graham* recognized that “[t]he line between felonies and misdemeanors is an ancient one,” but it also noted that, “[w]ith the rise of the penitentiary and the disappearance of the death penalty for most felonies . . . the felony-misdemeanor distinction solidified at the one-year line.”<sup>114</sup> Even so, we concluded that Congress could ignore the year-and-a-day rule in its own statutory law. As a result, the label New York had affixed to *Graham*’s offense was immaterial; what mattered was the fact that his misdemeanor fell within the technical federal definition of an “aggravated felony.”<sup>115</sup>

Contrary to the statutory scheme we confronted in *Graham*, § 922(g)(1) *respects* the more modern, year-and-a-day distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. Indeed, it does more than respect it: it actually excludes from its scope misdemeanors that are punishable by two years of imprisonment or less. In this way, § 922(g)(1) incorporates certain state-law judgments about what crimes count as “serious” mis-

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<sup>112</sup> *Id.* at 791 (“8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) defines an aggravated felony as a theft offense with a sentence of at least one year.”).

<sup>113</sup> *Id.* at 789.

<sup>114</sup> *Id.* at 792.

<sup>115</sup> *Id.* (“Congress has the power to define the punishment for the crime of reentering the country after deportation, and we conclude that Congress was defining a term of art, ‘aggravated felony,’ which in this case includes certain misdemeanants who receive a sentence of one year.”).

demeanors. In other contexts, the Supreme Court has affirmed the value of easily administrable statutory schemes by stating that Congress can adopt clear, uniform rules about what counts as a “felony” for purposes of federal law, even where state-level definitions are more nuanced.<sup>116</sup>

The bottom line is this: once a misdemeanor is punishable by more than two years in prison, treating it as though it were intrinsically different than a felony is unjustifiably formalistic. By choosing to punish such misdemeanors more severely than a traditional felony, a state has *already* indicated that such crimes are serious. In my view, Congress is entitled to rely on that judgment.

Accordingly, my resolution of this case would be simple. *Heller* tells us that “nothing in [that] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.”<sup>117</sup> Our Court has since interpreted *Heller* to say that the ban on felons possessing firearms is a complete carve-out from the Second Amendment right. Since, for pre-

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<sup>116</sup> See, e.g., *Burgess v. United States*, 553 U.S. 124, 134 (2008) (recounting how Congress amended a statute’s definition of “felony drug offense,” which in its previous form “depended on the vagaries of state-law classifications of offenses as felonies or misdemeanors,” to instead use a “uniform federal standard”); *Logan*, 552 U.S. at 35 (explaining that Congress could choose to “revise § 921(a)(20) to provide . . . that federal rather than state law defines a conviction for purposes of [§ 922]”); *United States v. Turley*, 352 U.S. 407, 411 (1957) (“[I]n the absence of a plain indication of an intent to incorporate diverse state laws into a federal criminal statute, the meaning of the federal statute should not be dependent on state law.”).

<sup>117</sup> 554 U.S. at 626.

sent purposes, there is no functional difference between felons and persons who commit misdemeanors punishable by more than two years in prison, all persons with the scope of § 922(g)(1)—including the plaintiffs here—are *disqualified* from asserting their interest in using firearms “for defense of hearth and home.”<sup>118</sup> At *Marzzarella* step-one, no further analysis is necessary.

**C. A Note on *Heller*’s Use of the Word “Presumptively”**

A majority of my colleagues disagree with the proposition that the felon-in-possession ban is a constitutional carve-out from the Second Amendment right. In affirming the plaintiffs’ challenges, they make it clear that district courts in our Circuit must now conduct person-by-person, individualized inquiries in order to determine whether the application of § 922(g)(1) is constitutional in any particular case.

In reaching that conclusion, my colleagues treat *Heller*’s use of the word “presumptively” as though it *requires* courts to consider as-applied challenges to the felon-in-possession ban. Judge Hardiman, for example, cites the Seventh Circuit’s decision in *United States v. Williams*, which read *Heller*’s reference “to felon disarmament bans only as ‘presumptively lawful’” to imply “the possibility that the ban could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied challenge.”<sup>119</sup> Likewise, Judge Ambro insists that “[u]nless flagged

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<sup>118</sup> *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 92.

<sup>119</sup> Hardiman Op. Typescript at 9-10 n.6 (citing *Williams*, 616 F.3d at 692).

as irrebutable, presumptions are rebuttable.”<sup>120</sup> The shared assumption here is that, when the Supreme Court used the word “presumptively” in *Heller*, it meant to convey something like the definition of “presumption” that one might find in a legal dictionary—*i.e.*, “a rule of law, statutory or judicial, by which [a] finding of a basic fact gives rise to existence of presumed fact, until [the] presumption is rebutted.”<sup>121</sup>

This reading of “presumptively” in *Heller* puts more weight on that word than it can fairly bear. It is important to keep in mind the context within which the word appears. The key text of *Heller* says:

[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.<sup>122</sup>

Footnote 26 of *Heller*, which accompanies this passage, states: “We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.”<sup>123</sup>

Judge Ambro and Judge Hardiman read the word “presumptively” as though the Supreme Court was communicating, through its use of a single adverb in a

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<sup>120</sup> Ambro Op. Typescript at 28.

<sup>121</sup> *United States v. Chase*, 18 F.3d 1166, 1172 n.7 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1185 (6th ed. 1990)).

<sup>122</sup> 554 U.S. at 626-27.

<sup>123</sup> *Id.* at 627 n.26.

footnote, a *mandate* that the Second Amendment now *requires* courts to hear as-applied challenges to certain laws that limit gun rights. That interpretation strikes me as exactly backwards. The Supreme Court was not putting us on notice that “longstanding prohibitions” universally considered constitutional pre-*Heller* were, post-*Heller*, constitutionally suspect. The Court was instead trying to provide assurances that, whatever else *Heller* might portend, it did not provide a basis for future litigants to upend any and all existing restrictions on the right to bear arms. In other words, *Heller*’s language about “longstanding prohibitions” was meant to *cabin* its holding, not to expand it.

It is also important to underscore that not all of the “longstanding prohibitions” on *Heller*’s list are the same. The ban on “the possession of firearms by felons”<sup>124</sup> is a black-and-white proscription that has deep roots in our shared constitutional tradition. There is also nothing unclear about when it applies. *Marzzarella* recognized as much, reasoning that *Heller* “suggests [that] felons . . . are disqualified from exercising their Second Amendment rights” because the “validity” of the felon-in-possession ban does not “turn on the presence or absence of certain circumstances.”<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> *Id.* at 626.

<sup>125</sup> 614 F.3d at 91-92. Judge Ambro states that “the two-step *Marzzarella* framework controls all Second Amendment challenges,” (Ambro Op. Typescript at 40), and I agree. Yet *Marzzarella* plainly stated that “the better reading” of *Heller* is that felons are *disqualified* from asserting their Second Amendment rights. *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 91-92. Judge Ambro departs from this reading to leave open the possibility of “a successful as-applied

The latter two kinds of “longstanding prohibitions” are different. These categories—“laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places” and “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms”<sup>126</sup>—have much more ambiguous boundaries. One might well ask: other than a school and a government building, what kind of location counts as a “sensitive place”? What kinds of conditions on the sale of arms are truly “longstanding”? In a case involving such a regulation, a court will need to engage in a more probing inquiry to determine whether the challenged law is constitutionally valid.<sup>127</sup>

And here we come back to the word “presumptively.” In a case involving “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places” or “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of

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challenge by a state-law felon” to § 922(g)(1), although he cautions that the “individual’s burden would be extraordinarily high—and perhaps even insurmountable.” (Ambro Op. Typescript at 33-34 n.6.) Nowhere does Judge Ambro explain how we can simultaneously proclaim our fidelity to *Marzzarella* while at the same time ignoring its reading of *Heller*’s key language.

<sup>126</sup> *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626-27.

<sup>127</sup> See, e.g., *Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv.*, 790 F.3d 1121, 1124-29 (10th Cir. 2015), *cert. denied*, 136 S. Ct. 1486 (2016) (considering whether a federal regulation limiting the carrying of firearms in post office *parking lots* was constitutionally permissible in view of *Heller*’s guidance about carrying of firearms in government *buildings*); *Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc.*, 700 F.3d at 203 (considering the constitutionality of a federal law prohibiting the sale of firearms to 18-to-20-year-olds by federally licensed firearms dealers, and concluding that the law “is consistent with a longstanding, historical tradition, which suggests that the conduct at issue falls outside the Second Amendment’s protection”).

arms,”<sup>128</sup> the word “presumptively” is important. It signals to lower court judges that they must think carefully about whether the challenged regulation is truly analogous to “longstanding prohibitions” upon which *Heller* does not “cast doubt.” In the parlance of our Court’s jurisprudence, not all such regulations will be “presumptively lawful” enough to satisfy the inquiry at *Marzzarella* step-one.

But with respect to the felon-in-possession ban, there is no work for the word “presumptively” to do. Section 922(g)(1) codifies the restriction on criminals possessing firearms in a manner that reflects longstanding history and tradition—and the Supreme Court has explicitly told us that *Heller* does not “cast doubt” on such a law.<sup>129</sup> This is not to say that Congress could never press its luck. If Congress were to *expand* § 922(g)(1) beyond its traditional scope by, for example, banning the possession of firearms by persons convicted of crimes punishable by *six months’* imprisonment, it might well run afoul of the Second Amendment’s protections. But such a law would be outside of *Heller*’s safe harbor for “longstanding prohibitions,” requiring courts—again, in the parlance of our Circuit—to proceed to *Marzzarella* step-two and assess such a law under some form of heightened constitutional scrutiny.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>128</sup> *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626-27.

<sup>129</sup> *Id.* at 626.

<sup>130</sup> The same could be said of the ban on mentally-ill persons possessing firearms. As currently codified, § 922(g)(4) makes it unlawful for any person to possess a gun “who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or . . . committed to a mental institution,” and *Heller* does not “cast doubt” on that law. But if Congress

Consequently, I disagree with Judge Ambro’s view that courts must “determin[e] whether crimes are serious enough to destroy Second Amendment rights” on a case-by-case basis.<sup>131</sup> To my mind, the validity of the felon-in-possession ban is not so precarious. Congress has made a reasoned judgment that crimes currently covered by § 922(g)(1)—felonies and misdemeanors punishable by more than two years’ imprisonment—*are* serious enough to support disarmament. That categorical rule is consonant with history and tradition, and *Heller* does not “cast doubt” on it at all.<sup>132</sup>

### III. *Marzzarella* Step-Two and the Proper Application of Constitutional Scrutiny

Even if, out of an abundance of caution, we were to move on to step two of the *Marzzarella* analysis and apply heightened scrutiny—a step I do not believe is necessary—Congress’s interests in preventing gun violence are sufficiently important, and the felon-in-possession statute sufficiently tailored, that § 922(g)(1) would survive the plaintiffs’ challenges.

My colleagues disagree. Judge Hardiman believes that § 922(g)(1) is so destructive of Second Amendment rights that, at least as applied to non-violent criminals, it is *per se* unconstitutional. Judge Ambro, meanwhile, insists that we must apply constitutional scrutiny at the level of people *like the plaintiffs*, and that if the government cannot show that “disarming

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were to expand the current restriction to, for example, all persons who have ever seen a mental health professional, *Heller*’s safe harbor for “longstanding prohibitions” would no longer apply.

<sup>131</sup> Ambro Op. Typescript at 29.

<sup>132</sup> 554 U.S. at 626.



people *like them* will promote the responsible use of firearms,” or that people “*like them* remain potentially irresponsible after many years of apparently responsible behavior,”<sup>133</sup> then application of § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional. By contrast, I believe that conducting a tailoring analysis at Judge Ambro’s level of specificity is problematic. Even in the First Amendment context, there are some laws whose structure and purpose are *incompatible* with person-specific constitutional challenges. For the reasons that follow, § 922(g)(1) is such a law.

**A. Intermediate Scrutiny Is the Appropriate Standard for These Cases**

In *Marzzarella*, we opted to apply intermediate rather than strict scrutiny to test the constitutionality of a federal statute. Looking to First Amendment jurisprudence for guidance, we asked whether (i) the challenged law involved a government interest that was either “significant,” “substantial,” or “important,” and (ii) whether “the fit between the challenged regulation and the asserted objective [was] reasonable, not perfect.”<sup>134</sup> The law challenged in *Marzzarella*, 18 U.S.C. § 922(k), makes it unlawful to possess a firearm with an obliterated serial number. We concluded that the law survived intermediate scrutiny because the government had a substantial interest “in enabling the tracing of weapons via their serial numbers,” and *Marzzarella* had failed to offer any “lawful purpose for

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<sup>133</sup> Ambro Op. Typescript at 39 (emphasis added).

<sup>134</sup> 614 F.3d at 98.

which a person would prefer an unmarked firearm” to a marked one.<sup>135</sup>

In choosing to apply intermediate scrutiny, *Marzzarella* discerned an important distinction in *Heller*. While *Heller* clearly rejected rational-basis review,<sup>136</sup> it did not select either intermediate or strict scrutiny as the appropriate standard for assessing the constitutionality of the District of Columbia’s gun regulations. Instead, *Heller* stated that those regulations were unconstitutional “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny . . . applied to enumerated constitutional rights.”<sup>137</sup> *Marzzarella* interpreted *Heller* as suggesting that firearm regulations fall along a continuum, with laws like the District of Columbia’s handgun ban falling “at the far end of the spectrum of infringement.”<sup>138</sup>

*Marzzarella* thus drew a distinction between laws that burden the “core . . . right of law-abiding citizens to possess [certain] weapons for self-defense in the home,” on the one hand, and laws that “do[] not severely limit the possession of firearms,”<sup>139</sup> on the other. *Marzzarella* concluded that courts should

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<sup>135</sup> *Id.* at 98-99. For good measure, we noted that we would uphold the constitutionality of § 922(k) even if we applied strict scrutiny because, in our view, the statute was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. *See id.* at 99-101.

<sup>136</sup> *See Heller*, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (“If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.”).

<sup>137</sup> *Id.* at 628.

<sup>138</sup> 614 F.3d at 97.

<sup>139</sup> *Id.* at 92, 97.

apply strict scrutiny to test the constitutional validity of the former kind of regulations, while they should apply intermediate scrutiny to test the validity of other, less burdensome regulations.<sup>140</sup>

We reaffirmed this framework in *Drake v. Filko*,<sup>141</sup> where we considered the constitutionality of New Jersey’s regulations governing the issuance of permits to carry guns in public. *Drake* reasoned that “the Second Amendment can trigger more than one particular standard of scrutiny, depending, at least in part, upon the type of law challenged and the type of Second Amendment restriction at issue.”<sup>142</sup> It also concluded that courts should apply intermediate scrutiny unless the challenged regulation burdens the “core” Second Amendment right.<sup>143</sup>

Just as intermediate scrutiny was the correct standard to apply in *Marzzarella* and *Drake*, it is also the correct standard to apply here. The felon-in-possession ban, to the extent it burdens Second Amendment rights at all, does not impinge on the rights of “law-abiding, responsible citizens.”<sup>144</sup> Ra-

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<sup>140</sup> *See id.* at 97 (“The distinction between limitations on the exercise of protected conduct and regulation of the form in which that conduct occurs also appears in the First Amendment context . . . . Accordingly, we think § 922(k) also should merit intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny.”).

<sup>141</sup> 724 F.3d 426.

<sup>142</sup> *Id.* at 435 (quoting *United States v. Reese*, 627 F.3d 792, 801 (10th Cir. 2010)).

<sup>143</sup> *Id.* at 436; *see also id.* at 436 & n.14 (noting a few subtle differences between the standard for intermediate scrutiny articulated by the various circuits).

<sup>144</sup> *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635.

ther, it constrains the rights of persons who, by virtue of their prior criminal conduct, fall outside the core of the Second Amendment's protections.

Several of our sister circuits have assessed challenges to other provisions of § 922(g) using this same approach. In *United States v. Carter*,<sup>145</sup> for example, the Fourth Circuit considered a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), which prohibits firearm possession by “any person . . . who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance.” Citing *Marzzarella* with approval, *Carter* applied intermediate scrutiny to assess the validity of the statute.<sup>146</sup> It reasoned that a person within the scope of § 922(g)(3)—that is, a user of controlled substances—could not fairly claim to be asserting the “core” Second Amendment right of “law-abiding, responsible citizens.”<sup>147</sup> For the same reason, the Fourth Circuit has applied intermediate scrutiny to assess the validity of those provisions of § 922(g) that limit the possession of firearms by persons subject to protective orders and by persons who have committed misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence.<sup>148</sup> The decisions of several other circuits are in accord.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>145</sup> 669 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 2012).

<sup>146</sup> *Id.* at 417.

<sup>147</sup> *Id.* at 416 (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635).

<sup>148</sup> See *United States v. Chapman*, 666 F.3d 220, 226 (4th Cir. 2012) (“Chapman’s claim is not within the core right identified in *Heller*—the right of a law-abiding, *responsible* citizen to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense.”) (considering a challenge to § 922(g)(8)); *Chester*, 628 F.3d at 682-83 (“Although Chester asserts his right to possess a firearm in his home for the purpose of self-defense, we believe his claim is not within the core right identified

Thus, even assuming that Binderup and Suarez fall within the Second Amendment’s protections, I would join our sister circuits in holding that their prior criminal convictions place them outside the core “right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”<sup>150</sup> For this reason, intermediate scrutiny is the correct standard under which to assess their challenges.

### **B. Judge Hardiman’s Rejection of Heightened Scrutiny**

Before proceeding any further, I think it is important to pause in order to address a profound doctrinal disagreement between myself and Judge Hardiman. Like Judge Ambro and me, Judge Hardiman believes that we determine the proper scope of the Second Amendment by looking to history and tradition. Reviewing the relevant historical sources, Judge Hardiman concludes that, as a matter of past practice, the only persons subject to disarmament were those who were dangerous. Judge Ambro and I obviously disagree with that assessment, but I am happy to acknowledge that reasonable minds could differ on this score.

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in *Heller* . . . by virtue of Chester’s criminal history as a domestic violence misdemeanor.”) (considering a challenge to § 922(g)(9)).

<sup>149</sup> See *United States v. Chovan*, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Section 922(g)(9) does not implicate [the] core Second Amendment right because it regulates firearm possession for individuals with criminal convictions.”); *Schrader*, 704 F.3d at 989 (applying intermediate scrutiny “[b]ecause common-law misdemeanants as a class cannot be considered law-abiding and responsible”); *Reese*, 627 F.3d at 802 (applying intermediate scrutiny to § 922(g)(8)).

<sup>150</sup> *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635.

At that point, however, Judge Hardiman makes what I believe to be a serious doctrinal error.

Having concluded that Congress may permissibly disarm persons likely to commit violent acts, Judge Hardiman then defends the proposition that all other applications of § 922(g)(1) are *per se* unconstitutional. No recourse to heightened scrutiny or means-ends balancing is necessary. After all, *Heller* struck down a local ordinance that completely prevented citizens from possessing firearms in their homes for self-defense. Section 922(g)(1) has the same effect with respect to felons and certain misdemeanants. So, Judge Hardiman concludes, § 922(g)(1) must be unconstitutional in *every* application to non-violent criminals because it “eviscerates” their Second Amendment rights.<sup>151</sup> I agree with Judge Ambro that such an approach is inconsistent with the development of Second Amendment doctrine in this and other circuits.<sup>152</sup>

In addition, the rejection of heightened scrutiny in this context seems out-of-step with *Heller* itself. As discussed earlier, *Heller* says that the “core” Second Amendment right is the “right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”<sup>153</sup> Non-violent criminals are, by definition, not “law-abiding.” Insofar as Judge Hardiman’s opinion holds that non-violent criminals have an absolute, inviolable right to keep guns in their homes for self-defense, *Heller* seems to disagree.

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<sup>151</sup> Hardiman Op. Typescript at 18, 50.

<sup>152</sup> Ambro Op. Typescript at 15-18.

<sup>153</sup> 554 U.S. at 635.

The advantage of heightened scrutiny is that it allows us to think about how Congress (and, by corollary, we as a polity) can tackle real-world challenges within constitutional boundaries. Such an inquiry necessarily requires us to think about the connection between means and ends, and therefore to debate the seriousness of the problems we face—including gun violence—and the permissible means of addressing them. While history is of course important, and in many cases will be dispositive, the tiers of scrutiny provide us with a useful analytical framework for assessing the constitutionality of laws that burden Second Amendment rights—even those, like § 922(g)(1), that disarm certain persons altogether.

**C. The Felon-in-Possession Ban Survives Intermediate Scrutiny**

Applying intermediate scrutiny, we ask whether the challenged law involves a government interest that is “significant,” “substantial,” or “important,” and then assess whether “the fit between the challenged regulation and the asserted objective [was] reasonable, not perfect.”<sup>154</sup> Section 922(g)(1) easily clears those hurdles.

Courts have identified Congress’s objective in passing § 922(g) as “keep[ing] guns out of the hands of presumptively risky people” and “suppressing armed violence.”<sup>155</sup> As Congress explained when passing the 1968 modifications to the statute, “[T]he ease with which any person can acquire firearms other than a

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<sup>154</sup> *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 98.

<sup>155</sup> *Yancey*, 621 F.3d at 683-84 (citing S. Rep. No. 90-1501, at 22 (1968)).

rifle or shotgun (including criminals . . . ) is a significant factor in the prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime in the United States.”<sup>156</sup>

Our Court has also said that governments “undoubtedly [have] a significant, substantial and important interest in protecting [their] citizens’ safety.”<sup>157</sup> As the Second Circuit stated shortly after the horrific shootings in Newtown, Connecticut, “[t]he regulation of firearms is a paramount issue of public safety, and recent events in this circuit are a sad reminder that firearms are dangerous in the wrong hands.”<sup>158</sup>

Having established that the government’s objective is a substantial one, we next ask if the challenged law is a “reasonable fit” to carry out the government’s purposes. In making that assessment, the “State bears the burden of justifying its restrictions [and] it must affirmatively establish the reasonable fit we require.”<sup>159</sup> Seeking to satisfy this burden, the government points to numerous studies that explore the link between past criminal conduct and future crime,

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<sup>156</sup> Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 901(a)(2), 82 Stat. 197, 225 (1968).

<sup>157</sup> *Drake*, 724 F.3d at 437 (citing *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)) (punctuation modified).

<sup>158</sup> *Osterweil v. Bartlett*, 706 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir.) (O’Connor, J.), certifying question to the New York Court of Appeals, certified question answered, 999 N.E.2d 516 (N.Y. 2013); see also *N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Cuomo*, 804 F.3d 242, 261 (2d Cir. 2015) (“It is beyond cavil that both states have substantial, indeed compelling, governmental interests in public safety and crime prevention.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

<sup>159</sup> *Drake*, 724 F.3d at 453 (quoting *Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox*, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)).



including gun violence.<sup>160</sup> The plaintiffs challenge the relevance of the government’s cited studies, asserting that while they may show a connection between past criminal conduct and gun violence, they do not show such a link with respect to criminals who share their characteristics and who committed offenses similar to theirs.<sup>161</sup> Judges Ambro and Hardiman share this criticism.

Several courts have—correctly, in my view—refused to parse the government’s evidence as finely as the plaintiffs ask us to.<sup>162</sup> The question is not whether someone *exactly like the plaintiffs* poses a threat to public safety. The question is whether “the fit between the challenged regulation and the asserted ob-

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<sup>160</sup> See Gov’t Br. in *Binderup* at 28 (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, *Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994*, at 6 (2002); Mona A. Wright et al., *Effectiveness of Denial of Handgun Purchase to Persons Believed To Be at High Risk for Firearm Violence*, 89 Am. J. of Pub. Health 88, 89 (1999)). The government also points out that the risk of recidivism is particularly high for sex offenders like *Binderup* irrespective of whether or not states categorize their crimes as felonies or as serious misdemeanors.

<sup>161</sup> We might also consider the fact that, as we noted in *Drake*, legislatures generally crafted the regulatory schemes governing firearms before *Heller* concluded that the Second Amendment protected an individual right to bear arms. Consequently, the statistical evidence of “fit” may be lacking in certain instances because the drafters of the regulations did not realize they would need to compile it. See *Drake*, 724 F.3d at 437-38.

<sup>162</sup> See, e.g., *Yancey*, 621 F.3d at 685 (“[M]ost felons are nonviolent, but someone with a felony conviction on his record is more likely than a nonfelon to engage in illegal and violent gun use.” (citing *United States v. Lane*, 252 F.3d 905, 906 (7th Cir. 2001)).

jective [is] reasonable, not perfect.”<sup>163</sup> The plaintiffs seem to want something more.

Assessing the strength of the government’s evidence as assiduously as the plaintiffs demand would also raise separation of powers concerns, at least in the context of intermediate scrutiny. We generally say that “[i]t is the legislature’s job, not ours, to weigh conflicting evidence and make policy judgments.”<sup>164</sup> Our Court has cautioned that “conflicting empirical evidence . . . does not suggest, let alone compel, a conclusion that the ‘fit’ between [a challenged firearm regulation] and public safety is not ‘reasonable.’”<sup>165</sup> Other courts have said that Congress may regulate firearms on the basis of “correlational evidence” that does not necessarily “prove a causal link” between the conduct at issue and a particular provision of § 922(g).<sup>166</sup> In the words of the D.C. Circuit, “the legislature is ‘far better equipped than the judiciary’ to make sensitive public policy judgments (within constitutional limits) concerning the dangers in carrying firearms and the manner to combat those risks.”<sup>167</sup> Judge Wilkinson of the Fourth Circuit has been even more direct: “This is serious business. We do not wish to be even minutely responsible for some unspeakably tragic act of mayhem because in the peace

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<sup>163</sup> *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 98; see also *Drake*, 724 F.3d at 436 (same).

<sup>164</sup> *Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester*, 701 F.3d 81, 99 (2d Cir. 2012).

<sup>165</sup> *Drake*, 724 F.3d at 439.

<sup>166</sup> *United States v. Carter*, 750 F.3d 462, 469 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 273 (2014).

<sup>167</sup> *Schrader*, 704 F.3d at 990 (quoting *Kachalsky*, 701 F.3d at 97).

of our judicial chambers we miscalculated as to Second Amendment rights.”<sup>168</sup>

Against this backdrop, I conclude that the government’s evidence adequately establishes a connection between past criminal conduct and future gun violence. I also conclude that Congress’s decision to disarm felons and those who commit misdemeanors punishable by more than two years in prison is reasonably tailored to preventing such violence.

**D. Tailoring § 922(g)(1) Too Narrowly Is Problematic**

The foregoing analysis, of course, speaks to the issue of tailoring with respect to the connection between the risk of gun violence and the universe of offenses that trigger § 922(g)(1) (*i.e.*, felonies and misdemeanors punishable by more than two years in prison). The plaintiffs believe that the statute must be tailored

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<sup>168</sup> *United States v. Masciandaro*, 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011). I do not take Judge Wilkinson’s admonition to imply that judges are incapable of making decisions about whether particular persons are dangerous. Every day judges decide whether to grant bail, impose prison time, or revoke a period of supervised release—and all of these determinations touch on dangerousness. The key point is that, in these contexts, there are mechanisms in place for informing judicial discretion. In sentencing, revocation, and bail hearings, for example, judges have the benefit of presentence and pretrial services reports, input from trained probation and pretrial services professionals, and recommendations from prosecutors.

By contrast, there are no tools readily at-hand for deciding whether an individual person should have access to a firearm despite a past criminal conviction. *See also infra* at pages 66-69 (discussing previous cases that have recognized the inherent difficulties in making such determinations).

more narrowly still—indeed, so narrowly that it takes account of their individual characteristics.

And here we come to the difficult conceptual issue in this case: is this sort of as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) even permissible? This issue has divided the Courts of Appeals, caused endless trouble for the government at oral argument, and has at times perplexed me as well. But I ultimately conclude that the answer must be “no.”<sup>169</sup>

The notion of an as-applied challenge is familiar to us in the context of First Amendment law. In such cases, the government enacts some kind of law limiting speech for either logistical reasons (such as time, place, and manner restrictions) or to promote its own conception of the public good (such as regulations governing campaign financing). In such situations, it is entirely predictable that a certain number of citizens will raise the argument that the law makes little sense as applied to them. These arguments typically sound in overbreadth. The normal claim is that a person’s inclusion within the scope of the law has no meaningful connection to the government’s purported objective, leading to an impermissible infringement on that person’s free speech rights.

But Second Amendment limitations like the felon-in-possession ban and the ban on mentally-ill persons possessing guns are different—and the *reason* they’re

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<sup>169</sup> I offer here an alternative assessment of the problem of as-applied challenges in the context of intermediate scrutiny (*i.e.*, at *Marzzarella* step-two). Because I believe that felons and serious misdemeanants can be disarmed at *Marzzarella* step-one, I would hold as an initial matter that the plaintiffs have been disqualified from the exercise of their Second Amendment rights altogether.

different is because, in this context, the government's objective is neither logistical nor abstract. It is, quite simply, to prevent armed mayhem and death.<sup>170</sup> As a result, when we conduct a tailoring analysis in such a case, we must assess whether the challenged law is reasonably tailored to prevent future violence.

And *this* is why as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) are so problematic. *Binderup* and *Suarez* are, in effect, saying, “Trust us: we are not the kind of people who will cause future gun violence.” The problem is that it is practically impossible to make this kind of individualized prediction with any degree of confidence. Mistakes—costly ones—are simply too likely.

That is not my judgment, but rather the judgment of Congress itself. A separate provision of the federal gun laws, 18 U.S.C. § 925(c), states that “[a] person who is prohibited from possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition may make application to the Attorney General for relief from the disabilities imposed by Federal laws.” The Attorney General may “grant such relief if it is established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the disability, and the applicant’s record and

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<sup>170</sup> The Supreme Court’s decision in *Vartelas v. Holder*, 132 S. Ct. 1479 (2012), reiterated these congressional purposes. *Vartelas* addressed whether a provision of the immigration laws could be applied retroactively (that is, to conduct occurring before the law’s enactment). The government tried to draw an analogy between the challenged statute and § 922(g). The Court, rejecting that comparison, stated that the law at issue in *Vartelas* targeted “past misconduct,” *id.* at 1489, whereas “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons’ . . . target a present danger, *i.e.*, the danger posed by felons who bear arms.” *Id.* (quoting *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 626).

reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest.”<sup>171</sup> If an application is denied, the applicant may petition a district court for relief. As it turns out, this “relief provision has been rendered inoperative” by virtue of the fact that “Congress has repeatedly barred the Attorney General from using appropriated funds ‘to investigate or act upon [relief] applications.’”<sup>172</sup>

Congress defunded this provision in 1992. In a Department of Justice appropriations statute, it provided that “none of the funds appropriated herein shall be available to investigate or act upon applications for relief from Federal firearms disabilities under 18 U.S.C. 925(c).”<sup>173</sup> That embargo on funds has remained in place ever since. And why did Congress effectively write § 925(c) out of the statute books? Because it concluded that the task of granting individual applications for relief from § 922(g)(1) was *too prone to error*. A 1992 Senate report stated that the Justice Department’s review of applications was “a very difficult and subjective task which could have devastating consequences for innocent citizens if the wrong decision is made,”<sup>174</sup> and noted that the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) spent “approximately 40 man-years . . . annually to investi-

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<sup>171</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 925(c).

<sup>172</sup> *Logan*, 552 U.S. at 28 n.1 (alteration in original) (quoting *United States v. Bean*, 537 U.S. 71, 74-75 (2002)).

<sup>173</sup> Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-393, 106 Stat. 1729, 1732 (1992).

<sup>174</sup> S. Rep. No. 102-353, at 19 (1992).

gate and act upon these investigations and applications.”<sup>175</sup> Similarly, a later House report stated that “too many of these felons whose gun ownership rights were restored went on to commit violent crimes with firearms,” and concluded that “[t]here is no reason to spend the Government[’s] time or taxpayer’s money to restore a convicted felon’s right to own a firearm.”<sup>176</sup>

In other words, Congress reviewed the evidence from its prior regime of what were, in effect, as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) and concluded that such a system was unworkable. This should have a profound impact on our tailoring analysis. Under intermediate scrutiny, we ask whether there is a “reasonable” fit between the challenged regulation and the government’s objective.<sup>177</sup> Here, Congress tried the plaintiffs’ way of doing things and concluded that it was too error-prone to support the government’s objective of preventing armed violence.<sup>178</sup> There were too many mistakes—and, unlike in the First Amendment context, those mistakes were potentially fatal.

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<sup>175</sup> *Id.* at 20.

<sup>176</sup> H.R. Rep. No. 104-183, at 15 (1995).

<sup>177</sup> *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 98.

<sup>178</sup> As one of our colleagues in the D.C. Circuit has put it, “the reality of gun violence means our constitutional analysis should incorporate deference to the legislature.” *Heller v. District of Columbia*, 801 F.3d 264, 283 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Henderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing *Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project*, 561 U.S. 1, 34-36 (2010)). Deference in this context is even more appropriate when Congress has not simply made a policy judgment about preventing gun violence, but has actually experimented with a system of gun regulation and concluded—based on lived experience—that it was unworkable.

Notwithstanding Congress's experience with § 925(c), the plaintiffs seem to believe that by shoe-horning their complaints about § 922(g)(1)'s scope into the rubric of "as-applied challenges," they necessarily force us to assess their individual characteristics rather than rely on Congress's categorical rule. I disagree. Even in the First Amendment context, where courts routinely assess as-applied challenges to speech-limiting laws, there are circumstances where such challenges must fail in the face of reasonable deference to legislative judgments.

The Supreme Court's decision in *United Public Workers of America (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell*<sup>179</sup> is a perfect example. The Supreme Court there confronted an as-applied challenge to the Hatch Act, which bans government employees from engaging in certain kinds of partisan political activity, including some forms of political speech. Congress's goal in passing the Act was "to promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties."<sup>180</sup> The challenger, a "skilled mechanic" at the United States Mint, argued that he was simply not the type of government employee whose conduct was likely to raise integrity concerns.<sup>181</sup> Structurally, this argument is identical to the one the plaintiffs make here—*i.e.*, that they are too far removed from the core group of people who pose the risk of harm that Congress sought to address by passing § 922(g)(1) for that law to be constitutional as applied to them.

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<sup>179</sup> 330 U.S. 75 (1947).

<sup>180</sup> *Id.* at 96-97 (quoting *Ex parte Curtis*, 106 U.S. 371, 373 (1882)).

<sup>181</sup> *Id.* at 101.



The Supreme Court rejected that argument. In its view, the Hatch Act survived constitutional scrutiny because the conduct it outlawed was “reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public service.”<sup>182</sup> The Court recognized that, given his role at the Mint, the challenger was situated somewhat differently than white-collar employees who might be more inclined to take on management roles in political campaigns. Even so, the Court did not think these distinctions were constitutionally dispositive.<sup>183</sup> As the Court observed:

Whatever differences there may be between administrative employees of the Government and industrial workers in its employ are differences in detail so far as the constitutional power under review is concerned. Whether there are such differences and what weight to attach to them, are all matters of detail for Congress . . . .

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When actions of civil servants in the judgment of Congress menace the integrity and the competency of the service, legislation to forestall such danger and adequate to maintain its usefulness is required. The Hatch Act is the answer of Congress to this need.<sup>184</sup>

The logic of *Mitchell* applies with equal force to the present case. Here, too, Congress has passed a law to respond to a public danger. Here, too, individual-

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<sup>182</sup> *Id.*

<sup>183</sup> *Id.* at 102.

<sup>184</sup> *Id.* at 102-03.

ized predictions are impossible with any degree of accuracy. Here, too, a regime of person-by-person regulation would present grave problems of administrability. But here, unlike in *Mitchell*, the potential harm is not only serious and widespread, but also deadly.

*Mitchell* instructs us that Congress has the power in such circumstances to impose a complete ban on the exercise of a constitutional right by a category of persons who, in its reasonable estimation, pose a threat to the public. While courts must, of course, entertain constitutional challenges to statutes that infringe on constitutional rights, *Mitchell* makes it clear that there are some laws with respect to which as-applied challenges will categorically fail. I believe that § 922(g)(1) is such a law.<sup>185</sup>

Moreover, insofar as the plaintiffs' claims sound in overbreadth, it is worth emphasizing that the federal regime for regulating firearm possession by convicts has numerous safety valves that make any complaint about unfairness far less persuasive.

*First*, we should remember that § 922(g)(1) is a statute predicated on principles of federalism. Rather than specifying a list of qualifying offenses, “[i]t looks to state law” and imposes “restrictions on certain convicts based on decisions made by state legislatures

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<sup>185</sup> The First Circuit, too, has recognized that categorical rules are sometimes constitutionally permissible in the Second Amendment context. See *United States v. Booker*, 644 F.3d 12, 23 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Second Amendment permits categorical regulation of gun possession by classes of persons—e.g., felons and the mentally ill—rather than requiring that restrictions on the right be imposed only on an individualized, case-by-case basis.” (internal citation omitted)).

and courts.”<sup>186</sup> In this way, the federal statute leaves the judgment about which offenses should trigger disarmament to the discretion of state legislators who are, at least in theory, closer to the lived experience of their constituents. To put it another way, Congress did not decide that the plaintiffs’ convictions would have the effect of preventing them from owning firearms; rather, their state legislatures did.

At this point, one might reasonably object that, by refusing to permit as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1), we give legislatures far too much power to disarm citizens. After all, what prevents a state from passing a law saying that jaywalking is punishable by five years in prison? Or a speeding ticket? Or littering? “Surely,” one might think, “Congress cannot disarm people who commit *those* offenses?”

I understand and appreciate these concerns. But institutional considerations lead me to conclude that Congress may permissibly use the existence of a prior criminal conviction as a trigger for collateral consequences under federal law. This necessarily means that states have near total control over what offenses will trigger those federal consequences. If the citizens of a particular state believe that a criminal offense is too minor to trigger disarmament, their remedy is to petition the state legislature to amend the law—not to seek redress in the federal courts. Indeed, there is evidence that state authorities are perfectly capable of assessing the consequences of § 922(g) and acting to counter them if they feel that doing so is

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<sup>186</sup> *Chovan*, 735 F.3d at 1151 (Bea, J., concurring).

appropriate.<sup>187</sup> The alternative, a regime of judges serving as a super-legislature to review the reasonableness of the criminal codes in all 50 states, is inconsistent with the way we have regulated gun ownership for more than half a century.

To put it another way, § 922(g) reflects a congressional policy judgment that states should have a role in determining what kinds of misdemeanor offenses will trigger disarmament. That is a question over which the states will predictably disagree. The Supreme Court itself recognized as much in *Logan v. United States*.<sup>188</sup> The petitioner there asserted that his conviction for violating § 922(g)(1) was unlawful because, properly construed, that statute did not apply to state offenses—like his—that did not trigger any loss of civil rights.<sup>189</sup> The Supreme Court found that argument unpersuasive. In the course of its analysis, it favorably cited *McGrath v. United States*,<sup>190</sup> a Second Circuit opinion stating that “anomalies” in the application

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<sup>187</sup> See Robert A. Mikos, *Enforcing State Law in Congress's Shadow*, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 1411, 1463-64 & nn.187, 188 (2005) (finding that expungement of domestic violence convictions increased following the enactment of § 922(g)(9)); see also *Logan*, 552 U.S. at 33 (recounting that “Wisconsin no longer punishes misdemeanors by more than two years of imprisonment”).

<sup>188</sup> 552 U.S. 23, 34-36 (2007).

<sup>189</sup> See *id.* at 26. The petitioner’s argument relied on 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20), which provides that “[a]ny conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.”

<sup>190</sup> 60 F.3d 1005 (2d Cir. 1995).

of the federal firearms laws are “inevitable” when those laws “depend on the differing laws and policies of the several states.”<sup>191</sup> *Logan* also recognized that application of the federal firearm laws would be more uniform if “federal rather than state law define[d] a conviction for purposes of [§ 922].”<sup>192</sup> Even so, *Logan* treated the issue of how to balance uniformity and state-by-state variation in this context as a policy question properly reserved to the legislative branch.<sup>193</sup>

*Second*, federal law lifts the felon-in-possession ban whenever a conviction “has been expunged, or set aside,” or is one “for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored.”<sup>194</sup> This is a second way in which the statute devolves regulatory power to state authorities. As a consequence, § 922(g) “in its normal application does not create a perpetual and unjustified disqualification” from the Second Amendment right.<sup>195</sup> As the Ninth Circuit has

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<sup>191</sup> *Id.* at 1009; *see also Logan*, 552 U.S. at 33-34 (quoting the same passage).

<sup>192</sup> 552 U.S. at 35.

<sup>193</sup> *See id.* (“We may assume, *arguendo*, that when Congress revised § 921(a)(20) in 1986 . . . it labored under the misapprehension that all offenders—misdemeanants as well as felons—forfeit civil rights, at least temporarily. Even indulging the further assumption that courts may repair such a congressional oversight or mistake, we could hardly divine the revision the Legislature would favor.” (footnote omitted)).

<sup>194</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20); *see also United States v. Leuschen*, 395 F.3d 155, 159-60 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing the meaning of “civil rights” in our circuit).

<sup>195</sup> *Skoien*, 614 F.3d at 645 (discussing expungement as a way to lift the ban imposed by § 922(g)(9)); *see also id.* (“Some of the largest states make expungement available as of right to misdemean-

explained, any burden imposed by the provisions of § 922(g) “is lightened by these exceptions” in ways that can factor into the relevant constitutional calculus.<sup>196</sup>

*Third*, there is the right to petition Congress itself. With respect to § 925(c), some members of Congress have announced their support for appropriating the funds necessary for the Justice Department to once again consider applications for relief from the felon-in-possession ban.<sup>197</sup> Whether Congress will do so in light of its prior determination that such a regime is unworkable is an open question.

There is also the possibility of obtaining offense-specific carve-outs from § 922(g)(1). For example, another provision of the federal gun laws says that the term “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” in § 922(g)(1) “does not include . . . any Federal or State offenses pertaining to anti-trust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices.”<sup>198</sup> If the plaintiffs believe that the crimes of corrupting a minor and carrying a firearm without a license belong on that list, their

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ants who have a clean record for a specified time. California, for example, has such a program.” (citing Cal. Penal Code § 1203.4a)).

<sup>196</sup> *Chovan*, 735 F.3d at 1138.

<sup>197</sup> See Press Release, Rep. Ken Buck, Buck Fights for Second Chance at Second Amendment Rights (June 2, 2015), <https://buck.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/buck-fights-restore-second-amendment-rights> (last visited Sept. 2, 2016).

<sup>198</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A); see also *United States v. Schultz*, 586 F.3d 526, 529-31 (7th Cir. 2009) (considering the proper application of this statutory carve-out).

efforts may be more fruitfully directed towards the national legislature instead of the courts.

Accordingly, I believe that § 922(g)(1) is a reasonable fit to carry out the government's purpose of reducing armed violence. Congress has made a reasoned judgment that persons who commit felonies and misdemeanors punishable by more than two years in prison are likelier to commit future gun violence than law-abiding citizens. That judgment is informed by Congress's experience with § 925(c), which it concluded was unworkable and dangerous because, in its view, that law did not provide a way for the government to make accurate judgments about the safety of re-arming particular people.

I would therefore uphold § 922(g)(1) under intermediate scrutiny, both as applied to these plaintiffs and as applied to future plaintiffs who might bring similar challenges.

#### **IV. The Problems with As-Applied Challenges to § 922(g)(1) Are Insurmountable**

Finally, it is important to step back and take stock of what the plaintiffs are actually asking us to do, which is to create an entirely new judicial process for resolving as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1). Such an approach is both doctrinally unnecessary and administratively unworkable.

The current rule for determining whether § 922(g)(1) applies is about as straightforward as it gets: “the fact of a felony conviction imposes a firearm disability until the conviction is vacated or the felon is relieved of his disability by some affirmative

action.”<sup>199</sup> The advantage of this scheme is its simplicity. The alternative, “a free floating prohibition,” would be “very hard to administer.”<sup>200</sup> Indeed, it would create a never-ending stream of “serious problems of administration, consistency and fair warning.”<sup>201</sup>

This becomes apparent once we consider how a regime of as-applied challenges would function in the real world. We previously examined this issue in *Pontarelli v. United States Department of the Treasury*.<sup>202</sup> That case arose from Congress’s previously discussed decision in 1992 to defund § 925(c). In the early 2000s, plaintiffs began filing suits in federal court alleging that, by refusing to process their applications due to lack of funding, the Justice Department had effectively denied those applications. Because § 925(c) provides for judicial review of such denials, these litigants asserted that they could ask federal district courts to “review” their applications in the first instance.

*Pontarelli* rejected that argument. Sitting *en banc*, we concluded that Congress’s denial of funds to process § 925(c) applications stripped the federal district courts of jurisdiction to review the Justice Department’s refusal to act on those applications. We also expressed skepticism that courts were capable of making individualized determinations about whether

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<sup>199</sup> *Lewis v. United States*, 445 U.S. 55, 60-61 (1980) (considering a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 1202, the predecessor to the current § 922).

<sup>200</sup> *United States v. Rehlander*, 666 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2012).

<sup>201</sup> *Torres-Rosario*, 658 F.3d at 113.

<sup>202</sup> 285 F.3d 216 (3d Cir. 2002) (*en banc*).



any particular felon should have his or her firearm rights restored. We stated that “[d]istrict courts’ institutional limitations suggest that Congress could not have intended for the appropriations ban to transfer to them the primary responsibility for determining whether to restore felons’ firearm privileges.”<sup>203</sup> Such a task required “interviewing a wide array of people, including the felon, his family, his friends, the persons whom he lists as character references, members of the community where he lives, his current and former employers, his coworkers, and his former parole officers,” and, unlike a federal agency, “courts possess neither the resources to conduct the requisite investigations nor the expertise to predict accurately which felons may carry guns without threatening the public’s safety.”<sup>204</sup>

The Supreme Court later unanimously vindicated *Pontarelli* in *United States v. Bean*.<sup>205</sup> The Court there explained that “[i]naction by ATF does not amount to a ‘denial’ within the meaning of § 925(c),” and “an actual decision by ATF on an application is a prerequisite for judicial review.”<sup>206</sup> It further noted that “[w]hether an applicant is ‘likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety’ presupposes an inquiry into that applicant’s background—a function best performed by the Executive, which, unlike courts, is institutionally equipped for conducting a neutral, wide-ranging investigation.”<sup>207</sup> The Court summarized its

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<sup>203</sup> *Id.* at 230-31.

<sup>204</sup> *Id.* at 231.

<sup>205</sup> 537 U.S. 71 (2002).

<sup>206</sup> *Id.* at 75-76.

<sup>207</sup> *Id.* at 77.

view by stating that § 925(c) requires an “inherently policy-based decision best left in the hands of an agency.”<sup>208</sup>

*Pontarelli* and *Bean* recognized the many pitfalls inherent in a regime of as-applied challenges. We should embrace the wisdom of those opinions now.<sup>209</sup>

Indeed, the great advantage of § 922(g)(1) is that its application turns on a *prior* adjudication. There is a real risk that by instead peering into the seriousness of a plaintiff’s prior conviction, we are inviting what are, in effect, collateral attacks on long-closed proceedings. The Tenth Circuit recognized as much in *United States v. Reese*.<sup>210</sup> That case involved a challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which makes it unlawful to possess firearms while subject to a domestic protection order. The defendant argued that his prosecution for violating § 922(g)(8) was improper due to alleged infirmities in the underlying state court proceeding. The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that “the overwhelming weight of federal case law precludes a defendant in a § 922(g)(8) prosecution from mounting a collateral attack on the merits of the underlying state protective order.”<sup>211</sup> As-applied chal-

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<sup>208</sup> *Id.*

<sup>209</sup> I recognize, of course, that *Heller* changed the constitutional landscape. But again: *Heller* held that the Second Amendment protects the “right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” 554 U.S. at 635.

<sup>210</sup> 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010).

<sup>211</sup> *Id.* at 804; *see also id.* at 805 (“[A]ny such challenges could and should have been raised by Reese in the Hawaii Family Court.”).

lenges to § 922(g)(1) invite the same kinds of collateral attacks that *Reese* firmly rejected.<sup>212</sup>

My colleagues' approaches are also vulnerable on another front. Their suggested criteria for assessing as-applied challenges *might* be feasible if every challenger, like the plaintiffs here, filed a declaratory judgment action. But at this point it is important to reiterate that § 922(g)(1) is a provision of *criminal law*. This raises its own set of constitutional difficulties.

First, our decision today places an extraordinary administrative burden on district courts handling criminal prosecutions under § 922(g)(1). Once as-applied challenges start to work their way through our courts, there will be an increasingly large body of “rearmament orders” that restore individuals’ firearm rights. As a consequence, there will be more and more people who believe that they can rely on a particular judicial decision to claim that they, too, are entitled to possess a firearm. District court judges will find themselves in an ever-thickening morass of as-applied precedent, trying to make fine-grained distinctions about whether individual felon-in-possession pro-

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<sup>212</sup> We ourselves recently reiterated that, as a general rule, collateral attacks on past state convictions are disfavored in our federal system. In *United States v. Napolitan*, --- F.3d ---, 2016 WL 3902164 (3d Cir. July 19, 2016), we concluded that a defendant could not challenge the reasonableness of his federal sentence on the ground that it was to run consecutively to a state sentence that the defendant claimed was unconstitutional. In our view, permitting such an attack “would be a cumbersome imposition on federal sentencing and a clear repudiation of the finality typically afforded to state court judgments.” *Id.* at \*4. Asking district courts to litigate the seriousness of prior crimes giving rise to disarmament under § 922(g)(1) raises similar concerns.

secutions can proceed. Given that my colleagues leave the door open to as-applied challenges even with respect to persons who have committed felonies, we can expect these challenges to begin working their way through our Circuit almost immediately.<sup>213</sup>

Still worse, my colleagues' approaches appear to be on a collision course with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits the government from "taking away someone's life, liberty, or property under a criminal law so vague that it fails to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it invites arbitrary enforcement."<sup>214</sup> It seems to me that, under a regime of as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1), compliance with principles of due process will quickly prove impossible.

Keep in mind that both Judge Ambro and Judge Hardiman are open to the possibility that a person convicted of a crime might, over time, be able to present evidence of rehabilitation sufficient to mount a successful as-applied challenge to the felon-in-possession ban.<sup>215</sup> But if time-from-conviction is really one of the

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<sup>213</sup> See, e.g., *Woolsey*, 759 F.3d at 907 (noting defendant moved to dismiss indictment on Second Amendment grounds); *Moore*, 666 F.3d at 315 (same); *Barton*, 633 F.3d at 169 (same); *Vongxay*, 594 F.3d at 1114 (same); see also *United States v. Hauck*, 532 F. App'x 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2013) (not precedential) (same).

<sup>214</sup> *Johnson v. United States*, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556 (2015) (citing *Kolender v. Lawson*, 461 U.S. 352, 357-358 (1983)).

<sup>215</sup> See Hardiman Op. Transcript at 35 n.15 ("We have not been presented with historical evidence one way or another whether [the passage of time or evidence of rehabilitation] might be a route to restoration of the right to keep and bear arms in at least some cases, so we leave for another day the determination whether that turns out to be the case."); Ambro Op. Typescript at 36-37 n.7

relevant criteria, there is no clear reason why a person subject to § 922(g)(1) could not bring *seriatim* challenges in the hope that, at some point, his or her conviction would be too far in the past to support the statute's application. Perhaps in future cases we could try to jerry-rig some kind of doctrinal framework to address this situation (*e.g.*, multiple challenges in a single year are disfavored; one challenge every five years is permissible), but we would be doing so on the basis of nothing more than our own judicial intuitions.

Imagine, for example, that three people are prosecuted for committing a non-violent felony. One was convicted 1 year ago, one 15 years ago, and one 30 years ago. All three are caught by police officers at a shooting rage with guns-in-hand, thereby violating § 922(g)(1). Are the ensuing indictments constitutional, or are the convictions too far in the past? Under the approach adopted by my colleagues, I simply have no idea. Neither will future defendants, to whom the Fifth Amendment guarantees some clarity as to whether their conduct is, or is not, unlawful.

In response to this evident quagmire, one might propose a series of bright-line rules for determining when application of § 922(g)(1) is constitutional. Unfortunately, my colleagues do not offer such rules. Under their more holistic standards, the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute in any particular case may depend on the judge's views about the offense and offender. As a result, defendants may not

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("[U]nder the right circumstances the passage of time since a conviction can be a relevant consideration in assessing recidivism risks.").

have fair notice of when and against whom the statute will be—or constitutionally can be—enforced.

The federal judiciary’s recent experience with the Armed Career Criminal Act makes it plain that our new regime of as-applied challenges may be heading towards a doctrinal dead-end. The Act increases the penalties on violations of § 922(g) whenever a defendant has three or more earlier convictions for a “serious drug offense” or a “violent felony.”<sup>216</sup> The so-called “residual clause” of the Act defined a “violent felony,” in part, as a crime that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”<sup>217</sup> This clause bedeviled the Supreme Court for nearly a decade as it considered numerous cases raising the question of whether a particular offense presented a “serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Finally, in the recent case of *Johnson v. United States*,<sup>218</sup> the Supreme Court declared that the residual clause was void for vagueness. In the Court’s view, the clause created “grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime”<sup>219</sup> and generated too much “uncertainty about how much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony.”<sup>220</sup>

I take *Johnson* to stand for the proposition that the category of “violent felony” is simply too indefinite to use as a basis for determining who is and is not subject

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<sup>216</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).

<sup>217</sup> *Id.* § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

<sup>218</sup> 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).

<sup>219</sup> *Id.* at 2257.

<sup>220</sup> *Id.* at 2258.

to criminal liability under § 922(g)(1). Judge Hardiman, by contrast, would permit plaintiffs to bring as-applied challenges on the ground that their previous crimes were not sufficiently violent to support disarmament. This raises the question of *how violent*, exactly, a crime has to be for application of § 922(g)(1) to be constitutional. Citing *Barton*, Judge Hardiman focuses on offenses “closely related to violent crime,”<sup>221</sup> but goes on to state that “[c]rimes of violence’ were commonly understood [in the early part of the 20th century] to include only those offenses ‘ordinarily committed with the aid of firearms.’”<sup>222</sup> We and future litigants can only guess whether this definition, unbounded as it is by reference to the elements of an offense, extends to drug possession with intent to distribute, human trafficking, extortion, or RICO violations. We need not wonder, however, whether it provides fair notice and comports with due process: the Supreme Court made clear in *Johnson* it does not, and thus Judge Hardiman’s approach would lead inexorably to courts having to strike down § 922(g)(1) as void for vagueness.<sup>223</sup>

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<sup>221</sup> Hardiman Op. Typescript at 13 (quoting *Barton*, 633 F.3d at 174).

<sup>222</sup> *Id.* at 42 (material in second set of brackets added) (quoting *Barton*, 633 F.3d at 173).

<sup>223</sup> This is to say nothing of Judge Hardiman’s approach to assessing whether Binderup and Suarez are “responsible citizens.” In answering that question, Judge Hardiman considers not only the plaintiffs’ recent avoidance of criminal conduct, but also personal traits like the fact that they both have “a job [and] a family.” *Id.* at 46. This approach seems to require an analysis so particularized as to be practically characterological, raising additional problems of fair warning and due process.

Unfortunately, Judge Ambro’s approach raises its own set of problems. He would require district court judges to consider a variety of factors in order to assess a crime’s “seriousness,” including, among other things, (i) whether a crime is a misdemeanor or a felony,<sup>224</sup> (ii) the sentence imposed,<sup>225</sup> and (iii) whether there is a “cross-jurisdictional consensus regarding the seriousness” of the crime giving rise to the federal firearm disability.<sup>226</sup> Judge Ambro leaves it to future cases to explain more fully how to weigh and balance these various factors. Unfortunately, once district court judges start disagreeing about how to conduct this inquiry, it will only be a matter of time before void-for-vagueness challenges to § 922(g)(1) start to percolate throughout our courts.<sup>227</sup>

I see nothing in the Second Amendment that compels us to abandon the current system of administrable firearms regulation for such an uncertain future.

## V. Conclusion

It is easy to empathize with the plaintiffs in these cases. Having committed misdemeanors far in the past, they fail to see how they can fairly be denied a

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<sup>224</sup> Ambro Op. Typescript at 30-31.

<sup>225</sup> *Id.* at 31-32.

<sup>226</sup> *Id.* at 32.

<sup>227</sup> Not to put too fine a point on it, but I disagree with Judge Ambro’s conclusions as to seriousness in this very case. While it may not have involved the threat of violence, Binderup’s relationship with a teenager in his employ involved power dynamics that were, at the very least, troubling. And Suarez’s offense—carrying an unlicensed firearm—indicates a cavalier attitude towards *gun safety regulations*. Neither offense strikes me as frivolous or “non-serious.”



right guaranteed to them by the Constitution. *Heller* says that the “core” Second Amendment right is the “right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.”<sup>228</sup> The plaintiffs say that they are now “law-abiding, responsible citizens”—so why should they be unable to protect themselves and their families with a gun?

As understandable as that intuition may be, our emerging law of the Second Amendment does not permit this kind of as-applied challenge. First, *Heller* establishes a clear rule: statutes like § 922(g)(1) are “longstanding prohibitions” that are “presumptively lawful.”<sup>229</sup> Interpreting that directive, our Court has said that Congress may permissibly disqualify certain people from asserting their Second Amendment rights on a categorical basis.<sup>230</sup> As a matter of tradition and history, persons who commit felonies and misdemeanors punishable by more than two years in prison (which are felonies in all but name) fall into that category. Second, even if we were to consider the plaintiffs’ challenges under the rubric of intermediate scrutiny, Congress has reasonably concluded that persons who commit crimes are also likelier to commit gun violence. Because § 922(g)(1) is appropriately tailored to address that problem, the plaintiffs’ challenges must fail.

The plaintiffs’ suggestion that we should get into the business of issuing individualized exceptions to the felon-in-possession ban is, in the final analysis, admin-

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<sup>228</sup> *Heller*, 554 U.S. at 635.

<sup>229</sup> *Id.* at 626-27 & n.26.

<sup>230</sup> *Marzzarella*, 614 F.3d at 92.

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istratively unworkable and constitutionally suspect. By affirming the plaintiffs' challenges today, I fear my colleagues are sending our nascent law of the Second Amendment into a doctrinal Labyrinth from which it may not soon return.

I therefore respectfully dissent.

**APPENDIX B**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

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Civil Action No. 13-cv-06750

DANIEL BINDERUP, PLAINTIFF

*v.*

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND B. TODD JONES,  
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO,  
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES, DEFENDANTS

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Filed: Sept. 25, 2014

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**OPINION**

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APPEARANCES

ON BEHALF OF PLAINTIFF

Alan Gura, Esquire

Douglas T. Gould, Esquire

ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS

Stuart F. Delery, Esquire

Assistant Attorney General

Dianne Kelleher, Esquire

Assistant Branch Director, United States De-  
partment of Justice

Daniel Riess, Esquire,

Trial Attorney, United States Department of  
Justice

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Lesley Farby, Esquire  
Trial Attorney, United States Department of  
Justice  
Zane David Memeger, Esquire  
United States Attorney  
Annetta Foster Givhan, Esquire  
Assistant United States Attorney

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This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment filed February 20, 2014 ("Defendants' Motion"), and Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 10, 2014 ("Plaintiff's Motion").

For the reasons expressed below, I grant Defendants' Motion in part, dismiss it as moot in part, and deny it in part. I grant Plaintiff's Motion in part and deny it in part. I grant summary judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on Count One of the Complaint filed November 21, 2013. I grant summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants on Count Two.

#### **SUMMARY OF DECISION**

Plaintiff Daniel Binderup brings this federal civil rights action pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, against defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, and defendant B. Todd Jones, Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives.

In 1998, plaintiff pled guilty to one count of Corruption of minors in violation of section 6301 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301. Under Pennsylvania law, Corruption of minors is classified as a misdemeanor of the first degree. As such, it is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than five years. 18 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 106, and 6301.

Under federal criminal law, it is a crime for a person "who has been convicted in any court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" to, among other things, "possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive

any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).<sup>1</sup> This is colloquially referred to as the federal “felon-in-possession” offense.<sup>2</sup>

In Count One of his Complaint, plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring defendants from enforcing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) against him because his prior Pennsylvania state conviction does not fall within the scope of § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition.

Because, as discussed further below, plaintiff was convicted of an offense “punishable by”—that is, subject to a maximum possible penalty of—five years imprisonment, he is subject to § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition notwithstanding the fact that Pennsylvania law labels Corruption of minors as a misdemeanor. Accordingly, I grant Defendants’ Motion, deny Plaintiff’s Motion, and enter summary judgment in favor of defendants

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<sup>1</sup> Whenever “§ 922(g)(1)” and “§ 921(a)(20)(B)” appear in this Opinion, such reference is always to Title 18 of the United States Code.

<sup>2</sup> Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 39, 113 S. Ct. 1913, 1915, 123 L. Ed. 2d 598, 604 (1993).

Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “felon” as “[a] person who has been convicted of a felony” and, in turn, defines the term “felony” as “[a] serious crime [usually] punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or by death.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, at 693-694 (9th ed. 2009).

That treatment is consistent with the Supreme Court’s use of the term “felon-in-possession offense” to describe § 922(g)(1) in that § 922(g)(1) applies to any person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”—that is, it applies to felons, as that term is commonly understood. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

and against plaintiff on the statutory claim in Count One. Therefore, I dismiss Defendants' Motion as moot to the extent it seeks to dismiss Count One.

In Count Two of his Complaint, plaintiff seeks a declaration that, as applied to him,<sup>3</sup> § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and, as in Count One, injunctive relief barring defendants from enforcing § 922(g)(1) against plaintiff.

As further discussed below, plaintiff distinguishes himself from those individuals traditionally disarmed as the result of prior criminal conduct and demonstrates that he poses no greater threat of future violent criminal activity than the average law-abiding citizen. Therefore, he prevails on his as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) on Second-Amendment grounds under the framework for such claims set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011).

Accordingly, I grant Plaintiff's Motion, deny Defendants' Motion, and enter summary judgment in favor

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<sup>3</sup> There are, generally, two types of challenges which a party may raise which attack the constitutionality of a statute: facial challenges and as-applied challenges.

In order to succeed on a facial challenge to the constitutionality of a particular statutory provision, the challenging party must demonstrate that there is no set of circumstances under which the statutory provision could be applied without violating the constitution. See United States v. Mitchell, 652 F.3d 387, 415 (3d Cir. 2011).

By contrast, a party seeking to prevail on an as-applied challenge must demonstrate that, under the specific circumstances presented in the case, he was deprived of a constitutional right. Id. at 406.



of defendants and against plaintiff on the constitutional claim in Count Two.

**JURISDICTION**

This court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 because plaintiff's claims each present a substantial federal question.

**VENUE**

Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1)(B) and (C) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, and plaintiff resides, in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, which located within this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. §§ 118, 1391.

**PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

Plaintiff initiated this federal civil-rights declaratory action by filing his Complaint on November 21, 2013.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment was filed February 20, 2014.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Defendants' Motion was filed together with

- (A) Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment ("Defendants' Memorandum in Support");
- (B) Exhibit 1 to Defendants' Motion, Police Criminal Complaint filed September 30, 1997 in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Binderup, Crim. No. 4127-1997 (C.C.P., Lanc. Co.) (redacted);

On March 10, 2014 Plaintiff's Motion,<sup>5</sup> and Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Oppo-

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- (C) Exhibit 2 to Defendants' Motion, Sentencing Order and Guilty Plea each dated July 15, 1998, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Binderup, Crim. No. 4127-1997 (C.C.P., Lanc. Co.) (redacted);
  - (D) Exhibit 3 to Defendants' Motion, United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Fact Sheet: Profile of Nonviolent Offenders Exiting State Prisons (Oct. 2004) (hereinafter, "D.O.J., B.J.S. Fact Sheet");
  - (E) Exhibit 4 to Defendants' Motion, Mona A. Wright, et al., Effectiveness of Denial of Handgun Purchase to Persons Believed to Be at High Risk for Firearm Violence, 89 AM. J. OF PUBLIC HEALTH 88 (Jan. 1999) (hereinafter, "Wright et al., Effectiveness of Denial");
  - (F) Exhibit 5 to Defendants' Motion, Robert Miller, Preventing Adolescent Pregnancy and Associated Risks, 41 CAN. FAM. PHYSICIAN 1525 (Sept. 1995);
  - (G) Exhibit 6 to Defendants' Motion, R. Rivera, et al., Contraception for Adolescents: Social, Clinical and Service Delivery Considerations, 75 INT'L J. GYNEC. & OBSTET. 149 (2001);
  - (H) Exhibit 7 to Defendants' Motion, Marcia L. Shew, et al., Interval Between Menarche and First Sexual Intercourse, Related to Risk of Human Papillomavirus Infection, 125 J. PEDIATRICS 661 (Oct. 1994); and
  - (I) Exhibit 8 to Defendants' Motion, Amahuario A. Edebiri, Cervical Intraepithelial Neoplasia: The Role of Age at First Coitus in Its Etiology, 35 J. REPROD. MED. 256 (Mar. 1990).

<sup>5</sup> Plaintiff's Motion was filed together with

- (A) Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support"); and

sition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition"), were each filed.

On April 10, 2014, with leave of court, Defendants' Combined Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss or For Summary Judgment ("Defendants' Combined Opposition and Reply Brief") was filed.<sup>6</sup>

On June 6, 2014, plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority concerning the Opinion of the United States Supreme Court issued on June 2, 2014 in Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 189 L. Ed. 2d 1 (U.S. 2014).

Oral argument on the within motions was held before me on June 16, 2014. At the close of oral argument, I took this matter under advisement. Hence this Opinion.

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(B) Declaration of Daniel Binderup executed March 7, 2014, together with

- (i) Exhibit A to Declaration of Daniel Binderup, Criminal Docket Entry, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Daniel Richard Binderup, Docket Number CP-36-CR-0004127-1997 (C.C.P., Lanc. Co.); and
- (ii) Exhibit B to Declaration of Daniel Binderup, Order dated and filed June 1, 2009 in Daniel Binderup v. Restoration of Firearm Rights, Docket Number MD 314-2009 (C.C.P., Lanc. Co.).

<sup>6</sup> Defendants' Combined Opposition and Reply Brief was filed together with Exhibit 1 thereto, a copy of John E. Wetzel, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Recidivism Report 2013 (released February 8, 2013) ("Pa. D.O.C. Recidivism Report 2013").

**STANDARD OF REVIEW**

Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to seek summary judgment with respect to a claim or defense, or part of a claim or defense. Rule 56(a) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); National Association for the Advancement of Colored People “NAACP” v. North Hudson Regional Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2012).

For a fact to be considered material, it “must have the potential to alter the outcome of the case.” Id. (citing Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006)). Disputes concerning facts which are irrelevant or unnecessary do not preclude the district court from granting summary judgment. Id.

Where a party asserts that a particular fact is, or cannot be, genuinely disputed, the party must provide support for its assertion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Rule 56(c)(1) provides that a party may support its factual assertions by

- (A) citing particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
- (B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dis-

pute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, the district court must view the facts and record evidence presented “in the light most favorable to the non[-]moving party.” North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 475 (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007)).

If the moving party shows that there is no genuine issue of fact for trial, “the non-moving party then bears the burden of identifying evidence that creates a genuine dispute regarding material facts.” Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)).

Where a defendant seeks summary judgment, the plaintiff cannot avert summary judgment with speculation, or by resting on the allegations in his pleadings, but rather he must present competent evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in his favor. Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E. for M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir 1999); Woods v. Bentsen, 889 F. Supp. 179, 184 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (Reed, J.).

“Ultimately, [w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” North Hudson, 665 F.3d at 475 (quoting Matsushita Electric Industries Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986)) (internal quotations omitted and alteration in original).

**FACTS**

Upon consideration of the pleadings, record papers, exhibits, and declarations, the following facts are undisputed.

**Parties**

Plaintiff Daniel Binderup resides in Manheim, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. He is over the age of 21. He is not presently under indictment. He has never been convicted of a crime of domestic violence (felony or misdemeanor). He is not an unlawful user of, or addicted to, any controlled substance.<sup>7</sup>

He has never been discharged from the armed forces under dishonorable conditions. He has never renounced his United States citizenship. He has never been subject to a restraining order related to an intimate partner. He has never been adjudicated a mental defective or committed to a mental institution.<sup>8</sup>

Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr. is the Attorney General of the United States. Defendant B. Todd Jones is the Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives within the United States Department of Justice.<sup>9</sup>

**Facts Underlying Plaintiff's Claims**

Mr. Binderup presently intends to purchase and possess a handgun and a long gun within his own home to defend himself and his family.<sup>10</sup> However, sixteen

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<sup>7</sup> Declaration of Daniel Binderup at ¶¶ 1 and 3.

<sup>8</sup> Declaration of Daniel Binderup at ¶¶ 1 and 3.

<sup>9</sup> Complaint at ¶¶ 2 and 3.

<sup>10</sup> Declaration of Daniel Binderup at ¶ 2.

years ago, on July 15, 1998, Mr. Binderup pled guilty and was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania of one count of Corruption of minors in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301(a).<sup>11</sup>

Pennsylvania classifies the offense of Mr. Binderup's conviction as a misdemeanor of the first degree, which is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of five years. Mr. Binderup's offense of conviction did not carry a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment. See 18 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 106(b)(6), and 6301(a). Mr. Binderup was sentenced to, and served, a term of three years' probation. He paid court costs and restitution, as required. He was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment for his conviction.<sup>12</sup>

The charge and his conviction stemmed from a romantic affair that Mr. Binderup conducted with a seventeen-year-old employee of his bakery business. Mr. Binderup was 41 years old at the time of the relationship. Thus, Mr. Binderup (the employer) was 24 years older than his mistress (the employee).<sup>13</sup>

Mr. Binderup acknowledges that what he did was wrong. His wife forgave him and they remain married. He currently owns and operates a plumbing business and has not been convicted of any further offenses.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Id. at ¶ 4.

<sup>12</sup> Declaration of Daniel Binderup at ¶ 6.

<sup>13</sup> Id. at ¶ 5.

<sup>14</sup> Id. at ¶ 7.

On June 1, 2009, the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County granted a petition by Mr. Binderup pursuant to 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6105(d) to remove his disqualification from owning or possession firearms which was imposed under Pennsylvania law as the result of his 1997 conviction for Corruption of minors.<sup>15</sup>

Although his Pennsylvania state-law disqualification has been lifted and he desires to own and possess firearms for self-defense in his home, Mr. Binderup refrains from purchasing or possessing a firearm for that purpose because he fears arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment by federal authorities under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Moreover, the requisite form for the purchase of a firearm asks whether the prospective purchaser has been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of imprisonment. Mr. Binderup is unwilling to answer in the negative (for fear of prosecution for False statements to a federal firearms licensee). Should he disclose his conviction on such form, all federal firearms licensees will be prohibited from selling a firearm to him. Thus, Mr. Binderup is prevented from obtaining a firearm from a federally-licensed dealer.<sup>16</sup>

#### **CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES**

Defendants contend that plaintiff's claims should be dismissed or summary judgment should be entered in their favor because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) applies to plaintiff, and application of that statute to plaintiff does not violate his rights under the the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.

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<sup>15</sup> Id. at ¶ 8, and Exhibit B to Declaration of Daniel Binderup.

<sup>16</sup> Declaration of Daniel Binderup at ¶¶ 9-11.



Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to summary judgment in his favor because § 922(g)(1) does not apply to him based upon his prior criminal conviction. He also argues, alternatively, that § 922(g)(1), as applied to him, violates the Second Amendment.

### DISCUSSION

#### Plaintiff's Statutory Claim (Count One)

As noted above, in Count One of his Complaint, plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief barring defendants from enforcing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) against him because his prior Pennsylvania state conviction for Corruption of minors in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301 does not fall within the scope of § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition.

As it pertains to plaintiff, § 922(g)(1) provides that [i]t shall be unlawful for any person—

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

\* \* \*

to . . . possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The term “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” is defined by the statute, in pertinent part, as follows:

(20) The term “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” *does not include*—

\* \* \*

(B) *any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.*

What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).

**“Punishable by”**

Plaintiff claims that his prior Pennsylvania state conviction for Corruption of minors in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301(a) does not fall within the scope of § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition because it was for a “State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less” and, therefore, is excluded from § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition by the definition set forth in § 921(a)(20)(B).

The parties agree that Pennsylvania classifies the offense of Mr. Binderup’s conviction as a Misdemeanor of the first degree and that the maximum possible punishment for such an offense is not more than five

years imprisonment. Thus, the determinative question as to Count One is whether plaintiff's prior offense of conviction is "punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less". 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B).

As explained by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, § 922(g)(1) does not actually require a person to have been convicted of a felony. Rather, the statute requires a person to have been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, but that crime may not be a state-law misdemeanor which is punishable by imprisonment for a term of two years or less. United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.3d 64, 69 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing § 922(g)(1) and § 921(a)(20)(B)).

Plaintiff contends that the phrase "punishable by" is subject to multiple interpretations.<sup>17</sup> Plaintiff contends that the phrase "punishable by" can, and should, be interpreted to mean "capable of being punished [by]".<sup>18</sup> As described further below, the interpretation of the phrase "punishable by" as used in § 922(g)(1) and § 921(a)(20) which has been applied by the courts takes "punishable by" to mean "subject to a maximum possible penalty of".

The Schoolcraft case involved a direct appeal from defendant Schoolcraft's conviction under § 922(g)(1). The prior conviction underlying that federal § 922(g)(1) charge was a Pennsylvania state-court conviction for Robbery. See Schoolcraft, 879 F.3d at 66. Under Pennsylvania law, the lowest classification for Robbery is as a felony of the third degree.

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<sup>17</sup> Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support at page 8.

<sup>18</sup> Id. at page 9.

18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3701. Third-degree felonies under Pennsylvania law are punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than seven years. 18 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 106, 1103.

In Schoolcraft, the Third Circuit rejected defendant's insufficient-evidence challenge to his conviction, which challenge was based on the argument that the government failed to prove at trial that he had a prior conviction which fell within § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition. Schoolcraft, 879 F.3d at 69.

In holding that the government provided sufficient evidence of defendant's guilt under § 922(g)(1), the Third Circuit concluded that defendant's prior Pennsylvania conviction for Robbery was a qualifying predicate conviction and that the government provided sufficient evidence defendant's guilt under § 922(g)(1). Schoolcraft, 879 F.3d at 70. Specifically, Third Circuit explained that

[t]he robbery Schoolcraft had been previously convicted of could not have been a misdemeanor, *nor could it have been "punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less."* We have reviewed the relevant Pennsylvania statutes, which show the crime of robbery as a felony and the *maximum sentences* ranging from seven to twenty years . . . . In sum, the testimony established that Schoolcraft had been convicted of a crime punishable for a term exceeding one year and that the crime was not a misdemeanor subject to a sentence of two years or less.

Id. (citing 18 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 1103, 3701) (emphasis added and internal citations omitted).

In other words, defendant Schoolcraft was not saved by § 921(a)(20)(B)—the same definitional exclusion relied on by plaintiff Binderup—both because Robbery (unlike Corruption of minors) is never classified as a misdemeanor under Pennsylvania law, and because the lowest maximum possible sentence for Robbery (that is, for Robbery as a third-degree felony) is a term of imprisonment of not more than seven years.

In sum, the Third Circuit in Schoolcraft looked to the maximum permissible sentence to determine whether defendant Schoolcraft’s prior Robbery conviction was for an offense “punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less” for purposes of the § 921(a)(20)(B) exclusion. 879 F.3d at 69-70.

Subsequent to the Schoolcraft case, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968 (3d Cir. 1993), rejected the argument raised that the term “punishable” in § 921(a)(20) “means *actually* ‘punished’ by a year or more of incarceration.” Essig, 10 F.3d at 972 (emphasis added).<sup>19</sup> There, the Third Circuit stated that the United States Supreme Court “has clearly established that *it is the potential sentence that controls* and not the one actually imposed . . . .” Id. At 973 (citing Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 113, 103 S. Ct. 986, 992, 74 L. Ed. 2d 845 (1983)) (emphasis added).<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> In Essig, defendant’s counsel on collateral appeal conceded that “‘a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year’ is a crime for which the *maximum permissible sentence*, rather than the time actually served, is more than one year under currently controlling caselaw.” Essig, 10 F.3d at 972.

<sup>20</sup> Indeed, here the parties are in agreement that it is not the actual sentence imposed which is relevant to the “punishable by”

The Opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 128 S. Ct. 475, 169 L. Ed. 2d 432 (2007) further confirms that the phrase “punishable by” in § 921(a)(20)(B) is to be interpreted by reference to the maximum possible punishment for the underlying offense.

In Logan, defendant-petitioner James D. Logan pled guilty to one count of possession of a firearm in violation of § 922(g)(1). Because of his criminal record, which included three Minnesota state-law misdemeanor convictions, Mr. Logan was subject to (and the district court imposed) a mandatory minimum fifteen-year term of imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (hereinafter “ACCA”).<sup>21</sup> Logan, 552 U.S. at 26, 128 S. Ct. at 478, 169 L. Ed. 2d at 437.

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inquiry under §§ 922(g)(1) and 921(a)(20). They are in agreement that it is the potential punishment for the prior offense that matters. Their disagreement is whether the relevant potential punishment is the “maximum permissible” punishment (the position advanced by defendants) or the “whole range of permissible punishments” (the position advanced by plaintiff).

<sup>21</sup> The Supreme Court explained the ACCA in Logan:

Federal law generally prohibits the possession of a firearm by a person convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Ordinarily, the maximum felon-in-possession sentence is ten years. See § 924(a)(2). If the offender’s prior criminal record includes at least three convictions for “violent felon[ies]” or “serious drug offense[s],” however, the maximum sentence increases to life, and ACCA mandates a minimum term of 15 years. § 924(e)(1) (2000 ed., Supp. V).

Logan, 552 U.S. at 27, 128 S. Ct. at 479, 169 L. Ed. 2d at 437.

Mr. Logan appealed the district court's application of the ACCA sentence enhancement, contending that none of his Minnesota misdemeanor convictions qualified as a predicate "violent felony", because those convictions did not cause the loss of his civil rights. Logan, 552 U.S. at 29, 128 S. Ct. at 480-481, 169 L. Ed. 2d at 439. The Supreme Court upheld the application of the ACCA sentence enhancement to Mr. Logan based upon his three prior Minnesota misdemeanor convictions.

The statutory definition provided by § 921(a)(20) of the term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" applies to both § 922(g)(1) (the substantive felon-in-possession offense) and § 924(e) (the ACCA sentencing enhancement). Thus, the misdemeanor exception at issue here is the same misdemeanor exception discussed by the Supreme Court in Logan.

The sentence enhancement provided for by the ACCA applies only to certain predicate offenses, including "violent felon[ies]". See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). As the Supreme Court in Logan explained:

Congress defined the term "violent felony" to include specified crimes "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." § 924(e)(2)(B) (2000 ed.). *An offense classified by a State as a misdemeanor, however, may qualify as a "violent felony" for ACCA-enhancement purposes (or as a predicate for a felon-in-possession conviction under § 922(g)) only if the offense is punishable by more than two years in prison. § 921(a)(20)(B).*

Logan, 552 U.S. at 27, 128 S. Ct. at 479, 169 L. Ed. 2d at 437-438 (emphasis added).

The Court further stated that § 921(a)(20)(B) “places within ACCA’s reach state misdemeanor convictions punishable by more than two years imprisonment” and “[a]n offender would fall within ACCA’s reach if his three prior convictions carried potential prison terms of over two years . . . .” Logan, 552 U.S. at 34-35, 128 S. Ct. at 483, 169 L. Ed. 2d at 442.

Moreover, the Court in Logan noted that Minnesota state law had subsequently been amended to reduce the maximum term of imprisonment for misdemeanors to a maximum of two years and “thus [Minnesota] no longer has any misdemeanors that qualify as ACCA predicates”—that is, all Minnesota misdemeanors fall within the misdemeanor exception because none is subject to a maximum term of imprisonment of greater than two years. Logan, 552 U.S. at 29, 128 S. Ct. at 483, 169 L. Ed. 2d at 442.

The Opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Logan confirms what was established by reading the Opinions of the Third Circuit in Schoolcraft and Essig together. Namely, that the phrase “punishable by” in § 921(a)(20)(B) concerns the maximum potential punishment for the state-law misdemeanor offenses and means, more specifically, “subject to a maximum possible punishment of”.

Most recently—and subsequent to the United States Supreme Court decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008)—the issue of whether a Pennsylvania first-degree misdemeanor conviction qualified as a predi-



cate prior conviction to disqualify an individual from lawfully possessing a firearm under § 922(g)(1) was addressed by my colleague, Senior United States District Judge Berle M. Schiller and the Third Circuit on appeal. Dutton v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 2012 WL 3020651, at \*1 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2012) (Schiller, S.J.) (“Dutton I”), aff’d 503 Fed. Appx. 125 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Dutton II”).

There, plaintiff Kelly Dutton pro se brought claims against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania State Police, and the Attorney General of Pennsylvania under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that those defendants were unlawfully prohibiting him from purchasing a firearm. Dutton I, 2012 WL 3020651, at \*1.

Plaintiff Dutton had two prior Pennsylvania state-law convictions for first-degree misdemeanors, which are punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of five years. Dutton I, 2012 WL 3020651, at \*1 (citing 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 106(b)(6)). Plaintiff Dutton contended that § 922(g)(1) applies only to felonies and misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence and that he was not subject to § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition because his misdemeanor crimes were not domestic violence offenses. Dutton I, 2012 WL 3020651, at \*1.

Judge Schiller concluded that plaintiff Dutton’s prior Pennsylvania convictions for first-degree misdemeanors fell within § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition and, thus, precluded him from obtaining a firearm permit. Accordingly, Judge Schiller granted defendants’ motion to dismiss Mr. Dutton’s claims.

In reaching that conclusion, Judge Schiller reasoned that a crime classified as a first-degree misdemeanor under Pennsylvania law carries a maximum penalty of five years imprisonment and, accordingly, “a Pennsylvania first-degree misdemeanor conviction does not satisfy the Section 921(a)(20) exception to Section 922(g)(1) . . . .” Dutton I, 2012 WL 3020651, at \*3. Adoption of the interpretation of “punishable by” which defendants advance here is implicit in Judge Schiller’s conclusion in Dutton I.

Plaintiff Dutton appealed. By per curiam Opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarily affirmed Judge Schiller’s decision to grant defendants’ motion and dismiss plaintiff’s claims. Dutton II, 503 Fed. Appx. at 126. In doing so, the Third Circuit explained that § 922(g)(1)

prohibits individuals who have been convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” from possessing a firearm. However, this term specifically does not include “any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B). While both of Dutton’s previous convictions are classified as first degree misdemeanors in Pennsylvania, . . . , first degree misdemeanors carry a *maximum penalty* of five years’ incarceration, 18 Pa. [C.S.A.] § 106(b)(6). Accordingly, *a conviction for a first degree misdemeanor in Pennsylvania does not satisfy the exception created in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) . . . .*

Dutton II, 503 Fed. Appx. at 127 (internal citations omitted and emphasis added). As with the district

court's decision there, the Third Circuit in Dutton II—albeit in a non-precedential Opinion—implicitly adopted the interpretation of “punishable by” which is advanced by defendants here.

The cases discussed above demonstrate that the phrase “punishable by”, as utilized in § 921(a)(20) and § 922(g)(1), concerns the maximum, (see Schoolcraft, supra), potential, (see Essig, supra), term of imprisonment applicable to a particular prior state-law conviction. Judge Schiller's Opinion in Dutton I, and the summary affirmance thereof by the Third Circuit in Dutton II confirms the propriety of looking to the maximum possible term of imprisonment for an offense to determine whether that offense is “punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” under § 922(g)(1) or “punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less” under § 921(a)(20)(B). Dutton II, 503 Fed. Appx. at 127; Dutton I, 2012 WL 3020651, at \*3.

Here, plaintiff's prior conviction for Corruption of minors is a first-degree misdemeanor under Pennsylvania law and, as such, is punishable by a maximum possible term of five years imprisonment. Accordingly, based upon the case law discussed above, plaintiff's prior conviction falls within § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition and is not excluded therefrom by § 921(a)(20)(B). Therefore, I deny Plaintiff's Motion, grant Defendants' Motion, and enter summary judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on plaintiff's claim in Count One of the Complaint.

### Rule of Lenity

In support of his claim in Count One, plaintiff contends that the rule of lenity requires the adoption of his preferred “capable of” interpretation of the statutory phrase “punishable by” in § 922(g)(1) and § 921(a)(20).<sup>22</sup> Defendants contend that the rule of lenity is inapplicable here because the court is not faced with a grievous statutory ambiguity.<sup>23</sup>

The Third Circuit has described the operation of the rule of lenity as follows:

In interpreting an ambiguous criminal statute, the court should resolve the ambiguity in the defendant’s favor. The rule of lenity applies in those situations in which a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the statute. *The rule is not properly invoked simply because a statute requires consideration and interpretation to confirm its meaning. It applies only if there is such grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in a statute that, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, the Court can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.*

United States v. Kouevi, 698 F.3d 126, 138 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 315 (3d Cir. 2009)) (emphasis added).

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<sup>22</sup> Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support at pages 7-8.

<sup>23</sup> Defendants’ Combined Opposition and Reply Brief at pages 6-7.

While plaintiff posits an alternative interpretation of the phrase “punishable by” in § 922(g)(1) and § 921(a)(20), “[t]he simple existence of some statutory ambiguity . . . is not sufficient to warrant application of the rule of lenity, for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree.” Kouevi, 698 F.3d at 138 (quoting Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 577, 129 S. Ct. 1849, 173 L. Ed. 2d 785 (2009)).

Given the consistent interpretation and application of “punishable by” with reference to the maximum possible punishment for the offense of conviction, I conclude that the phrase “punishable by” is not so grievously ambiguous so as to warrant application of the rule of lenity to support adoption of plaintiff’s preferred interpretation of that phrase.

#### **Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance**

Additionally, plaintiff urges the court to adopt his proposed interpretation of the phrase “punishable by” based on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.<sup>24</sup>

Specifically, plaintiff contends that if his “capable of” interpretation of the phrase “punishable by” is rejected in favor of the “subject to a maximum possible punishment of” interpretation—that is, in favor of the interpretation which has been applied uniformly to date by courts interpreting the § 922(g)(1) prohibition and the § 921(a)(20)(B) misdemeanor exception—then the § 922(g)(1) prohibition will be applied to plaintiff and others like him who have been convicted of non-violent state-law misdemeanor offenses with a maximum possible punishment greater than two years im-

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<sup>24</sup> Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support at pages 13-15.

prisonment but who nonetheless could have (and may well have) been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of less than two years or even a non-custodial sentence.

Moreover, plaintiff contends that he and other individuals convicted of non-violent state-law misdemeanors are at low risk of recidivism, pose no greater threat to society than a typical law-abiding citizen, and will therefore be able to present serious as-applied post-Heller Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1).<sup>25</sup> Because of the potential for such as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1), plaintiff contends that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance compels the court to adopt his “capable of” interpretation of the phrase “punishable by”.<sup>26</sup>

Defendant contends that the doctrine of constitutional avoidance does not compel adoption of plaintiff’s proposed interpretation of “punishable by” because application of § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition to plaintiff creates no serious constitutional question to be avoided.<sup>27</sup>

“[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.” Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S. Ct. 1904, 146 L. Ed. 2d 902 (2000) (quoting United States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408, 53 L. Ed. 836, 29 S. Ct. 527 (1909)).

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<sup>25</sup> See Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support at page 15.

<sup>26</sup> Id.

<sup>27</sup> Defendants Combined Opposition and Reply Brief at page 7.

The Third Circuit has explained that

[t]he doctrine of constitutional avoidance applies “[w]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems.” Edward D. Debartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building and Construction Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S. Ct. 1392, 99 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1988). In such instances, “the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” *Id.* *Before this canon of interpretation may be used, there must exist a doubt as to the meaning of the statute.*

United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 567 n.7 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).

Here, although plaintiff disagrees with the case law interpreting the phrase “punishable by” as used in § 922(g)(1) and § 921(a)(20)(B) and posits an alternative interpretation of that phrase, the case law interpreting and applying the phrase “punishable by” in those statutory provisions leaves no doubt that the meaning of the phrase “punishable by” concerns the maximum possible punishment for a particular offense, and does not concern the full range of conceivable punishments permissible for that offense.

Accordingly, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance does not mandate adoption of plaintiff’s proposed interpretation of “punishable by” which would, in turn, place plaintiff’s underlying Pennsylvania first-degree misdemeanor conviction for Corruption of minors conviction within the misdemeanor exception created by § 921(a)(20)(B) to § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition.

I also note that, on June 6, 2014, in advance of the June 16, 2014 oral argument on the within motions, plaintiff filed a Notice of Supplemental Authority concerning the Opinion of the United States Supreme Court issued on June 2, 2014 in Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 189 L. Ed. 2d 1 (U.S. 2014).

Plaintiff contends that the Bond case<sup>28</sup> provides further support for plaintiff's proposed interpretation

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<sup>28</sup> The Bond case arose in this judicial district. Carol Anne Bond, a microbiologist from Lansdale, Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, discovered that her closest friend Myrlinda Haynes was pregnant. Ms. Bond came to learn that her husband was the father of Ms. Haynes child. Ms. Bond sought revenge. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085, 189 L. Ed. 2d at 8-9.

Specifically, Ms. Bond procured two chemicals online from Amazon.com—each of which is toxic to humans and lethal in high-enough doses—and went to Ms. Haynes home 24 times over 8 months where she spread the chemicals on Ms. Haynes mailbox (she also removed some of Ms. Haynes mail), car door, and door-knob. The chemicals are visible to the eye and Ms. Haynes saw the substance (and avoided touching it) on all but one occasion when Ms. Haynes touched the substance and suffered a minor chemical burn on her thumb. Ms. Bond was charged with two counts of theft of mail, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708, and two counts of possessing and using a chemical weapon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 229(a). Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085, 189 L. Ed. 2d at 8-9.

Ms. Bond contended that the § 229 did not reach her conduct because the statute's exception for the use of chemicals for "peaceful purposes", see 18 U.S.C. § 229F(1)(A), (7)(A), must be understood in contradistinction to "warlike" purposes and that her conduct (even if reprehensible) was not warlike. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2086, 189 L. Ed. 2d at 9-10.

In addition to that statutory argument, Ms. Bond also raised a constitutional argument that § 229, as applied to her conduct, is not necessary and proper means of executing the federal government's



of “punishable by” pursuant to the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.<sup>29</sup>

Ms. Bond, as Mr. Binderup does here, presented both a statutory claim and a constitutional claim. And, as plaintiff notes,<sup>30</sup> the Supreme Court reiterated there that “it is ‘a well-established principle governing the prudent exercise of this Court’s jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case.’” Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087, 189 L. Ed. 2d at 11 (quoting Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51, 104 S. Ct. 1577, 80 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1984) (per curiam)).

The Court in Bond did not rely upon this well-established principle to determine the appropriate reading of the statute and thereby answer the question presented by Ms. Bond’s statutory claim—the Court relied upon “basic principles of federalism embodied in the Constitution” to resolve the statutory question. 134 S. Ct. at 2090, 189 L. Ed. 2d at 14.

Rather, the Court relied upon that well-established principle—the principle of not deciding constitutional questions where such a decision is not necessary to the resolution of the case—in order to determine the sequence in which it would analyze the questions presented by Ms. Bond. 134 S. Ct. at 2087, 189 L. Ed. 2d at 11. In short, that well-established principle did not

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treaty power, U.S. CONST., Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and thereby violates the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2085-2087, 189 L. Ed. 2d at 9-10.

<sup>29</sup> Notice of Supplemental Authority at page 3.

<sup>30</sup> Id. at page 2.

drive the outcome of the statutory question in Bond but dictated that the statutory question must be addressed first.

Here, as the Court did in Bond, I address plaintiff's statutory claim first. That order of analysis is consistent with the maxim that a court should "not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case." Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087, 189 L. Ed. 2d at 11 (internal quotations omitted). Unlike Bond, however, disposition of plaintiff's statutory claim (because plaintiff does not succeed on that claim, as explained above) does not obviate the need to reach his constitutional claim.

For all of the reasons expressed above, plaintiff is subject to § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition and I enter summary judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on plaintiff's statutory claim asserted in Count One of the Complaint. Accordingly, I now turn to plaintiff's constitutional claim asserted in Count Two.

#### **Plaintiff's Constitutional Claim (Count Two)**

In Count Two of his Complaint, plaintiff seeks a declaration that, as applied to him, § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and requests injunctive relief barring defendants from enforcing § 922(g)(1) against him.

#### **Applicable Framework**

Initially, I address the issue of the appropriate framework is to be applied in resolving the question presented by plaintiff's claim in Count Two.

*Contentions of the Parties*

Defendants' Memorandum in Support of their motion to dismiss or for summary judgment addresses plaintiff's as-applied Second Amendment claim primarily under the means-end framework set forth by the Third Circuit in United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 958, 178 L. Ed. 2d 790 (U.S. 2011).<sup>31</sup> Under that framework, defendants contend that plaintiff's Second Amendment claim fails because there is a reasonable fit between § 922(g)(1), as applied to plaintiff, and the government's important interest in protecting public safety and reducing crime.<sup>32</sup>

However, Defendants' Memorandum in Support also cites the Opinion of the Third Circuit in United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011). Defendants contend that under the framework set forth in Barton, plaintiff's as-applied Second Amendment Claim fails because he was convicted of a serious (rather than a minor) crime and because he cannot demonstrate that he is fundamentally different from persons historically excluded from Second Amendment protections.<sup>33</sup>

Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of his motion for summary judgment contends that Barton provides the applicable roadmap for addressing plaintiff's as-applied Second Amendment claim.<sup>34</sup> Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to defendants' motion to dis-

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<sup>31</sup> See Defendants' Memorandum in Support at pages 6-24.

<sup>32</sup> Id. at page 24.

<sup>33</sup> Defendants' Memorandum in Support at pages 18-19, and 24.

<sup>34</sup> Id. at page 17.

miss or for summary judgment contends that the means-end framework set forth in Marzzarella does not apply to plaintiff's as-applied challenge and Barton controls.<sup>35</sup>

Defendants' Combined Opposition and Reply Brief reasserts their position that Marzzarella governs the Second Amendment claim, but address Barton alternatively in the event that it controls.<sup>36</sup>

However, at oral argument, defendants' counsel argued in opposition first under Barton and then under Marzzarella. I inquired of defendants' counsel whether or not that order of argument reflected defendants' prediction that the Third Circuit would likely find Barton to be the governing framework appropriately applicable to plaintiff's claim in Count Two. Counsel responded, candidly, that defendants are not certain, think that Barton speaks more directly to as-applied challenges, and briefed the issue under both frameworks in an abundance of caution.<sup>37</sup>

For the reasons expressed below, I agree with plaintiff's position, and defendants' prediction, that the Opinion of the Third Circuit in Barton supplies the controlling framework for plaintiff's as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) in Count Two of the Complaint.

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<sup>35</sup> Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition at pages 4-5.

<sup>36</sup> Defendants' Combined Opposition and Reply Brief at page i.

<sup>37</sup> See Transcript of Motions Hearing Before the Honorable James Knoll Gardner, United States District Judge, held June 16, 2014 ("Transcript of Motion Hearing"), at pages 45-46.

*Supreme Court Precedent: Heller & McDonald*

The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST., amend. II.

In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637 (2008), the United States Supreme Court held that the right enshrined in the Second Amendment is an individual (rather than collective) right which is not conditional upon one’s service in the militia. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, 128 S. Ct. at 2799, 171 L. Ed. 2d at 659; see United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Heller, *supra*).

Specifically, the Heller Court held that—while the specific contours and substance of the right may be subject to further refinement if and when the issue is properly before the Court—the Second Amendment guarantees “the right of *law-abiding*, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 635, 128 S. Ct. at 2821, 171 L. Ed. 2d. at 683 (emphasis added). With respect to the District of Columbia’s “requirement that firearms *in the home* be rendered and kept inoperable at all times”, the Court stated that requirement “makes it impossible for citizens to use them for the *core lawful purpose of self-defense* and is hence unconstitutional.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 630, 128 S. Ct. at 2818, 171 L. Ed. 2d. at 680 (emphasis added).

Subsequently, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 177 L. Ed. 2d 894 (2010)—

where the Court held that the Second Amendment is incorporated pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and, thus, applies to state as well as the federal government—the Court explained that its earlier Opinion in Heller “point[ed] unmistakably” toward the conclusion that the right to keep and bear arms is fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty and deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition. McDonald, 561 U.S. at \_\_\_, 130 S. Ct. at 3036, 117 L. Ed. 2d at 914.

The Court in McDonald described the “central holding” of its Opinion in Heller as the conclusion that “the Second Amendment protects a personal right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes, most notably for self-defense within the home.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at \_\_\_, 130 S. Ct. at 3044, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 922.

In short, the Court has held that “the Second Amendment protects the right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense” which “is fundamental from an American perspective”. Id., 561 U.S. at \_\_\_, 130 S. Ct. at 3050, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 929.

Nevertheless, in recognizing the Second Amendment as protecting an individual right to keep and bear arms—and the core of that right being the right to keep and bear arms for the lawful purpose of defending one’s hearth and home—the Court in Heller stated expressly that

*nothing in [its] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive*

places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.

554 U.S. at 626-627, 128 S. Ct. at 2816-2817, 171 L. Ed. 2d. at 678 (emphasis added).

In a footnote at the end of the above-quoted sentence, the Court stated that it identified those “*presumptively lawful* regulatory measures only as examples” and that the “list does not purport to be exhaustive.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26, 128 S. Ct. at 2817, 171 L. Ed. 2d. at 678 (emphasis added).

Reiterating that point in McDonald, the Court stated that its holding in the Heller case “did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as ‘prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons . . . ,’” and “[d]espite [the] municipal respondents’ doomsday proclamations, incorporation [of the Second Amendment to the states] does not imperil every law regulating firearms.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at \_\_\_, 130 S. Ct. at 3047, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 926.

#### *Third Circuit Precedent*

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has had occasion to address claims pressed under the Second Amendment in the wake of the Opinions of the United States Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald. The Third Circuit has issued both precedential, see United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010), *cert. denied*, 131 S. Ct. 958, 178 L. Ed. 2d 790 (U.S. 2011); United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011), and non-precedential Opinions in those matters. See Dutton v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 503 Fed. Appx. 125 (3d Cir. 2012) (“Dut-

ton II”), affirming 2012 WL 3020651, at \*1 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2012) (Schiller, S.J.) (“Dutton I”). Each case bears examination and I address them in turn.

### Marzzarella

Defendant Micheal Marzzarella was charged with possession of a handgun with an obliterated serial number in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k).<sup>38</sup> Mr. Marzzarella filed a motion with the district court to dismiss the indictment charging him with that offense because § 922(k), as applied to him, violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Heller, *supra*. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 88. The district court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment.<sup>39</sup> Thereafter, Mr.

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<sup>38</sup> That provision states:

It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to transport, ship, or receive, in interstate or foreign commerce, any firearm which has had the importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number removed, obliterated, or altered or to possess or receive any firearm which has had the importer’s or manufacturer’s serial number removed, obliterated, or altered and has, at any time, been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 922(k). In other words, § 922(k) prohibits possession of any firearm which has had its serial number altered or destroyed, regardless of where such a firearm is possessed. See id.

<sup>39</sup> The district court denied the motion to dismiss, “holding that the Second Amendment does not protect a right to own handguns with obliterated serial numbers and that § 922(k) does not meaningfully burden the ‘core’ right recognized in Heller . . . .” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 88.

The district court further held that “because § 922(k) is designed to regulate the commercial sale of firearms and to prevent possession by a class of presumptively dangerous individuals, it is



Marzzarella entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to challenge the constitutionality of § 922(k) on appeal.

On appeal, this issue presented to the Third Circuit was “whether Defendant Micheal Marzzarella’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) for possession of a handgun with an obliterated serial number violates his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 87. The court held that it did not.

The Third Circuit in Marzzarella stated that it read Heller to suggest a two-pronged approach to Second Amendment challenges. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 90. Under the first prong, a court asks “whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. “If it does not, [the] inquiry is complete” and there is no Second Amendment violation.

“If it does, [the court] evaluate[s] the law under some form of means-end scrutiny.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. This means-end scrutiny is the second prong. “If the law passes muster under that [means-end] standard, it is constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid.” Id. at 89. The Third Circuit spoke of appli-

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analogous to several longstanding limitation on the right to bear arms identified as presumptively valid in Heller”, and “[f]inally, . . . that even if Marzzarella’s possession of the Titan pistol was protected by the Second Amendment, § 922(k) would pass muster under intermediate scrutiny as a constitutionally permissible regulation of Second Amendment Rights.” Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 88.

cation of this two-prong approach to Second Amendment challenges and did not limit its application exclusively to facial or as-applied challenges. See id.

With respect to the scope of the personal right guaranteed by the Second Amendment, the Third Circuit in Marzzarella stated:

Heller delineates some of the boundaries of the Second Amendment right to bear arms. At its core, the Second Amendment protects the right of law-abiding citizens to possess non-dangerous weapons for self-defense in the home. And certainly, to some degree, it must protect the right of law-abiding citizens to possess firearms for other, as-yet-undefined, lawful purposes. The right is not unlimited, however, as *the Second Amendment affords no protection for the possession of dangerous and unusual weapons, possession by felons and the mentally ill, and the carrying of weapons in certain sensitive places.*

Id. at 92 (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). There is no mention or suggestion anywhere in the court's Opinion that Mr. Marzzarella had any prior criminal convictions.

The Third Circuit rejected Mr. Marzzarella's argument that § 922(k) is unconstitutional because the Second Amendment categorically protects the right to possess unmarked firearms. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 93. Despite finding that "there is no categorical protection for unmarked firearms," the Third Circuit nevertheless stated that "[Mr.] Marzzarella's conduct may still fall within the Second Amendment because his possession of the Titan pistol in his home implicates

his interest in the defense of hearth and home—the core protection of the Second Amendment.” Id. at 94.

Ultimately, the Third Circuit determined that it did not need to resolve the question of whether the Second Amendment ensured the right to possess an unmarked firearm (that is, a handgun with an obliterated serial number) in the home because the court concluded that § 922(k) would pass constitutional muster under means-end scrutiny in the even that it did in fact burden Second-Amendment protected conduct. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 95. In other words, the Third Circuit concluded that it need not resolve the question posed by prong one because Mr. Marzzarella’s claim failed on prong two in any event.

With respect to prong two—the application of means-end scrutiny to the challenged statutory provision—the Third Circuit in Marzzarella concluded that intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, would apply to § 922(k).<sup>40</sup> The Third Circuit held that § 922(k) passed muster under intermediate scrutiny because preserving the ability of law enforcement officers to conduct serial-number tracing constitutes a substantial or important governmental interest, and there is a reasonable fit between that important interest (the end) and the prohibition of possession of un-

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<sup>40</sup> The court reached that conclusion by reasoning that § 922(k) did not prohibit the exercise of Mr. Marzzarella’s Second Amendment right to possess a firearm in his home for the purpose of self-defense. Rather, the court read § 922(k) as a regulation on the manner in which Mr. Marzzarella could exercise his Second Amendment right—that is, he could possess a firearm at home, but it could not be a firearm with an obliterated serial number. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97.

marked firearms (the means) employed to effectuate it. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 98-99.

Although the Third Circuit held that intermediate scrutiny applied to Mr. Marzzarella's claim, the court held (in the alternative) that the § 922(k) passed constitutional muster under strict scrutiny if that was the proper level of means-end scrutiny. Id. at 99. In so holding, the Third Circuit concluded that the government's interest in being able to trace and recover information about recovered firearms (and, in turn, to solve and potentially prevent crimes) is not only important, but compelling. Moreover, the Third Circuit concluded that, because there is no comprehensive inventory and tracing system other than the serial number system, § 922(k) is narrowly tailored to serve that compelling governmental interest. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 99-101.

In sum, the Third Circuit concluded that Mr. Marzzarella's conviction for violation of § 922(k) must stand because even if that statutory provision burdened Second-Amendment-protected conduct, § 922(k) passes muster under both intermediate and strict scrutiny. Id. at 101.

#### Barton

The Third Circuit next addressed a Second Amendment challenge to a provision of 18 U.S.C. § 922 in the Barton case. There, defendant James Barton was charged by indictment with two counts of being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)—the same provision which plaintiff Binderup challenges here. Barton, 633 F.3d at 170.

Like Mr. Marzzarella, Mr. Barton filed a motion to dismiss the Indictment on Second-Amendment grounds and, when the motion to dismiss was denied by the district court, entered conditional pleas of guilty to the charged offenses and reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss on Second-Amendment grounds. Id.

On appeal, Mr. Barton argued that the Supreme Court's statement in Heller concerning the presumptive lawfulness of felon gun dispossession statutes is mere dicta. The Third Circuit rejected this argument, holding that the Supreme Court's list of "presumptively lawful" regulations in Heller—including "prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons"—is not mere dicta, but rather an "outcome-determinative" part of the Court's holding there (and thus binding on all lower courts). Barton, 633 F.3d at 171.

Accordingly, the Third Circuit rejected Mr. Barton's facial challenge to § 922(g)(1). In doing so, the court reasoned that § 922(g)(1), the felon-in-possession prohibition, is "one of Heller's enumerated exceptions" which is presumed to fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment right as recognized in Heller. Barton, 633 F.3d at 172.

Moreover, the Third Circuit noted that "the Supreme Court has twice stated that felon gun-dispossession statutes are 'presumptively lawful.'" Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26, 128 S. Ct. at

2817, 171 L. Ed. 2d. at 678; and McDonald, 561 U.S. at \_\_\_, 130 S. Ct. at 3047, 177 L. Ed. 2d at 926).<sup>41</sup>

Ultimately, the Third Circuit held that Heller requires courts to presume, under most circumstances, that felon dispossession statutes like § 922(g)(1) “regulate conduct which is unprotected by the Second Amendment” and, therefore, that Mr. Barton’s facial challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) failed. Barton, 633 F.3d at 172.<sup>42</sup>

Having denied Mr. Barton’s facial challenge to § 922(g)(1), the Third Circuit turned to the as-applied challenge to his conviction under that provision. The court reasoned that, by describing felon gun dispossession statutes as “presumptively lawful” in Heller, the Supreme Court clearly implied that the presumption could be rebutted. Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that it is possible that a felon could successfully raise an as-applied challenge to such statutes. Barton, 633 F.3d at 173. Plaintiff Binderup asserts just such a challenge.

Although the Third Circuit took Heller to permit an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1), the circuit court in Barton noted that the Opinion of the Supreme Court in “Heller does not catalogue the facts [the court] must consider when reviewing a felon’s as-applied challenge.” Barton, 633 F.3d at 173.

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<sup>41</sup> The Third Circuit explained that, for purposes of Heller’s presumption, “lawful” prohibitions are those that “regulate[] conduct fall[ing outside] the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.” Barton, 633 F.3d at 172 (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91).

<sup>42</sup> Recognizing the import of Barton, plaintiff does not assert an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) in this action.

Absent such direction from the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit determined that “to evaluate [Mr.] Barton’s as-applied challenge, [it would] look to the historical pedigree of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) to determine whether the traditional justifications underlying the statute support a finding of permanent disability in this case.” Barton, 633 F.3d at 173.

Turning to the historical pedigree of § 922(g), the Third Circuit noted that the United States Congress did not pass a federal statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms until 1939, id. at 173 (citing Federal Firearms Act (FFA), ch.850, § 1(6), 52 Stat. 1250, 1251 (1938)),<sup>43</sup> and, even then, that prohibition applied only to those convicted of a “crime of violence”. Id. (citing C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 698 (2009)).

Continuing its historical review, the Barton court noted that the ratifying conventions in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire (“which were considered ‘highly influential’ by the Supreme Court in Heller”), Barton, 633 F.3d at 173 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 604, 128 S. Ct. at 2804, 171 L. Ed. 2d. at 665), confirmed that “the common law right to keep and bear arms did not extend to those who were *likely to commit violent offenses*.” Barton, 633 F.3d at 173 (emphasis added).

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<sup>43</sup> Section 2(f) of the Federal Firearms Act stated that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a crime of violence . . . to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped for transported in interstate . . . commerce . . . .”

Based on this this historical review, the Third Circuit stated that

[t]o raise a successful as-applied challenge, [the challenger] must present facts about himself and his background that distinguish his circumstances from those of persons historically barred from Second Amendment protections. For instance, a felon convicted of a minor, non-violent crime might show that he is no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen. Similarly, a court might find that a felon whose crime of conviction is decades-old poses no continuing threat to society.

Barton, 633 F.3d at 174.

Applying that framework, the Third Circuit held that Mr. Barton failed to present a factual basis for a successful as-applied challenge. The circuit court so held because Mr. Barton did not argue (nor could he have credibly argued) that his predicate offenses (convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and receipt of a stolen firearm), id. at 170, did not make him “no more likely than the average citizen” to commit a future crime of violence. Id. at 174.

In concluding that Mr. Barton had failed (and would have been unable) to make such a demonstration, the Third Circuit noted both that courts have held in numerous contexts that “offenses relating to drug trafficking and receiving stolen weapons are closely related to violent crime”, Barton, 633 F.3d at 174 (collecting cases), and that the record demonstrated that Mr. Barton had not been rehabilitated but rather was a recidivist who had admitted recently selling a firearm



with an obliterated serial number to a confidential police informant. Barton, 633 F.3d at 174.<sup>44</sup>

Here, plaintiff Binderup asserts that § 922(g)(1), as applied to him, violates the Second Amendment and seeks to prevail on that claim under Barton by demon-

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<sup>44</sup> As an alternative, “fallback” argument, Mr. Barton contended that, even if his actions place him in the category of offenders which society has determined “not to be trusted to possess a firearm”, he nevertheless has a fundamental right to use a weapon for the purpose of defending “hearth and home”. Barton, 633 F.3d at 174. Specifically, Mr. Barton argued that “§ 922(g)(1), like the ordinance struck down in Heller, is unconstitutional to the extent that it restricts his fundamental right to keep a weapon in his home for self-defense.” Id. (explaining Barton’s position).

The Third Circuit held that Mr. Barton’s fallback argument was foreclosed by Marzzarella. Barton, 633 F.3d at 174-175. The Barton court recognized the Third Circuit’s statement in Marzzarella that a “felon arguably possesses just as strong an *interest* in defending himself and his home as any law-abiding individual.” Id. at 174 (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 92). However, the Barton court explained that Marzzarella “held that ‘a felony conviction disqualifies an individual from asserting’ his fundamental right to ‘defense of hearth and home.’” Id. (quoting Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 92).

In this respect, the Third Circuit noted that the fundamental right under the Second Amendment is “not unique” and is like other fundamental constitutional rights (like the right to vote) for which a felony conviction may trigger disabilities that have been upheld by the Supreme Court. Id. at 175 (citing and quoting, among others, Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54-56, 94 S. Ct. 2655, 41 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1974) which upheld a state law disenfranchising felons on the basis of criminal conviction).

The Third Circuit “[found] persuasive the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that ‘felons are categorically different from the individuals who have a fundamental right to bear arms.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Vongxay, 594 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2010)).

strating that he “‘is no more dangerous than a typical-law, abiding citizen,’ and ‘poses no continuing threat to society.’”<sup>45</sup>

### Dutton

Unlike Marzzarella and Barton, which involved appeals from criminal convictions, the Dutton case involved a civil-rights action brought by plaintiff Kelly Dutton pro se pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Mr. Dutton brought claims against defendants Pennsylvania State Police, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General, alleging that they were unlawfully prohibiting him from purchasing a firearm. Dutton I, 2012 WL 3020651 at \*1.

Specifically, Mr. Dutton, acting pro se, attempted to purchase a firearm in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania Instant Check System revealed two prior convictions in Pennsylvania for first-degree misdemeanors—one for carrying a firearm on a public street, the second for carrying a firearm without a license. As a result, Mr. Dutton was not permitted to purchase a firearm.

He challenged this denial to the Firearms Division of the Pennsylvania State Police and was informed that the denial was based upon his prior convictions and which disqualified him under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Dutton I, 2012 WL 3020651 at \*1.

Mr. Dutton claimed that the denial based upon § 922(g)(1) was unlawful because, according to Mr.

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<sup>45</sup> Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support at page 19 (quoting Barton, 633 F.3d at 174.)

Dutton, that statutory provision “applies only to felonies and misdemeanors of domestic violence.” Dutton I, 2012 WL 3020651 at \*1. Defendants moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) on the grounds that Mr. Dutton failed to state a claim.

As discussed further in the above section concerning Plaintiff’s Statutory Claim (Count One), Judge Schiller granted defendants’ motion and dismissed Mr. Dutton’s claim that the denial violated his federal statutory rights under § 922(g)(1). In explaining the statutory nature of the claim asserted by Mr. Dutton, Judge Schiller noted that, even when plaintiff’s pleading was construed liberally, as required because he was proceeding pro se, Mr. Dutton did not assert a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1).

Nevertheless, Judge Schiller noted that the Opinion of the Third Circuit in Barton would foreclose a facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) even if one were asserted by Mr. Dutton, and that an as-applied challenge by Mr. Dutton would fail because he had not presented any facts which would distinguish him from other felons categorically unprotected by the Second Amendment. Dutton I, 2012 WL 3020651 at \*2 n.3. Because Judge Schiller concluded that the facts presented by Mr. Dutton could not sufficiently state a facial or as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1), he did not grant leave to amend for Mr. Dutton to assert such claims and, instead, dismissed Mr. Dutton’s Complaint with prejudice. Dutton I, 2012 WL 3020651 at \*2.

Mr. Dutton appealed Judge Schiller’s grant of defendants’ motion to dismiss. The Third Circuit summarily affirmed Judge Schiller’s decision, holding that a Pennsylvania first-degree misdemeanor carries a

maximum term of imprisonment of five years and, thus, does not qualify for § 921(a)(20)(B)'s exception to § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition. Dutton II, 503 Fed. Appx. at 127.

Like Judge Schiller, the Third Circuit took Mr. Dutton to be asserting a violation of his statutory rights and not a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1). Id. at 126-127. However, like Judge Schiller, the Third Circuit also considered the outcome if Mr. Dutton were attempting to assert a Second Amendment claim. Id. at 127 n.1.

In doing so, the Third Circuit noted that Barton clearly foreclosed a facial challenge to § 922(g)(1) and that Mr. Dutton was similar to Mr. Barton in that he also “presented no facts distinguishing him from those of other felons who are categorically unprotected by the Second Amendment.” Dutton II, at 127 n.1. Moreover, the Third Circuit upheld Judge Schiller’s decision not to grant leave for Mr. Dutton to amend his pleading, stating that it “[did] not see how *any amendment* to [Mr.] Dutton’s complaint would save his claim.” Id.

This statement by the Third Circuit affirming the denial of leave to amend clearly indicates that no amendment would save the claim which Judge Schiller and the Third Circuit took Mr. Dutton to actually be asserting—namely, Mr. Dutton’s statutory claim that § 922(g)(1) only applies to felonies and misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence and, therefore, does not apply to him regarding his two Pennsylvania first-degree, non-domestic-violence misdemeanor convictions.

However, to read that footnoted statement by the Third Circuit in Dutton II to mean that there is no conceivable set of facts which Mr. Dutton could muster that would sufficiently state an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) would effectively overrule the precedential Opinion in Barton. Rather, Dutton I and Dutton II are more appropriately read together to support the proposition, wholly consistent with the Third Circuit's precedential Opinion in Barton, that a party seeking to raise an as-applied Second-Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) must present facts distinguishing themselves from other felons unprotected by the Second Amendment. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 174; Dutton II, at 127 n.1.

In short, the Dutton case reinforces that which the parties here do not seriously dispute—namely, that a party may assert an as-applied Second-Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) and, the party asserting such challenge bears the burden of demonstrating facts sufficient to show that application of § 922(g)(1) to him or her violates the Second Amendment.

The central question presented by plaintiff Binderup's claim in Count Two is whether he has presented such facts here. Mr. Dutton did not attempt to make such a showing and, accordingly, neither Judge Schiller, nor the Third Circuit had occasion to address whether or not that (unattempted) showing was sufficient. Accordingly, while the Dutton case certainly reinforces the principles articulated in the Barton case, it does not provide significant guidance in addressing the sufficiency of plaintiff's showing on his as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) here.

*The Barton Framework Controls*

Upon review of the caselaw discussed above, I conclude that Barton governs plaintiff's as-applied Second-Amendment claim in this action.

As discussed above, the Third Circuit in Marzzarella laid out a two-prong framework for Second-Amendment challenges and did not explicitly limit the application of that framework (including the application of means-end scrutiny to provisions which infringe on Second-Amendment-protected activity) to facial constitutional challenges asserted under the Second Amendment. In the absence of such a limitation, it is certainly understandable why defendants first addressed plaintiff's as-applied Second Amendment claim under the Marzzarella framework.

Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted the two-prong Marzzarella framework in United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013) and applied it to defendant-appellant Chovan's claim on appeal that § 922(g), both on its face and as applied to him, violated the Second Amendment. Id. at 1129-1130. Thus, the Marzzarella framework could conceivably be applied to an as-applied Second-Amendment claim.

However, as noted above, the second prong of the Marzzarella framework requires the application of means-end scrutiny to determine whether a particular provision which burdens protected conduct passes constitutional muster. The Third Circuit in Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 97, and the Ninth Circuit in Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138, applied intermediate scrutiny in conducting its prong-two analysis under Marzzarella.

The Third Circuit also applied strict scrutiny in an alternative analysis of the constitutionality of § 922(k) under prong two in Marzzarella. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 99-100.

The application of either intermediate or strict scrutiny by the Third Circuit in Marzzarella is noteworthy as a point of contrast with the framework set forth by the Third Circuit for as-applied challenges in Barton.

As the Third Circuit has stated, “[u]nder intermediate scrutiny, the State must assert a significant, substantial or important interest and there must be a reasonable fit between the asserted interest and the challenged regulation.” Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 453 (3d Cir. 2013). In other words, where intermediate scrutiny applies, the party seeking to uphold a challenged provision has the burden of demonstrating the constitutionality of that provision. See id.

Similarly, in Chovan, the Opinion of the Ninth Circuit clearly demonstrates that the burden of overcoming intermediate scrutiny on prong two of the Marzzarella framework rests with the party seeking to uphold the challenged provision. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1140-1141.

By contrast, the Opinion of the Third Circuit in Barton clearly placed the burden on Mr. Barton—that is, the party challenging the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)—to present facts demonstrating the unconstitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as applied to him. The principle that the party seeking to assert an as-applied constitutional challenge under the Second Amendment bears the burden of demonstrating the unconstitution-

ality of a particular provision as applied to the challenger is reinforced by the Dutton case discussed above.

Accordingly, I conclude that Barton—the more recent, and directly-on-point precedential Opinion of the Third Circuit—provides the framework governing plaintiff’s as-applied claim in Count Two.

### **Analysis of As-Applied Challenge**

The crux of plaintiff Daniel Binderup’s as-applied Second Amendment challenge to the constitutionality of applying § 922(g)(1)’s prohibition to him, specifically, is his contention that “[h]e is no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen,’ and ‘poses no continuing threat to society.”<sup>46</sup> The undisputed material facts presented in this case support that claim.

#### *No History of Violence*

Plaintiff was born in the spring of 1955 and is presently 59 years old.<sup>47</sup> He and his wife of 40 years have raised two children. From 1989 through 2001, he owned and operated a bakery which employed eight people.<sup>48</sup>

From June 1996 through August 1997, a period of fourteen months, plaintiff carried on a sexual rela-

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<sup>46</sup> Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support at page 19 (quoting Barton, 633 F.3d at 174).

<sup>47</sup> See Criminal Docket in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Daniel Richard Binderup, Docket No. CP-36-CR-004127-1997, in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, submitted as Exhibit A to the Declaration of Daniel Binderup, with date of birth redacted.

<sup>48</sup> Declaration of Daniel Binderup at ¶ 7.



tionship with one of the females employed at his bakery. At the time this sexual relationship began, the female employee was seventeen years old. Plaintiff later admitted to a detective of the Manheim Township Police Department that he knew that the female employee with whom he had intercourse on multiple occasions over more than a year's time was less than eighteen years old.<sup>49</sup>

On October 1, 1997, based upon his sexual relationship with his seventeen-year-old employee, plaintiff was charged with one count of Corruption of minors in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301(a) as a misdemeanor of the first degree<sup>50</sup>—that is, plaintiff was charged under 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(i).

Plaintiff was not charged with Corruption of minors in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(ii), which relates to the corruption of minors by a course of conduct in violation of Chapter 31 of Title 18 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code—that is, a course of conduct which would constitute another sexual offense against a person under Pennsylvania law.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Exhibit 1 to Defendants' Motion, Police Criminal Complaint, at pages 2-3.

<sup>50</sup> *Id.* at pages 1-2.

<sup>51</sup> *See id.*; Exhibit 2 to Defendants' Motion, Sentencing Order, at page 1.

A course of conduct in violation of Title 18, Chapter 31 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code would involve Rape (§ 3121) (first-degree felony); Statutory sexual assault (§ 3122.1) (first- or second-degree felony); Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (§ 3123.1) (first-degree felony), Sexual assault (§ 3124.1) (second-degree felony); Institutional sexual assault (§ 3124.2) (third-degree felony); Sexual assault by sports official, volunteer, or employee of non-

Plaintiff pled guilty on November 25, 1997 to one count of Corruption of minors under 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301 and was sentenced on July 15, 1998 to a term of three years' probation, and ordered to pay a fine of \$300.00, court costs of \$1,425.70, and restitution of \$450.00.<sup>52</sup> Plaintiff paid each of those financial obligations and successfully completed his term of probation.<sup>53</sup>

Moreover, plaintiff's license to carry firearms was revoked and he sold the firearms he owned at that time to a licensed dealer to comply both with the federal statute which now challenges, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and the Pennsylvania statutory provision governing Persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell or transfer firearms, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).<sup>54</sup>

Plaintiff's wife forgave him and they remain married. In 2001, plaintiff sold his bakery and now owns and operates a plumbing business.<sup>55</sup>

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profit association (§ 3124.3) (third-degree felony); Aggravated indecent assault (§ 3125) (first- or second-degree felony, depending on circumstances); Indecent assault (§ 3126) (first- or second-degree misdemeanor or first-degree felony depending on circumstances); Indecent exposure (§ 3127) (first- or second-degree misdemeanor, depending on circumstances); Sexual intercourse with an animal (§ 3129) (second-degree misdemeanor); or Conduct relating to sex offenders (§ 3130) (third-degree felony).

<sup>52</sup> Exhibit A to the Declaration of Daniel Binderup, Criminal Docket in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Daniel Richard Binderup, Docket No. CP-36-CR-004127-1997, at pages 1-2.

<sup>53</sup> Declaration of Daniel Binderup at ¶ 6.

<sup>54</sup> Id. at ¶¶ 6 and 8.

<sup>55</sup> Declaration of Daniel Binderup at ¶ 7.

Since his November 1997 conviction and 1998 sentencing for Corruption of minors, plaintiff has not been convicted of any further offenses.<sup>56</sup> Moreover, there is no record evidence suggesting that plaintiff has been arrested or charged with any criminal offense in that nearly-seventeen-year period.

Plaintiff concedes that the sexual relationship he engaged in with his seventeen-year-old female employee while he was in his forties was both “wrong” and criminal under Pennsylvania law.<sup>57</sup> Moreover, nothing in this Opinion should be taken to condone such conduct or to suggest that it is inappropriate Pennsylvania to criminalize such conduct.

However, the question presented by plaintiff’s as-applied Second-Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) is not simply whether plaintiff’s underlying criminal offense was morally reprehensible. Rather, under Barton, the pertinent question is whether the “traditional justifications underlying the [disarmament] statute support a finding of permanent disability in this case.” 633 F.3d at 173. The Third Circuit’s consideration of the historical pedigree for such felon-disarmament laws identified the core concern of whether an individual was “likely to commit a violent offenses.” Id.

There is simply nothing in the record here which would support a reasonable inference that plaintiff used any violence, force, or threat of force to initiate or maintain the sexual relationship with his seventeen-year-old employee. Moreover, there is no record

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<sup>56</sup> Id.

<sup>57</sup> Id. at ¶¶ 6-7.

evidence present here which would support a reasonable inference that plaintiff was convicted of any crime of violence (or that he even engaged in any violent or threatening conduct) before or after his November 1997 conviction for Corruption of minors.

As noted above, at the time of his 1997 conviction for Corruption of minors, plaintiff was a licensed owner of firearms. Upon his conviction, when he could no longer lawfully possess those firearms pursuant to Pennsylvania and federal law, he sold them to a licensed dealer.

In contrast to Mr. Marzzarella, plaintiff did not possess any firearm with an obliterated serial number—that is, a virtually-untraceable firearm particularly well-suited for use in criminal activity. In contrast to Mr. Barton (prior state-law convictions for convictions for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and receipt of a stolen firearm) and Mr. Dutton (prior state—law convictions for carrying a firearm on a public street, the second for carrying a firearm without a license), the record does not support a reasonable inference that plaintiff has ever unlawfully possessed or carried a firearm, received a stolen firearm, or engaged in drug trafficking activity.

In addition to a past devoid of any crimes of violence, plaintiff's past is devoid of any firearms offenses or drug trafficking offenses, which the Third Circuit has noted are closely related to violent crime. See Barton, 633 F.3d at 174.

In opposition to plaintiff's as applied challenge, defendant describes the conduct underlying plaintiff's conviction for Corruption of minors as "predatory sex-

ual conduct with a teenaged employee”.<sup>58</sup> Plaintiff describes the same as a “consensual[,] if illicit[,] affair[]”.<sup>59</sup> Both descriptions are, to varying degrees, accurate; the latter more so than the former.

With respect to defendants’ characterization, it is undisputed that plaintiff had sexual intercourse (“sexual conduct”) with his seventeen-year-old female employee (“a teenaged employee”). Plaintiff objects to defendants’ use of the word “predatory”, arguing that there is nothing in the record to suggest that plaintiff engaged in “predatory” behavior.<sup>60</sup>

Predatory means, among other things, “inclined or intended to injure or exploit others for personal gain or profit”. MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 915 (10th ed. 2001). Thus, defendants’ description of plaintiff’s conduct as “predatory” may be reasonable to the extent that defendants intend that characterization to suggest that plaintiff’s sexual relationship with his seventeen-year-old employee reflects or evidences plaintiff’s intent or inclination to exploit the employer-employee relationship (and authority differential) between himself and his much younger female employee.

However, the context certainly suggests that defendants’ characterization is meant to depict plaintiff as a sexual predator who, as such, is a dangerous individual who should not be permitted to possess a firearm.

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<sup>58</sup> Defendants’ Combined Opposition and Reply Brief at page 1.

<sup>59</sup> Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support at page 18.

<sup>60</sup> Transcript of Motions Hearing at page 31.

A “sexual predator” is “a person who has committed many violent sexual acts or who has a propensity for committing violent sexual acts.” BLACKS’S LAW DICTIONARY 1499 (9th ed. 2009).

Here, there is simply no record evidence which suggests in any way that plaintiff has committed many violent sexual acts. Moreover, there is no record evidence which supports a reasonable inference that he has a propensity to commit violent acts, sexual or otherwise. Were it otherwise, and the record instead demonstrated a history of or propensity for violence, plaintiff’s as-applied challenge under Barton would be a non-starter.

*Not a Statutory Rapist*

Defendants further contend that disarming plaintiff based on his Corruption of minors conviction is consistent with the scope of the Second Amendment as understood at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. In support of that contention, defendants note that “one crime punishable under early English criminal law was carnal knowledge of a female under a particular age, regardless of the female’s consent”—citing a 1576 English statute which prohibited such relations with “any woman child under the age of ten years.”<sup>61</sup>

According to defendants, that 1576 English statute demonstrates that “the nature of the conduct for which Plaintiff was convicted would have been recognized during the Founding Era as punishable by criminal sanctions”, and the difference between that 1576 Eng-

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<sup>61</sup> Defendants’ Memorandum in Support at page 10.

lish statute and the statute under which plaintiff was convicted—18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(i)—is “a difference in degree, not in kind.”<sup>62</sup> Plaintiff contends that the argument likening his criminal conduct to having sex with a girl under the age of ten is “absurd”<sup>63</sup> and describes the analogy as “frankly inappropriate”.<sup>64</sup>

Plaintiff correctly and understandably concedes that sexual relations with a girl age nine or below is, and has been historically, a very serious felony. Plaintiff notes that sexual relations with a girl age ten through twelve was, historically, also a criminal offense.<sup>65</sup> However, as plaintiff points out, the actual conduct for which he was convicted—that is, sexual relations between a man in his forties and a seventeen-year-old girl—was not subject to criminal sanction at, or before, the time of the Founding.

The parties dispute whether or not plaintiff is a “statutory rapist”.<sup>66</sup> Defendants contend that, despite plaintiff’s protestations and that the offense of which he was convicted is termed “Corruption of minors” under Pennsylvania law, plaintiff’s conduct “falls within the well-understood generic legal and layperson’s definition of ‘statutory rape.’”<sup>67</sup>

Black’s Law Dictionary, which defendants rely on for their definition of the term, defines “statutory

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<sup>62</sup> Id.

<sup>63</sup> Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support at page 18 n.4.

<sup>64</sup> Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition at page 7.

<sup>65</sup> Id. at page 8.

<sup>66</sup> Id. at page 10; Defendants’ Combined Opposition and Reply Brief at page 17.

<sup>67</sup> Defendants’ Combined Opposition and Reply Brief at page 17.

rape” as “[u]nlawful sexual intercourse with a person under the age of consent (as defined by statute), regardless of whether it is against that person’s will. Generally, only an adult may be convicted of this crime. A person under the age of consent cannot be convicted.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1374 (9th ed. 2009) Similarly, Merriam Webster’s Dictionary defines “statutory rape” as “sexual intercourse with a person who is below the statutory age of consent.” MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1146 (10th ed. 2001).

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has stated that “[i]t is axiomatic that [individuals] *under the age of 16* may not legally assent to sexual acts of . . . any kind.” Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Hughlett, 249 Pa. Super. 341, 346, 378 A.2d 326, 329 (1977) (emphasis added).<sup>68</sup> It is undisputed here that plaintiff’s employee-paramour was seventeen years old at the time the two were engaging in sexual intercourse.

At the time of plaintiff’s conviction, as now, the Pennsylvania Crimes Code did not contain an offense called “Statutory rape”—as explained below, Rape of a

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<sup>68</sup> If the individual under age sixteen does not agree to the intercourse and sexual intercourse is by force or threat of force, then it is Rape. See 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3121. If the individual under age sixteen agrees to the intercourse but the perpetrator is four or more years older than the individual, then it is Statutory sexual assault. See § 3122.1. If the individual under age sixteen agrees to “deviate sexual intercourse” (that is, oral or anal intercourse, see § 3101) but the perpetrator is four or more years older than the individual, then it is Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse. § 3123(a)(7).



child and Statutory sexual assault are separate offenses under Pennsylvania law.

Pennsylvania law provides for the offense of “Rape of a child” and states that “[a] person commits the offense of rape of a child, a felony of the first degree, when the person engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less than 13 years of age.” 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3121(c). Consent is no defense to Rape of a child.<sup>69</sup>

Additionally, Pennsylvania law prohibits “Statutory sexual assault” and provides:

**(a) Felony of the second degree.**—Except as provided in section 3121 (relating to rape), a person commits a felony of the second degree when that person engages in sexual intercourse with a com-

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<sup>69</sup> The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recognized “a common thread” throughout the provision of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code setting forth sexual offenses—namely that,

if the Commonwealth proves that a victim is under the age of 13 and the defendant engaged in the prohibited conduct, criminal liability is established, and the victim’s consent is not an available defense. See 18 Pa. C.S. § 3121(c) (rape of a child); 18 Pa. C.S. § 3125(b) (aggravated indecent assault of a child), 18 Pa. C.S. § 3123(b) (involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child); 18 Pa. C.S. § 3126(a)(7) (indecent assault). By imposing liability whenever the victim is below a certain age threshold [(the age of 13)], the legislature has in essence made it a crime per se for defendants to have sexual contact with minors under a certain age, irrespective of whether the minor putatively consented to such contact.

C.C.H. v. Philadelphia Phillies, Inc., 596 Pa. 23, 40, 940 A.2d 336, 346 (2008).

plainant to whom the person is not married who is *under the age of 16 years* and that person is either:

- (1) four years older but less than eight years older than the complainant; or
- (2) eight years older but less than 11 years older than the complainant.

**(b) Felony of the first degree.**—A person commits a felony of the first degree when that person engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant *under the age of 16 years* and that person is 11 or more years older than the complainant and the complainant and the person are not married to each other.

18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3122.1.

As with Rape of a child, consent is no defense to Statutory sexual assault, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Parsons, 969 A.2d 1259, 1261, 1271 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). However, Statutory sexual assault requires that the complainant be under the age of sixteen (that is, at most, fifteen years old). 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3122.1.

By contrast, under Pennsylvania law, consent is a defense to Rape and Sexual assault if where the complainant is age sixteen or older. Teti v. Huron Insurance Company, 914 F. Supp. 1132, 1139-1140 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (Robreno, J.).

In other words, Pennsylvania law does not provide a bright-line rule concerning the age at which an individual may legally consent to sexual intercourse with an adult. Id. at 1140.

Put another way, sexual intercourse with an individual under the age of thirteen is Rape of a child,

regardless of the complainants purported consent. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3121(e). Moreover, sexual intercourse with a person under the age of sixteen is Statutory sexual assault if the perpetrator is four (or more) years older than the complainant, regardless of consent. 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3122.1.

However, consensual sexual intercourse with a seventeen year old—that is, sexual intercourse which is not by force or threat of force, see 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3121(a)(1)-(2), and where the seventeen year old is conscious, not mentally disabled and not substantially impaired by an intoxicant which the perpetrator administered surreptitiously, see 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3121(a)(3)-(5)—is neither Rape, nor Statutory sexual assault. Ultimately, a sixteen year old under Pennsylvania law has the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse with an adult, regardless of the adults age. Teti, 914 F. Supp. at 1140.

Although, as explained above, the sixteen (or seventeen) year old has the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse with an adult, and the adult with whom that individual had sexual intercourse (here, plaintiff Binderup) is not deemed to have committed a “sexually violent offense” for which sex-offender registration would be required. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9799.13(3.1)(ii)(A)(I) (expressly excluding Corruption of minors under 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301 from the term “sexually violent offense”). Such consensual sexual intercourse nevertheless “corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less than 18 years of age”, 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1), and is thus subject to criminal sanction under Pennsylvania law.

In short, the sole offense for which plaintiff was convicted (and the conduct underlying that offense) did not involve sexual intercourse with a minor by force or threat of force, nor did it involve sex with a minor who, because of her age, was unable to consent to sexual intercourse with plaintiff.

As explained further above, the Corruption of minors as a first-degree misdemeanor (plaintiff's underlying offense) is punishable by a term of imprisonment up to five years and, thus, is not a minor offense. Pennsylvania's Corruption of minors offense covers "a broad range of conduct"—some of it sexual in nature, and some not. See Commonwealth v. Decker, 698 A.2d 99, 101 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997). And, indeed, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Decker noted that "generally a corruption of minors charge accompanies another more serious charge such as involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, statutory [sexual assault], indecent assault, etc." Decker, 698 A.2d at 100.

Were that the case here—if, in addition to the Corruption of minors offense, plaintiff had been charged with, and convicted of, a sexually violent offense based upon the relationship with his employee-paramour—then his as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1) under Barton would be a non-starter.

But that is not the case here. Plaintiff—despite having well-earned his charge and conviction for first-degree misdemeanor Corruption of minors under 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(i) and commensurate moral opprobrium for his extra-marital affair with an employee-paramour more than 20 years his junior—was not convicted of Statutory sexual assault, nor of any other crime involving force or violence.

For the reasons expressed above, I conclude that plaintiff has demonstrated that, if allowed to keep and bear arms in his home for purposes of self-defense, he would present no more threat to the community than the average law-abiding citizen.

### **Defense Exhibits**

In support of Defendants' Motion and in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion, defendants provide a number of exhibits pertaining to recidivism risk and the efficacy of denial of handgun purchases for certain persons as a method of reducing the risk of firearm violence.<sup>70</sup>

Defendants rely on these exhibits as empirical support for their argument that application of § 922(g)(1) to plaintiff survives intermediate means-end scrutiny under the Marzzarella framework. Nevertheless, the contentions which defendants contend these studies support are also pertinent to the analysis of plaintiff's as-applied challenge under the Barton framework.

Specifically, defendants quote the statement of the Third Circuit in Barton that, "It is well established that felons are more likely to commit violent crimes than other law-abiding citizens."<sup>71</sup> Specifically, the Third Circuit in Barton noted the Bureau of Justice Statistics's finding that "within a population of 234,358 federal inmates released in 1994, the rates of arrests

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<sup>70</sup> Exhibit 3 to Defendants' Motion, D.O.J., B.J.S. Fact Sheet; Exhibit 4 to Defendants' Motion, Wright, et al., Effectiveness of Denial; Exhibit 1 to Defendants' Combined Opposition and Reply Brief, Pa. D.O.C. Recidivism Report 2013.

<sup>71</sup> Defendants' Memorandum in Support at page 13 (quoting Barton, 633 F.3d at 175, in turn citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, at 6 (2002)).

for homicides were 53 time the national average”. 633 F.3d at 175.

A great leap is not required to distinguish plaintiff Binderup, whose state-law offense earned him a probationary sentence, from individuals who committed federal offenses which earned them a term of incarceration.

Defendants further contend that violent and non-violent convicted offenders as a group (a group which includes plaintiff) “present a significant risk of recidivism for *violent* crime.”<sup>72</sup> Specifically, relying on the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics Fact Sheet (Exhibit 3 to Defendants’ Motion), defendants contend that the danger posed by plaintiff is demonstrated by the fact that “approximately 1 in 5 [nonviolent] offenders was rearrested for violent offenses within three years of his or her release.”<sup>73</sup>

Beyond the implicit fact that four in five (or, 80% of) nonviolent offenders are not rearrested for violent offenses within three years of their release, plaintiff is demographically distinguishable from the population addressed by Exhibit 3 to Defendants’ Motion.

Specifically, the releasees addressed in Exhibit 3, by definition, committed one or more offenses for which they were sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Plaintiff was not imprisoned, but sentenced to a three-year term of probation. Two-thirds of the non-violent releasees were under the age of 34. Plaintiff is now 59 years old. Two-thirds of the nonviolent re-

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<sup>72</sup> Id. at pages 13-14 (citing, generally, the D.O.J., B.J.S. Fact Sheet) (emphasis added).

<sup>73</sup> Defendants’ Memorandum in Support at 14.

leases admitted using illegal drugs within one month of the offense for which they were incarcerated. One quarter were alcohol-dependent prior to their offense. There is no record evidence here suggesting, in any way, that plaintiff used or uses illegal drugs or is alcohol-dependent.<sup>74</sup>

Moreover, with respect to prior criminal history, 95% of the non-violent releasees had an arrest record, and 80% had at least one criminal conviction, prior to the offense for which they were imprisoned.<sup>75</sup> In other words, the vast majority of the individuals in the population addressed by defendants' Exhibit 3 were already demonstrated recidivists. Indeed, of that significant portion of nonviolent releasees in Exhibit 3 with a prior criminal history, "[o]n average, the RAP sheets of nonviolent offenders discharged from prison indicated 9.3 prior arrests and 4.1 prior convictions."<sup>76</sup>

Here, by contrast, nothing in the record supports a reasonable inference that plaintiff was ever arrested or convicted for any offense before (or after) his Corruption of minors offense underlying his claim here.

Defendants further contend—relying upon the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections' Recidivism Report 2013 (Exhibit 1 to Defendants' Combined Opposition and Reply Brief)—that "[i]ndividuals convicted of statutory rape as a class are also much more

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<sup>74</sup> D.O.J., B.J.S. Fact Sheet, at page 1.

<sup>75</sup> D.O.J., B.J.S. Fact Sheet, at page 1.

<sup>76</sup> Id.

likely than the general population to commit future crimes.”<sup>77</sup>

The Recidivism Report 2013 does support defendants’ assertion. However, as explained below, it does not speak to the risk for future violent crime which plaintiff would present if permitted to possess a firearm in his home and, thus, is immaterial with respect to the question presented by plaintiff’s as-applied challenge in Count Two.

Specifically, Table 12 on page 21 of the report lists the three-year overall recidivism (that is, both rearrests and reincarceration) rate for those in the “Offense Category” of “Statutory Rape” at 50.0%, “Forcible Rape” at 49.3%, and “Other Sexual Offenses” at 60.2%.

These statistics certainly suggest that there a substantial possibility (and in an the case of “Other Sexual Offenses”, a probability) that an individual convicted of “Forcible Rape”, “Statutory Rape”, or an “Other Sexual Offense[]” and sentenced to a term of imprisonment will be rearrested and or reincarcerated within three years of release from state prison. However, as discussed above, plaintiff was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment and, thus, is not a releasee.

Moreover, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections’ Recidivism Report 2013 does not define the “Forcible Rape”, “Statutory Rape”, and “Other Sexual Offenses” by reference to any particular provisions of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, or otherwise. “Statutory Rape” presumably includes Rape of a child” (sex-

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<sup>77</sup> Defendants’ Memorandum in Support at page 14 (citing Pa. D.O.C. Recidivism Report 2013 at page 21).



ual intercourse below age thirteen), but could conceivably also be broad enough to encompass Statutory sexual assault (sexual intercourse below age sixteen with someone four or more years older). However, Statutory sexual assault could just as well be considered among “Other Sexual Offenses”. The report does not say.

And, most importantly in light of plaintiff’s as-applied claim here, there is no indication anywhere in the report that Corruption of minors—particularly when, as here, it was a first-degree misdemeanor under 18 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 6301(a)(1)(i), and not a third-degree felony under § 6301(a)(1)(ii)—is included in the category “Other Sexual Offenses”. Indeed, such an inference would be unreasonable.

The very language of the Corruption of minors statute itself demonstrates that first-degree misdemeanor Corruption of minors is not a sexual offense under Pennsylvania law. Specifically, § 6301(a)(1)(ii) makes Corruption of minors a third-degree felony where it is “by any course of conduct in violation of Chapter 31 (relating to *sexual offenses*) . . . .” 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(ii) (emphasis added).

Chapter 31 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 3103-3144, indeed pertains to sexual offenses and includes the following offenses: Rape (§ 3121); Statutory sexual assault (§ 3122.1); Involuntary deviate sexual intercourse (§ 3123.1), Sexual assault (§ 3124.1); Institutional sexual assault (§ 3124.2); Sexual assault by sports official, volunteer, or employee of nonprofit association (§ 3124.3); Aggravated indecent assault (§ 3125); Indecent assault (§ 3126); Indecent

exposure (§ 3127); Sexual intercourse with an animal (§ 3129); or Conduct relating to sex offenders (§ 3130).

Corruption of minors under § 6301(a)(1)(i)—the offense for which plaintiff was convicted in 1997—is decidedly absent from the sexual offenses covered by Chapter 31, and as explained above, is not among the sexual offenses which would trigger an offender’s duty to register as a sex-offender.

The Recidivism Report 2013 examined inmates released from the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections—that is, those convicted of a crime under Pennsylvania law and sentenced to a term of imprisonment.<sup>78</sup> As explained above, it is undisputed that plaintiff was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment and, thus, is not a releasee.

Whatever the cited portion of the Recidivism Report 2013 may say about the recidivism risks posed by rapists and other sex offenders who have served time in, and been released from, Pennsylvania’s state prison system, it simply does not speak to whether (or to what extent) a person convicted solely for first-degree misdemeanor Corruption of minors who’s sentence was probationary and not custodial presents a risk of recidivism generally, or a risk of violent or firearm-related crime more specifically.

Moreover, even assuming plaintiff’s prior offense had resulted a custodial sentence, certain findings reported in the Recidivism Report 2013 suggests that plaintiff would pose a reduced recidivism risk. Specifically, the report found that the overall recidivism

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<sup>78</sup> Pa. D.O.C. Recidivism Report 2013 at page 37.

rate (rate of rearrest or reincarceration) is 62.7% three years after release, and 71.1% five years after release.

Furthermore, the report states that “[t]he first year [after release] is by far the most risky period” and that the recidivism-rate data for the five years following release demonstrate a “slow-down of recidivism rates as the time since release grows longer.”<sup>79</sup>

In other words, the risk of recidivism is greatest in the first three years after release from prison and, although the overall recidivism rate tends to increase between years three and five, the rate of increase drops significantly between year three and year five.<sup>80</sup>

Plaintiff’s sole criminal conviction occurred in November 1997, nearly seventeen years ago. He is simply not a state-prison releasee with less than one, three, or even five year(s) since his release. And, although his conviction is not (strictly speaking) “decades old”, Barton, 633 F.3d at 174, it is more than a decade-and-half old and, in light of the statistics contained in the Recidivism Report 2013 (defendants’ own exhibit), seventeen years without an incident of recidivism is a substantial period for purposes of assessing future risk.

Additionally, the Recidivism Report 2013 looked at recidivism rates among state-prison releasees by age categories. According to the report, the overall recidivism rate three years after release was 77.9% for those under age 21, 67.3% for those age 21 through 29,

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<sup>79</sup> Pa. D.O.C. Recidivism Report 2013 at page 10.

<sup>80</sup> See id. at page 10.

and dropped to 37.3% for those above age 50 (the range in which plaintiff would currently fall if he had actually been incarcerated). The report concluded that its “age group findings suggest that age has a strong negative correlation with recidivism.”<sup>81</sup>

Finally, the Recidivism Report 2013 assessed recidivism rates for state-prison releasees with prior criminal history—that is, history prior to the arrest and conviction for which they were incarcerated that qualified them as a releasee and, thus included them in the report.<sup>82</sup>

The overall recidivism rate was 41.9% for those releasees with one-to-four arrests prior to their incarceration offense, and dropped to 12.4% for those releasees with zero arrests prior to their incarceration offense (that is, those who were incarcerated for the offense on which they were arrested for the first time). The Recidivism Report 2013 concluded that “[p]rior criminal history [before the the current incarceration offense] appears to be highly associated with whether an inmate will continue to commit crimes after being released from state prison.”<sup>83</sup> Here, plaintiff never committed an offense for which he was incarcerated and only committed a single criminal offense.

For those reasons, plaintiff is materially distinguishable from those individuals who make up the group and sub-groups addressed and the Recidivism Report 2013.

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<sup>81</sup> Pa. D.O.C. Recidivism Report 2013 at page 18.

<sup>82</sup> Pa. D.O.C. Recidivism Report 2013 at page 19.

<sup>83</sup> Id.

Defendants also submitted an article from the American Journal of Public Health in support of their contention that convicted offenders (including those whose offenses were nonviolent) are much more likely than the general population to commit future crimes, including violent crimes.<sup>84</sup> The article does not undermine plaintiff's as-applied challenge in Count Two.

That article describes the authors' study, which sought to assess the effectiveness of preventing handgun purchases by those thought to be at high risk of committing firearm-related violent crime as a tool to prevent firearm-related violence. The authors studied two groups of people: a purchaser cohort (2470 people with at least one prior felony arrest, but no felony conviction), and a non-purchaser/denial cohort (170 individuals with prior felony convictions who submitted handgun purchase applications but were denied on account of their prior record).

The authors compared the two groups by looking at criminal charges for new offenses occurring within three years of the handgun purchase or application in an attempt to determine whether those who were denied a handgun committed fewer, and fewer violent, crimes than those who were permitted to purchase a handgun.<sup>85</sup>

Although the authors concluded that their "findings suggest that denial of handgun purchase is associated with a reduction in risk for later criminal activity of approximately 20% to 30%", they went on to state that

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<sup>84</sup> Defendants' Memorandum in Support at page 14 (citing Wright et al., Effectiveness of Denial, at page 88.)

<sup>85</sup> Wright et al., Effectiveness of Denial, at page 88.

“[t]his modest benefit may reflect the fact that the members of both study groups had extensive criminal records and therefore were at high risk for later criminal activity.”<sup>86</sup>

Indeed, even those 2470 individuals in the purchaser cohort—who did not have felony convictions to disqualify them from purchasing—had a cumulative total of 14,192 arrests between them.<sup>87</sup> Here, plaintiff cannot similarly be described as having an extensive criminal record.

Moreover, although the authors noted that “[a]mong those with only one prior weapon or violence arrest charge, [handgun] purchasers were 2 to 4 times as likely to be charged with new offenses as those who were denied”, there was no such effect seen among those (like plaintiff here) with no prior arrest charges involving violence or weapons.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the authors of the study stated that “[i]n terms of some potentially important differences in risk for later criminal activity, *this study was too small to determine whether the differences occurred by chance.*”<sup>88</sup>

In sum, this study may suggest (it cannot be said with certainty because of the small size) that denying lawful purchase of a handgun to a population of arrestees described as having “extensive prior criminal records” might be effective at reducing firearm-related violent crime. However, it does not suggest

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<sup>86</sup> Wright et al., Effectiveness of Denial, at page 89.

<sup>87</sup> Id. at page 88.

<sup>88</sup> Id. at 89 (emphasis added).

that plaintiff here—who does not have an extensive prior criminal record and who has not committed a crime in the nearly-seventeen years since his sole prior conviction—poses an above-average threat of future firearm-related violent crime (or any violent crime, for that matter).

For the reasons discussed above, I conclude that, based on the record evidence in this matter, plaintiff has carried his burden on his as-applied challenge under Barton in Count Two, and defendants have not shown otherwise.

### CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, plaintiff Daniel Binderup's first-degree misdemeanor conviction for Corruption of minors in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301(a)(1)(i) is not "punishable by" a term of imprisonment of two years or less, as that term has been construed by authority which is binding upon this court. Therefore, plaintiff is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) from possessing a firearm and is not excluded from that prohibition by operation of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B). Accordingly, plaintiff is not, and defendants are, entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's statutory claim in Count One.

As to plaintiff's statutory claim in Count One, I grant Defendants' Motion to the Extent it seeks summary judgment on that claim, deny Plaintiff's Motion in that respect, and dismiss Defendants' Motion as moot to the extent it seeks to dismiss that claim.

Because plaintiff's statutory claim fails, I reach his alternative constitutional claim asserted in Count Two. For the reasons expressed above, I conclude that

plaintiff has demonstrated that, despite his prior criminal conviction which brings him within scope of § 922(g)(1)'s firearm prohibition, he poses no greater risk of future violent conduct than the average law-abiding citizen.

Therefore, application of § 922(g)(1) to him violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution under the framework set for the by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011). Accordingly, plaintiff is, and defendants are not, entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's as-applied constitutional challenge asserted in Count Two of the Complaint.

As to plaintiff's constitutional claim in Count Two, I grant Plaintiff's Motion to the extent that it seeks summary judgment on that claim, and deny Defendants' Motion with respect to Count Two.

An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.



**APPENDIX C**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

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Civil Action No. 13-cv-06750

DANIEL BINDERUP, PLAINTIFF

*v.*

ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES; AND B. TODD JONES, DIRECTOR OF  
THE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND  
EXPLOSIVES, DEFENDANTS

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Filed: Sept. 25, 2014

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**ORDER**

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NOW, this 25th day of September, 2014, upon consideration of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment filed February 20, 2014 ("Defendants' Motion"); upon consideration of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 10, 2014 ("Plaintiff's Motion"); upon consideration of the pleadings, record papers, exhibits, declarations, legal memoranda and briefs of the parties; after oral argument on the within motions held before me on June 16, 2014; and for the reasons expressed in the accompanying Opinion,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendants' Motion is granted in part, dismissed as moot in part, and denied in part.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion is granted to the extent it seeks summary judgment on Count One of the Complaint filed November 21, 2013.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that declaratory judgment is entered in favor of defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General of the United States, and defendant B. Todd Jones, Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, and against plaintiff Daniel Binderup on Count One of the Complaint.

IT IS DECLARED that plaintiff is subject to the prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) for his prior conviction for Corruption of minors under 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301 and is not excepted from that prohibition by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion is dismissed as moot to the extent it seeks to dismiss Count One of the Complaint.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion is denied to the extent it seeks summary judgment on Count Two of the Complaint.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion is granted in part and denied in part.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion is granted to the extent it seeks summary judgment on Count Two of the Complaint.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that declaratory judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff Daniel Binderup and against defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr., At-

torney General of the United States, and defendant B. Todd Jones, Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, on Count Two of the Complaint.

IT IS DECLARED that application of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) to plaintiff Daniel Binderup for his prior conviction for Corruption of minors under 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301 violates the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and all persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of this Order shall be permanently enjoined from enforcing 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) against plaintiff Daniel Binderup for his prior conviction for Corruption of minors under 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 6301.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion is denied to the extent it seeks summary judgment on Count One of the Complaint.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall mark this case closed for statistical purposes.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ JAMES KNOLL GARDNER  
JAMES KNOLL GARDNER  
United States District Judge

**APPENDIX D**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

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CIVIL NO. 1:14-CV-968

JULIO SUAREZ, PLAINTIFF

*v.*

ERIC HOLDER, JR., ET AL., DEFENDANTS

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Filed: Feb. 18, 2015

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**MEMORANDUM**

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*I. Introduction*

We are considering a motion to dismiss and cross-motions for summary judgment. This matter relates to a two count complaint in which Plaintiff asserts that Defendants have barred him from acquiring firearms in contravention of federal law and in violation of the United States Constitution. (Doc. 1). On October 20, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 12). In response, on November 13, 2014, Plaintiff filed his own motion seeking summary judgment. (Doc. 17). For the reasons discussed below, we will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to Count One, and we will grant Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment with respect to Count Two.

*II. Background*

On June 26, 1990, Julio Suarez was convicted in Montgomery County, Maryland of carrying a handgun without a license. (Doc. 1 at 2); see MD. CODE ANN., art. 27, § 36B(b).<sup>1</sup> The offense was a misdemeanor and subject to a term of imprisonment for not less than thirty days nor more than three years. (Doc. 1 at 2). Suarez was ultimately sentenced to 180 days imprisonment and a \$500 fine, both suspended, and he was sentenced to one year probation. (Id.). Suarez's conviction, according to Defendants, places him within the scope of the Gun Control Act of 1968, see 18 U.S.C. § 921(g)(1), which bars individuals convicted of certain offenses from possessing a firearm. (Id. at 5). Therefore, Defendants' have prevented Suarez from possessing a firearm.

On May 20, 2014, Suarez (hereinafter Plaintiff) filed a complaint in which he announced that he intended to acquire firearms for self-protection and the protection of his family. (Doc. 1 at 1, 5). He first asserts that his conviction is statutorily excluded from the scope of the Gun Control Act; however, Defendants have misinterpreted the Act so as to include it. (Id. at 6). Therefore, in Count One of his complaint, Plaintiff argues that Defendants have wrongly enforced the Gun Control Act against him. (Id.). Accordingly, he asks us to issue a judgment declaring that he does not fall within the ambit of the Gun Control Act and to enjoin Defendants from continuing to enforce it against him. (Id.). In Count Two of his complaint, Plaintiff claims

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<sup>1</sup> MD. CODE ANN., art. 27, § 36B(b) is now codified without substantive change at MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-203.

that even if he does fall within the bounds of the Gun Control Act, as applied to him, the Act violates the Second Amendment. (*Id.* at 7). Plaintiff again prays for injunctive and declaratory relief. (*Id.*)

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), asserting that Plaintiff has failed to state a facially plausible claim. (Doc. 12). At the same time, Defendants filed an alternative motion for summary judgment, arguing that there is no issue of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (*Id.*). Plaintiff, in turn, filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, claiming that the record evidence establishes that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Doc. 17). The issues have been extensively briefed by the parties, and the motions are ripe for our disposition.

### *III. Discussion*

#### *A. Motion to Dismiss*

##### *1. Standard of Review*

Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Under Rule 12(b)(6), we must “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). While a complaint need only contain “a short and plain statement of the claim,”

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), and detailed factual allegations are not required, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[L]abels and conclusions” are not enough, and a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

*2. Count One—Interpretation of The Gun Control Act of 1968*

Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), The Gun Control Act dictates that it is unlawful for a person to possess a firearm if that person has been convicted “of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). As defined by 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B), however, “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” does not include State misdemeanors that are “punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B). The parties dispute the meaning of the word “punishable” as used in the exclusionary language of § 921(a)(20)(B). Plaintiff asserts that “punishable” means capable of being punished. And since the court was capable of imposing a sentence of two years or less on his misdemeanor conviction, he falls within the exclusion, and Defendants are wrongly enforcing the Act against him. Citing opinions from the Third Circuit and other courts of ap-

peal, Defendants argue that because the maximum punishment that Plaintiff could have received on his firearm conviction was three years of imprisonment, Plaintiff's conviction was "punishable" by over two years. Therefore, he is not excluded by § 921(a)(20)(B) and falls within the plain language of § 922(g)(1)'s firearm prohibition. Accordingly, Defendants argue Plaintiff fails to state a claim in Count One. We agree.

"Statutory construction must begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose."<sup>2</sup> Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252 (2004). The word Congress used in § 921(a)(20)(B)—punishable—generally means "[d]eserving of or capable or liable to punishment; capable of being punished by law or right." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1234 (6th ed. 1991); see also WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1842 (3d ed. 1961); accord Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980, 986 (D.C. Cir. 2013). But our analysis does not end with the bare meaning of the word in question. We must also look to the placement of the language in the statutory scheme. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 145 (1995) (superseded on other grounds). "Ultimately, context determines meaning, and we do not force . . . definitions into contexts where they plainly do not fit and produce nonsense." Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133,

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<sup>2</sup> Neither party argues that Congress intended to give the word "punishable" a non-ordinary meaning. Accordingly, we need only determine the ordinary meaning of "punishable."



139-40 (2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Here, the word punishable is placed within a criminal statute, and together with a specified term of imprisonment, is used to identify which convictions disable individuals from possessing firearms and which convictions do not. 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(20)(B); 922(g)(1). There are myriad cases that have observed that in the context of criminal statutes, the words “punishable by,” together with a single specified term of imprisonment and no further modifiers, identifies the maximum punishment a court is capable of imposing.<sup>3</sup> We find the numerosity and consistency of

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<sup>3</sup> See, e.g., United States v. Logan, 552 U.S. 23 (2007) (stating that an offender would have been convicted of a crime punishable by a term exceeding one year if the offense carried a potential prison term of over two years); United States v. Leuschen, 395 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that the only qualification imposed by § 922(g)(1) is that the predicate conviction carry a potential sentence of greater than one year of imprisonment); United States v. Essig, 10 F.3d 968 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the defendant’s statement that he had never been convicted of a crime punishable by a term exceeding one year was plainly false because his conviction had a maximum sentence of five years); United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that the defendant did not fall within § 921(a)(20)(B)’s exclusion because his prior convictions had a maximum sentences of seven years and twenty years); Dutton v. Pennsylvania, 503 F. App’x 125 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that defendant did not qualify for the exception in § 921(a)(20)(B) because he was convicted of first degree misdemeanors with a maximum penalty of five years); Schrader v. Holder, 704 F.3d 980 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (finding that punishable refers to the maximum term of punishment capable of being imposed); United States v. Coleman, 158 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that common law assault is an offense punishable by over two years because there was no maximum limitation other than constitutional

these opinions an authoritative indication of the ordinary meaning of “punishable” in the context of § 921(a)(20)(B).<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, we find that the word punishable, as used in § 921(a)(20)(B), means the maximum punishment a court is capable of imposing.<sup>5</sup> See Schrader, 704 F.3d at 986.

Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary do not persuade us. According to Plaintiff, because a court is “capable” of imposing a minimum punishment, various canons of statutory construction require that we interpret “punishable” to refer to the minimum punishment the court was capable of imposing, not the maximum. (Doc. 18 at 17-18). Therefore, since Plaintiff’s firearm offense had a minimum sentence of only

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limits); Binderup v. Holder, No. 13-CV-06750, 2014 WL 4764424 at \*6-8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2014) (holding that punishable refers to maximum possible punishment).

<sup>4</sup> Although the parties spill much ink debating whether these cases are of binding precedential value, we need not reach that question. First, the fact that some of the opinions do not analyze the meaning of “punishable” does not dissuade us. On the contrary, the fact that some courts reached that meaning without discussion gives an even stronger indication of the ordinary meaning of “punishable.” Further, we need not decide the precedential value because our ruling is consistent with the holdings of these opinions. Finally, we note that by not reaching this question, we render moot Plaintiff’s argument that District of Columbia v. Heller calls into question the precedential value of any opinion that pre-dates it.

<sup>5</sup> We decline Defendants’ invitation to examine the legislative history of the statute. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the authoritative statement is the statutory text. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005). Therefore, we find no need to examine the legislative history—material not subject to the requirements of Article I.

thirty days imprisonment and was actually sentenced to only 180 days, the conviction was “capable” of being punished by two years or less, and Plaintiff falls within the statutory exclusion of § 921(a)(20)(B). (Id.).

At the outset, we find that Plaintiff’s interpretation does not comport with the common and ordinary usage of the English language. The following examples demonstrate the point. If a crime had a mandatory minimum prison term of three years and a maximum term of ten years, because the minimum penalty the court would be capable of imposing is three years, Plaintiff would have us say the crime was “punishable by three years imprisonment.” Likewise, if the maximum possible prison term were ten years, but no minimum term was specified, because a court would be capable of imposing a minimum term of zero years, Plaintiff would have us describe the penalty as “punishable by no term of imprisonment.” Although correct in some hyper-technical sense, this is simply not how our society normally speaks or writes. See Lopez v. Gonzales, 549 U.S. 47, 56 (2006) (rejecting an interpretation because it is not how we normally speak or write). In the first example, where both the upper and lower boundaries are specified, in order to identify all potential punishments, we would say the crime was punishable by three to ten years imprisonment. Where only one term of imprisonment is specified, as in the second example, in order to include all possible terms of imprisonment, we ordinarily identify only the upper boundary of the punishment. All lower possible terms of imprisonment are included by implication. Therefore, we would say that the crime was “punishable by ten years imprisonment.” Thus, to accept

Plaintiff's contrary interpretation would be to use a definition that defies common usage and force a definition were it does not fit. Johnson, 559 U.S. 139-40.

In addition, we find that the canons of statutory construction on which Plaintiff relies cannot bear the weight of his argument. First, Plaintiff argues that because the word "punishable" is ambiguous, and it is used in a criminal statute, the rule of lenity requires that we adopt his interpretation. Further, he argues that because his interpretation avoids the difficult constitutional question of whether § 922(g)(1), as applied to him, violates the Second Amendment, the constitutional avoidance doctrine dictates that we adopt his interpretation. We disagree. The rule of lenity does not apply just "because a statute requires consideration and interpretation to confirm its meaning. It applies only if there is such grievous ambiguity . . . the Court can make no more than a guess as to what Congress meant." United States v. Kouevi, 698 F.3d 126, 138 (3d Cir. 2012). Similarly, the constitutional avoidance doctrine only applies when a statute is susceptible of two fairly possible constructions. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 555 (2002). As revealed in our discussion above, we do not find "punishable" to be an ambiguous term, much less so ambiguous that we can only aimlessly guess at its meaning, and so we do not find it susceptible to two fairly possible constructions. Accord Binderup v. Holder, No. 13-CV-06750, 2014 WL 4764424 at \*11 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2014).

Therefore, we find that a State misdemeanor conviction only falls within the exclusion of § 921(a)(20)(B) if the maximum penalty the court was capable of im-

posing was two years or less. Because the court was capable of sentencing Plaintiff to a maximum term of three years imprisonment, he does not fall within the exclusion. Thus, there is no question whether § 922(g)(1) prohibits Plaintiff from possessing a firearm. It does. Accordingly, we find that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim in Count One, and finding that amendment of the complaint would be futile, we will dismiss Count One with prejudice. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

*3. Count Two—As Applied Constitutional Challenge*

*i. Applicable Standard*

In Count Two, Plaintiff asserts that, as applied to him, § 922(g)(1)'s firearm prohibition violates the Second Amendment. In order to determine whether Plaintiff has pleaded enough facts to state a plausible claim, we must first determine what rule applies. Defendants assert that the applicable rule is set out in United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010). In Marzzarella, the Third Circuit held that a two prong test is used to analyze Second Amendment challenges. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 89. Pursuant to the two prong test, we first ask if “the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee. If it does not, our inquiry is complete. If it does, we evaluate the law under some form of meansend scrutiny.” Id. Plaintiff, however, argues that the applicable rule is set out in United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011). In Barton, the Third Circuit held that in order “[t]o raise a successful as-applied [Second

Amendment] challenge, [the challenger] must present facts about himself and his background that distinguish his circumstances from those of persons historically barred from Second Amendment protections.” Barton, 633 F.3d at 174.

The parties assert numerous arguments in support of their respective positions. Defendants argue that Marzzarella provides the applicable framework for all Second Amendment challenges, and if Barton has any role,<sup>6</sup> it is to address the first element of Marzzarella—whether the law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee. (Doc. 28 at 14). According to Defendants, if the first prong is satisfied using the Barton test, Marzzarella dictates that the court still must complete the second prong and evaluate the law under some form of means-end scrutiny. (Doc. 28 at 15, 34). Plaintiff, however, argues that Marzzarella only applies to facial challenges and the Barton test encompasses the entirety of the standard for as-applied Second Amendment challenges. (Doc. 18 at 22). According to Plaintiff, there can be no means-end scrutiny. (Doc. 31 at 18). If the challenger demonstrates that he is distinguishable from persons historically barred from Second Amendment protections, then he is harmless, and there is no level of scrutiny under which the law’s application could be justified. (Id.). We find that both Plaintiff and Defendants are partially correct.

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<sup>6</sup> As we read Defendants’ brief in support, they initially suggest that either Marzzarella applies or Barton applies, not both. They argue the answer is Marzzarella. In their reply brief, however, Defendants pivot and argue that Barton just elucidates the first prong of Marzzarella.

Marzzarella and Barton are derived from the Supreme Court’s holding in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). In Heller, the Court held that the Second Amendment, at a minimum, confers the “right of law-abiding citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Id. at 635. Recognizing the right not to be unlimited, however, the Court held that “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on commercial sale of arms[ ]” are presumptively valid.<sup>7</sup> Id. at 626-27.

Based on its reading of Heller, the Third Circuit decided Marzzarella. Marzzarella involved a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(k), which prohibits the possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 88. The Third Circuit held that, pursuant to Heller, a two prong test is used for reviewing Second Amendment challenges. Id. at 89. First, it must be determined whether the law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee. Id. If so, the law must be analyzed under some form of means-end scrutiny. Id. The Third Circuit then examined the Court’s discussion of presumptively valid firearm possession prohibitions. Id. at 91-93. It held that these prohibitions are presumptively lawful because they fall outside the scope of the Second Amendment. Id. at 91. That is, possession of firearms by felons is not conduct

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<sup>7</sup> The Court also noted that its list of presumptively valid prohibitions is not exhaustive. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26.

falling within the scope of the Second Amendment's guarantee of law-abiding citizens to bear arms in defense of hearth and home. Therefore, because challenges to these prohibitions would fail the first prong of the Second Amendment test, the Supreme Court held them to be presumptively valid. Accord id. Finding that § 922(k) was not in the list of presumptively valid prohibitions, the Third Circuit went on to analyze the statute under both prongs.

Less than a year later, the Third Circuit issued its opinion in Barton. Barton involved both facial and as-applied challenges to the firearm possession disability in § 922(g)(1). Barton, 633 F.3d at 169. In analyzing the facial challenge, the Barton court also analyzed the Supreme Court's discussion of presumptively valid prohibitions and, like the Marzzarella, found that the prohibitions are presumptively valid because possession of firearms by felons is not conduct protected by the Second Amendment. Id. at 170-71. The Barton court also found that the Supreme Court's discussion of presumptively valid prohibitions was binding. Id. And since Heller requires a presumption that "felon disposition statute[s] regulate conduct which is unprotected by the Second Amendment," the Third Circuit rejected the facial challenge of § 922(g)(1). Id. at 172.

With respect to the as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1), the Third Circuit held that because the prohibitions discussed in Heller are only "presumptively" valid, the presumption could be rebutted with an as-applied challenge. Id. at 173. According to the Third Circuit, to raise a successful as-applied challenge to a presumptively valid prohibition, the chal-



lenger “must present facts about himself and his background that distinguish his circumstances from those of persons historically barred from Second Amendment challenges.” Id. at 174. Meaning that in the context of an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1), the challenger “must demonstrate that his circumstances place outside the intended scope of § 922(g)(1).”

We find Marzzarella and Barton to be harmonious, and reading them together, we find that Barton does address the first element of the Marzzarella.<sup>8</sup> Marzzarella stands for the proposition that there is a two prong test for Second Amendment challenges, and that the prohibitions discussed in Heller are presumptively valid because a challenge of them would fail the first prong. Barton tells us that a challenger may rebut the presumptive validity through the use of an as applied challenge. If the challenger can demonstrate that his circumstances are different from those historically barred from Second Amendment protections, he establishes that his possession of a firearms is conduct within the Second Amendment’s protections and satisfies the first prong. Said differently in the context of § 922(g)(1), if a challenger can show that his circumstances place him outside the intended scope of § 922(g)(1), he establishes, as we read Barton, that he is the “law-abiding citizen” identified in Heller. And if he is a law-abiding citizen, the possession of a fire-

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<sup>8</sup> With respect to Plaintiff’s argument that Marzzarella only applies to facial challenges, we are not persuaded. Marzzarella itself was an as-applied challenge. See Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 88 (stating that Marzzarella moved to dismiss indictment on the grounds that § 922(k), as applied to him, violated the Second Amendment).

arm for protection of hearth and home is not just conduct protected by the Second Amendment, it is the core of the Second Amendment's guarantee. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635. Therefore, the first prong of Marzzarella would be satisfied.

That leaves us with the question of what to do with the second prong of Marzzarella. Because we find that Marzzarella sets the framework for Second Amendment challenges, and Barton only speaks to the first prong of Marzzarella when asserting as-applied challenges to presumptively valid prohibitions, we agree with Defendants that, in theory, we should conduct some sort of means-end scrutiny.<sup>9</sup> However, in the context of an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1), if a challenger satisfies Barton by demonstrating that he is outside the scope of § 922(g)(1), and thereby shows he is a law-abiding citizen who falls within the core of the Second Amendment's protection, any means-end scrutiny would be fatal in fact.<sup>10</sup> See Heller, 554 U.S.

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<sup>9</sup> Citing Marzzarella, Defendants urge us to use intermediate scrutiny. We find that, in this context, strict scrutiny would be the appropriate standard. The Marzzarella court applied intermediate scrutiny because § 922(k) does not severely limit possession of firearms, only those with obliterated serial numbers. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96. But where there is a straight prohibition of firearms possession, as in § 922(g)(1), and not just a regulation of possession, as in § 922(k), a fundamental right is implicated. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778 (2010) (stating the right to bear arms is among fundamental rights). As observed by Marzzarella, where there is a straight prohibition of a fundamental right, strict scrutiny is applied. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 96.

<sup>10</sup> In our view, this is why the Barton court stated that in order to raise a "successful" as-applied challenge, the challenger need only show his circumstances are distinguishable. If he does make such

at 628 (“Under any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home . . . firearm[s] . . . to keep and use for protection of one’s home and family would fail constitutional muster.”). As a practical matter, therefore, an analysis of the second prong of Marzzarella is futile. Accordingly, we find that in the context of an as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1), the analysis begins and ends with Barton. Accord Dutton v. Pennsylvania, 503 F. App’x 125, 127 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012) (analyzing as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) under Barton).

*ii. Whether Plaintiff States a Facially Plausible Claim*

According to the Third Circuit, the traditional justification of § 922(g)(1) was the disarmament of individuals likely to commit violent offenses. Barton, 633 F.3d at 173. Therefore, to state a facially plausible Second Amendment claim challenging the application of § 922(g)(1), a challenger must present facts about himself and his background that demonstrate that his circumstances place him outside of this intended scope. Id. “For instance, a felon convicted of a minor, non-violent crime might show that he is no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen. Similarly, a court

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a showing, he falls back into the core protections of the Second Amendment, and any means-end scrutiny would fail. Marzzarella analyzed the second prong because, as noted above, the statute was not a prohibition of possession, but a regulation of possession. Therefore, since the conduct was not within the core of the Second Amendment’s protections, a means-end analysis was not necessarily fatal.

might find that a felon whose crime of conviction is decades-old poses no continuing threat to society.” Id. (citing Britt v. North Carolina, 681 S.E.2d 320 (2009)). Here, Plaintiff pleads that his offense was a misdemeanor and did not involve violence. He also states that his conviction is nearly twenty-five years old. Moreover, he claims that he is no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen and poses no continuing threat because: (1) he has been married for twenty years and is successfully raising three children; (2) he is an elder in his church; (3) he has had no history of violence; (4) a firearm disability imposed under Pennsylvania law was removed by a Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas; and (5) he maintains “Secret” security clearance in connection with his employment for a government contractor.

Despite these facts, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts that place him outside the intended scope of § 922(g)(1). To support their argument, Defendants point to Dutton v. Pennsylvania, 503 F. App’x 125 (3d Cir. 2012).<sup>11</sup> In Dutton, a pro se plaintiff filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that § 922(g)(1) only applied to felonies and misdemeanors of domestic violence. Dutton v. Pennsylvania, No. 11-7285, 2012 WL 3020651 at \*1 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2012). The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice after finding that the

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<sup>11</sup> We read Defendants’ brief to argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim because Dutton precludes individuals convicted of carrying a firearm without a license from asserting a facially plausible as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1). Therefore, we address Dutton under the motion to dismiss, as oppose to the cross-motions for summary judgment.

statutory claim lacked merit and the plaintiff could not plead sufficient facts to assert a constitutional claim. Id. Upon appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed. Dutton, 503 F. App'x at 127. Like the district court, the Third Circuit noted any as-applied Second Amendment challenge would fail because the plaintiff did not present facts distinguishing himself from other felons. Id. at 127 n.1. It also concluded that the district court did not err in declining the opportunity to amend because “amendment would [not] save his claim.” According to Defendants, the case *sub judice* cannot be distinguished from Dutton. Id. at 127 n.2. Just like Plaintiff in this case, the challenger in Dutton was convicted of misdemeanor firearm offenses over a decade prior. And because the Third Circuit found that no amendment of the complaint would save the challenger’s claim, Defendants assert that there are no set of facts which Plaintiff could plead in order to establish that his circumstances place him outside the intended scope of § 922(g)(1). We disagree.

First, Dutton did not actually contain an as-applied challenge to § 922(g)(1). Indeed, even after liberally construing the complaint, both the district court and the Third Circuit found that only a statutory claim existed. See, e.g., id. at 127 n.1. Therefore, when the Third Circuit found that amendment was futile, it did so because there was no amendment that would save the plaintiff’s statutory challenge to § 922(g)(1). See Binderup, 2014 WL 4754424 at \*19. The court did not find amendment futile because there was no set of facts that the challenger could plead in order to assert an as-applied Second Amendment claim. Id. If it

did, Dutton would effectively abrogate Barton. Id. at \*20.

Therefore, viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, we find that Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to state a facially plausible as-applied Second Amendment claim. Accordingly, we will deny Defendant's motion to dismiss with respect to Count Two and will instead address Count Two on the cross-motions for summary judgment.

*B. Motion for Summary Judgment*

*1. Standard of Review*

We will examine the motion for summary judgment under the well established standard. Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Summary judgment is only appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact.”). We “must view all evidence and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and we will only grant the motion “if no reasonable juror could find for the non-movant.” Id. “Material facts are those ‘that could affect the outcome’ of the proceeding, and ‘a dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Roth v. Norfalco, 651 F.3d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2011)).

*2. Constitutionality of § 921(g)(1) As Applied to Plaintiff*

The record evidence establishes the following concerning Plaintiff's background and circumstances.<sup>12</sup> On February 9, 1990, law enforcement in Montgomery County, Maryland observed Plaintiff's vehicle fail to stop for a red traffic signal. (Doc. 14 at 1; Doc. 21 at 1). Upon stopping the vehicle, law enforcement found Plaintiff driving the car and smelled an odor of alcohol on his breath. (Doc. 14 at 2; Doc. 21 at 1). After failing field sobriety tests, Plaintiff was placed under arrest. (*Id.*). During a post-arrest search, law enforcement found a .357 Magnum handgun concealed under Plaintiff's sports coat. (Doc. 14 at 2; Doc. 21 at 2).<sup>13</sup> He was also found in possession of two loaded "speed-loaders." (*Id.*). For this incident, Plaintiff was convicted of carrying a handgun without a license, a misdemeanor under Maryland law. (Doc. 14 at 3; Doc. 21 at 2). He was sentenced to a term of 180 days imprisonment and a \$500 dollar fine, both suspended, and a year of probation, which he successfully completed. (Doc. 14 at 3; Doc. 19 at 2). Under both

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<sup>12</sup> Plaintiff and Defendants assert that the facts contained in the other party's statement of facts are largely irrelevant. However, in most circumstances we find nothing in Plaintiff's or Defendants' response pointing to record evidence to indicate a dispute. Accordingly, unless otherwise noted, we find the facts in each party's statement of facts to be undisputed. See Local Rule 56.1.

<sup>13</sup> The parties dispute whether Plaintiff notified law enforcement of his possession of the firearm or whether law enforcement recovered it without warning from Plaintiff. We do not find this fact material to the issue under consideration.

Pennsylvania<sup>14</sup> and federal law, Plaintiff's conviction barred him from possessing a firearm. In addition to his firearm conviction, Plaintiff was convicted of a misdemeanor in 1998 for driving while under the influence of alcohol.

Since his 1990 conviction, Plaintiff has been married for twenty years. (Doc. 19 at 2). He is a father of three children. He is a member of a local church and enjoys a position of leadership there. (*Id.*). Since 1992, Plaintiff has maintained continuous employment within the technology field. (Doc. 18-1 at 1). For the last six years, he has been employed as a Project Manager for a technology management company. (*Id.*). In his position, Plaintiff provides technology services primarily to Department of Defense clients. (*Id.*). And in order to provide those services, he holds a government security clearance of "Secret." (*Id.*). Finally, in August of 2009, Plaintiff applied to the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas of Adams County to remove the firearm disability imposed under Pennsylvania law. The court granted the application and held that Pennsylvania law no longer prohibits Plaintiff from possessing a firearm. See Commonwealth v. Suarez, CP-01-MD-615-2209 (Aug. 31, 2009). Plaintiff asserts that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because these circumstances place him outside the intended scope of § 922(g)(1). We agree.

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<sup>14</sup> Pursuant to 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6105, a person convicted of certain weapon offenses may not possess a firearm in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, unless the person applies for and is granted relief by the court of common pleas in the county in which she resides. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6105(a), (c).



The traditional justification for § 922(g)(1) was the disarmament of individual's likely to commit violent acts. Barton, 633 F.3d 173. Under Barton, a felon with a minor, non-violent conviction can demonstrate a lack of violent propensity, and therefore outside the intended scope of § 922(g)(1), by showing that he is no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen. Id. at 174. Alternatively, a felon can demonstrate that he is outside the intended scope of § 922(g)(1) by showing that his conviction is decades-old and that he poses no continuing threat to society. Id. First, we find that Plaintiff satisfies the threshold elements for both of these alternative tests. That is, Plaintiff's predicate conviction was minor and non-violent, and the conviction is now decades-old. The conviction was minor because he ultimately received only one year of probation.<sup>15</sup> It was for a non-violent offense because it did not involve the use of force, threat of force, coercion, or threats to public safety. And his 1990 conviction is now two and a half decades old.

Second, we find that Plaintiff's background and circumstances in the years following his conviction establish that he is no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen and poses no continuing threat to society. In Barton, the Third Circuit pointed to Britt v. North Carolina to exemplify a felon who is no longer dangerous and poses no continuing threat. Barton, 633 F.3d 174 (citing Britt v. North Carolina, 684

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<sup>15</sup> By the use of the word "minor," we do not mean to imply that the offense of carrying a firearm without a license is inconsequential. We use "minor" only to suggest that the penalty Plaintiff actually received was minimal.

S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 2009). In Britt, the felon had been convicted of possession with intent to deliver controlled substances. Britt, 684 S.E.2d at 321. His conviction did not involve violence or threat of violence. Id. at 322-23. He completed a short prison sentence and probationary period without incident. Id. In the thirty years following his conviction, there was no evidence that he was dangerous or misused firearms. Id. There was no evidence that he used violence toward other citizens, and he had not been convicted of any other crimes. Id.

Like the felon in Britt, Plaintiff's conviction did not involve violence. He served his probationary period without incident. There is no evidence that in the twenty-five years since his conviction Plaintiff was dangerous or misused firearms. There is no evidence that he used violence toward other citizens. Although he does have one intervening conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, that conviction is not a disqualifying conviction under § 922(g)(1) and is itself nearly two decades old. Indeed, despite Plaintiff's subsequent conviction, in 2009, a Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas determined that Plaintiff's circumstances justified removal of a firearm disability imposed under State law.<sup>16</sup> And finally, Plaintiff main-

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<sup>16</sup> Defendants assert that this fact should be accorded no weight because the Court of Common Pleas was required to remove the disability. Pursuant to § 6105, the court must remove the disability if (1) the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States has relieved the applicant of any disability imposed under federal law, and (2) ten years has elapsed since conviction. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6105(d)(3). If, however, Congress has not appropriated sufficient funds to enable the Secretary of the Treasury to grant relief,

tains “Secret” security clearance with the government in order to provide services to Department of Defense clients. We think it safe to assume that our government does not give such clearances to individuals that are dangerous or that pose a threat to society. Accordingly, we find that Plaintiff has established that he is no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen and poses no continuing threat to society. Therefore, we find that Plaintiff falls outside the intended scope of § 922(g)(1) and is distinguishable from those historically barred from Second Amendment protections.

Defendants’ arguments that Plaintiff’s circumstances make him no different than those historically barred from Second Amendment protections do not persuade us otherwise. First, they argue that Congress enacted § 922(g)(1) with a broad prophylactic purpose and intended to impose a possession prohibition on individuals convicted of both violent and non-violent crimes. (Doc. 13 at 29-33; Doc. 28 at 26). Therefore, according to Defendants, although Plaintiff’s conviction did not involve violence, he is not outside the intended scope of the felon possession prohibition of § 922(g)(1).<sup>17</sup> (Id.). We find this argument

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the court may waive the first condition. Id. In 2009, when Plaintiff applied, Congress did not appropriate funds to the Secretary of the Treasury and ten years had passed since Plaintiff’s conviction. Thus, Defendants argue that the court was required to remove the disability. However, Section 6105 states that the Court of Common Pleas may waive the first condition. After a hearing, and based on Plaintiff’s circumstances, the court exercised its discretion to waive that requirement. As a result, we do find the fact noteworthy.

<sup>17</sup> Plaintiff seems to argue that he is different than those historically barred because § 922(g)(1) was traditionally intended to

better made before the Third Circuit in an attempt to overturn Barton. Despite Congress's broad reach with § 922(g)(1), the Third Circuit's opinion in Barton allows a challenger to demonstrate that he is beyond that reach and therefore different from those historically barred. Barton, 633 F.3d 173. If the wide breadth of § 922(g)(1) meant that a challenger with a non-violent or decades-old conviction could never demonstrate that his circumstances place him beyond § 922(g)(1)'s intended scope, Barton would be hollow. We decline to render it so.

Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is no different than those historically barred because he is similar to the challenger in Barton.<sup>18</sup> (Doc. 13 at 26; Doc. 28 at 27). In Barton, the Third Circuit held that the challenger failed to demonstrate that his circumstances place him outside of § 922(g)(1)'s intended scope. According to Defendants, the court reached this ruling despite the challenger's predicate convictions being over a decade old and not inherently violent. (Id.).

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prohibit felons from possessing firearms. Because he was convicted of a misdemeanor, he claims is outside the scope of § 922(g)(1). We disagree. Congress generally equates a felony to a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than one year. Burgess v. United States, 553 U.S. 124, 130 (2008); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 617 (6th ed. 1991). Thus, if convicted of a crime punishable by over one year, the individual is a felon under § 922(g)(1). See Dutton v. Pennsylvania, No. 11-7285, 2012 WL 3020651 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 2012).

<sup>18</sup> Defendants also argue that Dutton establishes that Plaintiff is no different than those historically barred from Second Amendment protections. Because we have already examined Dutton and found it distinguishable from this case, see supra pp. 15-17, we need not re-examine it here.

Defendant's argue that Plaintiff is no different. We disagree.

The circumstances of each case matter greatly. The challenger in Barton was prohibited from possessing firearms under § 922(g)(1) because he was convicted of receiving stolen property—which happened to be a stolen firearm. Id. His challenge arose after being indicted for violating § 922(g)(1) because he sold a revolver with an obliterated serial number to a confidential informant. Id. Because the rule for making an as-applied claim would not be established until the Third Circuit issued its opinion in his case, the challenger presented no facts showing that his circumstances placed him outside § 922(g)(1)'s scope. Id. at 174. Nor was he capable of doing so, since he had just been indicted for selling firearms with obliterated serial numbers. Id.

Here, unlike the defendant in Barton, Plaintiff is not a criminal defendant currently under an indictment for selling firearms with obliterated serial numbers. Plaintiff's predicate conviction is not for an inherently violent crime. The challenger in Barton was convicted of inherently violent crimes. See Barton, 633 F.3d 173 (stating with approval that “[c]ourts have held offenses related to drug trafficking and receiving stolen weapons are closely related to violent crime). Further, Plaintiff's predicate offense is not just over a decade old, its over two decades old, and it did not involve a stolen firearm. And unlike the challenger in Barton, Plaintiff is capable of, and actually has, presented facts demonstrating that he outside the scope of § 922(g)(1). Accordingly, we find the disparity be-

tween Plaintiff and the challenger in Barton to be wide.

Finally, Defendants assert that Plaintiff is not outside the intended scope of § 922(g)(1) because he has not shown that he is no more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen and poses no continuing threat to society. First, they emphasize that at the time of Plaintiff's arrest, he was carrying a .357 Magnum handgun and two loaded speed-loaders while intoxicated to the point that he was placed under arrest for driving under the influence. (Doc. 13 at 27). They argue that possessing a firearm while intoxicated poses such a danger that many jurisdictions impose criminal sanctions for doing so.<sup>19</sup> (Id.). We agree with Defendants that the circumstances of Plaintiff's arrest were dangerous. But the inquiry is whether the challenger, today, not at the time of arrest, is more dangerous than a typical law-abiding citizen or poses a continuing threat. There are two ways in which a challenger may fail to show he is not dangerous. One, the challenger's conviction is for acts so violent that even after twenty-five years of nonviolent behavior he would continue to be dangerous and to pose a threat to society. This is not that case. Or Two, the facts and circumstances since the conviction show that the challenger remains dangerous. As revealed in our dis-

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<sup>19</sup> In addition, Defendants argue that Heller only protects the right of law-abiding citizens to bear arms. Therefore, they remind us that Plaintiff has also been convicted for driving under the influence, and a person who has been twice convicted cannot be characterized as "law-abiding." Again, Barton allows for a person convicted of a crime to demonstrate they are now law-abiding and fall within the Second Amendment's protection.

cussion above, we find Plaintiff's background and circumstance establish that, today, he is not dangerous and does not pose a risk to society.

Second, Defendants argue that although Plaintiff's predicate conviction was not violent, empirical studies reveal that those like Plaintiff have a high rate of violent recidivism, and thus Plaintiff continues to be dangerous and pose a societal threat. (Doc. 13 at 13, 29). While we agree that the generalized results of an empirical study are useful to refute a facial challenge and demonstrate that a statute survives some sort of means-end scrutiny, we do not find that generalized conclusions are particularly useful in as-applied challenges to demonstrate whether Plaintiff, himself, is dangerous or poses a continuing threat. Accordingly, we find the studies of little moment and decline to rely on them to find that Plaintiff is dangerous. Accord Binderup v. Holder, No. 13-CV-6750, 2014 WL 4764424 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 2014).

#### *IV. Conclusion*

Based on the discussion above, we find that Plaintiff does not fall within the exclusionary language of § 921(a)(20)(B) and that § 922(g)(1) does prohibit him from possessing a firearm. Accordingly, we will grant Defendants' motion to dismiss with respect to Count One. We further find that, pursuant to Third Circuit's opinion in United States v. Barton, Plaintiff has established that his background and circumstances place him outside of the intended scope § 922(g)(1), and therefore the application of § 922(g)(1) violates Plaintiff's Second Amendment protections. Accord-

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ingly, we will grant Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment with respect to Count Two.

/s/ WILLIAM W. CALDWELL  
WILLIAM W. CALDWELL  
United States District Judge



**APPENDIX E**

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

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CIVIL No. 1:14-CV-968

JULIO SUAREZ, PLAINTIFF

*v.*

ERIC HOLDER, JR., ET AL., DEFENDANTS

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Filed: Feb. 18, 2015

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***ORDER***

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AND NOW, this 18th day of February, 2015, upon consideration of the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and the Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment filed by the respective parties, it is ordered that:

1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with respect to Count One.
2. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED with respect to Count Two.
3. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DISMISSED as MOOT with respect to Count One.
4. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to Count Two.
5. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DISMISSED as MOOT with respect to Count One.

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6. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED with respect to Count Two.
7. The clerk shall close this file.

/s/ WILLIAM W. CALDWELL  
WILLIAM W. CALDWELL  
United States District Judge

**APPENDIX F**

1. U.S. Constitutional Amend. II provides:

A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.

2. 18 U.S.C. 921 provides in pertinent part:

**Definitions**

(a) As used in this chapter—

\* \* \* \* \*

(20) The term “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” does not include—

(A) any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices, or

(B) any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less.

What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.

\* \* \* \* \*

3. 18 U.S.C. 922(g) provides:

**Unlawful acts**

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—

(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;

(2) who is a fugitive from justice;

(3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802));

(4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution;

(5) who, being an alien—

(A) is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; or

(B) except as provided in subsection (y)(2), has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa (as that term is defined in section 101(a)(26) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(26)));

(6) who has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions;

(7) who, having been a citizen of the United States, has renounced his citizenship;

(8) who is subject to a court order that—

(A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate;

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(B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or child; and

(C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or

(ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury; or

(9) who has been convicted in any court of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence,

to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

4. 18 U.S.C. 925(c) provides:

**Exceptions: Relief from disabilities**

(c) A person who is prohibited from possessing, shipping, transporting, or receiving firearms or ammunition may make application to the Attorney General for relief from the disabilities imposed by Federal laws with respect to the acquisition, receipt, transfer, shipment, transportation, or possession of firearms, and the Attorney General may grant such relief if it is

established to his satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the disability, and the applicant's record and reputation, are such that the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety and that the granting of the relief would not be contrary to the public interest. Any person whose application for relief from disabilities is denied by the Attorney General may file a petition with the United States district court for the district in which he resides for a judicial review of such denial. The court may in its discretion admit additional evidence where failure to do so would result in a miscarriage of justice. A licensed importer, licensed manufacturer, licensed dealer, or licensed collector conducting operations under this chapter, who makes application for relief from the disabilities incurred under this chapter, shall not be barred by such disability from further operations under his license pending final action on an application for relief filed pursuant to this section. Whenever the Attorney General grants relief to any person pursuant to this section he shall promptly publish in the Federal Register notice of such action, together with the reasons therefor.