1 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 2 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA 3 4 United States of America, 5 Plaintiff, 6 vs. Criminal Action No. 3:24-cr-12 7 Malachi Jamir Sweeney-Teal, 8 Defendant. 9 10 Proceedings had in the pretrial hearing in the 11 above-styled action on April 18, 2024, before the Honorable 12 Gina M. Groh, United States District Judge, at Martinsburg, 13 West Virginia. 14 15 APPEARANCES 16 On behalf of the United States of America: 17 Kyle R. Kane Assistant United States Attorney 18 United States Attorney's Office 217 West King Street, Ste. 400 19 Martinsburg, West Virginia 25401 20 On behalf of the defendant: 21 Kristen Leddy Assistant Federal Public Defender 22 Federal Public Defender's Office 651 Foxcroft, Ste. 202 23 Martinsburg, West Virginia 25401 24 The defendant was present in person. 25 Proceedings reported by means of stenotype; transcript produced by official court reporter. Kate A. Slayden, RPR

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1 PROCEEDINGS 2 (April 18, 2024, at 11:25 A.M.) 3 THE COURT: We'll call our case. 4 THE CLERK: This is the case of the United States of 5 6 America versus Malachi Jamir Sweeney-Teal, Criminal Number 7 3:24-cr-12, defendant 1. 8 The government is represented by counsel, Kyle Kane. The 9 defendant is present in person and by counsel, Kristen Leddy. 10 Are the parties ready to proceed? MR. KANE: The United States is ready. 11 12 MS. LEDDY: The defense is ready, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: All right, Counsel, I think this case, although the issues are a bit different, is in the same posture 14 as the other. There's a conditional plea in this. 15 So the parties want the Court to rule on the motion to dismiss filed 16 by the defendant; and then if this case survives, you all are 17 going to the magistrate judge to enter a plea. So there's not 18 19 going to be a trial in this case on Tuesday unless something 20 screws up with the plea; correct? 21 MS. LEDDY: That's correct, Your Honor. 22 MR. KANE: That's correct, Your Honor. Okay. I will say the only other thing 23 THE COURT: 24 other than this motion that would have been on the plate for our pretrial today anyway, would have been the annotated 25

voir dire. 1 2 And, Ms. Leddy, it looks as though you followed the 3 Court's -- basically, my general voir dire, and you tailored your submitted proposed voir dire to that, so there wasn't 4 much in addition. There wasn't -- I don't know if there was 5 6 any overlap. I don't think there is any objection to this voir dire if 7 we go to trial, is there, Mr. Kane? 8 9 MR. KANE: No, Your Honor. Okay. So thank you. You made that THE COURT: 10 11 easy. MS. LEDDY: Thank you, Your Honor. 12 THE COURT: All right. So the only thing left for 13 the Court to decide in this case is the defendant's motion to 14 15 dismiss the superseding indictment. I read the motion. I read 16 the government's response. And we can get started with your 17 argument, Ms. Leddy. MS. LEDDY: Thank you, Your Honor. 18 19 As Your Honor stated, we're here before the Court on a 20 motion to dismiss the indict -- the superseding indictment. 21 Count 1 charges a violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), and Count 2 22 alleges a violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(0)(1). And we're lucky to 23 be before the Court today after a previous hearing wherein my noted colleagues explained the framework -- the historical 24 25 framework that brings us to -- before the Court today from

McDonald and D.C. v. Heller, and the Supreme Court's recent 1 decision in Bruen, which is the basis of our motion to dismiss. 2 THE COURT: So what you're saying is you're going to 3 4 cut that part out because Mr. Kane represented the government in that case, too, and I certainly understand it, so we can 5 move forward from that point. 6 7 MS. LEDDY: Thank you, Your Honor. Furthermore, I do go into the history of the statutory framework as well in my 8 motion, so I would incorporate that as well. 9 THE COURT: Of course. 10 11 MS. LEDDY: So I would begin with the questions or 12 the one step that Bruen asks the Court to resolve to analyze 13 the motion to dismiss. And that is whether the Second 14 Amendment's plain text covers the conduct that's alleged here. 15 If so, the Constitution will presumptively protect that 16 conduct. 17 So we begin by asking, does the Second Amendment's plain text cover an individual's conduct? And the plain text of the 1.8 19 Second Amendment, as the Court is aware, discusses the right of the people to keep and bear arms. And there are two parts to 20 the plain text: the conduct and the who. 21 22 So we're talking about the right of Mr. Sweeney to 23 possess firearms inside and outside of his home. And we ask, 24 "Is Mr. Sweeney among the people?" And to answer this 25 question, I -- my -- I developed my argument from the Fifth

Circuit's holding in the United States v. Daniel, which was an as-applied challenge to the application of 922(g)(3) in that case. And in that case, the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant in that case, Daniels, even as a marijuana user was a member of the political community. That he had a presumptive right to bear arms and that by infringing on that right, 922(g)(3) contradicts the plain text of the Second Amendment.

8 The Court goes on to say that more than just model 9 citizens enjoy the right to bear arms and that because 10 Daniels -- that -- excuse me -- that model citizen was just a 11 shorthand to exclude from the discussion folks such as mentally 12 ill and felons, people who were historically stripped of their 13 Second Amendment rights.

So the government in its response says that only 14 15 law-abiding citizens are -- have conduct that's covered by the Second Amendment. But as the Court -- the Fifth Circuit has 16 17 stated, it's not just model citizens. That the plain text of 18 the Second Amendment makes no distinction between law abiding/non-law abiding, felon/non-felon, drug user/not drug 19 user. So we argue here, Your Honor, that Mr. Sweeney-Teal 20 should be included as part of the people. And as I said, the 21 Fifth Circuit held that Mr. Daniels was part of the people. 22

After the Court makes this determination about whether or not Mr. Sweeney-Teal is protected by the Constitution, the burden under *Bruen* shifts to the government to demonstrate that

1 922(g)(3) is consistent with the Nation's historical traditions
2 of firearms regulation.

So in Daniels, the Court asks what kind of similarity are 3 we looking for? Distinct similarity or less precise relevant 4 similarity? And the Court goes on to find that Bruen doesn't 5 require more than relevant similarity here. So it discusses 6 how the founders were familiar with intoxication by alcohol and 7 that they were familiar with the use of marijuana plants, but 8 they were not familiar with the widespread use of marijuana as 9 a narcotic nor the modern drug trade. However, though 10 intoxication was generally a persistent social problem, the 11 founding generation had no occasion to consider the 12 relationship between firearms and intoxication. 13

So the Court here considered several analogues and found 14that the statutes that were relevant fell into three different 15 groups: statutes that disarmed intoxicated individuals, 16 statutes disarming the mentally ill or insane, and statutes 17 disarming those adjudged dangerous or disloyal. And it goes 18 19 into its analysis of each of those different types of statutes and finds that, in short, neither the restrictions on the 20 21 mentally ill nor the regulatory traditions surrounding intoxication can justify Daniels' conviction. 22

23 Perhaps the government can show that Daniel -- the drugs 24 Daniels used were so powerful that anyone who used them is 25 permanently impaired in a way that's comparable to ongoing

1	mental illness or that the government can demonstrate that
2	Daniels' drug use was so regular and so heavily heavy that
3	he was continually impaired. But the Court found in the Fifth
4	Circuit that the government could not show evidence of any of
5	those things, so it let me back up and make sure I'm
6	covering everything so that Daniels' marijuana use was not
7	shown to predispose him to armed conflict or that he had a
8	history of drug-related violence. That's with regard to
9	922(g)(3).
10	He's among the people covered by the Second Amendment,
11	and there's no historical tradition distinctly similar to
12	922(g)(3) giving rise to an exception to the Second Amendment's
13	unqualified mandate. So Count 1 should be dismissed.
14	With regard to 922(o)(1), we ask the Court to use the
15	same analytical framework, but I do not have any case law that
16	is after the issuance of Heller that discusses 922(o)(1). So
17	when the Court after the Court reaches a decision upon
18	whether or not he is part of the people, the Court would have
19	to or the government would have to have a burden of showing
20	that 922(o)(1) is relevantly similar to or a historical
21	analogue. And I don't have any case law that discusses that
22	statutory section.
23	THE COURT: Anything further?
24	MS. LEDDY: That's it, Your Honor.
25	THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
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1	Mr. Kane.
2	MR. KANE: Thank you, Your Honor.
3	Your Honor, again, I would incorporate my entire brief,
4	all the case law cited in that.
5	For Mr. Sweeney-Teal, I think it's important to start
6	with a little bit of factual background that we provided in our
7	response because of what the (g)(3) charge is.
8	Mr. Sweeney-Teal was is alleged to have brandished a firearm
9	equipped with a Glock switch, which is a machine gun, at some
10	juveniles in Martinsburg. When he was placed under arrest, he
11	was in possession of fentanyl pills that were tested and were
12	positive for fentanyl. And he made a statement that night to
13	police that he is addicted to opiates, and he gave a statement
14	to ATF agents two days later that not only is he addicted to
15	opiates, but at the time of their interview, he was undergoing
16	withdrawal. So he is a person that at the time of the
17	possession was actively addicted to opiates, and I think that
18	that is relevant for the Court's consideration in this case.
19	THE COURT: On Count 1.
20	MR. KANE: On Count 1. So, Your Honor, we lay out
21	the same argument that we just made in the Jacobs' case in our
22	brief regarding the Heller decision, how Bruen affected that,
23	and the application to non-virtuous, dangerous citizens, which
24	I think that there is plenty of support for that. People who
25	are intoxicated are dangerous in certain circumstances.

1 The Daniels Court interestingly finds that the laws related to people intoxicated by alcohol are relevant, 2 historical analogues. They just didn't find them persuasive. 3 So that case is also on a cert. petition to the Supreme Court 4 5 right now. In the government's cert. petition, they point out six reasons why people who are intoxicated should be considered 6 dangerous and that that should have been given more weight. 7 Drug users may mishandle firearms or use firearms to commit 8 9 crimes. Drug users often commit crimes in order to obtain 10 money or buy drugs. Violent crime may occur as part of drug business or culture. Armed drug users endanger police. 11 Armed 12 drug users endanger themselves. Sorry. It's five reasons. And the argument there is that the historical tradition 13 14that they pointed to in that case of not being able to possess 15 firearms while intoxicated and showing up for military service 16 while intoxicated, you know, those sort of laws, that they 17 should have been given more weight. And I think that this 18 Court is able to apply the weight to those analogues that it

19 sees fit. It's not bound by the Fifth Circuit's determination
20 in that regard.

The government also points to -- and I'm just really relying on the *Daniels* opinion's recitation of that because I think that it does go through a detailed analysis of some of those. But there's the mental ill -- mentally ill and just the dangerous people who are -- can be prohibited from possessing

1 firearms. And we reiterate the five reasons we just gave that 2 people who are addicted to or using opiates would be considered dangerous, particularly when they have firearms, and in this 3 situation, were in possession of a firearm, brandished a 4 5 firearm while they're in possession, and addicted to opiates. 6 THE COURT: But hasn't that been a longstanding 7 Addiction, alcoholism -problem? MR. KANE: It has ---8 9 THE COURT: We'll hear stories about how, you know, 10 you probably have the marshals high on morphine arresting 11 people in the Wild West. Thomas Jefferson was probably drunk 12 from the wine in his vineyards. That's been a longstanding 13 problem. 14 It has, Your Honor. And I would just MR. KANE: 15 point out that there have been other applications or other 16 cases involving Section (q)(3) that have been decided since 17 Heller around the country and in this district that have found 18 (g)(3) to be constitutional. There is the opinion out of the 19 Ninth Circuit in Dugan that said Section (g)(3) has the same 20 historical pedigree as other portions of 922(q), which are 21 repeatedly upheld by numerous courts since Heller. And this --22 page 8 of my motion has some of those. There's a case out of this district that I believe is on 23

24 appeal right now. United States v. Wendell Beverly. There was 25 an initial order denying the motion to dismiss (g)(3) that was

It was then reheard, I believe, after the trial and 1 issued. 2 was denied again. But in this district, since *Heller*, since *Bruen*, (q)(3) 3 has found -- has been found to be constitutional and that's at 4 5 the Fourth Circuit right now. I'm not aware of any Fourth Circuit precedent since Bruen on (g)(3), so I guess I'll leave 6 7 (g)(3) there. I think that the history of disarming dangerous people is 8 here. I think that the history of disarming intoxicated people 9 10 is here. And as applied to him, he was actively addicted and in possession of opiates at the time that he had the firearm in 11 12 this case. But when we look back to the 13 THE COURT: government's burden to establish a historical tradition of laws 14 15 disarming those similarly situated to the defendant, there weren't any drug bans for drug users taking a look back ---16 17 MR. KANE: No --THE COURT: -- to 1791 or thereabouts. 18 19 MR. KANE: There is at least one prohibition noted in Daniels of disarming people who were intoxicated by alcohol. 20 21 There is not anything that I've seen in any of the briefs that 22 I've read, any of the opinions I've read about disarming drug 23 users; but there have been opinions since Heller around the 24 country, in this district, affirming the constitutionality of 25 (g) (3) on a historical analysis and saying that, you know --

1	this is the same argument about the categories. It's not just
2	about an exact twin.
3	The Fifth Circuit said that, hey, alcohol is close, and
4	we can use that. They discounted the weight of the tradition,
5	but I think that the government's position in the Daniels case
6	is still correct. That the mentally ill are analogous to drug
7	users because of the effect that drugs have on your brain and
8	that the dangerous citizenry is applicable to drug users as
9	well because all the reasons that, you know, I said here, but
10	all the reasons that we frequently talk about the danger that
11	drugs and guns have together. I think that you can easily fit
12	(g)(3) into someone who is addicted or using drugs into a
13	dangerous person in that historical tradition of disarmament
14	falls.
15	Turning to the machine gun
16	THE COURT: Are you going to have some testimony on
17	the machine gun? Because I know if we're looking at Heller,
18	Heller clarifies that the Second Amendment protects those that
19	are in common use and those typically possessed by law-abiding
20	citizens for lawful purposes but not those firearms that are
21	dangerous and unusual.
22	MR. KANE: Well, I Agent Cox is here. I guess I
23	can call him. I was going to rely on the cases cited on
24	page 17 of our brief that are post-Heller decisions, post
25	obviously, post-Miller decisions, but post-Heller decisions

1 that have concluded machine guns fall outside the Second 2 Amendment scope. That's U.S. v. One Palmetto State Armory, 3 Hollis v. Lynch, and United States v. Henry. Those are out of the Third, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. So I think that there is 4 case law -- not out of the Fourth Circuit -- that has found 5 6 machine guns to do that. 7 If the government would permit me, I could call Special 8 Agent Cox. 9 THE COURT: Thank you. 10 Special Agent Cox. MR. KANE: (The witness, Seth Cox, was sworn in.) 11 12 THE CLERK: Please watch your step as you walk up. 13 DIRECT EXAMINATION 14 BY MR. KANE: 15 Would you state your name for the record, please. Q. 16 Seth Cox. Α. 17 0. And how are you employed? 18Α. Special agent with ATF stationed here in Martinsburg, 19 West Virginia. 20 0. And you became involved in an investigation of Malachi 21 Sweeney-Teal in the fall of last year? 22 Α. I did. 23 And that involved the possession of a firearm that was Ο. 2.4 affixed with a Glock switch; is that correct? 25 Α. That's correct.

## SETH COX - DIRECT EXAMINATION

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1	Q. Can you explain what a Glock switch is?
2	A. It is a small device that goes on to a Glock model
3	firearm. Essentially fits on the back of the slide. That
4	small firing pin release on the back of the slide can be
5	removed. These parts are purchased after market. It's not
6	something that Glock creates. They only have one model that
7	they produce that's wholly automatic. That firing system is
8	built into that firearm. With these, they're aftermarket
9	products that we're seeing through our investigations that are
10	inserted. It allows the firearm to function as a fully
11	automatic firearm.
12	Q. Okay. Two questions. The fully automatic firearm that
13	Glock does make, for what purpose do they make that?
14	A. Military and law enforcement generally.
15	Q. So that's not something that's generally available to the
16	public?
17	A. No.
18	Q. Okay. And is that something that's available in the
19	United States?
20	A. No, it's not.
21	Q. Okay. Now, you said that the Glock switch converts the
22	Glock to a fully automatic firearm.
23	A. It does.
24	Q. And what when that what does that mean in terms of
25	the machine gun statute?
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	provenue (1997)
1	A. Essentially that firearm will fire more than one round
2	with a single trigger.
3	Q. Okay. And the firearm fixed with a Glock switch in this
4	case, was that tested?
5	A. It was.
6	Q. And did it fire multiple rounds with a simple pull of the
7	trigger?
8	A. It did. So excuse me Firearms Enforcement Officer
9	Nicholas Campbell conducted that testing. He's the one that
10	did the essentially researched the firearm. Recreated what
11	needed to be done to shoot, and he did that. I only observed
12	that process, but I was there when he fired it. I believe he
13	did two, five-round bursts of that firearm.
14	Q. Okay. Now, you said that the Glock switches are an
15	after-market product. How would one come to possess a Glock
16	switch?
17	A. Historically right now, trends, you know, it's an
18	aftermarket. A lot of these are coming from other countries
19	that are purchased online. China is a big, essentially,
20	source. They're purchased online in aftermarket areas,
21	inserted by the user of the firearm generally on their own.
22	Q. Is it something that's available to the public at a gun
23	shop?
24	A. No.
25	Q. Is it something that would be available for purchase at a

gun show? 1 2 Α. No. 3 Ο. Okay. 4 THE COURT: Why not? THE WITNESS: They're regulated by the government. 5 So essentially you would need -- you need to be a Class 3 6 7 dealer, military, law enforcement. I'd have to do my research 8 again, but --THE COURT: That's fine. 9 THE WITNESS: -- the machine gun protect -- the 10 11 Firearm Protection Owners Act. After 1984, there's certain 12 firearms that you cannot buy unless you --THE COURT: So to boil it down, it can't legally be 13 14sold here like that unless it's one of those exceptions you've 15 explained to us? 16 THE WITNESS: Correct. The general public 17 generally -- there's certain parameters that you can do with 18 authorized dealers, license -- that you -- general day-to-day 19 citizens like a regular GCA, Gun Control Act, firearm cannot be 20 purchased by a lawful citizen to have a machine gun. 21 BY MR. KANE: 2.2 Okay. So a machine gun would be an unusual weapon? Ο. 23 Correct. We don't come across them too often, especially Α. here in the Northern District, but they're starting to become 24 25 more prevalent here in the Northern -- or excuse me -- Eastern

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1	Panhandle of West Virginia.
2	Q. And you talked about a five-round burst that was able to
3	be accomplished from the test-fire. If you can recall, can you
4	explain to the Court how quickly that gun fired those five
5	rounds?
6	A. I would say probably under one and a half seconds.
7	Q. Okay.
8	A. Maybe a second. It was very rapid.
9	Q. Okay. And that is how distinct is that from being
10	able to fire five rounds without that equipped?
11	A. I'd say five rounds, you'd probably get it off in maybe
12	two seconds; but it's considerably exponentially, it gets
13	very fast. In this example, the firearm held a 30-round
14	magazine. Shooting all those rounds by a single trigger pull
15	would take quite some time. Thirty rounds in that magazine
16	probably could be done in under five seconds.
17	Q. And the five-round burst that was accomplished, was that
18	only because there was only five rounds loaded into it?
19	A. Yeah. That's just what generally the FEOs over our
20	technical center that's usually what they base their
21	parameters on. The five-round burst.
22	Q. So if you had a the Glock fixed with a Glock switch,
23	and you had a 30-round fully-occupied magazine, you could fire
24	all 30 rounds with a single pull of the trigger?
25	A. You could unless there was a malfunction of the firearm.
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1	Q. And I think you said that the actual Glock switches are
2	only available to military and law enforcement uses?
3	A. The Glock from my recollection and my experience with
4	these firearms, Glock only makes one fully automatic handgun.
5	The Glock switches are something that's been designed to
6	essentially circumvent the standard practice of a single
7	trigger pull with the Glock firearms.
8	Q. Okay. So the typical firearm possessed by citizens for
9	self-defense cannot operate or cannot fire more than one
10	shot with a single action of the trigger?
11	A. That's correct.
12	Q. Okay.
13	MR. KANE: Those are my questions, Your Honor.
14	THE COURT: So, Agent, just so I understand the
15	mechanics of this, this Glock in question, before it was
16	modified well, at all times it was a handgun; right?
17	THE WITNESS: It was.
18	THE COURT: Okay. So before the modification, if I
19	want to fire that, I have to pull the trigger, and then I have
20	to re-aim before well, if I let's say I'm shooting at
21	something. I have to re-aim?
22	THE WITNESS: Essentially what that firearm is going
23	to do is when you shoot the firearm, that slide is going to go
24	back, eject that shell, and as it goes forward, the trigger is
25	going to reset, which is going to allow you to have to pull
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1	that trigger again. So if that's your second round, you're
2	going to shoot a second round. Kick that shell out. The slide
3	is going to go forward, and the trigger is going to reset.
4	You're going to pull a third time. A machine gun that auto
5	sear that you put in the back, essentially to drop in the Glock
6	switch, defeats that purpose and allows you to just hold the
7	trigger and that round is going to reset, reset, reset, which
8	allows it to function very quickly.
9	THE COURT: So as long as I'm holding that
10	trigger
11	THE WITNESS: That gun is going to go essentially
12	boom until it runs out of rounds.
13	THE COURT: So it's harder to control?
14	THE WITNESS: Oh, I've shot it myself before. It
15	doesn't matter how big you are, they all have a propensity to
16	go straight up in the air or go sideways. It's going to go
17	across you.
18	THE COURT: I presume that's part of the
19	dangerousness
20	THE WITNESS: Yes.
21	THE COURT: of that modification?
22	THE WITNESS: In my experience, my proficiency with
23	firearms, I'm much more accurate with a regular firearm.
24	Shooting it with a single trigger pull, you're able to control
25	that firearm much easier. A fully automatic firearm, if I put

## SETH COX - DIRECT EXAMINATION/CROSS-EXAMINATION

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1	two targets side by side and shot 30 rounds, I know that my
2	grouping with my regular firearm, my duty-issued firearm, would
3	be much more accurate. I don't even know if I'd be able to
4	keep all the rounds on the target with a fully automatic
5	firearm.
6	THE COURT: Thank you.
7	THE WITNESS: Sure.
8	THE COURT: Any follow-up on that, Mr. Kane?
9	MR. KANE: One follow-up on that.
10	BY MR. KANE:
11	Q. At the same time that you would be less accurate, those
12	rounds would be discharged exponentially faster as you said?
13	A. Correct.
14	MR. KANE: No further questions, Your Honor.
15	THE COURT: Thank you.
16	Ms. Leddy, any questions for the agent?
17	MS. LEDDY: Just briefly, Your Honor.
18	<u>CROSS-EXAMINATION</u>
19	BY MS. LEDDY:
20	Q. Agent Cox, when did you become involved in the case?
21	A. You mean the exact date or
22	Q. The timing.
23	A. I believe it was the evening after. I'd have to
24	recollect my reports, but I know essentially I assisted with
25	this. Was contacted by the local law enforcement and state

police. 1 2 Ο. So you joined the investigation after his arrest and 3 after he was taken into custody? 4 Α. That's correct. 5 Okay. But you -- have you reviewed the reports from the Ο. arresting officers? 6 7 I have. Α. 8 Can you tell us if there was any statement made by Q. 9 Mr. Sweeney-Teal about the functionality of the Glock switch at the time of the incident? 10 11 From my recollection, I believe he did make a statement Α. 12 that he knew it was on there, but he knew it didn't work. 13 So it was -- it was -- he reported that it was not Q. 14operational at the time? 15 Yes. Α. 16 And then there's the report of -- and I'm sorry. I 0. 17 forget the officer's name who conducted the firearms testing 18 here. 19Α. FEO Campbell. 20 0. He had to insert a pin or do some sort of reworking to 21 see if it would actually operate it? 22 Α. Yes. He essentially took a metal punch, which is part of his tool kit there aside of his desk. And generally what he 23 24 did is the Glock switch has a little circle in the back about 25 the size of a pencil. That's a little metal punch that he had.

## SETH COX - CROSS-EXAMINATION

SETH COX - CROSS-EXAMINATION

1	He just stuck that in there. And that's what was in lieu of
2	the selector switch. Essentially, this firearm lacked the
3	selector switch because you could turn it on and off
4	essentially. So you could go from full auto to semi-auto.
5	That fire this Glock lacked that selector switch, so he just
6	merely stuck the pin in, and it fired as a fully automatic
7	firearm.
8	Q. So at the time of the incident, the firearm that he had
9	functioned as a regular Glock semi-automatic; not as a fully
10	automatic Glock switch-controlled firearm?
11	A. In the area that it was recovered, when it recovered,
12	yes, the switch had been removed. Now, I don't know who did
13	that or how quickly it had been done, but, for example, as
14	quickly as Mr. Campbell was able to put that back in, that's
15	how manipulable these are. So they can be removed very
16	quickly.
17	In my training and experience, these Glock switches
18	there's websites. There's information out and readily
19	available on the internet to teach people how to manipulate and
20	very quickly to detect insulate themselves from law
21	enforcement, essentially, if they were to be recovered. So if
22	law enforcement stops you, and you're in the vehicle, there's
23	information that is publicized to show you how to remove that.
24	And I've also had cases in my past experience where the
25	defendants or the subjects have known that law enforcement is
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## SETH COX - CROSS-EXAMINATION/REDIRECT EXAMINATION

1	coming. They will put the Glock switch in, take it out, while
2	they've been contacted by law enforcement.
3	Q. But you're not aware of that happening in this case?
4	A. No. I'm just saying I was just trying to illustrate
5	that it wasn't on the scene. But my investigation was that
6	they were ascertained when it was done, but potentially could
7	have been done. It's a very quick process.
8	MS. LEDDY: Nothing further, Your Honor.
9	THE COURT: Any further, Mr. Kane?
10	MR. KANE: Yeah. Just a little bit of clarification
11	with that question.
12	REDIRECT EXAMINATION
13	BY MR. KANE:
14	Q. Ms. Leddy asked you about whether the Glock could fire
15	automatically at the time of the incident. You gave your
16	response, but I want to draw a distinction.
17	In Count Number 2, what was charged as the machine gun,
18	is the machine gun conversion device; is that correct?
19	A. That's correct.
20	Q. And that's the Glock switch that we talked about?
21	A. In and of itself, yes.
22	Q. So the Glock switch, itself, it exists to convert a
23	semi-automatic firearm into an automatic firearm; is that
24	correct?
25	A. That's correct.

1 Ο. Does it have any other purpose? 2 Α. No. Okay. So that, itself, is the machine gun that you're 3 Q. 4 referring to? 5 Α. That's correct. 6 Ο. Okay. 7 THE COURT: Anything further, Ms. Leddy? 8 MS. LEDDY: Nothing further, Your Honor. 9 THE COURT: You can return to your seat. Thank you. 10 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 11 (Witness excused.) 12 THE COURT: Any further argument, Mr. Kane? 13 MR. KANE: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 14 THE COURT: Ms. Leddy. 15 MS. LEDDY: Your Honor, we ask the Court to make an as-applied finding in this case. And we move -- we're moving 16 17 to dismiss both counts, and we ask the Court to find that 18 Mr. Sweeney-Teal is of the people and that the government 19 cannot meet its burden of showing a historical analogue statute 20 that proscribes his conduct. Thank you. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. I don't find there's any 22 question that this defendant is of the people. Heller 23 determined that the Second Amendment applies to all Americans. 24 Therefore, that shifts the burden to the government both with 25 regard to Count 1 and Count 2.

1 Let's start with Count 1. The government must establish 2 that 922(g)(3) is consistent with this Nation's historical 3 tradition of firearm regulation. The historical tradition, as 4 we discussed in the last case, can be established by analogical 5 reasoning. Long-standing problems must be distinctly similar 6 to historical analogue. So the government has a high burden 7 here with regard to Count 1 to establish a historical tradition 8 of laws disarming those similarly-situated to this defendant; 9 in this case, a drug user.

10 It's -- I don't find that the government met its burden 11 with regard to this count to show that a person who is a drug 12 user is banned for life from owning guns. At the time of the 13 ratification of the Constitution, we can all acknowledge that 14 drug use was a known thing, and there was no ban on drug users 15 from owning guns.

Based upon that, I don't find that the government has met its burden with regard to Count 1. So the defendant's motion to dismiss with regard to Count 1 is granted. And I'll note the government's exception to that.

Now, we looked to *Heller* for analysis with regard to Count 2 because defendant possessed a banned gun, and we know that that case involved a handgun ownership ban. *Heller* directly talks about automatic weapons and says that they're not of common use. In fact, they are unusual. And I know when we began the discussion with Mr. Kane, I had commented that in

1 the Heller decision, the Supreme Court clarified what arms the 2 Second Amendment protects. It protects those that are in 3 common use and those typically possessed by law-abiding 4 citizens for lawful purposes but not those that are dangerous 5 and unusual.

So this statute under which the defendant is charged in 6 7 Count 2 is not a prohibition from him owning any guns. It's a ban, a prohibition on him modifying a legal gun into a machine 8 9 gun. So it's a bit of a different analysis. This machine gun conversion device turns a regular Glock into a machine gun. 10 And we know Heller has told us that these automatic guns are 11 not of common use; and from the testimony of Agent Cox, which I 12 13 find was competent and credible, I understood that from his 14testimony, it's not of common use. In fact, it's not -- cannot 15 be lawfully sold and is not lawfully sold by anyone here in the 16 United States with two exceptions: to law enforcement and to 17 military.

So it's not typically possessed by a law-abiding citizen for lawful purposes, and it is dangerous, and it's unusual. It's dangerous because it turns a regular Glock handgun into a machine gun. It's hard to control. And it's unusual because no one sells them. It's a modification.

Therefore, I find that the government has met its burden pursuant to Count 2, and the defendant's motion to dismiss with regard to Count 2 is denied. So that leaves us proceeding to

trial on not Count 1 but to Count 2. Anything further with regard to the government's position? Thank you for noting our exceptions to MR. KANE: Count 1, and I think that's it today. THE COURT: Anything further, Ms. Leddy? MS. LEDDY: Nothing further, Your Honor. THE COURT: Defendant is remanded. (Hearing concluded at 12:05 P.M.) 

1	CERTIFICATE
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3	I, Kate A. Slayden, Registered Professional Reporter
4	and Official Court Reporter of the United States District Court
5	for the Northern District of West Virginia, do hereby certify
6	that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the
7	proceedings had in the above-styled action on April 18, 2024,
8	as reported by me.
9	I certify that the transcript fees and format comply
10	with those prescribed by the Court and the Judicial Conference
11	of the United States.
12	Given under my hand this 10th day of May 2024.
13	
14	/s/Kate A. Slayden
15	
16	Kate A. Slayden, RPR Official Reporter, United States
17	District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia
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