certain parts of Allen vs. United States, 164 US 492, and it appears to me in reading these cases on the substance of the charge appearing from Ortson vs. United States, in 221 Federal Second 632 for the Fourth Circuit, Your Honor in the brief research that I had the opportunity to make mention whatsoever in the Allen case about time and expense, in the Jenkins case vs. United States 380 U.S. 445, expense was mentioned Your Honor in that case, but, however, after it was mentioned, the Court went further and explained that it had nothing to do whatsoever with the jury reaching a verdict, now, in Wolin vs. United States expense was mentioned there, and an explanation was made. Your Honor, we respectfully submit that the policy of the Court giving the Allen charge doesn't necessarily mean that you have to follow the exact wording of the Allen charge, certainly that is a policy procedure more than it is an exact terminology or giving of certain words, but the time that it is given is certainly important as to whether or not it is impressive or coercevie or amounts to pressuring the jury into believing that they must come back with a verdict.

and for the

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

24

25

it l,

All

have

, that

Hwyor

are

d to

-

you

รนอกเรา

ıse

.

:'s

٠,

.

ike 22

23

ury

BY THE COURT:

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

I don't believe you will find in the book any more watered down charge than Allen vs. the United States because that has a lot of interculation of my own, that was taken from no decision, as a matter of fact, I took the first part of that Allen charge that looks like it deals exclusively with the government's side of the case and says so many things about the government's side of the case and then it sorts kinds pinches off when it talks about the defendant's part of the case and doesn't make it clear that that same consideration is being indulged for the defendants and I spell it out in that case, but not only that, I've never seen a charge as I did the fact that both parties were entitled to a mistrial if they couldn't agree

BY MR. WATKINS:

Your Honor is correct about that. If I had to suffer the consequences through the Allen charge in any event I had rather have it just like Your Honor gave it than any other way, but we do respectfully submit that this matter of time and expense may have mislead the thinking of the jury and also, Your Honor please-

BY THE COURT:

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Well, a juror wouldn't be very smart if he didn't know a trial like that would be very expensive, would he?

BY MR. WATKINS:

That's true.

BY THE COURT:

He probably wouldn't even measure up to a cross section juror.

BY MR. WATKINS:

Correct, Your Honor. Your Honor please it specified a partial verdict and that had to do with one of the instructions that Your Honor had already given the jury, we feel like that singling out that partial verdict instruction was a matter also that had its prejudicial influence on the jury. We also call to the Court's attention in the other cases that I referred to that the Allen charge was given in the early deliberation by the jury. Your Honor, in this particular instance, I don't know how many hours they deliberated----

BY THE COURT:

Nine hours and forty minutes before I gave the Allen charge, you can't give it under six hours, and I gave it nine hours and forty minutes.

BY MR. WATKINS:

...

Yes sir, at any rate Your Honor, we respectfully submit that because of this the jury would think that they should go back in there and come up with a verdict regardless, and it was highly prejudicial.

BY THE COURT:

Well, they didn't come out with a verdict with respect to some of them.

BY MR. WATKINS:

That's true, and that's my position Your Honor,
I think that it is a plain question of law
involved as to----

BY THE COURT:

You can't ever tell what the Jury is going to think about the Allen charge, I recall that the last time that I gave that instruction was right here in this courtroom, and the jury went out and promptly turn the defendants loose, three of them, and I thought they were as guilty as sin. But the jury didn't think so.

BY MR. WATKINS:

That's correct, Your Honor you never know what a jury will do and of course having them decide against us Your Honor its counsel's duty to

19

20

21

22

23

urge upon the Court everything possible to grant us a new trial.

BY THE COURT:

I understand.

BY MR. ALFORD:

May it please the Court, we have assigned some twenty-four grounds for the defendant Cecil Ray Price and also twenty-four grounds for Billy Wayne Posey, and they are approximately the same. They are a little different in the wording in grounds number 11 in the terminology for the motion of Price, I believe.

BY THE COURT:

Did the same Counsel draw both of them?

BY MR. ALFORD:

Same Counsel drew both of them, to change the wordking to fit the ground and I'll call that to the Court' attention when I get there.

BY THE COURT:

All right.

BY MR. ALFORD:

Now, if Your Honor please we do have one ground assigned here that we, of course, ask the Court to grant us permission to put on some testimony or ask the government to stipulate, and that is

n.

k

3

10

11

12

13

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23 24

):

with regards to clearing the courthouse on Thursday evening around 5:30 or 6:00 o'clock 2 before the jury went to supper and then that 3 night around 8 or 8:30. BY THE COURT: 5 Clearing the courthouse, what do you mean? BY MR. ALFORD: 7 Well they had all of the defendants, their attorneys 8 and their families to leave the courthouse building 9 before the jury went to supper on Thursday after-10 noon, and then that night about 8:30 o'clock they 11 did the same thing. 12 BY THE COURT: 13 I don't get your point. What's that got to do 14 with this? 15 BY MR. ALFORD: 16 Well sir, we raise that point, we earnestly say 17 that we had the right to be there as long as 18 the jury was deliberating. 19 BY THE COURT: 20 I wasn't in the building during the time you 21 mentioned. 22 BY MR. ALFORD: 23 But we wanted to be there. 24

eys

ing

У

BY THE COURT:

Well---

BY MR. ALFORD:

Therefore, I would like to ask the government if they would stipulate that was the facts?

BY MR. HAUBERG:

We won't stipulate to any such thing. It was a matter of crowd control, and the Court had ordered that the jury file out separately from any of the defendants or any of the crowd outside and the Marshal asked some of them to leave the court building because the jurors were ready to go out to eat supper, that was a normal procedure in any kind of a trial.

BY THE COURT:

We did have some crowd control.

BY MR. ALFORD:

We were up on the third floor and they told us to leave too, and the jury was on second floor.

That's what we would like to make a record on.

BY MR. HAUBERG:

I don't know anything about what happened on the third floor, Your Honor.

BY THE COURT:

24

I don't either but I'll let him make his record

though.

BY MR. ALFORD:

Would you like for us to make our record first?

BY THE COURT:

I'll hear you out and I'll let you file some affidavits and then counter-affidavits may be filed and if you need oral testimony, I'll let you put that on.

BY MR. ALFORD:

Your Honor please, in assigning our grounds for a motion for a new trial we submit that the Court erred in denying the defendants' motion for acquittal at the conclusion of the evidence and at other times shown by the record. The verdict of the jury reported is contrary to the weight of the law and evidence, and is not supported by the law and evidence, and the Court erred in sustaining the objection made by the attorneys for the defendants and overruled the objections made by the United States of America as shown by the record. The Court erred in all of the charges———

BW THE COURT:

Any particular questions or just all of them?

BY MR. ALFORD:

All of them. The Court erred in charging the jury in refusing the charges to the jury requested by this defendant and the defendant Posey. I'm reading from Price's motion and it is also the same for Posey's motion also as whown by the record.

BY THE COURT:

2

5

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

I didn't get that one.

BY MR. ALFORD:

Its on the instruction, if Your Honor please. The ones we excepted to and the ones that were denied to us that we filed with the Court. the question that we rasie under ground 6 for both of these defendant is the fact of the matter of polling the jury after the jury had returned in the courtroom to announce their verdict. would respectfully show that when the verdict was returned before it was reported and this is from Rule 31, when the verdict is returned the jury shall be polled upon the Court's own motion or any party. Upon the polling of the unanimous verdict of the polling of the jury the jury may be directed to retire fur further deliberation or may be discharged. We respectfully submit that when the verdict was first read in this case the

:t

21

22

24

Deputy Clerk first read in open Court that Cecil Price was found not guilty, and that he was then 2 advised that this was a mistake and he was found guilty. BY THE COURT: You are making it sound that it was a little delay---BY MR. ALFORD: Immediately after that. 9 BY THE COURT: 10 But the Clerk immediately corrected it and read 11 it right and the jury was asked in accordance 12 with invariable instructions of this Court as to 13 whether that was the verdict of this jury and 14 they said yes, so say each of you, and each one 15 of them said yes, and then you asked that you 16 have them further polled and I wouldn't allow it. 17 BY MR. ALFORD: Your Honor, we did ask to have them polled, we 19 did ask that the jury be polled, and then it was 20 denied. 21 BY THE COURT: 22 23 That's right.

BY MR. ALFORD:

24

25

We submit that this was a valuable right for these

defendants, especially in view of the facts and circumstances involved and it was submitted that the verdict of the jury was not unanimous in that these defendants were guilty, or were found guilty as charged, and in support of that we would like to call to the Court's attention the statement in Corpus Juris Secumdum V. 23 a, section The manner in which a jury is polled 1392 c. has been a matter of discretion in the trial Court and no particular method to be followed, and etc. Now there was a case decided in the first CTrcuit of the United States Court of Appeals in 1958 and styled Amanda A. Miranda vs. United Statesfof America, and Your Honor please, in this case the Court held very positively in regard to the polling of the jury that you had a right for the jury to be polled and in this as we turn to the defendant's contention that the District Court erred in not granting him a new trial. of the grounds it assert is a reversible error we submit when the request to poll the jury was denied by the trial Judge. They relied on Rule 31 d of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which I have referred to in the motion.

BY THE COURT:

2

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Well I don't think its any use to waste any time about that because this jury was polled, and you don't have to poll them in any particular way, if the Court can be perfectly satisfied as I was that they were polled and they gave individual expressions to the question, and the Clerk asked them if this was the verdict of this jury and they said yes, and they all nodded, and then she said, so say each of ye, and they nodded their heads again and a Corpus Juris or no other kind of jury can change me on that.

BY MR. ALFORD:

Your Honor, this Fifth Circuit case has quoted verbatim what was done. May I read it to the Court?

BY THE COURT:

Yes sir.

BY MR. ALFORD:

The government conceding the right in this case to demand a polling of the jury came too late and the trial Judge refused to permit the poling of the jury was improper. What happened here reached a Mr. Foreman, have you/verdict? Mr. Foreman:

We have, is this a unanimous verdict of all your hurors, so say ye all, the Court asked that

I order that the verdict be read and question. entered and the Clerk of the United States of America vs. Miranda number 7299 Criminal, we the Jury find the defendant/charged as in the first count of the indictment, guilty as charged in the second count of the indictment, guilty as charged in the third count of the indictment, signed J. E. Caronda, foreman. He asked that the jury be polled in this case, the case says in the body of it that we have the right to call on for a motion for the jury to be polled and as a right under that tule and that is what we relay on. There is another case here that I would like to call the Court's attention to and that's the Macket vs. United States of America which is recorded in 90 Federal Reporter Second Series and that case is referred to the old landmark case that was decided many years ago in the District of Columbia vs. Humphrey which is 11th appeal, page 68 and 174 US page 190, it refers to the fundamental right of polling the jury. We respectfully submit that that was a violation of these defendant's rights to have the jury each individually polled as to his so saying where they guilty or innocence, especially in

ir

idual

8

2

3

10

11

12

13

14

15

16 17

18

19

20.

21

22

23

ng

)UT

view of the fact that in this case Price was

first read not guilty, and then that he was then

read guilty. Other cases along this same line

that I would like to call the Court's attention to

is Keys vs. United States where it says a jury

poll is obviously a part or an inquiry where they

did in fact vote the result as announced and

as the Court had a form verdict for them to mark

their decision we respectfully submit that this

was a constitutional right and a valuable right

in the duty or system of our Court because a poll

of the jury, as to individuals.

BY THE COURT:

I don't question that, you have the right to have the jury polled but you've got to consider what Corpus Juris says there that the Court has a discretion about polling, that's a sound discretion and its a discretion to call upon to be exercised in connection with a ballot which is marked very plainly, no mistake about what the jury did, and everyone of the jurors signed that ballot, so that's not the practice all of the country because a lot of places permits just the Foreman to sign the verdict and that is the verdict of the jury. Apparently the case you read there is a case of

that whiten where the foreman had signed it and they

:0

ļ.

ion

se

asked him if that was the verdict of the jury but nobody asked the foreman he was seated with the rest of the jury, and the entire jury signed the ballot and they were asked if that was their verdict and everyone nodded their heads yes, so say ye all, and everyone of them again nodded their heads and if that wasn't a polling there never will be a polling in this court.

BY MR. ALFORD:

Your Honor, we respectfully submit that we should have had that right to poll each one of them.

BY THE COURT:

Well-

BY MR. ALFORD:

I would like also to point out that one of our gounds is that the United States of America failed to prove venue in this case. Nowhere in the record do they say this case of conspiracy occurred specifically in the Southern District, United States Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.

BY THE COURT:

Can the Court take judicial notice that the county of Neshoba is in the Southern District of

Mississippi? BY MR. ALFORD: Well we submit that that is the question that they should have proved that it was, that Neshoba County pm Lauderdale County or wherever they say this conspiracy occurred was part of Southern District of Mississippi, and no where in the record we say was that specific proof put on. BY THE COURT: 10 I don't remember that. Are there any cases about 11 that having to be proved or can the Court take 12 judicial notice of something that is as clear as 13 that? 14 BY MR. ALFORD: 15 No sir, Your Honor, I don't have any cases. 16 17 BY THE COURT: I've seen a lot of cases where that had to be 18 proved. 19 20 BY MR. ALFORD: Its a fundamental thing in our State courts where 21 it must be proved, the Supreme Court passed on that 22 in the state court. Now, ground number 8 we sub-23 mit that the United States of America failed 24

25

to prove that the alleged victims were citizens

at the time the alleged offense was said to have occurred. 2 BY THE COURT: Let's talk about that just a minute. Didn't they prove that one of them was, this colored fellow Chaney, I believe was his name, didn't they prove that he was born and reared there in Meridian? 7 That's my recollection on that. 8 BY MR. ALFORD: There was no testimony about Chaney living in 10 ut Meridian. The Preacher testified there about 11 knowing him there in Meridian, but the preacher 12 ìS wasn't a native of Meridian himself, as I recall 13 it, he was from Florida. 14 BY THE COURT: 15 I thought some testimony showed that this fellow 16 Chaney was born and reared at Meridian, 17 Mississippi. 18 BY MR. ALFORD: 19 I believe they introduced a birth certificate 20 ere 21 or something that we objected to, I believe that that 22 is what the Court's thinking about. ub-23 BY THE COURT: 24 Yes, I think that's right.

t.

BY THE COUNSEL, ALFORD:

I don't want to mislead the Court if I can help it but I think that's where you got it as we 2 objected to that being introduced as it was. 3 BY THE COURT: Yes, I remember that. Youdon'd think that will 5 sufficient? 6 BY MR. ALFORD: No, I do not. 8 BY THE COURT: A native born American citizen? Without a birth 10 certificate, I don't think so. 11 BY THE COURT: 12 I know a lot of people that doesn't think 13 Mississippi is in the Union but I've never heard 14 this theory before. 15 BY MR. ALFORD: 16 Your Honor please, we submit the Court erred in 17 not granting a severance to this defendant, Orice .18 and the defendant Posey from the other defendants. 19 At the time the request was made diligence was 20 shown in requesting the severance, and we submit 21 that much prejudicial evidence was introduced dur-22 ing the trial of the case that actually led to the 23 conviction of these two defendants, which could

not have been produced and could not have led to

24

their convictions had they been granted a separate trial. For example, the Highway Patrol testified that Billy Wayne Posey came down Highway 19 on the night of the alleged offense and asked where was Price. This statement could only be used against the defendant, Posey, but since this defendant Price was being tried along with the defendant Posey it was permitted to be introduced into evidence, and the jury could not disregard this, even though it was instructed to do so.

BY THE COURT:

Now, what statement was that sir?

BY MR. ALFORD:

Where Mr. Poe testified that the defendant,
Billy Wayne Posey came down Highway 19 on the
night of the alleged offense and asked where was
Price. We submit that this was prejudicial
against Price and was inadmissible against him
but yet the jury couldn; t disassociate that fact
eventhough the Court had instructed them not to
that would be inadmissible as against Price but
not against Posey.

BY THE COURT:

The witness was named Poe?

3	BY MR. ALFORD:
2	Poe, Earl Poe, the Highway Patrolman.
3	BY THE COURT:
4	Poe. I remember.
5	BY MR. ALFORD:
6	And we submit that was prejudicial against
7	Price.
8	BY THE COURT:
9	Was that objected to?
10	BY MR. ALFORD:
11	Yes sir. It sure was.
12	BY THE COURT:
13	What was the ruling on it?
14	BY MR. ALFORD:
15	It was overruled, the Court held that it was
16	admissible against Posey but not against Price,
17	I believe I'm correct in that statement.
18	BY THE COURT:
19	Was the Jury told to discegard in?
20	BY MR. ALFORD:
21	I don't recall, I kinda think it was. At the
22	same time we submit very earnestly and sincerely
23	that you can't have a jury get something out of
24	their mind something that is there once its
2!	there. Another thing was the introduction of

the confession of Horace Doyle Barnett, this alleged confession implicated several of the defendants even though some of the names and certain places were struck out of the alleged confession; however, this only gave rise to the jury to surmise and conjecture as to whose names were intended to be in that place. The alleged confession could not be introduced against this defendant but it had the same effect as being used against this defendant as far as the jury was concerned. Now many instances are shown throughout the record made a part of this motion by reference showing that Frice and Posey were convicted because of evidence that was incompetent

BY THE COURT:

Excuse me just a minute Mr. Alford. Go ahead Mr. Alford.

BY MR. ALFORD:

It was permitted to be used because the defendants were not granted a separate and different trial.

Now that, if Your Honor please, goes to what Mr.

Watkins was talking about that when you try eighteen defendants and evidence is admissible as to one and none of the others, its highly bre-judicial to permit that testimony to be introduced

and the jury has a tremendous job for this long a period of time as to what he can hold as to one defendant and what he can't hold against a defendant in a trial of this kind, therefore. we submit that we should be granted a new trial at this time because we were not granted a severance as to Posey and Price. We further submit that the Court should grant us a new trial in letting evidence be introduced concerning the alleged meeting at Bloomo Schoolhouse and the alleged burning of the church, which are both unrelated and unconnected of the alleged offense charged in the indictment. This imflamed and prejudiced the jury against these defendants and led to their conviction and was wholly improper in this case. There was an alleged meeting of some kind in the Blloomo School which was wholly disassociated with this case and the conspiracy and yet it inflamed and prejudiced the jury, and we submit that's one of the grounds for a new trial, and then if Your Honor please, another serious ground that I want to call the Court's attention to is that during the trial of this case the alleged confession of Horace Doyle Barnett was let to be introduced into evidence with the names of

these defendants in the confession and then it was introduced over the objection of Posey and Price, with this further instruction of the Court that the names be deleted and that it would be not be referred to. The jury, at the time of the reading of this the Department of Justice Attorney, Mr. Doar, read in their through, uh name and incident in first reading it before the jury during the introduction of it, and if I remember correctly one of them was something about a bulldozer operator, and the other was the Philadelphia car, where Philadelphia had been deleted and bulldozer had been deleted, and we objected and the Court admonished the Counsel who was reading it to read it correctly or the Court would take further action or have somebody else read it, I don't recall the exact words of the Court.

BY THE COURT:

2

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The bulldozer man was let out of the case wasn't he?

BY MR. ALFORD:

Yes sir.

BY THE COURT:

Of course, I noticed that and I'm sure it was

an advertence on the part of Mr. Doar, he wasn't as careful in reading it as he should have been but he did read the town of Philadelphia and I didn't think that gave anybody any clue, I didn't think that was an unfair revelation simploy that it was a Philadelphia car, I didn't think that said anything particular.

BY MR. ALFORD:

Your Honor please, I'm leading up to something else, since it was an indication that there was some Philadelphia people there it led the jury to believe and to speculate who was it in that car, and then another serious matter right along this line, during the arguments, Mr. John Doar, Assistant United States Attorney General was reading from the alleged confession and said during this instance or read during this instance the name of Price instead of reading it blank. An objection to this was made and a motion for a mistrial was made by the defendants and overruled by the Court.

21 BY THE COURT:

The name of Mr. Price was read?

23 BY MR. ALFORD:

Yes sir.

25 BY THE COURT:

Out of the statement?

BY MR. ALFORD:

Yes sir.

BY THE COURT:

I don't remember that.

BY MR. ALFORD:

During the closing argument?

BY THE COURT:

8

9

10

11

12

13

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Do you have a copy of the transcript on that,

BY MR. ALFORD:

No sir, but I remember going back and calling the Court's attention to that during the recess.

BY THE COURT:

I don't remember that.

BY MR. ALFORD:

And we made a motion for a mistrial and objection and it was overruled by the Court and we say this highly prejudiced this defendant Price before the jury, and led to his conviction and if the Court please there was quite a number of occasion involving argument of Counsel and the conduct of Counsel in the argument to hold that these prejudicial things are definitely grounds for a new trial. Now, I would like to call the Court's

William A. Davis, Official Court Reporter, Jackson, Miss.

attention to the case of Kitchell vs. the United States 354, Fd. 2nd, 714.

BY THE COURT:

2

3

5

6

7

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

What Circuit is that from?

BY MR. ALFORD:

That is from the First Circuit, decided in 1965 and they had a statement in there where they had made some blanks and the Court held that when Court began to review the evidence and discuss this thing they said that the confession of the guilt was uncontradicted and not refuted as commented by the statement with the blanks in there and we submit that was a prejudicial error in this case especially for the name Price to be used as coming from that statement when it was supposed to be blank there at this time, and the case of DeLuter against the United Statesis a Fifth Circuit Case where argument of Counsel was such that it was prejudicial to the defendants and the Court had to grant a new trial on the grounds of it, or the Fifth Circuit reversed it I believe in that case, and another case, Handford vs. the United States is a Fifth Circuit case, decided in 1957 in regard to a comment in the argument of Counsel, and in the case of Kraft vs. the United

States and that is an Eighth Circuit Case decided in 1956, calling---

BY THE COURT:

Give Counsel your references, you don't give them your book and page number.

BY MR. ALFORD:

7

10

11

12

13

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

In Craft vs. Umited States, 238, F. 2d, 794; Hanford vs. United States 245, F wd, 225; Duluter vs. United States, 308, F 2d, 140; Kitchell vs. United States, 384, F2d, 715; and United States vs Bujeuo, which is a Second Circuit Case, 304, F. 2d, 177. In this case it says its the prosecution's obligation to avoid argument on matters which may serve only to prejudice the jury. his duty of all depth to be fair and objective and to argue within the issues of the case and to repeat references which the Judge had admonished him not to do is more highly prejudice, and the reason I'm saying that the Court did admonish Mr. Doar in the reading of that purported confession and corrected him and instructed him to read it correctly and then in the argument he undertook to reread this matter and read the name Price in it which we say is most highly prejudicial. Now, in Reshirt vs. United States in 359 F. 2d, 278, that is a

Circuit Court of Appeals case from the District of Columbia in 1966, in regard to closing arguments 2 of statements from witnesses which were never re-3 ceived in evidence was prejudicial even when it might have been set forth in the statement but 5 never made to appear in the record. Now that is 6 something that I want to call to the Court's 7 attention that even though the name of Price 8 might have been in this original confession the 9 Court ordered it deleted and the Court had already 10 called to the attention of Mr. Doar to read the 11 thing correctly before the jury and then after 12 that admonition to do that, then in his argument 13 for him to read the name of Price in it, I say 14 it is wholly prejudicial in telling the jury that 15 Price was there as a participant and since it was 16 in there the Court had ordered Mr. Doar not so 17 to do, to read it in there was the most prejudicial 18 thing during this entire trial so far as Price 19 and we submit the Court should grant him a new 20 trial on that. Now, also in the argument of 21 Counsel, Mr. Hauberg, in his closing statement, 22 said to the effect that the jury should consider 23 the conduct of the defendants around the rail 24 of the bar, and that they could gain the im-

25

10

11

12

pression of guilt or innocence from seeing and observing them. If the Court please we say that is an unfair argument to these defendants, Price and Posey; at this time because they hadn't testified and that was a reference to their demeanor there which under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States a person has the right to remain silent and the jury is not to gain any inference as to their guilt or innocence and that statement there we say was most highly prejudicial as to these defendants.

We further submit that after the jury had retired and the, uh, before the jury had retired the Court had given the instructions to the jury and then they retired and then on the second day of their deliberations the jury sent a written note to the Judge of this Court to the effect that they were deadlocked if they stayed for one year, and then during the afternoon of the same day, the jury was brought back into the courtroom and given further instructions by the Court which were objected to and excepted to a motion for a mistrial was made by all defendants, including the defendants Price and Posey, and especially was this charge objected to because this charge suggested

12

13

15

17

22

23

25

that the minority ought to yeild to the majority 2 opinion of the jurors. It was suggested that because of the time and expense involved the jury ought to try and agree on a verdict and it was of great importance for them to agree in some manner if it did not do violence to themselves personally 6 7 These are not the only grounds to this charge which 8 is known as the Allen Charge, but we submit that 9 took the right of free thinking and consideration. 10 of this case from these jurors and caused them 11 to lean further away from their personal convictions 12 and compromised then in an effort to reach a 13 verdict which was prejudicial to each of these 14 defendants, Mr. Price and Mr. Posey. In support 15 of that I would like to call to the attention of 16 the Court to the case of Green vs. United States 17 of America in 309 F. 2d, 852, which was a Fifth 18 Circuit Case. Now, we submit to the Court that 19 in this case that charge was given before the 20 jury ever retired but in that case the Court 21 goes to great length to discuss the affect of 22 this type case in the charge mon the jury and it 23 goes, uh, we submit to the point of causing the 24 jury to cast aside or go beyond their original 25 convictions and ideas and thoughts of what their

William A. Davis, Official Court Reporter, Jackson, Miss.

personal thoughts are and go over to the side of the majority and therefore, we submit that this is grounds for a new trial in this cause, as a result that the charge given by the Court as a supplemental charge, which is also known as the Allen Charge and which is also referred to in this Green decision as the uh dynamite charge to try and unlock a deadlocked jury. Several Courts have criticized and held that this charge is not applicable in a criminal case nor appropriate and it invades the province of the jury in deciding a free deliberation among themselves and continue

BY THE COURT:

their convictions.

What was the reason assigned to the reversal of Green?

BY MR. ALFORD:

The Green case, Your Honor please, was, as I have just said, that iw was given before the jury ever retired.

BY THE COURT:

What was the reason the Fifth Circuit reversed it, what was the reason for reversal?

BY MR. ALFORD:

The time was not appropriate nor was the Allen

Charge appropriate. BY THE COURT: 2 The timeliness then was the reason. BY MR. ALFORD: 5 Yes sir, and then it goes on to quote these other cases as to what others had said about it. 7 BY THE COURT: 8 Of course, the Fifth Circuit don't have much discussion where they like the Allen Charge or 10 not, that's the Supreme Court of the United States but they have said in the last several cases that 11 12 they have approved the Allen charge, haven't they? BY MR. ALFORD: 13 14 In this case they say it is untimely. 15 BY THE COURT: 16 I say though some members of the Fifth Circuit doesn't like the Allen charge but they've approved 18 I believe the last three cases up there that 19 involved the Allen Charge, they said the Allen 20 Charge was correctly given. They reversed Judge 21 Clayton for giving it because he said it was 22 their duty to agree. I told them it was not 23 their duty to agree. I just negatived it on 24 everything that I've known that they have criti-

cized it on in my Allen charge.

25

pı

r G

BY MR. ALFORD:

If the Court will permit me I submit that my criticism of your uh, let's call it supplemental or Allen Charge is this. That this was a long and complicated case that involved several defendants and to give that charge in a case of this type at any time would tend to take away from the jury a feeling that they were independent as individuals who could decide this case independently and come up with a verdict either guilty or innocent of their own individual conviction as to each individual defendants, wherein you have this many and as long a case as it was and as complicated as it was with many factors to it, that charge there tended to overwhelm or persuade them to lay aside their personal convictions and go to the majority to reach a verdict as to the individuals who were so charged, who had their sacred rights in the hands of that jury and that is what I submit under all of the facts and circumstances in this case leads us to ask for a new trial because of the giving of that Allen charge.

MY THE COURT:

Well, the present Chief Justice of the Fifth

Circuit says that he's against it that it doesn't mean anything, that is the charge don't mean anything.

BY MR. ALFORD:

2

3

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

Well, he might say so but I submit if he was sitting in the jury box and for His Honor on the bench to give that charge it would have a propound effect more as a layman than me as a lawyer sitting there to reevaluate and to reweigh everything there in an effort to go along with the majority.

BY THE COURT:

Well every Federal Judge has the right to comment on the evidence and the only thing that he's got to say is that's just me talking and you just disregard everything I say. That's supposed to clear the record, isn't it?

BY MR. ALFORD:

It is supposed to Your Honor where a word is said and the old saying is once its gone you can never recall it, when it hits its mark or target like an arrow goes into the heart of a person as to the heart of an apple, it can never be called back to be---

BY THE COURT:

Are you familiar with that Fores decision I was

24

asking Counsel about?

BY MR. ALFORD:

No sir, I'm not.

BY THE COURT:

I'll give Counsel that opinion, its a slip opinion, its not even in the advance sheet, it deals with the question of admitting a statement of a co-defendant into evidence and then refusing severance, Judge Rives I believe was speaking for the Court and he used some language which I thought Counsel was reading from another case there a while ago, the identical language. Its a delicate question.

BY MR. ALFORD:

It sure is. There's another grand for a new trial. There were several people in attendance during the trial of this cause and during the time after this second charge was being given it was referred to as the dynamite charge, there was a discussion around and among the spectators and the United States Attorney used the term of it being the "dynamite charge" after the charge was given the United States Marshal in attendance ordered all of the attorneys to leave the court building and premises, also all of the defendants

William A. Davis, Official Court Reporter, Jackson, Miss.

and their friends and families, and they did leave the premises, and there was no Judge left on the premises either as the United States Marshal advised that the Judge had already left too. At that time the attorneys, defendants and people in attendance did not know that these defendants had been accused or that any of these defendants had been accused or suspicioned had made threats about using dynamite or making threats against anyone; however, the jury continued to deliberate for sometime and then when this occurred, it was already past dark, and early the next morning by nine o'clock, the jury returned a verdict into open court, it is by this verdict that these defendants stand before the Court awaiting judgment by the Court. We submit that the attorneys and the defendants not being permitted to remain in the courthouse or the premises while the jury deliberated, but were found guilty within a matter of a few hours after the defendants and attorneys were required to leave the premises. We submit that this was a right that these defendants had to be present in the courthouse in the vicinity of the courtroom and

they were denied that privilege.

.

8

11

12

14

16

17

19

20

21

23

24

BY THE COURT: Would you like the opportunity to put some testimony on? BY MR. ALFORD: We would like to. BY THE COURT: In preference to an affidavit? BY MR. ALFORD: Well, I'm up here and I would like to have an opportunity to ask Counsel that is with me 10 for his decision on that if Your Honor please. 11 BY THE COURT: All right. 13 (Counsel confers) 14 BY MR. ALFORD: 15 Your Honor, Counsel has asked me to ask the 16 Court that if we submit affidavits would that be 17 accepted by the Court as proof? 18 BY THE COURT: 19 20 Yes sir, and I will afford the other side an 21 opportunity to respond to it and if it looks like 22 it would be impossible to make a determination 23 as to the facts I will then permit you to put 24 on oral testimony.

1ed

ned

es

BY MR. ALFORD:

William A. Davis, Official Court Reporter Lackson, Mice

Very well, Your Honor, we will submit affidavits. When would the Court like to have these, or what time.

BY THE COURT:

Do you have any cases first that would show to make any difference?

BY MR. ALFORD:

I don't have, Your Honor, and I don't know where any of the other Counsel has any or not.

BY MR. WEIR:

I have one, Your Honor, that I would like to just call to Mr. Alford's attention, its very short and if you will let me show it to ham.

BY THE COURT:

All right. You know the facilities at Meridian are sorta crowded and for some reason we don't have but one means of entrance and exit to the courthouse and I was advised that the jury whated to go to dinner, and I was at the motel at that time and I told them they could carry the jury to dinner and to keep them together, and I didn't know by what means they accomplished that but they were instructed at the beginning of the trial to keep that hury intact and minimize as much as they could to keep any contacts from any outsiders

so if that was their means of doing it I wouldn't see anything wrong with it.

BY MR. ALFORD:

Your Honor, during the trial days they had everybody just to move down to the end of the hall and actually the lawyers, most of us, I was up on third floor at the time they came to tell us to leave which was way away from the jury.

BY THE COURT:

Well, they were told to lock the courtroom each time there was so much talking of dynamite around there and they had lost some dynamite the first day of the Court and they were told to clear the courtroom.

BY MR. ALFORD:

We didn't object to clearing the courtroom, but to clear the courthouse was the question that we raised Your Honor.

BY THE COURT:

I didn't make any instructions about that, I didn't know where you were.

BY MR. ALFORD:

Now, I would like to call the Court's attention to a Michigan case, the style of it the People of the State of Michigan vs. Labonne, which is cites in 73 NW 2d, 537.

2 BY THE COURT:

1

3

4

5

6

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

Is that from an appellate court?

BY MR. ALFORD:

The Supreme Court of Michigan, if Your Honor please. It says that we recognize that all that transpired between Judges and Jurors the Court concluded there had been no misconduct as in the record before us, therefore, it was argued that the defendants rights to be present is not determined from the result and the review thereof from the Court's inquiry, but merely from the inquiry the defendants were not given an opportunity to exercise those privileges, it was their rights to be present affords them, with such fundamental rights denied the guilt or innocence of the accused is not concerned and meither party is put to the burden of showing actual injury or prejudice and it goes on then to cite there another Michigan case which is McLizzie, 223, 581 NW, 540 and 14 LRA 809 and it says neither in this case is this an case an authority of what was done in Murray's case, the Court did not order the courtroom to be cleared of spectators but the lobby outside; however, no violence is shown no mis-

conduct. I can not exceed to the proposition intimated in that case if a public trial is not afforded the accused the burden is upon him to show that actual injury has been suffered by deprivation of his constitutional rights on the contrary when he shows that his constitutional rights have been violated the law conclusively concludes that he has suffered an actual injury, and it goes on, and then it says that we think the record more than justifies and then it says in accordance we do not discharge the defendant but we reverse the conviction and order a new trial.

BY THE COURT:

An you say some constitutional right was invaded by not allowing you to stay on the third floor until the jury went to dinner off of the second floor?

BY MR. ALFORD:

Yes sir, we had a right to do that and the defendants.

BY THE COURT:

You weren't observing them from the third floor?
BY MR. ALFORD:

No sir, but we had somebody there that was, some

of the lawyers would stay down and some would stay up on third floor, we didn't want to cause any congestion down on the second floor so that was the way we would do it.

BY THE COURT:

No impropriety ever came to my attention that anybody ever tried to obtain any access to the jury but I think that all of these trials and particularly these heavily attended trials should be conducted far from suspicion and that was what was done in this case.

BY MR. ALFORD:

We thought that was what was done until they made us move out Your Honor please and we thought that was an invasion of the rights of these defendants, if Your Honor please. We further submit that grounds for a new trial is the Court's instruction on reasonable doubt. That is a question that is hard, we submit for anyone to define and for further grounds we submit that the jury themselves asked the Court for a further instruction on reasonable doubt.

BY THE COURT:

Yes sir, I took great pride in drawing that instruction, I thought I had come up with a masterpiece and nobody has ever satisfied anybody else with a definition of reasonable doubt, and I thought you were right in objecting to any further confusion of the jury by attempting to clarify something they hadn't been able to clarify by then and that's the reason I didn't give it to them again.

BY MR. ALFORD:

We further submit that the United States of Americal failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the three alleged victims were in fact the parties charged in the indictment as being the ones whose rights were alleged to have been violated from the result of this conspiracy charge, and we further assign as frounds that the Court erred in not instructing the jury that the testimony of alleged incompentence or paid informers should be weighed with great care and caution and distrust.

BY THE COURT:

I believe I did.

BY MR. ALFORD:

If it please the Court, I don't believe the Court went quite far enough in the instruction we asked you to give, you refused ours.

BY THE COURT:

2

3

6

7

8

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

Well I told them to view it with distrust and it was my recollection that I refused yours because it was exactly the same wording as the one I had given them, I just didn't want to tell them twice the same thing, isn't that correct?

BY MR. ALFORD:

I believe one of the words was left off that we had, either with great care and caution or distrust, it was one of those three words that was left off as I recall it, if Your Honor .please. That's one of the grounds that we assign that one of those words was left off/ We submit that the question of grounds for a new trial for defendant Price is that there was no proof that this defendant was any part of any alleged conspiracy in any way. They had testimony about what Price did about arresting them for speeding, placing them in jail, but if there is any other testimony that puts him where he was in any conspiracy we submit that the record is poor as to that. We further submit that neither the indictment or proof sustains any offense against the United States of America, and we submit also grounds for a new trial that the Court

erred in admitting into evidence the group of evidence that was not necessarily material, such as the photographs of the alleged victims which tendered to prejudice the jury against these defendants and also the Court erred in permitting the Plaintiff to show an alleged backroad used by the conspirators on a map that was not supported by competent evidence, and I would like to call . the Court's attention that during the argument of Mr. Doar, that he used a pointer and pointed out the backroutes on that map that had never been shown by any witness other than Mr. Doar who was attempting to testify at that time, and there has been case after case that held that attorneys can't testify in Court or comment on evidence that has not been placed of record and there is no evidence whatsoever to pinpoint the roads that he pointed to in his argument.

BY THE COURT:

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

You're talking about that road where there was a cut-off in the northeastern corner of the map weren't you?

BY MR. ALFORD:

Yes sir. There is another ground that I would like to assign in this cause on behalf of these

2648 2648

two defendants and that is we would like to ask
the Court to consider under the 24th ground for
many other reasons, and that is, Your Honor, that
statment, the Jincks Act Statement that the
government furnished the defandants, and those
statements and reference to them should be made
out of the presence of the jury. The case of
Reichart vs. United States, 359, F. 2d, page
278 so holds in that case.

BY THE COURT:

2

3

-5

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

21

23

25

It was my recollection that you asked for the Jencks Act statements when you made it appear and you have to make out a prima facie case, you would ask for that and then you would ask for them.

BY MR. ALFORD:

Yes sir, Mr. Bowers' attorney asked for them, but we submit in this case here that the jury should be retired, AT THAT TIME.

20 BY THE COURT:

When you are asking about it?

22 BY MR. ALFORD:

Yes sir.

24 BY THE COURT:

What Circuit is that from?

BY MR. ALFORD:

That is the United States Circuit Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. That's Mr. Skelly Wrights' case, I believe.

BY THE COURT:

What would be the prejudicial about it about asking about the existence or not of it?

BY MR. ALFORD:

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The fact is when you ask for it or not when you are questioning the witness about whether or not it was made, where it is any inconsistencies in his statement, if Your Honor please. They have held that if the reference to that is made and then is not specifically used that that is prejudicial to the defendants.

BY THE COURT:

Of course, you have the right to use them.

BY MR. ALFORD:

If you elect so to do it, if you don't, the Court has held that could be prejudicial to the defendants.

BY THE COURT:

Let's just talk about this case not about another case, but you had a right to those Jencks Act
Statements for the purpose of cross examination

and take and study them----BY MR. ALFORD: 2 We took them and studied them and cross examined 3 them. BY THE COURT: Then what does that leave you to talk about what 6 could have happened, we are talking about what did happen? 8 BY MR. ALFORD: The fact is that the Jury wasn't retired before 10 we discuss it. 11 BY THE COURT: 12 We are still talking about what could have 13 happened and not what happened. 14 BY MR. ALFORD: 15 Well, this case, the Reiger case the one that 16 I refer to. And another case in support of this 17 trip that Mr. Doar pointed out on the road I 18 would like to refer to the case of United States 19 vs ---- 258 F 2d, 338 from the Second Circuit 20 decided in 1958 wherein the argument of the 21 Counsel made certain statements that were not in 22 the record, and the Court said that was a preju-23 dicial error, and another case in support of this 24 misquoting testimony inregard to this statement

which I referred to a while ago about the name mentioningis Wallace vs. United States 281 F. 2d 2 656. 3 BY THE COURT: What Circuit is that from? 5 BY MR. ALFORD: Your Honor please I don't have that Circuit listed lid here. 8 BY THE COURT: Do you have a memoranda on these cases you are 10 reading from? 11 BY MR. ALFORD: I have copies of some of them and some of them 13 I just have a pencil memorandum, if Your Honor 14 please. I have a copy of most of the ones I have 15 quoted. Now, if Your Honor please, we respectfully 16 submit that a serious ground raised in our motion is 17 for a new trial for Cecil Wayne Price and Billy 18 Ray Posey will merit a new trial for these two es 19 defendants, and if the Court Please, I would like 20 to confer with Associate Counsel for any remarks 21 they might like to have if the Court will indulge 5.10 22 me. ju 23 24 BY THE COURT: this All right. at 25

(Counsel conferred) 1 BY MR. WEIR: 2 May if please the Court, I don't want to make 3 any statement or say antyhing that has already been said, but Your Honor in reference to this 5 statement that Mr. Doar read from this alleged 6 confession, we further submit that the jury did 7 not have this to carry back to the jury room and 8 the read it you see---BY THE COURT: 10 Let's see, did that go? 11 BY THE CLERK: 12 None of the statements went to the jury. 13 BY MR. WEIR: 14 And I didn't want to repeat anything that had 15 already been said. 16 BY THE COURT: 17 All right. 18 BY MR. ALFORD: 19 Your Honor please, I would call to the Court's 20 attention here that was filed on behalf of Mr. 21 E. G. Hop Barnett renewing our motion for a judg-22 ment of acquittal and I don't want to inject it 23 in the middle of this hearing, but I did want 24 to call it to the Court's attention after the