Local Trust and National Stability

A Desk Study on the Nigeria Police Force Prepared for the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), U.S. Department of Justice

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COPS
Community Oriented Policing Services
U.S. Department of Justice

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Introduction

Nigeria's security conditions are deteriorating rapidly nationwide. Large-scale banditry is on the rise throughout the country,[1] and terrorist groups such as Boko Haram are committing large-scale killing and cattle rustling in the northeast.[2] Domestic political leaders such as Senator Kashim Shettima, the former governor of Borno state, have warned that the entire north could become uninhabitable in five years if urgent measures are not taken to halt these deadly activities.[3]

In response to these heightened security concerns, this publication examines the role of the Nigeria Police Force (NPF)—the largest public security provider—in resolving communal conflicts, preventing violent extremism, and safeguarding Nigeria's federalization and democracy, and delineates policy recommendations for the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP). Though popular demands have arisen for the NPF's institutional reform and decentralization, one of the most urgent issues facing Nigeria's domestic security would only be peripherally addressed by the proposed reforms: the lack of trust between local communities and police. The distrust of the Nigerian public towards its police force jeopardizes any other high-level reforms and their implementation. This distrust is deeply rooted in the history and development of Nigeria's police force, reinforced by many aspects of the police's performance over the years. In response to this tension and the deteriorating security conditions in Nigeria, ICITAP, as a leader in promoting sustainable institutional law enforcement development (SILED) worldwide, should implement a microtraining project with activities including skill-building in conventional and community policing and countering violent extremism and civic education to encourage incremental social and cultural shifts at the grassroots level.

Microtraining (MT) is a learning process conducted through recurring, 15- to 20-minute learning sessions. It is guided by a structured curriculum to provide skills and knowledge that can be used immediately in an organization's daily activities. Past NPF trainings funded by international donors were much longer training sessions conducted outside of duty hours; these trainings did not produce long-lasting momentum for meaningful improvements or sustainable impacts. The successful implementation of police MT in countries such as Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Senegal, however, has shown that it can be an effective training method.

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1. Campbell and McCaslin, "Bandit and Jihadi Attacks."
2. Campbell, "Massacre in Northern Nigeria."
3. *Premium Times Nigeria,* "Gombe Governor Ready to Dialogue."

This desk study was conducted through literature and archival reviews, including books, journal articles, theses, and press reports. The author also conducted in-depth interviews with practitioners, advocates, and academics from Nigeria, the United States, and the United Kingdom (for a list of interviewees, please see Appendix A). This publication reviews the NPF's history and evolution; analyzes the NPF's existing operational challenges; describes the political and economic constraints on its reform; and proposes recommendations for future development projects funded by the U.S. government. This study is not intended as a criticism of the NPF, but rather, as a constructive and candid discourse to build trust between the NPF and Nigerian civil society actors. In turn, this will provide productive grounds for gradual, localized solutions to highly complex national security problems.

Overview of Nigeria

To understand the dynamic between the NPF and the public, it is essential to understand NPF officers' operational environment. Nigeria is a multiethnic and culturally and religiously diverse federation consisting of thirty-six autonomous states, each with unique security challenges. With more than 200 million people, Nigeria has the largest population of any African country, accounting for approximately half of the population of West Africa; the percentage of its population under twenty-five is one of the largest in the world.[4] It is also one of the most significant economic powers in sub-Saharan Africa;[5] its domestic market size and untapped human resources have given the country high economic potential.[6] Further, it is Africa's biggest oil exporter and has the largest natural gas reserves on the continent.[7]

Nigeria's future development stability depends on whether it can overcome dependence on oil, inadequate infrastructure, growing inequality, domestic instability, and weak institutions.[8]

Ethnoreligious diversity and federal character

Nigeria has great linguistic and religious diversity, with more than 400 ethnolinguistic groups. Its population is approximately 50 percent Muslim, 40 percent Christian, and 10 percent animist.[9] The northern part of Nigeria is ethnolinguistically Hausa and Fulani and predominantly Muslim. The Middle Belt of northern to central Nigeria is home to a number of minor tribes, with some Hausa-Fulani people also present, and is predominantly Christian. The southwest is predominantly Yoruba with large Muslim and Christian populations, and the southeast is predominantly Igbo and majority Christian.

However, these ethnoreligious groups have not always coexisted peacefully. Since its independence in 1960, Nigeria has experienced political tension and war around regionalism, religion, and ethnicity, making these sensitive topics in the country. As a result, the Nigerian census does not ask for such information, which makes ethnoreligious tracking impossible. Moreover, the country's geographical divides along ethnic and religious lines have led to calls for partition across the country, especially in the southeast and the Niger Delta; for instance, the attempted partition by the Biafra state during the civil war in 1967 to 1970 was a collective assertion of ethnic identity by the Igbo people. Though the war ended in 1970, the sectarian sentiment remained.[10] Today, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger

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4. *Premium Times Nigeria,* "Gombe Governor Ready to Dialogue."
5. World Bank, "The World Bank in Nigeria."
6. International Labour Organization, "ILO in Nigeria."
7. World Bank, "The World Bank in Nigeria."
8. World Bank, "The World Bank in Nigeria."
9. Paden, *Faith and Politics in Nigeria,* 7.
10. Paden, *Faith and Politics in Nigeria,* 98.

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Figure 1. Deaths by state from May, 2011 – July, 2020

0 ███████████████████ **31,683** deaths

Source: Campbell, Nigeria Security Tracker Source: Campbell, Nigeria Security Tracker

Delta (MEND), an organization of mostly Ijaw people, is one of the most prominent militant organizations engaging in sectarian violence to try to partition Nigeria.[11]

To mitigate the ethnoreligious and geographical divides in Nigeria, the constitution includes the "Federal Character" provision as a power-sharing mechanism among the thirty-six states. It requires that all states should be represented in the executive and legislative branches of government, including the police force. This provision, however, does not directly address ethnicity and religion—rather, these identities are assumed based on state of origin. For instance, according to an informant, if an Igbo person living in Lagos sees a police officer who is originally from Abuja, they automatically assume that the officer is Hausa-Fulani Muslim. Ethnoreligious grievances can be one basis for community distrust of the police and other law enforcement entities.

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11. Religious Literacy Project "The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta."

Domestic security

Nigeria's domestic conflicts and fragility are deeply rooted. This is mostly due to the aftermath of the Biafran civil war, ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts, electoral violence, and struggles for natural resources. Overall, Nigeria's security conditions can be generalized by three regions—Northern Nigeria, the Middle Belt, and Niger Delta (see figure 1 on page 3).

- In Northern Nigeria, Borno state has become the epicenter of Boko Haram–related violence, which has spillover effects on other Northeastern states such as Adamawa and Yobe. Moreover, violent extremist activities in this region and the resulting displacement have contributed to high poverty in the Northeast, which creates more challenges for security and stabilization.

- The Middle Belt region has experienced high levels of ethnoreligious conflict and clashes between farmers and pastoralists, both of which can turn into violent events in the absence of effective conflict resolution interventions.

- Though people in the Southeast tend to have higher incomes and receive better education than the rest of the country, disputes over natural resources such as petroleum have encouraged and funded local insurgencies and led to criminality and maritime piracy in the Niger Delta.[12] Moreover, the region's overall stability has been decreased by MEND's disruptive tactics, including kidnapping and ransoming oil workers, staging armed attacks on production sites, pipeline destruction, killing Nigerian police officers, and siphoning oil to sell on the illegal market.[13] Furthermore, land and boundary disputes near oil pipelines and facilities have resulted in communal conflicts in states such as Rivers, Delta, and Akwa Ibom.[14]

Therefore, public security providers in Nigeria, such as the army and police, need the capacities and skills to address conflicts and violence generated by a matrix of complex causes.[15] Instead, however, they often escalate the situation through their failure to recognize the need for thoughtful intervention and tailor their prevention and mitigation methods to the conflicts at hand. Moreover, the army and the police tend to resort to aggressive operations without regard for human rights norms or regional nuances.

Many of Nigeria's security threats are domestic, and domestic conflicts are deeply enmeshed with local politics. As the primary security interface with the public, the NPF needs to grow its capacity to navigate local political dynamics, cooperate with civil society, contain societal threats, and de-escalate communal conflicts.

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12. Nwankpa, "The Politics of Amnesty in Nigeria."

13. Religious Literacy Project, "The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta."

14. Ibeanu and Momoh, "State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs."

15. Marc, Verjee, and Mogaka, *The Challenge of Stability and Security.*

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History of the Nigerian Police Force

As one of the interviewees from Lagos told the author, *"I, or anyone you can see on the street, would do anything to not get involved with the police."*[16] There is a great divergence between the NPF and the public it serves, and it is deeply rooted and difficult to overcome. Though the NPF did not exist until 1960, the distrust between law enforcement and the people began in colonial times and continued to deepen and evolve after Nigerian independence. All four Nigerian republics have attempted to change this dynamic, but with little success. This section outlines the history of Nigerian policing and the attempts to reform it throughout the British colonial period, the First Nigerian Republic, the military junta, and the Fourth Nigerian Republic.

Colonial impact

The British were in control of Nigeria's law enforcement from the formation of the first police force in Lagos out of the unification of colonial constabularies in 1861 until the naming of the first indigenous Inspector General of Police (IGP), Louis Orok Edet, in 1964—four years after Nigerian independence.[17] British colonial impacts to the cultures of law enforcement and the judiciary are still felt today, and are still corrosive to police-community relations.

The Nigerian police force was first developed by the British army with two separate commands in the south and the north, corresponding to the two separate administrative colonies, and many local forces. In 1930, Colonial Ordinance No. 3 unified and consolidated the force with one headquarters in Lagos. Later, the Police Act of 1943 and the Criminal Procedure Act of 1945 gave the police statutory power to arrest, search, seize property, detain suspects, and use lawful force. While the Criminal Procedure Act was later updated in 1990, the Police Act of 1943, though outdated, remains in effect in Nigeria today. In 1954, the adoption of a federal constitution centralized the police force and made public safety a shared responsibility between the federal and state governments.[18] Finally, in 1960, a Police Council was established to administer the force, and a Police Service Commission was also formed with the powers of appointment and discipline over all the members of the force, except the Inspector General of Police,[19] who takes orders directly from the president.

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16. Gabriel Okeowo, interview, August 26, 2020. Audio recording can be accessed by emailing dx31@georgetown.edu.
17. Otu, "The Development and Growth of the Nigeria Police."
18. Chukwuma, "The Legal Structure of the Police."
19. Ibeanu and Momoh, "State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs."

This colonial legacy has left three long-lasting impacts on the NPF's community relations and public image. First, policing as an institution in Nigeria was formed on the opposite side of the Nigerian people's interests: British colonial rule organized and oriented the police force to represent and protect colonizers' interests, leading them to behave as an untrained occupation force, brutalizing local peoples and vandalizing their property.[20] During this period, police suppression of civil and independence movements was oppressive, repressive, brutal, and corrupt; examples include the Aba women's revolts against colonial taxation, the Egba women's revolts against a poll tax, the African Civil Servants Technical Union strike and the general workers strike of 1945, and the Burutu workers' strike of 1947, among others.[21] As a result of this legacy, the public associates the police with arbitrariness, ruthlessness, brutality, vandalism, incivility, low accountability, and corruption.[22]

Second, the "local authority" rule has created both operational challenges and incentive to abuse of power for police officers. Despite several attempts at centralizing the force

throughout the colonial period, British command's indirect rule placed law enforcement under the control of local leaders. This decision preserved ethnoreligious autonomy in certain regions; for instance, in the northern Caliphate states, emirs were allowed to retain Shari'a law and apply it over Muslim residents in both civil and criminal domains.[23] However, by blurring the boundary between politics and public law enforcement, it made it extremely difficult to hold police accountable for their corruption and abuse of law in the service of politics. These abuses by local police destabilized security conditions and undermined any future democratic development within the force.

Finally, the goals and preferences of the western judicial system introduced by Britain are at odds with the relative justice that local conflict resolution mechanisms prefer (see figure 2). Western legal systems require law enforcement to be impartial with no room for ambiguity, which is the opposite of the Nigerian public's traditional preference for their informal legal systems. The traditional values of particularism—clannishness, community cohesion, and family

Figure 2: Police officers' lack of soft conflict resolution skills creates trust and security vacuum

Western law

Police force

Strong-arm law enforcement

Distrust, exclusion, misunderstanding, marginalization, etc.

vs.

Traditional particularism

Local community

Conflict resolution with political skills

Reparation, recidivism prevention

20. Alemika, "Police Practice and Police Research in Africa."
21. Ibeanu and Momoh, "State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs."
22. Otu, "The Development and Growth of the Nigeria Police."
23. Alemika "Policing and Perceptions of Police in Nigeria."

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trust—trump the western notion of impartial justice. Nigerian grassroots systems put more emphasis on reparation and recidivism prevention over retribution. As Dr. Oliver Owen aptly observed, *"justice and punishment are good, but at the end of the day, people have bills to pay. If someone's goat was stolen, they just want their goat back and no more stealing will take place."*[24] The police role in criminal justice in the western legal system is not capable of providing the type of reconciliation that genuinely meets local grassroots conflict resolution needs, especially regarding petty crimes.

First Nigerian Republic (1960–1966)

In its 1963 constitution, the post-colonial administrations inherited the colonial policing system and maintained regional legislatures' control over native police.[25] As a result, local agencies continued to influence the police force during this period. In the Northern region, emirs retained legal powers and maintained their police forces. However, the system as a whole still failed to meet Nigeria's needs for crime management and prevention, civilian rule consolidation, and democratic development. Cheta Nwanze, a Nigerian journalist and policy analyst, has disappointedly lamented that the police force simply "swapped masters" during this period.[26]

The First Republic's localization of law enforcement continued police officers' abuse and misuse of power and further increased the public's distrust of police. The police's association with local political entities and constant involvement with local elections were characterized by favoritism, electoral fraud, and brutality,[27] which were incredibly corrosive to the public's faith in the First Republic's democratic development. Politicians put political gangs in police uniforms and

used them to start violent events such as operation Weṭẹ and the Tiv riots.[28] Scholars such as Okemuyiwa Akeem Adedeji have emphasized that the First Republic's native police force is a symbol of local authorities' reckless abuse of power for their own political gain—abuse which contributed to the end of the First Republic in 1966.[29]

The institutional abuses of law enforcement during the First Republic magnified public distrust of the NPF, increasing public resistance to police decentralization and giving governors command. In the literature review and interviews conducted for this study, police under local authority were continually cited as examples of how local control damages electoral processes and the spirit of democracy in post-independence Nigeria. Local authority over police remained the rule until the civilian government was overthrown by a coup d'état on January 15, 1966.

Military rule periods

Nigeria was ruled by military juntas from 1966 to 1979 and from 1983 to 1999.[30] In February 1968, under martial law, General Yakubu Gowon terminated the local authority of police forces and consolidated it under the direct command of the military.[31] This autocratic decree remained in effect throughout the five military administrations that ruled during this period. An elected civilian government was in power from 1979 through 1983, but it was too brief to leave any substantial impact on the police force.

Overall, the criminalization of dissent and governmental interference with criminal justice during this period further distanced the NPF from local communities.[32] Police reacted

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24. Interview, August 26th, 2020.

25. Republican Constitution of Nigeria 1963, 23 Section 105(7).

26. Nwanze, "A History of Nigeria's Police Service."

27. Odeyemi and Obiyan, "Exploring the Subsidiarity Principle in Policing."

28. Soyinka, *Ibadan: The Penkelemes Years.*

29. Adedeji, "State Police in Nigeria."

30. Alemika, "Policing and Perceptions of Police in Nigeria."

31. Alemika and Chukwuma, "Analysis of Police and Policing in Nigeria."

32. Paden, *Postelection Conflict Management in Nigeria.*

to communal conflicts and local disputes with an aggressive, top-down approach, regardless of the size or the origin of the conflict. The NPF also committed egregious human rights violations, repressed opposition groups, and terrorized the citizenry, all of which further deepened community conflicts and grievances. Innocent Chukwuma, Nigerian human rights activist, has argued that martial law, and the brutal, quasi-military structure it brought to police operations, led police-community relations in Nigeria to its nadir, worse even than the most brutal period of British colonial rule.[33]

The Fourth Nigerian Republic

Since emerging from the shadow of military rule, the Fourth Nigerian Republic has struggled to improve the NPF's basic policing skills and counter-violence capacity and to cultivate relationships with local communities. These improvements are essential due to the police's pivotal role in consolidating civilian rule and upholding democracy, especially by providing good security before, during, and after elections. Unfortunately, past administrations within the Fourth Republic have achieved little visible improvement.

The 1999 constitution provides the guiding source of decision-making power pertinent to public safety and security[34] in Nigeria. To ensure equal justice for all Nigerian citizens, it recognizes three bases of law: British common law, Shari'a, and customary law.[35] These multiple legal traditions, however, are not reflected in the provision of policing; the 1999 constitution[36] established the NPF as the only legitimate security provider or police force in the country. It did not establish adequate systems for transparency and accountability. The Inspector General of Police (IGP), the leader of the NPF, is appointed directly by and reports directly to the president. The NPF's operations and administration are technically overseen by the Police Council, but the constitution makes the IGP this council's head. Moreover, the Police Service Commission (PSC), intended as the neutral third-party disciplinary body of the NPF, has no authority over the IGP, making it nearly toothless as an accountability mechanism.

The 1999 constitution has also sparked a long-running debate between the federal and state governments over the command and centralization of the NPF. At the regional level, governors are the chief security officers of the states. Their advice, however, is still contingent upon presidential approval, because the state police troops are under the command of their commissioners, who take orders from the IGP.

In addition, police are deployed nationwide, which means that they may or may not serve in their state of origin. The deployment of federal police to local conflicts requires NPF officers to detect subsector nuances, meet the unique law enforcement needs of host communities, and gain trust from the Nigerian public. As a result, proponents of NPF decentralization have advocated for legislation to afford regional elected officials stronger control over NPF forces within their jurisdictions.

Alongside the Constitution, the Police Act and the Criminal Procedure Act remain in effect to provide legal backing for law enforcement operations. However, instead of supervising the force and increasing its effectiveness, the statutory powers enshrined in these acts have opened the door for police misconduct, including arbitrary arrests, repression against opposition political parties, lack of transparency and accountability, police corruption and coercion, and mismanagement of communal conflicts. The Police Act is a product of colonial history; for the NPF to meet modern law enforcement needs and protect the interests of Nigerian people, it must be subjected to serious review.

33. Chukwuma, "The Legal Structure of the Police."

34. Ibeanu and Momoh, "State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs."

35. Paden, *Faith and Politics in Nigeria.*

36. *Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria*, Section 214.

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To address these issues, presidents in the Fourth Republic have formed three committees to discuss structural reforms to the NPF. While these committees generated overwhelming attention and high expectations from domestic and international audiences, their implementation and enforcement were weak and poorly supervised. The first committee was instituted in 2006 by President Olusegun Obasanjo, a democratically elected retired army general, and led by retired Deputy Inspector General (DIG) Alhaji Mohammad Danmadami, who also was a career military general. Though a white paper was issued based on the committee report, it was not fully implemented.[37]

The second committee, established by President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua and led by retired IGP Alhaji M.D. Yusuf, convened in 2008 to consolidate these recommendations. In April 2008, this committee submitted a white paper with five chapters of general areas for change:

1. Emphasis on the centrality of human security in police service, which provides grounds for making citizens' security a primary responsibility of the federal government;

2. Acknowledgement that most of past reports' conclusions were eventually ignored and not implemented, and that therefore the IGP should set up a task force to implement the recommendations of this committee;

3. Production of definitive and practical measures for the enhancement of effective police service delivery with intervention points for external development partners;

4. Measures needed to completely transform the NPF into an efficient and proficient agency for effective law and order maintenance;

5. Any other contentious issues that were not previously considered, such as reorienting policing goals from enforcement to service. [38]

Unlike the first one, the second presidential reform committee led to concrete measures implemented by the Nigerian government between 2009 and 2011. Substantial funding was also dedicated, following the recommendations of Section 3 of the white paper, which invited international donors such as the Department for International Development (DfID). However, these efforts did not produce meaningful improvements to the force. For instance, the DfID–funded training programs failed to contextualize their curricula and democratic values to Nigeria's domestic norms.[39] Additionally, the training was developed by external, western, non-police consultants instead of experienced police officers.[40]

Moreover, the reforms failed to address many critical administrative issues impacting police officers' performance and job safety. The white paper proposed the following measures to improve police officers' sense of security and honor: creation of urban mapping systems, transparency in recruitment and promotion, life insurance for police officers, education for children of police, guaranteed housing for families of police officers who die in the line of duty, mandatory training on community policing, and improved transportation. However, these reform measures were not taken and all these issues remain unresolved today.

There are two reasons for the second committee's overall failure to meet its reform goals. Internally, the effective implementation of a cross-departmental initiative requires strategic collaboration frameworks and transparent oversight agencies, which were absent. Secondly, though international donors supported the initiative, their involvement was not localized; while human rights and democratic norms may seem noble and promising during a two-day offsite training with transportation and lodging compensation, when police officers return to their unsafe, smelly, and dilapidated barracks,[41] these norms seem so distant from their circumstances as to be irrelevant.

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37. Chukwuma, "Motions Without Movement," 7.
38. Chukwuma, "Motions Without Movement," 10, 11, 36, 42.
39. Hills, "Lost in Translation."
40. Alice Hills, interview, August 6, 2020.
41. Wahab, "Inside Smelly and Decaying Police Barracks."

The third presidential reform committee was constituted in 2012 by President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan and chaired by Parry Osayande, a retired DIG and then-chairman of the Police Service Commission. This committee's goal was to examine factors such as conditions of service and officer welfare that are detrimental to police effectiveness. This committee submitted its report without a white paper or any action items. Concurrently, to complement the committee's work and with funding provided by the DfID, the CLEEN foundation led a civil society panel to gather civic perspectives and opinion. Together, these efforts did attract more foreign funding, such as from the DfID's Justice for All (J4A) initiative. As with the second committee, however, these initiatives made only marginal improvements to the police's capacity, operations, performance, and transparency.

This result is mostly due to the continual lack of commitment from Nigeria's federal government and inadequate contextualization by foreign donors. Despite many international interventions and active domestic advocacy, a common feature shared by the three presidential committees is that their robust conversations led to little implementation or enforcement of reform on any level; the Nigerian government's inaction has instead generated reform fatigue and cynicism.[42] Meanwhile, the NPF's centralized power structure and overt brutality and corruption continue to cause community distrust and detachment. In sum, the lack of financial and political commitment at the federal level, uneven consensus of state governments, and absence of decentralized recruitment and deployment processes have made progressive NPF decentralization and reform unlikely in the near future. In response, future intervention programs should adjust their program designs to local realities and be prepared to start with incremental changes instead of systematic reforms.

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42. Owen, "Crime Victimization, Safety and Policing."

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Reasons for Community Distrust

While each state's unique history, ethnoreligious diversity, and security conditions mold the style of its police command, the public perception of the NPF is generally the same across Nigeria. The Nigerian public has little trust in or respect for the NPF and prefers not to reach out to the police when crimes are committed. This section examines factors that erode trust and harm police-community relationships, including local preferences for alternative dispute resolution; lack of understanding of local cultural and political context; unclear policing objectives; abuse by elite units; terrible police working conditions, welfare, pay, and allowances; problematic practices in police recruitment, promotion, and training; and challenges from informal security forces.

Popular preference for alternative dispute resolution

In Nigerian local politics, when a crime occurs and the offender is found, there are two ways to pursue justice: community alternative dispute resolution led by a community leader such as the local chief, and a formal judicial process led by the police and court (see figure 3 on page 12).

The alternative community conflict resolution is more popular for several reasons. First, it is more accessible than the formal process, with a much more transparent timeline. The formal process in Nigeria can take many years—even up to a decade—partly because of public sector inefficiency and partly because of the second reason: long remand periods. The constitution states that without a pressed charge, suspects should be released from remand after eight hours. However, police often keep the suspect in remand for months or years to delay proceedings and make them agree to extortion demands. This illegal remand causes overcrowding in police detention and poses obstacles to a fair trial when one is finally scheduled, as paper records are often lost during the delay. Third, the formal and customary courts are not enforcing the same codes of justice. For instance, in the context of western property law one farmer encroaching on another's land is a severe issue; in local communities in Nigeria, however, where land tenure is determined by community norms rather than official titles, this is a trivial dispute that can be resolved by the mediation of local leadership. Fourth, and relatedly, the community process values relative justice, where the basis of dispute settlement is not to punish the offenders but to appease the victims. Moreover, while judges are considered more transparent and fairer than police officers,[43] some of them are still susceptible to bribery. Therefore, from the perspective of victims and their communities, the alternative process has more potential for bringing healing and justice.

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43. Davidson Nwaonu, Manager, Youth Ethics and Anti-Corruption Programme, Centre for Social Awareness, Advocacy and Ethics. Interviewed by Danchen Xu on August 31, 2020.

Figure 3: Formal vs. informal justice processes in local contexts

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                    ┌─────────────────────────────────────────┐
                    │         When a crime takes place          │
                    └─────────────────────────────────────────┘
                         │ Formal process          │ Informal process
                         ▼                          ▼
                  Nigerian Police            Traditional/
                       Force                 religious leader
                         │                          │
                         ▼                          ▼
   Bribery       Remand suspect               Mediation
Case closed ◄ ─ ─ in a police cell                │
                                                   ▼
 Without             │                      Dispute
 bribery,            ▼                      resolution/
 at least         Court                     customary court
 one year with      │                          │
 no bail            ▼                          ▼
             Suspect charged              Reparation
             by judge or                  until victim is
             magistrate in                appeased
             court
                    │
       or           ▼
             Enforcement
                    │
                    ▼
             Appeal at
             courts of
             highter
             jurisdiction
```

Days to weeks depending on
1. severity of case,
2. community leaders and police's conflict resolution skills

Number of years depends on case's severity

While community members feel more comfortable reaching out to their local community leaders for justice, police officers are also motivated to collaborate with those local leaders and support the informal justice system. First, local connections are entrenched in Nigeria's political life. Since police officers are deployed on the federal level but are hosted by local communities, they work among people who have more access to informal ties, connections, and extended kinship networks than they do. To make up for this, it is in their best interest to build healthy relationships with local leadership. These informal relationships facilitate the operation of the formal law enforcement system: local chiefs or kings support police officers and help them identify suspects and make arrests. Second, some rural

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communities are suspicious of formal procedures, including keeping written records;[44] this, and local police officers' lack of access to technology make it difficult to collect evidence, inside or outside the formal justice process, without the help of local leaders. And third, because of the lack of protective equipment and policies to support officer welfare, police officers rely on local leaders to ensure their safety—another strong motivation to collaborate with them.

In order to increase their capacity to enforce the laws, the NPF should work with this preference for traditional justice systems by building their skills in alternative dispute resolution, bringing aspects of the traditional system into the formal operation of the legal system. Specifically, the following areas are missing from the current police academy training curriculum:

- The practice of objectivity and patience;

- Negotiation and facilitation skills;

- Effective and active listening;

- Ability to show empathy.

Lack of local familiarity

Enforcing law in a democracy is very much a matter of balancing the right to conduct legitimate civilian activities with the need to prevent or contain violence and instability.[45] Besides the needs to collaborate with local chiefs and kings, Nigeria police operations are also challenged by their lack of familiarity with complex local conditions. Political exclusion along ethnoreligious lines in Nigeria has led to profoundly rooted distrust and hatred between different ethnoreligious groups and between public officials and communities. On the national level, there are still citizens, especially in the Southern regions, who do not feel included or represented in the political sphere and thus harbor suspicion towards

public officials, such as police officers. For example, a civic and religious leader from Imo state said in an interview, *"Imo state almost always gets a Hausa police commissioner. Igbo people think they are there to spy on them as an aftermath of the Biafran war. In a way, it's like having an all-White force from California policing a Black community in Maryland—there are fundamental biases, police will never treat them equally, so their intentions can never be trusted."* During another interview, a citizen from Lagos living in the U.S. compared this situation to the marginalization and discrimination of Black communities in the U.S. domestic criminal justice system: *"Black people in America do not trust the police because the majority of the force is White and does not understand or respect the community dynamic. It's the same in Nigeria, especially in the rural areas; people trust and go to their local kings and chiefs, because they know everybody and their living situation. Therefore, they usually know the possible suspect or who committed the crime, know where to find them, and know how to appease the victim in an appropriate way."*[46]

On a more granular level, senior officers, who are usually not from the areas they serve, need to put in conscious, affirmative effort to familiarize themselves with the cultural norms, secular traditions, local conditions, and languages of the communities where they are stationed. The current training curriculum, however, does not include such trainings or education about civil society or human rights principles.

However, when force leadership decides to improve the status quo, they do have the influence to guide police under their command, improve their skills, and overcome existing ethnoreligious distrust. When the senior leadership engage in trust-building with the community, they lead their force to deploy more locally appropriate law enforcement styles. To take advantage of leadership's potential for driving change, it is important to raise the awareness of soft political and conflict resolution skills among senior leaders, who can then

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44. Davidson Nwaonu, Manager, Youth Ethics and Anti-Corruption Programme, Centre for Social Awareness, Advocacy and Ethics, interviewed by Danchen Xu on August 31, 2020.

45. Paden, *Postelection Conflict Management in Nigeria*.

46. Rev. Fr. Dr. Godswill Agbagwa, interview, August 17, 2020.

promote these tactics among police under their command. In an interview, Alice Hills suggested that some notable past police public relations improvements were initiated by force leadership, in a top-down approach.[47] For instance, though there is no official data, both Commissioner Marvel Akpoyivo in Lagos and Commissioner Tambari Yabo Muhammad in Kano reportedly reduced crime and violence by effecting top-down orders to make their policing styles more community-oriented.[48]

Unclear objectives

The NPF collaborates with other federal agencies such as the military, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Federal Roads Safety Commission, Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps, and State Security Service. (For a nonexhaustive list of conflict influencers in Nigeria, see appendix B). Combined, these organizations provide services including crime control, public order, and dispute resolution. However, there is no clear division of labor; agency mandates overlap in areas such as investigating and prosecuting certain types of crime, performing patrols, conducting anticrime operations, gathering intelligence, and guarding persons and facilities.

In addition, the federally controlled police and military, rather than any locally managed agencies, are the main public-facing forces managing local violence. The military is often called in when the police cannot maintain order; however, its approach to public order management is oppressive, confrontational, and tends to escalate conflicts. Moreover, the poor relationship between the police and military lessens police officers' public authority. Members of civil society have witnessed the army ridicule and disrespect police officers both verbally and physically in public spaces. Sometimes soldiers film these humiliations and upload them to social media and online sharing platforms such as YouTube.[49] According to one interviewee, *"the police don't have a service mentality or are qualified enough to do counter violent extremism work. That is the army's job. Police are associated with extortions, who only make profits out of any situation whenever they can."*

President Buhari's administration

Compared to his predecessors, President Buhari has devoted more funding and resources to improving NPF community relations and creating a foundation of community policing and information sharing for the NPF's future development. However, the current administration's presidential initiatives cannot succeed without meaningful cultural shifts at the local levels.

As chairman of the Police Council, President Buhari has approved reorganization initiatives to decentralize the NPF—for example, making the Force Intelligence Bureau the eighth department of the police force with its own Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG) and decentralizing the Force Criminal Investigation Department by

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47. Alice Hills, interview, August 6, 2020.

48. Hills, "Partnership Policing: Is It Relevant?"

49. For a YouTube video of soldiers punishing a police officer doing frog jumps in his uniform in public, see U-GITZ TV, "Exercises Done for Mistaken Identification," https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FD4PeObqNHs&feature=youtu.be.

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adding additional offices in Enugu (southeast) and Gombe (northeast).[50] He has also created five additional zonal commands in the police force,[51] a move which has been acclaimed by state governors.[52] This decentralization program is intended to enable local police commands to pursue intelligence-led community policing strategies tailored to local conditions. Additionally, Buhari has approved 13.3 billion Naira (approximately $34.5 million) for community policing, with special attention to building security infrastructure and community policing frameworks.[53] However, to visibly improve police performance and lay the foundation for future democratization, President Buhari's administration needs to consciously and actively address two issues: public distrust of the police and police corruption.

Distrust between the police and the public is deep-seated and systemic. While this distrust is rooted in the NPF's aggressive behavior, it has been compounded over the years by past reform efforts now perceived as inadequate or insincere. As a result of these previous disappointments, much of civil society believes the only way the current administration can satisfactorily prove its convictions is to implement constitutional reforms that "decentralize the command and control structures of NPF" away from the control of the President and place it fully under the control of the IGP and the state governors.[54] Civil rights advocacy organizations such as the Human Rights Writers Association of Nigeria (HURIWA) have described President Buhari's decentralization initiatives as inadequate in this regard, calling them "cosmetic" and "deceptive."[55]

Nor is the force's deeply rooted culture of corruption solely a problem for its relations with the public—it is also an internal barrier to enacting the reforms necessary for building public trust. It is difficult for individual officers to shift away from the oppressive and extortive culture of the NPF when that culture is reinforced from above—even from the oversight bodies themselves. In one particularly egregious recent case, SaharaReporters revealed in 2020 that IGP Adamu used his office to unlawfully compel and threaten Mobile Police (MOPOL) Commanders into generating millions of Naira monthly through illegal means to establish a MOPOL Training School in his hometown.[56]

Overall, Nigeria's history shows that robust reform of the NPF's structure and administration requires concrete commitments and interest from the President—prerequisites that have been lacking since the 1999 Constitution's enactment. Equally, it requires cultural shifts at local levels, as community policing and intelligence-led law enforcement are impossible without grassroots trust and engagement.

50. Adebayo, "Buhari Approves Re-organisation of Nigeria Police."
51. Adebayo, "Buhari Approves Re-organisation of Nigeria Police"
52. *Vanguard,* "Gov Diri Lauds Buhari."
53. Ukpe, "President Buhari Approves N13.3 Billion."
54. Olaniyi. "Police Need Reforms, Restructuring, Not Reorganization."
55. Human Rights Writers Association of Nigeria, "Reorganization of Police Is Too Little."
56. SaharaReporters, "EXCLUSIVE: How Nigeria's Inspector-General."

Political and Administrative Hindrances to Nigerian Police Force Effectiveness

The feedback loop of police corruption and brutality and public distrust is exacerbated by a number of specific political and administrative challenges: public abuse by elite units; deficiencies in police pay, benefits, working conditions, training, and career progression; and police coexistence with local informal security forces.

Police Mobile Force and Special Anti-Robbery Squad

In the fall of 2020, a movement to abolish the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS), #EndSARS, gained international attention and support. However, the brutality and widespread human rights abuses of Nigeria's special police forces has been an issue for civil society for decades.

In 1979, President Shehu Shagari's administration created the Police Mobile Force (MOPOL) as an anti-riot unit under the command of the IGP. Established as a paramilitary unit within the NPF, it has more public order management capacity and more advanced equipment than the regular police forces. MOPOL has frequently failed, however, to contain civil disturbances or avoid involving the military in managing them. MOPOL officers have become less a police force than a bodyguard detail for political elites. They are often seen standing behind political figures and carrying their briefcases at public events and functions; the optics of this damages the legitimacy not only of MOPOL but of the wider institution of Nigerian law enforcement.[57] Moreover, this constant inappropriate deployment of MOPOL officers depletes the NPF's overall resources and manpower. More seriously, MOPOL members have been widely reported committing brutal human rights violations and acts of political repression, including killing a soccer fan over his T-shirt, killing five traders who were victims of a robbery, and killing a musician for his performance earnings.[58] In such an environment, it is difficult for the public to see any police officers as reliable security providers, or even as human beings trying to do their jobs.

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57. Chukwuma, "Motions Without Movement."
58. *BBC News,* "Nigeria's Trigger Happy Police."

Similar criticism goes to the SARS, which was founded in 1992 by former police commissioner Simeon Danladi Midenda, purportedly in response to the extrajudicial killing of an army officer by police at a checkpoint in Lagos. It was originally established to detain, investigate, and prosecute people involved in violent crimes like armed robbery and kidnapping. Designed for robust crime control operations, it is better known for its extensive extortion, torture, framing of suspects, and blackmail. For instance, one interviewee mentioned that, *"as a young person, you can be stopped and searched by the police officers simply for dressing in nice clothes or having a good car. They will go through your phone, call history, texts, and mailbox, and if they see a foreign number, they can frame you for breaching cyber security, even that they know that is not the case."* Another interviewee said that they would run away every time they see the SARS.

There has been opposition against MOPOL and SARS from both civil society and the public sector. All three previous presidential committees have recommended their reorganization, and retraining and evaluation of both forces' personnel and budget are always on civic advocacy organizations' agendas. However, there is no evidence of political willingness to remove these units or eliminate their brutal brand of law enforcement.

Pay and allowances

In a Transparency International survey, 72 percent of Nigerians perceived police as corrupt.[59] Corruption is deep-rooted in Nigeria's domestic politics. Systemic corruption within public service in Nigeria goes beyond the scope of this research and ICITAP's project goal, but it is important to examine the relationship between police income and corruption, as well as corruption's influence over police-community relationships and police public order management capacity.

Internally, Nigerian police officers' morale and professionalism have suffered severely from low and delayed wages. The current wage of police constables is below the living wage of a typical family. An entry level constable's monthly salary is 43,293.80 Naira (approximately $112), a Police Commissioner's is N302,970.47 (≈ $782), and the IGP's is N711,498 (≈ $1836).[60] According to Statista, the average monthly cost of living for an individual in Nigeria is 43,200 Naira (≈ $111), and 137,600 Naira for a typical family (≈ $354). Police officers also have few prospects for improving their income or financial well-being. While constables' salaries are extremely low, they may also go a number of months without receiving any salary. Additionally, police do not receive hazard pay or insurance for their families when operating in higher-risk areas or unsafe environments. These conditions provide an incentive for unprofessional conduct, extortion, risk-averse law enforcement tactics, and corruption. As a development worker commented, *"the problem of poverty in the Nigeria police is very real and very clear. More than 90 percent of Nigeria police officers live under the poverty line. Civil servants are human beings too, they want to afford private school fees for their children when the public system is not working. This is why corruption is so pervasive."*[61]

Because police are poorly paid, the public believes they can be bought—which is often the case. According to one interviewee, *"police are called 'Yahoo boys,' because they are like a search engine that just searches everything—your car, your house, your phone, even your messages. They try to find every reason to extort you. It's ridiculous."* Some people choose to pay the police, in response to extortion demands or in exchange for additional protection or impunity, which helps perpetuate the culture of corruption (see figure 4 on page 19).

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59. Pring, *People and Corruption: Africa Survey 2015*.

60. See Appendix C for a full list of the most recent NPF salaries in 2020.

61. Salisu Mohammed, interview, June 18, 2020.

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Figure 4. Factors reinforcing police corruption

| Need for security | Impunity | Self protection | Fear | Self interest | Other |

Public

CORRUPTION

Police

| Low wages | Delayed pay | Low funding | Dilapidated conditions | Operational needs | Other |

Conditions and welfare

Other conditions of service, in addition to inadequate wages, have damaged police officers' morale, social standing, and ability to work. The NPF's centralized power structure funds and equips headquarters and local posts unequally;[62] while police headquarters have modern, high-tech equipment and pressed uniforms, local police officers have unkempt and ill-fitting uniforms, shabby and stinking police stations, and filthy and dilapidated police barracks.[63]

Despite the minimal resources they are given, some officers do strive to deliver better service to the public;[64] however, poor working conditions and lack of resources continue to prevent these efforts from becoming the norm among police officers. Despite the nation's rich natural resource reserves, more than one interviewee mentioned that the police cannot afford fuel for their vehicles when called for an emergency.

Some added that there is no direct telephone line to their local police post. One interviewee said, *"the police barracks are so broken and filthy. You can smell and see it as you walk past. It is hard to imagine that people actually live there."* All of these factors are easily visible to the public's eyes and directly diminish people's faith in the police force.

Second, the lack of welfare and benefits deters police officers from responding to crimes, especially in highly volatile regions. Police officers do not have comprehensive health plans, nor life insurance or other comprehensive survivor benefits. Before the first presidential committee on police reform, the Danmadami committee of 2006, junior officers initiated a national strike in protest over delayed promotions and inadequate welfare schemes, but no visible responses were made to their demands. Further, the absence of benefits for surviving family members leads the

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62. Hills, "The Dialectic of Police Reform."
63. Civil Society Panel on Police Reform in Nigeria, *Final Report*.
64. Hills, "The Dialectic of Police Reform."

police to be risk-averse in performing their duties. When police officers are killed in the line of duty, surviving families are expelled from the police barracks without any benefits or funeral compensation.

Recruitment and promotion

The NPF's recruitment process lacks transparency and does not attract quality candidates. New NPF recruits may be brought on in any of three tiers, with higher positions requiring more advanced degrees. The ongoing decline of the Nigerian education system has decreased the availability of high-quality or merely qualified recruits. Unstable economic conditions and lack of upward mobility[65] encourage applicants who are drawn to the culture of corruption and the opportunities it presents for access to power and illicit income sources.[66] It is difficult to find applicants who meet high educational and moral standards.

Additionally, NPF recruitment has a long history of nepotism and favoritism. These have been amplified by the surge in police hiring since 2000. To meet the United Nations' recommendation of one police officer for every 400 citizens of a country, President Obasanjo ordered a recruitment drive to add 40,000 new officers each year for at least five years. By 2008, the NPF increased from 140,000 to 350,000 police officers.[67] This vast expansion was achieved through extensive communal recruitment efforts, which involved widespread favoritism and bribery. Hiring and screening processes were also compromised by political and monetary influence, unclear job descriptions, and lack of training and institutional development.[68]

In an ideal scenario, after a cadet is recruited, promotion would be based on the criteria of merit, strict adherence to rules and guidelines, and successful completion of courses and examinations. However, in reality there is no exact, documented course for career progression. According to Dr. Alice Hills, who has over fifteen years of field research experience with law enforcement reform in Kano, Abuja, and Lagos, there have been officers who became successful and gradually moved up in the force from the bottom level. However, many of these successes relied on "contacts, background, and chance."[69] Many of these officers' careers also experienced unexpected setbacks due to the constantly changing political environment.

Training

The NPF's mandatory training is too minimal to meet conventional or community policing needs. According to the NPF Training Department's Assistant Commissioner (ACP) Grace Longe, constable recruit intakes occur once a year, after which the admitted recruits participate in six to nine months of training. The precise training timeframe and curriculum depend on the duties to which new constables are assigned after the academy, but most recruits are only trained to march, salute, recognize rank insignia, and memorize laws.[70] Additional training may become available when officers are moved to another technical category, but no systematic in-service training or recurring community policing training is offered within the NPF. Innovative training formats such as microtraining are not used.

65. While Nigeria has made some progress in socio-economic terms in recent decades, its human capital is ranked 152 out of 157 countries and below the average of sub-Saharan African states by the World Bank's 2018 Human Capital Index, which captures the knowledge, health, and skills that people invest in and accumulate throughout their lives. Moreover, inequality of income and opportunity has been growing rapidly in Nigeria. See https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview and https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/human-capital. Accessed July 1, 2020.

66. Owen, "The Nigeria Police Force: Predicaments and Possibilities."

67. Nwanze, "A History of Nigeria's Police Service."

68. Eric Beinhart, personal communication, June 1, 2020.

69. Alice Hills, interview, August 6, 2020.

70. Grace Longe, interviewed with Danchen Xu and Eric Beinhart, June 24, 2020.

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What training is offered is further compromised by unqualified trainers, inadequate training facilities, and the lack of curricula in practical skills for promoting police-community engagement such as conflict mediation and facilitation.[71] Moreover, because completing training does not guarantee promotion, officers have little incentive to participate in trainings.[72]

Overall, this study found a consensus among published works and interviewees that NPF performance can best be improved by trainings concentrated in two areas: 1) appropriate conventional policing skills, such as humane interrogation and arrests, and 2) good common-sense and tangible communication skills. Public perception of police—and with it, the police's institutional legitimacy—can be improved, but this improvement will require both large changes—reforming the NPF's culture of brutality and corruption—and small ones, such as greeting the public at livestock markets and participating in diverse community events.

Coexistence with informal security forces

To meet public safety needs, the NPF also needs to collaborate better with local security providers. Informal security providers create supports and challenges both for the NPF's operation and Nigeria's domestic security situation. Effective coexistence between these forces and the NPF is necessary to improve Nigeria's internal stability.

In general, informal security groups are divided into four categories:[73]

■ Neighborhood or community vigilantes: organized by community associations. The longest-established such neighborhood watch is the Vigilante Group of Nigeria[74]

■ Ethnic vigilantes: organized along ethnic lines to defend ethnic interests

■ Religious vigilantes: rooted in individual branches of faith

■ State-sponsored vigilantes: operate with the support of local governments[75]

Non-state security groups have a better understanding of their operational environment, community, and local politics than police officers. Their familiarity with details ranging from the terrain to community members' names allows them to better counter violent extremism in areas that the NPF cannot or is unwilling to reach. Furthermore, many vigilante groups have achieved a foundation of trust with the local populations which the police lack. Even though both groups have aggressive operational styles, community members find vigilantes not only more trustworthy, but more amicable than police officers. The vigilantes *"ask youth how their day has been and grab drink and food in local restaurants with community members."*[76] For all these reasons, the cooperation of non-state security groups can aid the NPF's operations.

Vigilante groups also create challenges for maintaining security in Nigeria. Community defense organizations attract criticisms from the Nigerian public and international NGOs for three primary reasons. First, informal security providers are not a long-term solution to Nigeria's security challenges. Their operations against Boko Haram and other insurgent groups tend to draw retaliatory attacks to their host communities, which lead to the death of more innocent citizens. For instance, Boko Haram has been extorting and cattle rustling from local villages in the Gubio local government area for decades. The locals started to resist by forming a vigilante

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71. Owen, "The Nigeria Police Force: Predicaments and Possibilities."

72. Owen, "The Nigeria Police Force: Predicaments and Possibilities."

73. Ogbozor, "Protectors or Outlaws?"

74. Ogbozor, "Understanding the Informal Security Sector in Nigeria," 1.

75. Note that this categorization is not exclusive; some groups fall into both categories: For instance, the Kano state funds Hisba to enforce non-criminal Shari'a law.

76. Rev. Fr. Dr. Godswill Agbagwa, interview, August 17, 2020.

group named Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in 2013.[77] Two months after the vigilantes killed two Boko Haram soldiers in the spring of 2020, a violent attack that was suspected to be retaliatory led to eighty-one people killed, the village of Felo destroyed, and between four hundred and twelve hundred cattle stolen.[78] Second, some vigilante groups have brutal operational styles and commit serious human rights abuses; while the presence of formal supervision does not prevent such abuses—as the NPF demonstrates—its absence provides particular challenges for ending them.[79] Abuses by vigilante organizations complicate their members' future reintegration into society. International organizations such as the Integrated Regional Information Network have pointed out that informal security groups and their members' reintegration might be Nigeria's next security threat after defeating Boko Haram.[80] Third, because they do not have control over their state police forces, governors resort to and fund informal forces to provide public safety and CVE activities within their states. The informal and volatile nature of these groups makes these relationships difficult to manage. If they end the arrangement, informal security providers can become security threats, capable of aggressive political agitation and violent rhetoric against public institutions.[81]

The NPF's operations cannot be understood in isolation from the complicated landscape of non-governmental security providers.[82] State-funded informal security providers are a part of the power struggle between states and the federal government over control of public security; in the absence of decentralized police forces, governors will continue to fund vigilantes to get around the President's complete control of the NPF. In the near term, then, cooperation between the NPF and informal security providers is unavoidable. This cooperation, however, can bring benefits: informal police groups remain essential in filling the local security vacuum. They have grassroots information, community recognition, and the operational capacity to provide effective services in areas where the NPF cannot function. Overall, despite international criticism of vigilante groups, the NPF needs to learn to coexist with informal security organizations and share information with them to improve Nigeria's domestic stability and security and the force's CVE capacity.

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77. Campbell, "Massacre in Northern Nigeria Involves Cattle Rustling, Jihadis, and Vigilantes."

78. Al Jazeera, "Fighters Kill Dozens, Raze Village in Nigeria's Borno State."

79. Ogbozor, "Understanding the Informal Security Sector in Nigeria," 11.

80. Ogbozor, "Protectors or Outlaws?"

81. Ibeanu and Momoh, "State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs."

82. Hills, "Partnership Policing: Is It Relevant?"

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A Political Economy Analysis for Implementing SILED in the NPF

It is important to contextualize the challenges of NPF development within Nigeria's political economy. The NPF is a part of the apparatus of the Nigerian state; its existence and development are contingent on developing the state's economic stability in all of the five domains described in the following section, though some might weigh more heavily than others. An understanding of domestic budgeting priorities is necessary to ensure ICITAP's microtraining development project does not add additional financial burden to the host government and can localize and sustain beyond the end of direct ICITAP support.

Economic Development and Security

Nigeria's nation-building and economic development are characterized by vigilance and constant confrontation with challenges.[83] Those challenges include high dependency on a single product (oil), rent-seeking by rulers, widespread corruption, patron-client relationships between political elites and their followers, wide inequality and mass poverty, high rates of unemployment, high levels of import dependency in both capital and consumer goods, and high external and domestic debt.[84] In order to create sustainable economic development in Nigeria, the following issues, listed in order of priority, need to be addressed:

1. Establishing a workable political system

2. Consolidating the rule of law

3. Developing capacities for conflict resolution

4. Facilitating economic development

5. Stemming corruption at all levels.[85]

Socioeconomic insecurities have the potential to turn response to economic injustices into violent events. Okechukwu Ibeanu and Abubakar Momoh argue that Nigeria's socioeconomic crises have worsened security conditions[86] by creating grounds for ethnic tensions, communal conflicts, and the rise of militia groups. It is worth

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83. Paden, *Postelection Conflict Management in Nigeria.*
84. Alemika and Chukwuma, "Analysis of Police And Policing In Nigeria."
85. Paden, *Postelection Conflict Management in Nigeria.*
86. Such as denial of access to power, militarism and authoritarian rule, etc.

noting the increasing youth of militia members, attributable at least in part to the lack of education and employment opportunities for young people. Armed youth groups include the Bakassi Boys, the Area Boys, the Egbesu Boys, Plateau Boys, and the O'odua People's Congress; their spread creates concerns over their members' future reintegration into society. These groups are only one of the challenges for the NPF's operation and recruitment that are exacerbated by economic insecurity.

Budget for change

Due to economic and sociopolitical instability, the Nigerian government's operational budget is minimal. According to the World Bank, Nigeria's economic development has stagnated since 2015, mostly due to the oil crisis and constant violence in the Niger Delta.[87] Nigeria's economic recovery is outside the purview of this research; however, its federal expenditures and police service budget can show us how Nigerian political elites prioritize investment in police and provide guidance for ICITAP's project development.

Nigeria's budget priorities should be understood in comparison to the rest of the sub-Saharan African region. Compared to other sub-Saharan countries such as Ghana and South Africa, Nigeria's federal per capita investment in police is significantly, disproportionately small (see table 1). In FY 2019, Nigeria's population was 6.6 times that of Ghana and 3.4 times that of South Africa; however, its overall governmental budget was 1.8 times that of Ghana and approximately one-fifth that of South Africa. In police expenditure, Nigeria's budget was only 3.8 times Ghana's and one-seventh of South Africa's.

Police forces' low financial priority in federal budgets limits the government's capacity for institutional reform or making meaningful and lasting security improvements in the future, as reform can be very costly. However, Nigeria's financial constraints make it well-suited to cost-effective interventions such as microtraining. Unlike past training projects and equipment donations funded by international donors, microtraining can be localized and sustained without robust financial commitment or technical support from donor countries.

Table 1: Nigerian governmental and police expenses in regional context

Country	Population* (as of 2019)	Government expenditure (FY2019)	Expenditure on police service (FY2019)
Nigeria†	200,963,599	₦ 8.9 trillion (≈ $23 billion)	₦ 366.1 billion (≈ $0.9 billion)
Ghana‡	30,417,856	¢ 73.4 billion (≈ $12.7 billion)	¢ 1.4 billion (≈ $0.24 billion)
South Africa§	58,558,270	R 1. 83 trillion (≈ $110 billion)	R 104.2 billion (≈ $6.3 billion)

* World Bank. "Population, Total - Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa | Data." Accessed June 20, 2021. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=NG-GH-ZA.

† Budget Office of Nigeria. "2019 Budget - Budget Office of the Federation - Federal Republic of Nigeria." Accessed June 20, 2021. https://budgetoffice.gov.ng/index.php/resources/internal-resources/budget-documents/2019-budget.

‡ TradingEconomics.com, "Ghana Government Spending | Summary," accessed May 19, 2021, https://tradingeconomics.com/ghana/government-spending#:~:text=Government%20Spending%20in%20Ghana%20averaged,7678.78%20GHS%20Million%20in%202017; Republic of Ghana Ministry of the Interior, *Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) for 2019-2022*, (Accra: Republic of Ghana Ministry of the Interior, 2019), https://www.mofep.gov.gh/sites/default/files/pbb-estimates/2019/2019-PBB-MINT.pdf.

§ Republic of South Africa National Treasury, *Budget Review 2019, (Pretoria: Republic of South Africa National Treasury, 2019),* http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/national%20budget/2019/review/FullBR.pdf.

U.S. dollar values are calculated based on the exchange rate as of August 31, 2020.

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87. World Bank. "Nigeria Economic Update: Beyond Oil."

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Conclusion and Recommendations

To best engage with the NPF's history and current challenges and Nigeria's political economy conditions, future U.S.–funded law enforcement development in Nigeria should be small-scale, engage communities, and be cost-effective. Our proposed microtraining pilot project includes traditional policing and conflict resolution training for police officers and civic education for local communities. This training could improve both the police force's conventional policing skills and their relationship with their host communities. Future project development should take into account the following considerations:

Certified training

Because the limited benefits and pay and lack of transparent promotion criteria provide little motivation for NPF officers to genuinely engage in and learn from a systematic, long-term training, in order to attract police officers' interests and commitment, it is crucial to add direct value to the pilot microtraining project. The most straightforward way to do this is to tailor the training curriculum and completion certificates to officers' professional development needs. Certificates can set the tone of the training—inspirational and stimulating, rather than condemnatory. The microtraining modules can be framed as individual development opportunities around one or more of the following ongoing internal security and safety issues:

- Work safety[88]

- Professional development

- Countering violent extremism (CVE)

- Preparing for the 2023 election

- Managing human trafficking

- Handling gender-based violence

- Responding to communal conflicts

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88. Owen, "Risk and Motivation in Police Work."

ICITAP's experience of microtraining in Sierra Leone

To pitch microtraining to NPF leadership, ICITAP can showcase its successes in Sierra Leone. In 2011, ICITAP received USAID funding to develop and implement an election security project for the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) for the local, municipal, parliamentary, and presidential elections that occurred on November 17, 2012. ICITAP developed the microtraining roll-out strategy in close consultation with the SLP training director.

Benefits of microtraining demonstrated by the Sierra Leone project include the following:

- Microtraining is cost-effective and sustainable. Ten SLP master instructors trained by ICITAP traveled throughout Sierra Leone and trained 733 more police instructors and 130 civilian instructors, including community and faith leaders and members of the media. Those 863 instructors then trained other police and citizens.

- It promotes good civic education. Citizens who understand what police should be doing are more likely to hold them accountable for their actions, which is essential to good governance.

- Its approach is easy to comprehend and accessible to the public. In Sierra Leone, ICITAP created simple but effective photographic posters of police acting out roles relevant to the training modules. An X next to the image denoted poor behavior, and a checkmark denoted good behavior. ICITAP hung these posters at every police station in Freetown and in other cities as well.

- It produces significant and visible results. On election day 2012, only a handful of minor incidents of election violence were reported. Furthermore, election observer groups commented on the professionalism of the SLP during the elections.

- The results are long-lasting. In an e-mail to ICITAP in 2019, one of the master instructors trained by ICITAP in 2012, who is now the director of training for the Sierra Leone Police, said the SLP is still using microtraining.

Multiple rounds of microtraining

According to ACP Grace Longe, in-service microtraining has never been offered by the NPF or other international donors.[89] For ICITAP's microtraining project to succeed, it will be vital to do extensive monitoring and document lessons learned and good practices from each session as the project is rolled out. With the budget to conduct an eighteen-month pilot project, ICITAP should divide the resources and time into three six-month training projects instead of a single continuous session. This way, each program can show areas of improvement for the next project. Moreover, to develop both the police and the community's ability to collaborate and empathize with each other, training feedback from civil society and the police force can feed into each other's curriculum in the next round (see figure 5 on page 27).

Besides providing valuable opportunities for evaluation, shorter training periods are easier for senior police officers and community leaders to commit to, especially where finances are limited: unlike long term training processes, microtraining does not create needs for accommodation and stipends for the trainees.

Consequences for ICITAP programs

Given the NPF's budget constraints, ICITAP should be mindful of the host country's financial limitations in its project design: The project will not be sustainable if it requires too much financial input from the federal government. Past international donors' experience in Nigeria attests to this: for instance, the J4A project funded by DfID provided a phenomenal amount of funding and training to the NPF, but its results were not sustainable: After DfID discontinued its

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89. Grace Longe, interview with Danchen Xu and Eric Beinhart, June 24, 2020.

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Figure 5: Cross-feeding evaluation system

funding in 2018, the training programs became unaffordable and were discontinued, and the donated facilities and equipment were abandoned because they were too expensive to operate or maintain.

According to the World Bank, the COVID-19 outbreak has set off the first recession in the sub-Saharan Africa region in 25 years. The financial impacts of both COVID-19 and oil price volatility will likely continue to hinder Nigeria's economic recovery for the foreseeable future.[90] Therefore, ICITAP should assume that the Nigerian government will not have the means to finance any robust police reform initiatives or fund ICITAP initiatives. Any proposed intervention programs should be scaled down to the financial and technical ability of the localities where they are to be implemented

and should be adapted to local political conditions. Program ownership should eventually be transferred to the local level, and the transfer should be planned in consultation with local communities and police officers. ICITAP should also work with the NPF to develop a cascade train-the-trainer approach, which can continue to expand training efforts after ICITAP has left.

Acknowledging George Floyd

In interviews conducted for this study throughout the summer of 2020, various stakeholders from different countries have brought up police killings and misconduct in the United States. These issues are not likely to be forgotten by the time the microtraining project begins development, and for

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90. World Bank, "COVID-19 (Coronavirus) Drives Sub-Saharan Africa."

ICITAP to duck inquiries about them during its exchange with Nigerian stakeholders will only detract from the legitimacy of ICITAP's development programs. ICITAP can turn criticism to its advantage with the right strategy, such as deploying instructor developers with experiences serving diverse neighborhoods and managing racial conflicts. Under DfID's J4A programs, some trainers have law enforcement experience in Northern Ireland. To establish ICITAP's credibility in both police and civilian trainees' eyes, it should acknowledge ongoing domestic movements in the United States and bring in trainers with police backgrounds from racially diverse states with good track records in managing communal conflicts to enable a mutual learning environment that promotes social justice worldwide.

Hands-on conflict resolution skills

When it comes to police-community relations, project design should shift away from attempting to transmit democratic values in the abstract. Instead, it should focus on practical, attainable professional and interpersonal skills development. In the style of conflict resolution curricula in the United States, the microtraining project should use storytelling and role-play scenarios sessions to develop NPF officers' skills in the following areas:

- Mediation

- Facilitation

- Negotiation

Civic education and affirmative outreach

Past international intervention's theory of change suggests that public trust in and legitimacy of the police force will grow naturally after its law enforcement capacity improves;[91]

however, this assumption is unlikely to hold true in Nigeria. The NPF's law enforcement capacity cannot be improved with the existing low trust and intense hatred from the public.[92] Trust is the foundation for public-police cooperation in combating internal security threats, and it needs to be built with conscious, affirmative, and appropriate efforts.

To recruit participants for civic education initiatives, ICITAP should consciously reach out to those groups that have been systematically disenfranchised from accessing public safety services. Its Nigeria project assistant should utilize local knowledge and work with the NPF to identify stakeholders from various parts of civil society. Levels of engagement with police should be understood as a spectrum (see figure 6 on page 29) While there are groups that feel comparatively comfortable engaging with the police force, such as advocacy groups, other groups consciously avoid police, especially members of the Road Transport Union. The findings of this desk-study suggest that civic education and willingness to engage with police are also lacking in highly violent areas. For instance, in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states, Boko Haram expelled cattle herders and occupied several local government areas without any resistance from the NPF.

Nigerian citizens' trust towards their official law enforcement institution is crucial to the country's domestic peace and stability. As a prominent leader in training and developing democratic law enforcement worldwide, ICITAP's proposed microtraining project is appropriate to Nigeria's grassroots reality and fulfills local conflict resolution needs. Careful project design, strategic collaboration, and well-documented evaluation will bridge the trust gap between the NPF and local communities and advance Nigeria's national security.

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91. Baker, "Is It Complex Environments or Complex Systems?"

92. Okenyodo, "Governance, Accountability, and Security in Nigeria."

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Figure 6: Comfort with engaging with the Nigerian Police Force by demographic group

This diagram was made in consultation with Dr. Oliver Owen during his interview on August 26th, 2020.

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Appendix A.
List of Interviewees

All interviews were conducted by the author; any co-interviewers are named in the notes. Audio recordings can be requested by emailing dx31@georgetown.edu.

- Godswill Agbagwa, President and Founder of the Center for Social Awareness, Advocacy and Ethics, Imo State, Nigeria and Maryland, U.S.

- Bruce Baker, Professor of African Security, Coventry University, Coventry, U.K.

- Eric Beinhart, Coordinator for Strategic Partnerships and Training, International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, U.S.

- John Campbell, former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, Ralph Bunche senior fellow for Africa policy studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC, U.S.

- Oche Precious Edeh, Founder and Executive Director of YES Project NG, Abuja, Nigeria

- Ellen Feingold, Curator of the National Numismatic Collection, National Museum of American History, Washington, DC, U.S.

- Alice Hills, Visiting Professor, University of Leeds, Leeds, U.K.

- Grace Longe, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Nigeria Police Force, Abuja, Nigeria

- Salisu Mohammod, Project Manager, PACT Office, Abuja, Nigeria

- Davidson Nwaonu, Manager, Youth Ethics and Anti-Corruption Programme (YEAP), Centre for Social Awareness, Advocacy and Ethics, Imo State, Nigeria

- Clara Ohakim, Graduate Student, Georgetown University, Lagos, Nigeria

- Ernest Ogbozor, Lecturer, George Washington University, Washington, DC, U.S.

- Gabriel Okeowo, Principal Lead and CEO, BudgIT Nigeria, Lagos, Nigeria

- John Paden, Professor Emeritus, George Mason University, Washington, DC, U.S.

- Laverne Page, African Section, African & Middle Eastern Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, U.S.

- Hunter Watts, CT Bureau, Department of State, Washington, DC, U.S.

- James Wuye, co-founder of the Interfaith Mediation Center of the Muslim-Christian Dialogue, Kaduna, Nigeria

- Former Senior Official, U.S. Department of State

Appendix B.
Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution's Nigeria Conflict Actors Matrix

In its 2003 report, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution identified a number of key actors in security decision-making, as part of a countrywide assessment of conflict in Nigeria. Please note that this is not an exclusive list.

Security actors

- security forces

- ex-servicemen

- mercenaries (foreign and Nigerian)

- vigilantes

Political actors

- political elite

- government / state governors

- political parties and internal factions

- political thugs

- traditional rulers and aspirants

Economic actors

- transnational corporations

- labor organizations

- herders and farmers

- multilateral financial institutions

Social actors

- indigenes and settlers

- ethnic groups

- religious leaders and organizations

- youth

- students

- cults

- militia

- community-based organizations and non-government organizations

Connecting actor

- Media

Appendix C.
Nigerian Police Ranks and Salaries, 2019

	Ranks	Grade Level	Monthly Salary	Annual Salary
1	Inspector General of Police, IGP	N/A	₦ 711,498	₦ 8,537,976
2	Commissioner of Police, CP	Grade 15 (step 1)	₦ 266,777.79	₦ 3,201,333.48
3	Commissioner of Police, CP	Grade 15 (step 6)	₦ 302,970.47	₦ 3,635,645.64
4	Assistant Inspector General of Police, AIG	Grade 16 (step 1)	₦ 499,751.87	₦ 5,997,022.44
5	Assistant Inspector General of Police, AIG	Grade 16 (step 5)	₦ 546,572.73	₦ 6,558,872.76
6	Deputy Commissioner of Police, DCP	Grade 14 (step 7)	₦ 242,715.65	₦ 2,912,587.8
7	Deputy Commissioner of Police, DCP	Grade 14 (step 1)	₦ 242,715.65	₦ 2,912,587.8
8	Assistant Commissioner of Police, ACP	Grade 13 (step 10)	₦ 212,938.16	₦ 2,555,257.92
9	Assistant Commissioner of Police, ACP	Grade 13 (step 1)	₦ 183,185.73	₦ 2,198,228.76
10	Chief of Superintendent of Police, CSP	Grade 12 (step 8)	₦ 199,723.96	₦ 2,396,687.52
11	Chief of Superintendent of Police, CSP	Grade 12 (step 1)	₦ 172,089.06	₦ 2,065,068.72
12	Superintendent of Police, SP	Grade 11 (step 1)	₦ 161,478.29	₦ 1,937,739.48
13	Deputy Superintendent of Police, DSP	Grade 10 (step 10)	₦ 148,733.29	₦ 1,784,799.48
14	Assistant Superintendent of Police, ASP1	Grade 09 (step 1)	₦ 136, 616.06	₦ 1,639,392.72
15	Assistant Superintendent of Police, ASP	Grade 08 (step 10)	₦ 144,152.07	₦ 1,729,824.84
16	Assistant Superintendent of Police, ASP	Grade 08 (step 1)	₦ 127,604.68	₦ 1,531,256.16

	Ranks	Grade Level	Monthly Salary	Annual Salary
17	Cadet Inspector	Grade 07 (step 1)	₦ 73,231.51	₦ 878,778.12
18	Sergeant Major	Grade 06 (step 10)	₦ 62,204.88	₦ 746,458.56
19	Sergeant Major	Grade 06 (step 1)	₦ 55,144.81	₦ 661,737.72
20	Police Sergeant	Grade 05 (step 10)	₦ 55,973.84	₦ 671,686.08
21	Police Sergeant	Grade 05 (step1)	₦ 48,540.88	₦ 582,490.56
22	Police Corporal	Grade 04 (step 10)	₦ 51,113.59	₦ 613,365.08
23	Police Corporal	Grade 04 (step 1)	₦ 44,715.53	₦ 536,586.36
24	Police Constable	Grade 10	₦ 51,113.59	₦ 613,363.08
25	Police Constable	Grade 03	₦ 43, 293.80	₦ 519,525.6
26	Police Recruit	N/A	₦ 9,019.42	₦ 108,233

Source: Ikenwa, Chizoba, "Nigerian Police Salary Structure: How Much Is a Nigerian Police Officer Paid," Nigerian Infopedia (blog), September 30, 2019, https://nigerianinfopedia.com.ng/nigerian-police-salary-structure/. See also Information Guide in Nigeria, "Nigeria Police Salary Structure 2019," March 21, 2018, https://infoguidenigeria.com/nigeria-police-salary/.

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In response to the rise of banditry and terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram throughout Nigeria, this publication examines the role of the Nigeria Police Force in resolving communal conflicts, preventing violent extremism, and safeguarding Nigeria's federalization and democracy, and delineates policy recommendations for the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) of the U.S. Department of Justice. The Nigerian public's distrust towards its police force jeopardizes the implementation of any other high-level institutional reforms. This publication examines the historical roots and present ramifications of Nigerian police-community conflict and recommends that ICITAP should implement a microtraining project with activities including conventional and community policing skill-building and civic education to encourage incremental social and cultural shifts at the grassroots level.