

A framework for the economic analysis of exclusionary conduct

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June 23, 2014

FTC & DOJ Workshop on Conditional Pricing Practices

- Comments are based in part on "A Framework for the Economic Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct," with B. Douglas Bernheim, forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, Roger Blair and Daniel Sokol, editors.
- Views expressed should not be attributed to anyone other than the speaker, and may not represent the views of others at Bates White, including coauthors.



- The most important mechanism of practical concern: Monopolist weakens rivals to protect its (usually future) market power
- Rule of reason approach to address this mechanism
- P<C for price-only allegations; analysis of exclusionary conditions for rest
- Four necessary conditions to have anticompetitive effects
- Analysis and balancing of procompetitive justifications
- Diagnosing procompetitive and anticompetitive effects
 - Procompetitive and anticompetitive effects leave distinctive empirical traces in the record
- ZF Meritor LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012) gets it right
- Implications for counseling clients



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Economic consensus over predation

- Predatory pricing
 - Price < Appropriate measure of the monopolist's own cost
- Multi-product bundled discount
 - Attribution of discount to contestable product in predation framework
- First dollar discounts (a.k.a. quantity-forcing discounts)
 - Revisit multi-product attribution notion: "Single product bundling" (must carry brands; differentiated consumers)
 - Attribution of discounts to contestable portion of demand
- What is the appropriate measure of cost?

Conduct involving exclusionary conditions is where the action is

- Exclusive dealing
- Loyalty discounts (discounts depend on rivals' share of purchases)
- Partial exclusivity
- Restrictions on customers' dealings with rivals, such as:
 - Channel restrictions
 - Advertising restrictions
 - Restrictions on prices of rivals' products
- Negative tying

 Why would P<C be informative about these potentially exclusionary mechanisms?




Exclusionary conditions (or contracts referencing rivals)

- Four necessary conditions to have anticompetitive effects:
 - Diminished ability of rival to compete
 - Enhanced market power of monopolist
 - Harm to consumers
 - Negative contracting externality
- Analysis and balancing of procompetitive justifications
 - Requires existence of (different) contracting externality to rationalize unusual contracting forms or pricing mechanisms
- Procompetitive and anticompetitive externalities leave a distinctive empirical trace in the record
 - Negative contracting externality must exist for exclusionary conditions to defeat Bork Critique
 - Different contracting externality must exist to rationalize procompetitive justifications



A simple visual aid: primary mechanism of antitrust harm in both predation and exclusion cases





A simple visual aid: ZF Meritor v. Eaton





Databook restrictions
Databook removal
Pricing penalties
?? Other threats ?? (e.g. supply reliability)









LTAs: 78%

92%

95%

97.5%

Today's customers Tomorrow's customers

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Key take aways

- P<C is useful to diagnose predation; not useful for exclusionary conditions
- The most important and common mechanism of harm is to prevent the rival from becoming a competitive threat in the <u>future</u> by depriving the rival of sales today
 - Sales by rival today typically lead to a more competitive rivalry in the future for there to be AT harm
- AT harm requires a negative contracting externality (NCE)
 - The AT harm is generally not to current purchasers
 - Simple stories that rely on single period intuition will lead you astray
- NCE can be exploited by carrots or sticks (or both)
- Pro-competitive justifications involve an externality or other market failure for which the exclusionary conditions are the solution
- Examination of the NCE and the pro-competitive rationale (market failure) will typically distinguish anti- versus pro-competitive situations

Counseling clients

- Market power screen only monopolists need be careful with exclusionary conditions
- Restrictions on dealings with rivals often have procompetitive justifications
 - These always involve contracting externalities
 - Explore least objectionable alternatives to overcome contracting problems
 - Document those contracting problems
 - Document alternatives explored
- Don't confuse desire to sell more or sell more profitably with being procompetitive
 - If selling more occurs because rival is weakened, it is anticompetitive
- Price above cost in the competitive increment
- If objective is to weaken rival, consider clearly procompetitive alternative strategies

What did the dissent in *ZF Meritor v. Eaton* get wrong from an economic perspective?

- Coercion (both majority and dissent got this wrong)
 - Carrots or sticks, or both, can be used for exclusion
- Exclusivity mean 100% exclusive
 - Judge Greenberg rails against "de facto partial exclusivity"
- Looks at the pro- v. anti-competitive balance as a static question:
 - Dissent balanced Eaton's motives to "win the business" against current impact on ZF
 - Real AT harm is in the future
 - Current impacts on the rival are source of future AT harm
- Saw no actual foreclosure (!)
- Commodity versus differentiated products
 - Cites A&H and HH, who also get this wrong
- Worried more about clever lawyers' craftily worded complaints than about clever monopolist's craftily structured exclusion





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