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CIVIL DIVISION Assistant Attorney General Alice Daniel

Anderson v. United States, No. 77-3222 (9th Cir., November 28, 1979) DJ 35-46-4

Title VII: Ninth Circuit Reverses
Preliminary Injunction Which Required
Air Force To Transfer Employee

The Ninth Circuit has recently reversed a preliminary injunction issued by a district court which ordered the Air Force to hire no other person other than plaintiff and to transfer plaintiff to the position pending a final decision on the merits. Plaintiff had claimed that the Air Force violated a promise, arising out of a sex discrimination claim, to give her priority promotion consideration. The Ninth Circuit relied primarily on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, and also stressed the fact that this prohibitory injunction disrupted the military's internal affairs.

Attorneys: Leonard Schaitman (Civil Division) FTS 633-3321

William Turner (Assistant United States Attorney - Nevada) FTS 598-6336

General Dynamics v. Marshall, No. 77-1192 (8th Cir., November 30, 1979) DJ 145-10-304

FOIA: Eighth Circuit Finds That Trade Secrets Act Is Not An Exemption 3 Statute

This case was before the Eighth Circuit on remand from the Supreme Court following its decision in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,

U.S. (1979), regarding reverse FOIA suits. On remand, the court agreed with the Government's assertion that the Trade Secrets Act (18 U.S.C. 1905) is not one of those statutes read into the FOIA through Exemption 3 to prevent disclosure in Government possession. This decision means that if information is not covered by any other FOIA exemption, it can and must be released upon request, because the Trade Secrets Act only bars unauthorized disclosures. The FOIA itself now provides the authorization to make such disclosures. In addition, the court did not accept General Dynamics' argument that the court had erred earlier when it followed the Government's view that

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reverse FOIA cases are not to be reviewed <u>de novo</u> by the district courts, but are to be reviewed under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act, on the basis of the agency record.

Attorney: Douglas Letter (Civil Division) FTS 633-3427

Gressley v. Califano, No. 79-1025 (7th Cir., December 3, 1979) DJ 137-26-221

> Social Security Benefits: Seventh Circuit Holds That Estoppel Is Inapplicable To The Government

The plaintiff in this case was found ineligible for social security disability benefits because he had not acquired a sufficient number of quarters of work. Alleging that he was advised by a social security employee that he would qualify if he could establish some additional quarters by paying back taxes on previously unreported self-employment, he paid about \$300 in back taxes. The Social Security Agency nonetheless continued to deny benefits because of a statutory provision providing that amended tax returns were ineffective to establish credits for self-employment if they were filed more than three years, three months and fifteen days after the obligation was incurred, which was the case here.

The district court found that the plaintiff relied to his detriment upon the advice of a government employee in paying the back taxes and that, accordingly, the government was estopped from denying benefits. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that estoppel cannot run against the government. In this connection the Court quoted approvingly from Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947) and several recent court of appeals decisions taking the Merrill position that estoppel is inapplicable to the government. The case is significant, among other reasons, because it further isolates the Ninth Circuit as the only circuit making significant changes in the Merrill rule.

Attorney: Joseph Scott (Civil Division)

FTS 633-5055

LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION
Assistant Attorney General James W. Moorman

<u>Kaiser Aetna v. United States</u>, U.S. _____, No. 78-738 (S. Ct. December 4, 1979) DJ 62-21-17

Navigation servitude; Artificially-improved pond connected to navigable waters of the United States not automatically subject to unrestricted public right of access

By a vote of 6-to-3, the Supreme Court declared that a former "fishpond" in Hawaii which had been deepened and opened to a bay of the Pacific Ocean for the purpose of navigation is "navigable waters of the United States" but is not subject to a public right of navigation without compensation. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion; Justice Blackmun's dissent attracted Justices Brennan and Marshall. The full impact of the opinion on the navigation servitude, the concept of "navigable waters of the United States," the Takings Clause, and the power of the United States to condition permits so as to assure public access is difficult to assess at this time.

Attorneys: Kathryn A. Oberly, Martin Green and Raymond N. Zagone (Land and Natural Resources Division)
FTS 633-2756/2827 and SG Staff

Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp., U.S. , No. 77-1819 (S. Ct. December 4, 1979) DJ 90-1-16-1482

Canals are not open to public simply because they connect with other navigable waters

In this companion case to <u>Kaiser Aetna</u>, an identically divided Supreme Court affirmed a Louisiana appeals court decision against the public's right of navigation in artificially constructed navigable canals, privately built and maintained and situated on private land but

connecting with navigable waters of the United States, including the Gulf of Mexico. The case was remanded for determination of whether these canals destroyed a natural, pre-existing network of waterways and, if so, the consequences. The United States filed a brief as amicus curiae.

Attorneys: Martin Green, Jacques B. Gelin, Raymond N. Zagone (Land and

Raymond N. Zagone (Land and Natural Resources Division) FTS 633-2827/2762/2748 and

SG Staff

Andrus v. Allard, U.S. , No. 78-740 (S. Ct. November 27, 1979) DJ 90-1-4-275

Interior may validly forbid commercial transactions involving eagles, and such action does not constitute an uncompensated taking

The government appealed from a decision of a three-judge district court which held that the Eagle Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act could not be applied to birds and bird parts which were legally taken prior to protection. The Supreme Court reversed, 9-0, holding that both Acts permitted the Secretary of the Interior to forbid all commercial transactions in protected birds or their parts, no matter when and how taken, in order to suppress present-day commercial traffic. The Court also held that the forbidding of such commercial transactions did not constitute a constitutional taking.

Attorneys: Edward J. Shawaker, Robert L.

Klarquist (Land and Natural

Resources Division) FTS 633-2813/2731 SG Staff (Harriet Shapiro)

<u>Six Nations Confederacy v. Andrus,</u> F.2d , No. 77-1941 (D.C. Cir. November 30, 1979) DJ 90-2-20-947

Exclusive jurisdiction over Indian Claims judgments was vested by Congress in the Indian Claims Commission with appeal to the Court of Claims

A group of Indians filed suit to set aside a judgment of the Indian Claims Commission on the ground of failure of due process for lack of notice. The district court denied their motion for a preliminary injunction restraining distribution of the judgment, and dismissed the action. The court of appeals affirmed on the ground that Congress had created an exclusive remedy by creating the Indian Claims Commission with subsequent appeal to the Court of Claims.

Attorneys: Dean K. Dunsmore and Jacques B. Gelin (Land and Natural Resources Division) FTS 633-4160/2762

Perkins v. Bergland, F.2d , No. 78-3659 (9th Cir. November 21, 1979) DJ 90-14-1357

Public lands; Agriculture's 50 percent reduction in grazing because of poor grazing conditions sustained

Perkins challenged an over 50 percent reduction in permitted grazing capacity ordered by Agriculture because of poor range conditions. The court of appeals upheld our arguments that the reduction was not reviewable as a permit revocation (which is only for misconduct). The court also rejected the Perkins' argument that a broad scope of review was available on grazing reductions, including inquiry into the ultimate merits of the decision and a reweighing of expert opinion. The court allowed "only very narrow review." The test is whether the agency decision is arbitrary and capricious.

In footnotes, the court also noted that hearings were not statutorily required on grazing reductions, that there was no evidence of abuse of discretion in this case, and that to show irrationality of method, Perkins must show that there is virtually no evidence in the record to support the agency's method. The case was remanded to the district court because that court had said that Agriculture's decision was completely unreviewable, a position never advocated by the government.

Attorneys: Carl Strass and Dirk D. Snel (Land and Natural Resources Division) FTS 633-4427/4400

<u>Wilderness Public Rights Fund v. Kleppe</u>, F.2d , Nos. 77-1606, 77-3693 (9th Cir. November 1, 1979) DJ 90-1-4-1357

Administrative law; Interior's allocation for rafting through Grand Canyon sustained

Private white water rafters sued to establish either a preference for private rafters or a pure lottery system for rafting through the Grand Canyon. Interior had been allocating a portion of the river use to concessioners and a portion to private users. The court held that Interior had the power to make allocations of the available river running time (which is now insufficient to satisfy demand), and that private rafters were not entitled to a preference. The court ruled moot a challenge to the specific allocation figures used, since new figures are being offered this year.

Attorneys: Carl Strass and Robert L.
Klarquist (Land and Natural
Resources Division) FTS
633-4427/2731

American Horse Protection Assoc. v. Andrus, F.2d , No. 78-3494 (9th Cir. November 23, 1979) DJ 90-1-4-1821

Jurisdiction; Nevada court ordered to examine whether Interior must prepare EIS on wild horse roundup, despite District of Columbia court's decision in similar case

The Association sued to prevent roundups of wild horses in Nevada, for which no EISs had been prepared. Interior had concluded that the roundups would cause no major federal actions having significant effects upon the human environment, within the meaning of NEPA. The district court relied upon the case of NRDC v. Morton, 388 F.Supp. 829 (D. D.C. 1972), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1386, to decline to review the decision not to prepare EISs. The D.C. court has continuing jurisdiction over the preparation of EISs concerning entire area range management plans. The Ninth Circuit here held that it would not be an interference with the D.C. court's jurisdiction if the Nevada federal court required preparation of EISs. The court of appeals left completely open for the district court the question of whether EISs are necessary in this case. The court also left open the scope of review of the Secretary's decision on the merits of a roundup. And the court declined to enjoin roundups before any final decision is made in district court. This last point is of prime importance as Interior's view is that the horses are substantially above desirable population levels, and are damaging the range. Finally, the court of appeals affirmed that portion of the district court's decision which refused to enjoin federal activities at the "holding area" where rounded up horses are corralled.

Attorneys: Carl Strass, Dirk D. Snel and Raymond N. Zagone (Land and Natural Resources Division) FTS 633-4427/4400/2748

American Dredging Co. v. <u>Dutchyshyn</u>, F.2d , No. 79-1502 (3rd Cir. November 21, 1979) DJ 90-5-1-5-72

Remedy; Injunction Against Denial of Permit Modification denied where Tucker Act relief is adequate

Without oral argument, the Third Circuit entered a three-sentence opinion affirming the district court's denial of an injunction on a taking claim. American Dredging alleged that denial by the Corps of a request for permit modification was a taking of its property for which the only adequate relief was an injunction. The district court determined that since there was an adequate legal remedy—a claim for money damages under the Tucker Act—injunctive relief was inappropriate, and the Third Circuit affirmed on this basis.

Attorneys: Maryann Walsh and Robert L.
Klarquist (Land and Natural
Resources Division) FTS
633-4168/2731

United States v. 88.28 Acres in Porter County, Indiana (Crumpacker), F.2d, No. 78-1037 (7th Cir. November 7, 1979) DJ 33-15-322-3173

Condemnation; Necessary parties

In a landowner's appeal of a condemnation case, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of one party from the condemnation action at the request of the United States, while proceeding against another. The United States had originally joined the additional party because it appeared that the party might have title to the property. It subsequently developed, however, that the additional party's title was invalid. Thus, that party was dismissed without prejudice. The district court made no finding as to title, but stated that any right to compensation would be preserved. The court of appeals held that it was error to dismiss the additional party without any finding as to the validity of that party's title, but affirmed the judgment

of the district court by ruling that such error was harmless. Joinder of any person who "claims" an interest in the property taken was ruled to be proper. The court said that an omitted claimant may pursue an inverse condemnation claim in the Court of Claims and that procedural defects may be so egregious that an omitted claimant's title is not affected, noting that the government may have to pay twice.

Attorneys: Robert W. Frantz and Edward J. Shawaker (Land and Natural Resources Division) FTS 633-3906/2813

Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. United States, Robedeaux,

F.2d, No. 77-1939 (10th Cir. November 26, 1979)

DJ 90-1-3-4853

Indians; Judgment creditor cannot attach exchanged land belonging to a restricted allottee

An original allottee conveyed restricted Indian land to his son, with Secretarial approval, which was later condemned by the state utility company. After the utility company agreed with Robedeaux, the Indian owner, to exchange the parcel for similar property, Robedeaux' judgment creditor sought to execute a lien against the exchanged land, received as condemnation proceeds. The district court denied the attachment concluding that since 25 U.S.C. 409(a) permits the United States as trustee to reinvest condemnation proceeds from allotted land in other property which becomes similarly restricted, the same effect can be reached by allowing the straight exchange of property, and continuing the restrictions against encumbrance on the exchanged parcel. The court of appeals agreed, and added that Robedeaux' status as a restricted Indian grantee, rather than an heir or allottee, made no difference since it is the United States' ownership of the land, rather than the status of the Indian beneficiary, that is critical. The policies favoring treating Indian land as restricted, apply equally to a father's transfer of restricted land to his son, approved by the Secretary.

Attorneys: Maryann Walsh and Carl Strass (Land and Natural Resources Division) FTS 633-4168/4427

National Wildlife Federation v. Alexander (Devils Lake),

F.2d, No. 78-1956 (D.C. Cir. December 7, 1979)

DJ 90-5-1-1-862

Navigable waters; Section 10 of Rivers and Harbors Act does not cover landlocked waters completely within a single state

Devils Lake covers 34,000 acres entirely within North Dakota's borders and is landlocked. It is navigable in fact, but its current uses are recreational. In 1973, the Corps determined that the lake, based on previous commercial navigation in the 19th Century, is a navigable water of the United States for purposes of the Corps' regulatory powers described in Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. The district court adopted the Corps' navigability determination. On appeal by the North Dakota State Water Commission, the D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded. The court held that the phrase "navigable waters," at the time Congress enacted Section 10, had assumed a "particular, refined meaning" through judicial construction, and that "navigable waters" were understood as those connected by water to other waterways which crossed interstate or international borders. Consequently, landlocked lakes completely within a single state are excluded from Section 10 regulation. Thus, as applied to the instant case, the State Water Commission could proceed to construct a drainage

channel which would divert surface water into the lake without first obtaining a permit from the Corps as provided by Section 10 and by relevant Corps regulations thereunder. The district court's injunction halting further state construction of the drainage channel was vacated by the court of appeals.

Attorneys: Maryann Walsh and Dirk D.

Snel (Land and Natural Resources

Division) FTS 633-4168/4400

TAX DIVISION

Assistant Attorney General M. Carr Ferguson

United States of America and David E. Nowak, Special Agent, Internal Revenue Service v. Upjohn Company and Gerard Thomas, Vice President, Secretary and General Counsel, 600 F. 2d 1223 (6th Circuit, June 28, 1979) Petition for Writ of Certiorari Pending DJ 5-38-543

Summons Enforcement: Attorney-client privilege is a valid defense in a summons enforcement proceeding, but communications between officers and employees of a corporation and its lawyers will be protected by the attorney-client privilege only when the officers and employees are in the "control group" of the corporation, namely, those officers who play a substantial role in directing the corporation's response to the legal advice given.

Summons Enforcement: The work product doctrine is not a valid defense in a summons enforcement proceeding.

In January, 1976, outside auditors of the Upjohn Company (Upjohn) discovered the existence of certain questionable payments to employees and agents of foreign governments. Upjohn's general counsel and an outside law firm conducted a factual investigation to determine the nature and extent of these payments, sending out questionnaires and interviewing over eighty officers and employees of Upjohn and its domestic and foreign subsidiaries. As a result of the investigation, Upjohn discovered questionable payments in the amount of \$2,710,000 which it disclosed to the SEC and to the IRS. Upjohn conceded that some \$700,000 of the payments might have federal tax ramifications.

In order to determine if the payments disclosed were, in fact, all the questionable payments that occurred during the years in issue, the IRS issued summonses to Upjohn and its general counsel for all documents relative to the investigation of the questionable payments, including the filled-out questionnaires and the lawyer's notes and memoranda of the employee interviews. Upjohn and its counsel refused to disclose this information, arguing that it was protected by the attorney-client privilege, or, in the alternative that it was attorneys' work product and thus protected from disclosure. The Government filed a petition for enforcement of the summonses in district

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court pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 7402 and 7604. The district court, after a hearing before a magistrate, ordered the summonses enforced and Upjohn and its general counsel appealed.

The court of appeals held that the attorney-client privilege only protected communications between the corporation's lawyers and officers and employees of the corporation who were in a position to determine what action the corporation would take as a result of the legal advice given, the so-called "control group" The court specifically rejected the broader "subject matter" test adopted by the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, protecting communications between any employee of the corporation and the corporation's lawyer if the subject matter of the communication involves information gained by the employee while acting within the scope of his employment, and is communicated to the lawyer, in confidence, for the purpose of securing legal The court remanded the case to the advice for the corporation. district court for a determination of which officers and employees interviewed were in the "control group."

The court also held that the work-product doctrine was not a defense to an Internal Revenue Service summons, and that the IRS simply must show that the inquiry is relevant to a good faith investigation conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the information sought is not in the IRS' possession and that proper administrative procedures have been followed. On such a showing, the IRS is entitled to have its summonses enforced as to all non-privileged material.

Attorneys: R. Bruce Johnson and Crombie J. D. Garrett (Tax Division) FTS 633-3732

Federal Rules of Evidence

Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Hearsay. Definitions. Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. Admission by Party-Opponent.

Trial judge found defendant guilty of distribution of heroin, specifically relying on a codefendant's statements admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The codefendant, however, was found not guilty by reason of entrapment. On appeal, defendant contended that since one member of the alleged two member conspiracy had established that his conduct was not criminal, and since a conspiracy must, by definition, involve more than one person, there could be no conspiracy in this case to supply the necessary predicate for the application of Rule 801(d)(2)(E).

The Court held that the defendant's argument falls because of an internal fallacy in equating the concept of conspiracy in substantive criminal law with that of conspiracy as part of an evidentiary principle. The two concepts, though overlapping to some extent, are not identical, and once the existence of a conspiracy is shown, it makes no difference in the applicability of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) whether the coconspirator testifying could actually be tried, convicted, and punished for the criminal offense of conspiracy. The Court also rejected defendant's contention that statements made by coconspirators who have been entrapped should, as a matter of public policy, be excluded, even though those statements implicate others who have not been affected by the Government's misconduct. Entrapment is a personal defense and a defendant is not permitted to invoke an exclusionary rule based on the Government's violation of the rights of others.

(Affirmed.)

United States v. Guillermo Gil, 604 F.2d 546, (7th Cir., August 31, 1979)

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Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Rule 11. Pleas.

In an opinion which is too lengthy and detailed to be summarized here, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, endeavoring to resolve any doubt among trial courts in that Circuit as to the standards applied in reviewing guilty plea hearings, reviews and harmonizes past decisions dealing with this subject and makes a clear and definitive statement as to how trial courts should conduct guilty plea hearings under Rule 11 and how such proceedings will be reviewed.

United States v. Winston Eugene Dayton, 604 F.2d 931, (5th Cir., October 18, 1979)

Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

Rule 15(a). Depositions. When Taken.

Defendants were convicted of conspiracy to possess and possession of state public assistance checks stolen from the mail and of preparing false income tax returns. Shortly before the scheduled trial date, the defendants requested the deposition of a potentially crucial witness, who was another principal figure in the check-cashing scheme which was the basis of the charges against the defendants. The witness, a fugitive in Spain who refused to return to the U.S. to be a witness, though he was willing to be deposed there, asserted in an affidavit that he had come upon a "political deal" to make money by purchasing stolen welfare checks, and that the defendants had no knowledge that some of the checks they cashed had been obtained through this "political deal". The district judge denied the request, primarily because the witness was a fugitive, relying on Murray v. United States, 492 F.2d 178 (9th Cir., 1973), which held that to allow the testimony of a fugitive to be taken by deposition would amount to an injustice.

The Court declined to follow Murray, noting that that case failed to consider the continuing tendency in the law to discard common law restrictions on the competency of witnesses in favor of submission of all available evidence to the factfinder for its evaluation, and held that the fact a witness is a fugitive does not render the witness incompetent to testify, but rather should only be a factor to be considered in assessing the weight of the testimony.

While Rule 15(a) entrusts broad discretion in the trial judge, when a ruling is based on an erroneous legal premise (here, the incompetency of a fugitive to testify), the scope of review is expanded. The evidence appeared from the affidavit to be relevant, and, to some extent, exculpatory; also, the credibility of the Government's chief witness was

called into serious doubt, rendering the potential testimony of the fugitive witness even more important. Stressing that it appeared doubtful that this crucial testimony could have been obtained by any means other than by deposition, the Court concluded that the deposition should have been permitted.

(Judgments vacated, order reversed, and new trial granted.)

United States v. Thomas Wilson, 601 F.2d 95 (3rd Cir., June 18, 1979)

LISTING OF ALL BLUESHEETS IN EFFECT

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UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL -- TRANSMITTALS

The following United States Attorneys' Manual Transmittals have been issued to date in accordance with USAM 1-1.500. This monthly listing may be removed from the Bulletin and used as a check list to assure that your Manual is up to date.

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